How Malorossia Was Turned into the Patch-quilt of Discord that is “Ukraine”

Posted on February 27, 2016 by Stanislav

Lands that are presently collectively known under the name of “Ukraine” had a turbulent history, especially in the last 300 or so years. In this post I want to take a look at a few maps, and present some short historical information, pertaining the term “Ukraine” and how it came to be. I will finish this post with some quite obvious genetic discoveries.

Let us first start with the following 4 maps, and explanation to them, coming strait out of Lada Ray’s excellent Earth Shift Report 2. Ukraine: Truth, Lies & Future Hope. It is a highly recommended, well-researched for-donation report of a size of a small book, for everyone who want to learn what is going on in Ukraine behind the scenes, its history and what lies ahead.

This map shows how the size of Ukraine changed through history. NOTE! What is shown here in yellow as ‘Ukraine in 1654’ was in fact the territory of the Zaporozhie Cossacks (Zaporozhskie Kazaki). There was no country or territory called Ukraine before Lenin and Bolsheviks created the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the USSR.

This map shows one of the ideas of how the division of Ukraine should happen by oblast, if it was done in 2014, before civil war began. It shows one big DNR consisting of Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporozhie, Kherson and Kharkov. For some reason it omits Dnepropetrovsk, which should be within this affinity, but that probably didn’t happen since at the time Kolomoysky was at the helm in Dnepropetrovsk . The center, incl Kiev, remains under Ukraine flag, western Ukraine’s 5 oblasts are obviously under nazi flag. Zakarpatie (Transcarpathia) with Rusins (ruthenians) has its own republic with a flag resembling Russian. Red/white/gold Odessa flag with anchor on it unites Odessa and Nikolaev oblasts (I’d add Kherson and certainly Pridnestrovie, plus possibly Gagauzia – part of Moldova). This kind of voluntary peaceful divorce could have happened if we were dealing with mature people and if Ukraine was a sovereign state, not under foreign occupation.

This map shows a different version of Ukraine’s division. In gray is basically western Ukraine – on this map it’s entitled ‘Ukraine (Poland)’; Small Malorossia in the center in pink with Kiev as capital; large Novorossia in the south-east in blue, which here includes Denpropetrovsk and also Kirovograd, plus Odessa and Nikolaev. But Kharkov and Sumi are designated separately as Slobozhanshchina, which is historically correct. Kharkov, Sumi and Chernigov – Severshchina (on this map in light green in the north) were always Russian territories, Chernigov being one of the ancient Russian cities. These, together with Novorossia were given to Ukraine by Lenin in 1922 over their population’s objections.

This map is self explanatory – a version of the ‘Future Map of Ukraine,’ giving some territory to foreign states, such as Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. All of Novorossia is under Russian flag, extending to Pridnestrovie and, presently Moldova’s, Gagauzia.

Incidentally, almost two years ago, I published the article Two Ukraines – with a Statistical and Historical View at Novorossia, which blends well with the maps, shown above.

But what is “Ukraine”? Lada’s Earth Shift Report 2 delves into it, and so does a larger documentary, which I am currently translating.

Here I will present two fragments of the translated script, along with two still images, illustrating the points made there.

What is “Ukraine”, “Ukrainian”?

The revolt, headed by Bogdan Hmelnitsky started in 1648. After 6 years of war, in 1654, Periaslav Rada was signed. This is a document about reunification with the Moskovy State of a part of Western Rus, including Kiev and the territories of Zaporozhje county. It was signed by Czar Aleksei Mikhailovich Romanov.

My the way, the phrase “reunification of Ukraine with Russia” appeared first in the Soviet history texts in 1920s.
The historians knew perfectly well that in 1654 there was simply no such country as “Ukraine”. Those territories were called Malorossia. While the words “Ukraine” – Ukraina (slight difference in stress here, both words are the same) was used in Poland and Russia about borderlands. For Poles it is the lands of the middle Dnepr – the central regions of the modern Ukraine.

Anna Razhny:
In Polish it is called “pugraniche”. It’s the border in the cultural, national, political, even historical meaning. Ukraina meant for Rech Pospolitaja a far away border, a territory, where different ethnos could live. In this context Ukraina no longer exists in the present time.

For Moscow, on the other hand, at one time Ukraina meant Tula, Kashira, Serpuhov – that was the Oka-river Ukraina – the border with the territories, from where nomads came.

The word “Ukrainian” in the Russian language of that time, is a profession – a border guard (or someone, who lives on the border). While a resident of Kiev or Poltava was called a Malorossian.

Still frame above is a fragment of a dictionary entry. Judging by the revision of the Russian alphabet used, specifically by the letter “Ѧ”, this is a text from before the 1710 language reform of Peter I. The example usages are from Ivan the Formidable’s texts of 1503. Here is a translation taking the pronunciation into account:

Ukrain’nik (Украиньникъ) – Noun, a resident of a border territory.
Ukrain’nyi (Украиньныи) – Adjective, as in “Ukain’nyi baron” – governor of a border territory.
Ukrainjanin (УкраинѦнинъ) – Noun, a resident of a border territory.

How and when did the term “Ukraine” as a national designation appear?

Ultimately Poland ceased to exist in 1795, when the large states performed the third division of the Polish lands.
Galicia, Zakarpatie (Transcarpathia) and Bukovina, populated by Russians, or as it was said then – Rusins (Ruthenians), came under Austrai-Hungary, while almost all of the Kievan Rus territories were taken by the Russian Empire.

That is how a large portion of the Polish population ended up in the Russian Empire.

The Poles are, of course, dreaming about resurrection of their beloved Poland – Rech Pospolitaja, and what is more, in the wider borders as they were before the partitioning.

All their ire and hatred is directed at Russia. The idea is like this: sow separatism on those lands, tear them away from Russia, announce that the people there are not Russian, but close to Poles.

In 1795 the Polish writer and historian Jan Potocki published historically-geographical fragments about Scythia, Sarmatia and Slavs. In that work, for the first time, Russians of Malorossia were called “Ukrainians”, a separate people, descendants of the Scythian tribe of Sarmatians.

Potocki’s idea was very simple in its design: If Malorossian “Ukrainians” have nothing in common with Russians; if Malorossian “Ukrainians” is a separate people with its separate culture and history, then it follows that also Russia has no historical rights on the lands West for Dnieper, including Kiev. Then it follows that there is not gathering of Russian lands. It follows then that Russia annexed and occupied Malorossia/Ukraine.

Potocki’s propaganda was first and foremost directed at the Western reader, who traditionally had a very vague idea what is Malorossia, Raussia, Kiev, and where all this is found.

Pavel Kuzenkov:
We see very clearly how neighbours were calling these “Ukrainians”. Up until 20th century they were called Rus. Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Romanians, all who surrounded this territory, never were in doubt that what starts from Transcarpathia is “Rus”.

But it was the Polish publicists, who by the beginning of the 19th century turn a topographic term “Ukraina” into a name of a country. In 1801 the Polish bibliophile and publicist Tadeusz Czadzki published his work “About the name of Ukraine and the birth of Cossacks”. It was a new phase in forming of Ukranianism as an ideology. Tadeusz Czadzki further distinguished that Ukrainian Malorossians are not Russians, rather they are different people.
Czadzki started the history of Ukrainians from the horde of the “Ancient Ukros”, who according to him moved in the 7th century from somewhere in Urals, across Volga to the Drepr river. The fact that neither the Polish nor the Russian chronicles ever mentioned any “Ukros”, didn’t in the least bother Czadzki.

These theories may have remained as brain games of the intellectuals, if not for one “but”. Czar Alexander I, a liberal pro-Westerner, favoured the Polish nobility, considered it to be more educated and well-mannered, than Russian. During Alexander’s reign, Poles played an important role at the court, in the Academy. The Imperial Foreign Ministry was headed by an ardent russophobe Adam Czartoryski, and with his support the Poles got full control of the education system in Malorossia.

Czartoryski’s close ally was a priest and historian Valerian Kalinka, who wrote about Malorossia thusly: “This land is lost for Poland, but we must do it so, that it becomes lost for Russia too.”

The still frame above is a definition of “Ukraina”. Judging by the alphabet, and specifically the usage of the Latin letter “i” this text comes after the 1738 language reform of Peter I, when usage of double-dotted “ї” before vocals was abolished (single-dotted and double-dotted “i” and “ї” is what distinguished present day “Ukrainian” from Russian). Mentioning of A. Jablonovskij’s name in the text points to the end of the 19th century.

The beginning of the text translates as follows:

“Ukraina – thus were called the South-Western Russian lands of Rech Pospolitaja. This name was never official, it was used only in private conversations and became common in folk poetry. It is difficult to define the boundaries of the lands, known as “ukrainnyi”, more so that this name was not permanent and at different times covered varying stretches of land…

Recently, some of the Western-bread ultra-nationalists took up Tadeusz Czadzki’s segregation banner to a new low and started saying that Ukrainians and Russians are different people genetically, stating that Russians are not even Slavs… This propaganda was shot down in 2014 by a respectable study. I first learnt about it from the editorial column of Argumenty i Fakty. Here is a translated text of that note:

It was initially clear for any reasonable person that Ukrainians and Russians are brothers.

The recent massive and authoritative scientifically research proved: Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians do not differ from each other genetically.

Let’s say it at once: the scientists studied the DNA of the Ukrainians on the basis of the genetic material of the inhabitants of the western regions of the country, namely, the city of Lvov, with which we markedly differ in language and culture. But, as it turns out, not the origin. Thereby the allegations of the Ukrainian nationalists, who say that Russians, having moved from the territory of modern Ukraine, have so much mixed up with the Mongoloid race, and that they stopped being Slavs, is completely debunked.

However, as it was initially clear for any sensible person: Ukrainians and Russians are brothers. And let the borders, ideology, economic disputes divide us now – this is largely a consequence of the geopolitical game of Western politicians, who have managed to embroil us with each other. One just wants to exclaim along with the character of Kipling: “We are of the same blood!” But now, alas, we are unlikely to be heard hear – until someone (both inside Ukraine and abroad) harvest their own political dividends from our “brotherly spats”.

Digging further, I found the publication from 27.07.2014 in KM.ru, which presents the research by Anatoly Klyosov. My translation of that article below:

A leading scientist of the scientific direction of “DNA genealogy”, Doctor of Chemistry, professor of Moscow State University and Harvard University, Anatoly Klyosov in an exclusive interview KM.RU denied allegations of genetic differences between the Russians and Ukrainians.

Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians represent a set of the same genera

Nationalist school of Western Ukraine promotes the idea that the Russian and Ukrainian peoples are not closely related. This point of view is “based” on the fact that although once upon a time, Russians moved from what is now Ukraine, later they allegedly severely mingled with representatives of the Mongoloid race and are no longer Slavs.

There is virtually no truth in this statement. Russians, Ukrainians and Beloarussians represent a set of the same genera, it is one and the same people from the genetic point of view. They have almost the same origin. Ethnic Russians have three main lines: R1a, I and N. 48% of Russians and 45% of Ukrainians are in haplogroup R1a. 22% of Russians and 24% of Ukrainians are in haplogroup I. Depending on sampling, these parameters may vary up to 4%.

A more noticeable difference between our peoples is observed in haplogroup N, which is common in Northern Europe. It includes, in particular, a portion of Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians, part of the Russian population of the Baltic states and the Russian north-east. 14% of Russians, 10% of Belarusians, and 1% to 4% of Ukrainians are in haplogroup N. Such a significant difference is due to the fact that Ukraine is located more south of the Baltic states, than Russia and Belarus. If we take the Belarusians, 52% belong to R1a, 22-24% belong to I, and as I said, 10% belong to N.

I want to stress that when I say “Ukrainians”, I am referring to the inhabitants of the western regions. Furthermore, we specifically took the data from Lvov. Of course, we have somewhat different cultures, and different language, but not the origin.

Assertions about the differences of our people is a part of the information war

There is such a thing as a “haplotype tree”. It is formed by different means. The first option is for the population genetics specialists to go to the field, go to the cities and villages with a test tube. Researchers collect saliva or blood from the representatives of certain ethnic category and determine DNA by it. From the point of view of the academic science such data is considered to be more accurate. The second option is when people send their samples to commercial organizations. Science generally shuns such data, but in the end the results obtained by scientists and commercial companies, is approximately the same, and often times simply identical.

So, we modelled this haplotypes tree , including to data on Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. To do this, we did a DNA analysis based on 111 parameters (DNA Y-chromosome markers), whereas normal “academic” analysis only takes into account 17 parameters or less – often 7-8 parameters. We tracked such details, that the researchers do not usually go into. We superimposed the haplogroups of our peoples, and found that there is a match everywhere. Again, the difference is observed only in haplogroup N. It is connected solely with the geographical reasons.

Thus, the question of the common origin of the Russian, Belorussians and Ukrainians is closed, although I am familiar with the “works” that deny this fact. They caused in me a great scientific and social resentment. These “scientists” spew nonsense and distort objective data. I regard such activities as a part of the information war.

For details of the research by Anatoly Klyosov see in the material in KM.RU “Professor Anatoly Klyosov ‘In DNA of Russians and Ukrainians there is no difference!'” (in Russian).

Lean Peace. Why Ukraine is not fulfilling its obligations regarding Donbass?

Posted on February 23, 2016 by Stanislav

The article translated below was published in Argumenty i Fakty on the 12th of February 2016.

The title of the article is reference to a Russian proverb: Lean peace is better than a good strife (or the English proverb Better a lean peace than a fat victory).

Headlines for related articles (in Russian) are also quite telling:

February the 12th marks one year of “Minsk-2” – Donbass agreements, concluded after a night of negotiations of leaders of Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine. Kiev is still not in a hurry to fulfilling its obligations.

Meanwhile, as “AiF” discovered, the residents of Donbass still have to go to work over the minefields.

They are still shooting

The main condition for the implementation of the Minsk agreements still remains a complete cease-fire, however not even a full “regime of silence” was ever established in the Donbass. The OCSE mission report clearly states: shooting goes on. Only on the 2nd of February there were recorded “514 explosions of uncertain origin”, “more than 100 firing bursts from heavy machine guns” and “more than 1,000 rounds of small arms at a distance of 3-5 km to the west of the observers’ position in a controlled by DPR (Donetsk People’s Republic) railway station in Donetsk”.

The shootings already gave Kiev a pretext to close 2 checkpoints over the line of contact. For residents of Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republic it is worse than the shootings. First, it is becoming increasingly difficult to legally “cross the border”. Second, the economic blockade of Donbass, which according to “Minsk-2” should have been removed, is on the contrary only strengthened.

“The pensioners who can not receive a pension are affected the most. Vehicles carrying humanitarian aid and medical supplies are blockaded. All this is nothing more than a continuation of the genocide of the people of Donbass by the Ukrainian government,” – Eduard Basurin, a spokesman for the Ministry of Defence of DPR, tells AiF. He believes that Kiev at the same time achieves another goal – protecting the Ukrainians from the truth about the life in the republics: “This is due to the significant difference in prices on the main categories of foods in the border regions of Ukraine and the DPR. Bread, milk, vegetables and potatoes, cereals and other products are cheaper in Donetsk than in Ukraine.” By the way, peaceful life – in spite of the disruptions of water supply and the economic blockade – is really getting back on track. Kindergartens, schools, hospitals, shops, cafes and restaurants are working. Factories have started up. For example, “Stirol”, one of the flagships of the chemical industry of Donbass, has again been started. And this means jobs and wages. The main problem – the sale of produce in the conditions of a blockade. However, entrepreneurs engaged in the installation of windows have no problems of this kind – after the war, the demand for their services is highest ever.

We must understand that the lives of many ordinary people, who find themselves on opposite sides of the demarcation line, is associated with the “enemy” territory in spite of the blockade. From DPR and LPR (Lugansk People’s Republic) people go “abroad” not only for pensions, but also to work. Thus, the press service of the OSCE mission said that the residents of the two villages near Gorlovka literally have to go across a minefield due to the closure of the checkpoint “Zaytsevo”: “They go on the mines to get to the controlled by Kiev Artemovsk, otherwise they run the risk of losing the jobs.” Not everything is simple with the pensions either. Some pensioners registered on the territory controlled by Kiev, and they cross the checkpoint every month to get the payments. But there are many of those who did not go to a compromise, and still can not get a pension. Dmitry Popov, manager of the Ombudsman of the DPR apparatus tells AiF that Kiev ignores the decisions of the Ukrainian(!) Courts regarding paying overdue pensions to the pensioners, who reside on the territory of the republic. Almost 15000 pensioners of Donbass prepared a lawsuits for the Ukrainian courts to recognize the Presidential Decree for the non-payment of pensions as illegal. Some of the lawsuits were satisfied by the courts of the first instance. Kiev said that while Ukrainian banks, treasury and financial management is not operating on the territory of DPR and LPR, the implementation of the decision impossible. However, they do not operate here not at the whim of the authorities of DPR and LPR, but because of the blockade of Kiev, which no one is intending to lift until the political issues are solved.

Why do they not want to agree?

Strictly speaking, all of the Minsk process has stalled on two points: the special status of Donbass (and related amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine), and the local elections on the territory of the DPR and LPR. Rada deputies, ignoring the “Minsk-2” agreement, did not vote for the amendments and moved the issue to the next session. Rather than comply with the requirements of Paris, Berlin, Moscow and even Washington, with regard to the ratification of such amendments, the deputies adopted some other amendments – regarding the rules of procedure of Parliament. Apparently, it is these subtleties of Ukrainian parliamentarism, which allow Kiev to sabotage the “Minsk-2”, that President Poroshenko was explaining last week to Angela Merkel in Berlin. Or perhaps he honestly admitted that he simply does not have enough votes in the parliament to fulfil his commitments.

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier suggested a possible compromise on the 19th of January, and it was later supported by Boris Gryzlov, the Russian representative in the contact group on the settlement of the situation in Ukraine. “According to «Steinmeier’s formula», you first need to hold elections in Donbass, and then use the emerging legitimate authorities for approval of the constitutional reform and other laws. But neither the Parliament, nor Poroshenko are yet ready for this,” said Konstantin Bondarenko, head of the Foundation “Ukrainian politics”. “Meanwhile the West is already barely holding back its irritation with Kiev’s policy as it is suffering from the sanctions not less than Russia. And if the ball does not get rolling on the implementation of the Minsk agreements, then, taking into account the forthcoming elections in their countries, Hollande and Merkel will try to demonstrate to Ukraine that if it will not abide by the agreement, then no one will talk to it.”

Not only the procedural matters complicate the situation with the local elections: Kiev demands that voting takes place according to the party lists, with the resumption of broadcasting (read – propaganda) of the Ukrainian TV channels for the whole of Donbass, while the Republics insist on elections by the majority system. If the West recognizes the elections, the Kiev regime will no longer be able to talk to Donbass using the language of force, consider these territories as occupied, and blame everything on Russia… “Kiev will be playing for time for another six months, while Donbass will continue the construction of its statehood, which sooner or later everyone will have to recognise. At the same time Donbass will be restoring its economy, which is quite powerful and self-supporting.” – said political analyst Sergei Mikheev.

Boris Yeltsin: Demon or Hero?

Posted on February 22, 2016 by Stanislav

On the 1st of February Boris Yeltsin, the first President of the Russian Federation, would have been 85. Commemorating the date, Argumenty i Fakty published a two-polar article about Yeltsin. Two views on what he did to Russia, one negative and one positive. The whole article Boris Yeltsin: Demon or Hero can be read in Russian at the site of AiF.

Here I am only going to translate one view, which reflects the real negative impact of Yeltsin on Russia. I cannot bring myself to translating the positive view by Vladimir Ryzhkov, who was the vice-speaker of the Parliament in 1997-1999 – in the years after the 1993 Yeltsin’s coup d’etat. Ryzhkov’s words are sugar-coated paintings of black as white. IF anyone wants to read them, go to the Russian article above and use Google translate…

Aleksander Prokhanov, writer:

– For me, Yeltsin is an absolute evil, while the recently opened “Yeltsin Center” in Ekaterinburg is a temple where all the haters of Russia can now congregate and worship their idol.

When Hitler was preparing his attack on the Soviet Union, he had “Plan Ost” – to dismember the USSR, to destroy its defence industry, the whole of the Soviet ideology and culture, to reduce the number of Russian and, finally, to introduce external management of all parts of the dismembered country. Hitler’s plan was not allowed to come to fruition because in 1945 Stalin’s T-34 danced a quadrille on the Reich Chancellery bunker.

But in 1991 Yeltsin carried this plan out almost to the point. He made 3 coup d’etats. The first one in August 1991, when he took away all the powers from Gorbachev while he sat in Foros. The second – in December of the same year, when Yeltsin dissolved the Soviet Union by signing the Belovezhsk agreement. And the third coup – in 1993, when Yeltsin, in violation of the Constitution, disbanded the parliament, and then shot at it from the tanks, torching a terrible fire in the centre of Moscow. (Translator note: for more details about the 1993 coup d’etat see my post The ”Wild 90s” in Russia, as reflected in people’s memory)

In 1994, Yeltsin launched a fratricidal war in Chechnya. He compromised the integrity of what was still remaining of Russia – back then Tatar, Bashkir, Ural republics almost became independent… (Translator note: Nikolaj Starikov in one of his video journals demonstrated samples of “Ural Roubles” – a currency that war already printed and was supposed to be introduced in that fragmented bit of Russia.) Yeltsin created the monstrous class of oligarchs who to this day view the country as their prey, and are transferring the loot abroad. At the same time he created in Russia is alien to her way of consumption, saturation, hedonism and egoism – despite the fact that our people had always been a part of a community, cooperative, society… Yeltsin sought to re-encode the Russian people and Russian psycho. Hollywood came here in full power and started imposing Western values.

Finally, as was intended in the “Plan Ost”, our country came under external management. The Yeltsin-Kozyrev Russia did not have its own foreign policy – it was built on the national interests of the US; CIA officers were sitting in our economic centres, managing privatization and allocation of resources.

End of the translation.

The Belovezhsk agreement, which dissolved the USSR was voluntaristic and unconstitutional. Article 3 of USSR’s Constitution was dedicated to the procedures, which needed to be observed if a republic wanted to exit the union. Referendums were supposed to be conducted.

This Yeltsin’s act alone had terrible, tragic consequences: Russian people became the most fragmented nationality in the world, still living as non-citizens in oppression in such “European value” countries as Estonia and Latvia. Millions of people ended up being “abroad” from one day to the other. Hundreds of thousands of families were split up. Millions died in the ensuing war, hunger and economic collapse, which was also in the Hitler’s “Plan Ost”, manifested by Yeltsin.

At best, Yeltsin was a naïve fool, used by Western powers in their Big Game of destroying Russia. At worst, he was a ruthless criminal.

Democracy of Mass Destruction. Documentary by Pavel Selin (with English subtitles)

Posted on February 19, 2016 by Stanislav

Ever wondered what is the common denominator between Vietnam, Yugoslavia and Iraq? How democratic values are dropped from the US war planes?

I have earlier posted a short article about two revealing Russian documentaries. Now, translation of one of them is done. The original untranslated video is published here: Демократия массового поражения. Фильм Павла Селина.

I could not include formatting for the subtitles, published on YouTube. The formatted subtitle file in ASS format can be downloaded separately. Full text of the script is below the video frame.

Please note that translating a documentary film or an article takes a lot of time and emotional effort. I am doing it on a voluntary basis, but if someone feels like supporting my work, a Bitcoin donation to the following address is appreciated: 1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2

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Andrey Karaulov: “Those, who laughed at us yesterday, are no longer laughing today”

Posted on February 15, 2016 by Stanislav

Below is my translation of an interview with Andrei Karaulov, published in “Argumenty i Fakty” on the 30th of January 2016. The information in this interview underlines and strengthens what I previously wrote in the articles, pertaining to the Wild 90s: The ”Wild 90s” in Russia, as reflected in people’s memory and another of Karaulov’s articles that I translated, For Russia 90’s Were Worse Than WWII.

One highlight from the article below:

Liberal historian Boris Sokolov counted how many people died over the course of only two years – 1992 and 1993 – during the so-called “reforms” of Gaidar and Chubais. 150.000 more than during the executions of 1937-1938.

Andrey Karaulov was born in 1958 in town Korolev. Journalist and writer, winner of TEFI, Author of TV programmes “The Moment of Truth”, “Russian century”. Author of the documentary films “Unknown Putin”, “Khodorkovskij. Pipes(dead bodies)” (translator note: the inserted character creates the pun), “A Common Fascism”. Author of the books “Around Kremlin”, Russian hell”, and other.

Olga Shablinsky, “AIF”: “It looks as if a new war is coming! We’ve quarreled with almost the whole world,” – it’s a conversation that I recently overheard, expressing the mood of so many… And at the same timet Karaulov writes on his page on the social networks: “Why is Putin not afraid of isolation?” Andrey, are you not worried with these feeling of a coming war?

– I want to ask you two questions. When and where did the first mobile phone appear? You don’t know? The answer is: in 1969. Leonid Brezhnev walked with it around his dacha, next to it, in the bushes there was a “Volga”, stuffed with equipment, but the handset worked exactly like a mobile phone – not from a wired network. Later the trunks of all government cars were equipped with a huge box with an antenna – “Angara” mobile communication system. And in 1992, Khasbulatov was holding the first real mobile phone released the pilot plant at one of the institutes of Dubna. But then reformers cropped up: one – the Minister of Economy, we all know of the other – Chubais. The plant and the Construction Agency were cut… disappeared as if they never existed! These “leaders” did not understand what they were doing. Well, they did not understand anything at all! And America and England got passed on the right to be called the “homeland” of mobile phones. If Dubna patented them back then, today they would have fed the whole of the Russian Federation, just like oil and gas do.

Now the main question: where did the cell phone come from? The answer is: it is one of the technologies that were used by two great men – Michael Yangel and Vladimir Utkin.

Now on to the next question: when and where did the Internet appear? Experts know, but I shall remind you: the first Internet (it’s prototype, if you like) was used by Yuri Andropov. This system was called “Mais”. It, too, hails from the Military-Industrial Complex. Only the members of the board of the KGB had access to “Mais”. The system was primitive. But the info from the “Database” on those USSR citizens who peaked the interest of the KGB or were part of the nomenclature came up instantly.

In other words, both the mobile phone and the Internet are the products of the Soviet defence industry.

The liberals (I suspect none of them were anywhere near any defence factory) are incessantly yelling that today’s Russia is militarising, that our “Korolev of today” – the great Russian scientist, academician Yuri Solomonov, and his colleagues are mad, creating one missile better than another, that all these expensive toys, including IL-80 of academician Henry Novozhilov will ruin our country. I also know how to yell. That does not take much wit… What is this mighty Soviet IL-80 drone? It is a “flying nuclear suitcase”! It is from this plane that the command to launch all of our terrestrial and submarine nuclear missiles comes, if for some reason the President, Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces can not give the launch command themselves. And where will they fly? At those who decided that Russia is a third world country…

IL-80
IL-80

Now the most interesting – what will happen if IL-80 too becomes incapacitated in the air? Then a missile is launched, Americans call it “dead man’s hand”, and it issues a command to strike back…

No one else has such a nuclear shield, like our country today. We are ahead of the Americans by 15-20 years. When the US State Department, having given things some thought, speaks nowadays of the possible lifting of the sanctions from Russia in 2016, this is not surprising. It’s too late to fool around with Russian.

Each missile means tens of thousands of the latest technologies, many of them (well, almost all) have a dual purpose – not only military, but also civil. Solomonov put the chips from the “Topol” missile into the “Lada-Kalina” car. Military factories support over a dozen other industries. It is at the Solomonov’s factories that the monorail was developed in the 90s (Luzhkov applied it in Moscow), water purification system, the new X-ray machines and so on. New military technologies will make you happier, as well as all the citizens of Russia.

– And how will rockets make each of us happy?

– By giving us a complete safety! For our children and our grandchildren, too. America is the only country that can start a third world war. But the US has a law: if the enemy can (even in theory!) inflict an unacceptable damage, then the US will never attack that country. And unacceptable damage to them means 12% of their territory. So there will be no war. Through the operation in Syria, Putin has shown to everyone that the world is no longer unipolar, that it isn’t purely American. Those who yesterday were laughing at us, do not laugh today, after Syria. Today, we are as strong as ever.

A gang of thieves

– Andrey Victorovich, talks about our missiles, of course, inspire pride… But it would be nice to hear “the little man” as well. For example, my neighbour, who is crying: “Pensions are not enough for anything”.

– We must always believe the little man, because he is always right – what reason has he to lie? Why, despite the real successes of our country (defence is an enormous part of the economy) dollar so suddenly shot up relative to the rouble? Today, the best minds say that the rouble is undervalued by a third. And if the rouble is undervalued, why the hell did it drop relative to the dollar?! With these missiles! Say thanks to Anatoly Chubais – he was one of those who developed the scheme, where the rouble got pegged to the oil price. Some villains turned up, who agreed that the oil in our major export commodity. They started to play on it. But I am sure that Putin will instruct the Investigative Committee to conduct a supervisory investigation. And soon everyone will see that there is no connection between the oil price and the exchange rate of the rouble.

– But I also remember very well the pre-stock-exchange times – how my grandfather was on the verge of suicide when all his savings of many years evaporated – 5000 Soviet roubles. Granddaughters’ weddings were postponed…

– You have just mentioned the worst of the problems of the end of the twentieth century. Liberal historian Boris Sokolov counted how many people died over the course of only two years – 1992 and 1993 – during the so-called “reforms” of Gaidar and Chubais. 150.000 more than during the executions of 1937-1938. And, mark, so far no one got punished for that! And then there was 1994… The flywheel of reforms spun even harder…

Today neither Gaidar nor Chubais are in the power. We live in a different country. But people are still scared. Here you are talking to me about the little man. So as not to be a little man, it is necessary not to unduly frighten ourselves with the stories about the acts of terrorism, and to know the true heroes of the country and be proud of them! This is the genuine Russia.

It is necessary that the TV screens instead of reporting about disasters, started showing reports about the revived the great enterprises, about young workers, children, high school students, who come to the defence factories after school, how future professionals are made of them.

We live in a country of myths, but not of little people. People will read our interviews in “AIF”, and they will no longer feel as little people. Deceived – yes, not knowing much – yes. But proud of their country. Those who wants to know the truth, will always find a way. One just has to want to.

Who and How Transferred Crimea into Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1952-1954

Posted on February 12, 2016 by Stanislav

Below is my translation of a very informative article by Mikhail Smirnov, published in Svobodnaja Mysl’ (Free Thought).

It is worth noting, that when the author points out the Russian roots in Crimea, he is most probably referring to the Scythians, who are just the same people as Rus, but going under a different name. See my summery of the documentary Yes, Scythians Are Us.

When reading the text below, note one historic peculiarity of USSR of that time. While 14 republics were almost always denoted by their national name – e.g Ukrainian SSR (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) – there was one exception. In USSR no one spoke of Russia, to the extent that the existence of Russia as a republic was largely forgotten. Instead the acronym RSFSR was always in use (decoded as Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic).

At the end of this post, after the main article, I present my translation of the closing speech by K.E Voroshilov from the stenography of the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from the 19th of February 1954, which is an important historical evidence, setting the stage for the transfer of the peninsular and the expectations connected to the act.

It was not Khrushchev, who made the decision on the transfer of Crimea, but his rabid anti-Stalinism and voluntarism became the propelling power behind this whole undertaking. There were no objective reasons for this decision.

In the history of the presence of the Crimea within modern Ukraine, which, as it is now widely known, began with the official transfer of the Crimean region of the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 and is associated with the name N.S.Khrushchev, you can set apart the pre-history, that is the actually history of decision-making on behalf of the Crimea, from hatching of the idea to the party-bureaucratic mechanism for its implementation.

As it is well-known, at the time of its transfer into the Ukrainian SSR in 1954, Crimea had the status of the region within the RSFSR. From 1921 to 1945 it was a multi-national autonomy within the Russian Federation – the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (KrASSR) with the official languages of Russian and Tatar, and in places of compact settlement – also German and Hebrew. After the well-known dramatic events during the War, the administrative status of Crimea was downgraded: Crimean Autonomy was eliminated by converting it into the Crimean region, officially – due to changes in the ethnic composition of the population of Crimea. Crimean Autonomy was restored in 1991 as part of the Ukrainian SSR, and in 1992 it was renamed into the Republic of Crimea.

In the public mind there is a long-established stereotype, which firmly connects the transfer of the Crimean region of the RSFSR into the Ukrainian SSR with the name of N.S. Khrushchev. By and large it is justified, but, after all, a few comments clarifying and enriching the picture of the event will be reasonably useful.

According to the memoirs of the contemporaries of the events, the idea of the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine began to ripen in Khrushchev’s mind ever since the time, when he in 1944-1947 headed the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, and at the same time was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR. The year was 1944, the war was still going on. The boss off the USSR, I.V. Stalin, demanded that Khrushchev sent from the Ukrainian SSR to the neighbouring republic 100 thousand people – they were supposed to help with the rebuilding of the Russian Federation. But the position of Ukraine itself was not less, but even more severe, as during the Great Patriotic War almost the whole of its territory saw devastating military operations, and almost all of it has been exposed to enemy occupation. Nikita Khrushchev was furious. “Ukraine itself is destroyed, and more is taken from us” – he raged. (Head of the Soviet trade unions, Lavrentij Pogrebnoy, was a witness to Khrushchev’s indignation in 1944. A few years later, he told one of the Soviet writers about the events.)

Khrushchev could not directly oppose Stalin’s orders. So perhaps even then, or a little later, he hatched the idea that a decent compensation for this extra effort (and even, maybe for Starvation [translator’s note: Gologomor, for the real history surrounding it, I’d recommend reading the article The Real Truth About USSR: Golodomor and Collectivization in Ukraine]), could become a significant territorial gain of Ukraine within the USSR: of course, at the expense of the beneficiary of the “Ukrainian brotherly” assistance – the Russian Federation, which was to boot the most rich territory-wise. Even a cursory glance at the map of the Soviet Union was enough to see the most likely scenario for this: geographically isolated from the rest of the territory of the RSFSR, but located in the vicinity of the Ukrainian SSR and adjacent to it, is the Crimean peninsula. And being by nature a voluntarist, he vowed that he will get Crimea, whatever it takes.

But Khrushchev began the direct implementation of his idea later, in the first half of the 50s, or more precisely – starting from 1952, when the signs of limitations in functional capacity of Stalin became more and more obvious for the party leadership. (Stalin announced that he was going to retire at the October Central Committee plenum of 1952, which was held after the completion of the XIX Congress of the CPSU. But already starting from February 1951, three Politburo members (G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria, N.A. Bulganin) were given the right to sign various documents on behalf of Stalin, as, according to Molotov, due to the decrease in performance he did not sign many government documents for a prolonged period of time.) The real opportunity opened up only in connection with the death of Stalin. But it is possible that another significant cause for activation of Khrushchev on this subject at that time was also the activity of a supporter of Stalin’s policy in regard to the Crimea, which brought to the fore the ideas that went counter to Khrushchev’s.

According to unconfirmed records, in October 1952, the first secretary of the Crimean regional party (in 1949-1954) P.I. Titov, while being a delegate of the XIX Party Congress, addressed personally to Stalin with a written offer to rename the Crimean region into Tauridia. In his opinion, it would be entirely consistent with the history of the region, starting from the XVIII century. In particular, as one of the arguments, Titov appealed to the forgotten Soviet Republic of Tauridia. He believed that for the Crimean region of the RSFSR “it’s high time to restore its Russian, Rus name”.

Titov’s proposal was not priorly discussed in the Crimean Regional Party Committee and was not approved by them. But we know that the second person in the region – D.S. Polanski (in 1952-1954 the chairman of the executive committee of the Crimean Regional Council) – objected to this initiative. On the other hand he supported the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR. Twenty years later, the nomenclature Party member G.V. Myasnikov, while at that time the second secretary of the Moscow city committee of the Komsomol remembered Polyansky thus: “I remember how he went up the hill. He met Khrushchev and Titov in the Crimea. An idea of the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was brought up. Titov rejected the idea right away, while Polyansky said it was “brilliant”. The next day they gathered the plenum of the Crimean Regional Committee, Titov was driven out, while Poljansky became the first secretary of the regional committee.”

But it is more likely that this “cleansing out” of Titov took place more gradually, after the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of USSR, N.S. Khrushchev visited the Crimea in October 1953. Khrushchev’s son-in-law, Adjoubei Alex, who accompanied him on his trip around the country, recalled that when Khrushchev came to the Crimea at that time, he was shocked by how disastrous was the situation in the region and how great was the discontent by this among the local residents. At the same time, however, Khrushchev remained true to himself, and when he saw at the local airport some aircraft, he immediately ordered to fly it over to Kiev. And then, a few hours later, he already talked, over a supper, with the local party leaders about the transfer of Crimea and resettlement of Ukrainians into Crimea. Most likely, it was at this moment that an open dispute ensued between him and Titov. According to Titov’s deputy, L.G. Mezentsev, the head of the Crimea was called in to Moscow in mid-January of 1954 to inform him of preparation of a decision on the transfer of the region. He protested, for which on the 16th of January he was replaced with a Ukrainian Dmitry Polyansky. Thus, based on the totality of the memories of witnesses, it can be argued that P.I. Titov strongly objected to Khrushchev regarding the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, and he had constant clashes with the Secretary of the Central Committee on this issue, which resulted in this imperious and prudent owner of the Crimean region being finally deposed to the rank of Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the RSFSR. In general, according to the researchers, Khrushchev initiated a rather limited number of people into his intentions with respect to Crimea. Among them – the first secretary (since June 1953) of the Communist Party of Ukraine A.I. Kirichenko, who, at the time, was also a candidate member of the Praesidium of the Central Committee of CPSU and was in good standing with Khrushchev.

But Stalin, who was by that time ill, delayed an official response to Titov. According to the memoirs of some of Titov’s colleagues, in the spring of 1953 and later he, nevertheless, referred to a brief personal answer from Stalin, which was sent personally to him in late January 1953, saying that his proposal was “interesting and perhaps correct. This question can be discussed and resolved.” In the middle of November of 1953 Titov told about this opinion of Stalin to Khrushchev and Polyansky, when the principal decision on the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine had in fact already been made.

An indirect confirmation of the fact that Stalin was quite seriously considering Titov’s proposals, can be the process of renaming of the Crimean Tatar names into Russian ones, which began from the mid-1940s and which was initiated by Stalin himself after the deportation of the Tatar population from there. There are many sources describing this. For example, a comprehensive project on renaming in Crimea was dated with the 25th of September 1948, when the Crimean Regional Committee passed the decree “On renaming of settlements, streets, certain types of work, and other Tatar designations”. However, it was not planned to rename Crimea itself. But even before that, in the 1944-1946, 11 out of 26 Crimean regional centres were renamed (for example, the Ak-Mechetsky region into Chernomorskij, Larindorfsky into Pervomaisky) as well as 327 villages. In the period from 1948 to 1953, it was planned to rename some towns. The documents recorded in particular that Djankoi was going to become either Uzlovo, Severnyj or Verhnekrymsk, Saki turning into Ozernoje, and they wanted to call Bakhchisaray – “Pushkin”. Kerch was supposed to be given the name of “Korchev”, known from the old-Russian chronicles. In general, during 1947-1953 new – Russian – names were given to 1062 settlements and nearly 1300 natural object, mostly replacing Tatar ones. It is obvious that in the context of this process, also Titov’s proposal to change the name of the Crimea looked quite logical. However, the renaming slowed down when the turn of the cities came. And after Stalin’s death, the plan to rename the Crimean cities was abandoned altogether.

Thus, we can see that the project of the inclusion of Crimea into Ukraine was preceded by a project of strengthening of Russian presence in Crimea, and in 1952-1953, as a logical completion of the latter, there was also a project, which remained on the level of an idea, of re-renaming the Crimean region into Tauridian.

(An aside from the translator: Crimean Tatars are more likely Mongolians, the descendants of the Golden Horde of the Mongolian Khan Baty, who raided and occupied the peninsular in the 14th century. The name given to the peninsular by them was “Kyrim”, meaning “trench”. Before the Mongol occupation the peninsular had the Greek name of “Tauridia”. What the endemic population, Scythians, called their land back then is lost.)

As is known, the Russian presence in Crimea has been recorded since ancient chronicled times. Of particular interest to us – in the light of the events of the XX century that we discuss here – is “Tmutarakan” sub-plot of this presence. The original antique city of Panticapaeum, which in the era of the Khazarian Khaganate (translator note: For a well-researched foray into the history of Khazarian Kaganate, I would recommend reading Lada Ray’s Earth Shift Report 6: UKRAINE – NEW KHAZARIAN KHAGANATE?) of the VIII century got the name of Karsha or Charsha, which in Turkic means “market” or “bazaar”, is mentioned in the old-Russian historical records of the events of the X century under the Slavinised name of Krchev (Korchev) [Кърчевъ]. In the tenth century, Tmutarakan principality – part of the Ancient (Kievan) Rus – takes root on the Crimean and the Caucasian coasts of the Kerch Strait. Korchev was closely associated with the capital of the principality – Tmutarakan, while the Eastern geographers of that time called the Kerch Strait for the Russian River.

And so it was in Kerch that, after a long period of Ottoman history in Crimea, Russia once again establishes on the peninsula, several years before its full incorporation into the Russian Empire. In 1771 Russian troops took Kerch and neighbouring fortress Yeni-Kale. By the Kuchuk-Karnadzhiyskomu peace treaty between the Russian and Ottoman empires, which ended Russian-Turkish war of 1768-1774, this city with its fortress was the first of all the Crimea to become part of the Russian Empire, while, in accordance with that agreement, the Crimean Khanate as a whole then became independence from the Ottoman Empire, with the exception of the influence in the questions of religion. The manifesto of Catherine II was issued on the 8th of April 1783 and decreed the accession of Crimea, Taman and Kuban into the Russian Empire. By the decree of the 2nd of February 1784 Tauridian region (oblast) was established, covering some of the continental land. Later it was transformed into a province (county).

It is quite possible that the role of Kerch, and the Kerch Peninsula as a whole, in the Russian development on Crimea was the foundation for another P.I. Titov’s proposal in November 1953, which he already addressed to Polyansky and Khrushchev, and reiterated in January 1954. It pertained to the inclusion of this region (ie. Eastern Crimea) with the status of the “Kerch region” into the composition of RSFSR. Already then Titov had a well-founded belief that it was inadvisable for RSFSR “to vacate” Crimea, and, thanks to the newly formed region, the strategically important Kerch (Azov-Black Sea) Strait – “Russian River” – would still be a part of RSFSR. Titiov’s “Kerch” was outright rejected by Khrushchev followers, so much so, that the entire water area of the Kerch Strait in the subsequent transfer of the Crimea ended up being assigned to the Ukrainian SSR.

The question of what was the nature of the whole of Crimean autonomy – national or territorial – is also of crucial importance. Lenin’s Sovnarkom initially created both types of autonomies, but over time only the national ones were left. The Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, in this regard, had become a unique autonomous construct, which retained its territorial nature. According to the All-Union census of 1939, Russians comprised 49.6% of the Crimean population, Crimean Tatars – 19.4%, Ukrainians – 13.7%, Jews – 5.8%, Germans – 4.6%. But as the total population during the war declined sharply, and its ethnic composition underwent fundamental changes, Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was transformed into the Crimean region (oblast) on the 30th of June 1945. Unlike most other autonomous regions, where there was the predominance of the indigenous population, the Crimean Autonomous Republic was not Tatar from the very beginning of its establishment. Moreover, 2/3 of the population of the Crimea at the time was Russian, and only one-third consisted of the peoples who had settled here before the Russians and made up the indigenous population of the peninsula. (Translator note: in the bird’s eye historic perspective, Russians are the indigenous population of the peninsula, who were driven from Crimea, but later returned.) At the same time, flirting with Kemalist Turkey, the Soviet leadership traditionally appointed mostly men of Tatar origin to the leading positions in the republic. This created a false impression that the Crimean autonomy was, like all the other, the national one – Crimean Tatar. But as it is known, in accordance with the provisions of the National Defence Commission of 11th of May and the 2nd of June 1944, of all Tatars of all ages (about 180 thousand people) were deported from Crimea to Kazakhstan. (Translator note: the exception was given to mixed-marriage families, where a Tatar woman was married to a Russian.)

All of the above sheds some light on the political context in which Khrushchev’s fateful for the history of the Crimea voluntarist decision was conceived and prepared. But it is equally important to take into account the details of the mechanism of this decision at the state level.

The fact is that N.S. Khrushchev became the first person in the USSR leadership only in 1955. While immediately after the death of Stalin (at the time of the death he held the post of the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers), the head of government and a key figure in the leadership of the USSR was G.M. Malenkov. By the end of Stalin’s life, Malenkov was one of the main contenders for the post of supreme leader of the country, and immediately after his death, inherited the post of the chairman of the Council of Ministers. I.V. Stalin died on the 5th of March 1953, and at that time, in the beginning of the 1950s, this was the main post, while the position of the General Secretary of the CPSU was abolished, since, according to the late Stalinist concept of the governance structure, the Communist Party should no longer play a leading role in governing of the country.

M.S. Voslensky in his famous book “The Nomenclature” writes:

In the days after the death of Stalin in March 1953, it was customary to conclude speeches at the memorial meetings in the following typical ending: “Eternal glory to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Secretary of the CPSU I.V. Stalin! Long live Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee G.M. Malenkov!”

As it becomes clear from these titles, according to a new tradition established by Stalin, the post of the President of the Council of Ministers of USSR was the most important positions in contemporary system of power, and that it was inherited by Malenkov. And although the decision from March the 5th 1953 of the joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers abolished the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of CPSU, and on the the 14th of March 1953 the political opponents of Malenkov managed to deprive him of his post of a Secretary of the CPSU (ie, at the time, one of the many secretaries of the Central Committee), in 1953-55 he was still the Chairman of the USSR, and presiding over the meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee of CPSU (as Politburo of the Central Committee of CPSU was called at the time). And thus, according to the then semi-official representations of the structure of power in the USSR, and, to an even greater extent, due to the political practice established under Stalin’s influence, he was the real leader of the country. It was during the period of his leadership of the country, that the transfer of the Crimean region into the Ukrainian SSR actually took place.

And if you take the viewpoint of those, who do not recognize that the decisions in the USSR were taken collectively, but absolutely want to assign personal responsibility for any decision to one of the “leaders”, then we must blame Malenkov, and not Khrushchev for the transfer of the Crimean region. By the beginning of 1954, when the Crimea was handed over, Khrushchev was not yet a sufficiently influential figure so as to define such major decisions. He was one of the secretaries of the Central Committee, responsible for the work of the entire Secretariat (on September the 7th 1953 he was elected 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU), he was a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, and was a member of a group, warring with the group of Malenkov. The very same Voslensky in his book indicates that Malenkov tried his best to belittle the role of the Central Committee Secretariat, and it was under him that they began to speak of the secretariat as of a purely technical body. Therefore, it is logical to assume that any significant initiatives emanating from Khrushchev, would not get the support of Malenkov.

If, however, we are be absolutely exact, then from a purely formal point of view, the transfer of Crimea was initiated by a collective body – the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, which meetings at that time were chaired by Malenkov. This can be seen from documents published in “Rossiyskaya Gazeta” (Federal Edition #3409 of the 19th of February 2004):

From the protocol N 49 of the Central Committee of the CPSU Presidium meeting on the transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of the RSFSR into the composition of the Ukrainian SSR
25th of January 1954
Presided by: G.M. Malenkov
Present:
Members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, comrades N.S. Khrushchev, K.E. Voroshilov, N.A. Bulganin, L.M. Kaganovich, A.L. Mikoyan, M.Z. Saburov, M.G. Pervukhin.
Candidates for members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, comrades N.M. Shvernik, P.K. Ponomarenko.
CPSU Central Committee secretaries, comrades M.A. Suslov, P.N. Pospelov, N.N. Shatalin.

XL About transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of the RSFSR into the composition of the Ukrainian SSR
1. To approve as amended at the meeting, the attached draft of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of the RSFSR into the composition of the Ukrainian SSR.
2. To deem it appropriate to hold a special session of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR, at which to consider a joint submission to the Bureau of the Supreme Soviets of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR on the transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of the RSFSR into the composition of the Ukrainian SSR.

Secretary of the CPSU Khrushchev
АЛРФ.Ф.З.Оп.10.Д.65Л1,4-б Подлинник (original)

However, having the real distribution of power in the USSR leadership elite in favour of the government agencies – as a testament from Stalin, outwardly the power system in the country continued working in a mode, familiar to the people, that is, in such a way, that the decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU were governing in relation the decisions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which was only a “law publishing” body, which gave the appearance of democracy to decisions, which had actually been taken in the Central Committee. Thus, the Council of Ministers, headed by Malenkov, was sidelined on the decision of the Crimea. This decision was taken by the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, a meeting presided by Malenkov.

Again, from a purely formal point of view, N.S. Khruschev’s responsibility for this decision consisted only in the fact that he, like everyone else, voted “for” and in addition to this, as the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee heading the work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, put his signature, just formally certifying the protocol. In the same way as in the Brezhnev period Giorgadze put his signature after Brezhnev’s signature. But analysis of the alignment of the centres of power in the power system of that time shows that the decision of the Presidium chaired by the economic planner Malenkov could be a bargaining chip (albeit a pretty small one) in the nomenclature and political struggle of his supporters with the group of Khrushchev – the highest at that time party functionary. In any case, with that set up, Malenkov was a guarantor that, as a result of this decision, there would be no major changes in the Crimea’s situation and, above all, in the nature of economic relations of the Crimean region within the control system of the USSR.

From the extract from the protocol N49, cited above, it is clear at the same meeting the draft of the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the transfer of Crimea was approved, which after a multi-stage procedure, would in the end be “rubber-stamped” by the Supreme Council. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR rubber-stamped the decree draft at its meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of February the 19th 1954. Here is the text of the decree:

The stenography of meeting can be consulted here. (Translator note: I will translate the closing speech of Voroshilov, which gives additional context to the political and cultural background, as well as assumed conditions, of the transfer.)

DECREE
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
On the transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of the RSFSR into the composition the Ukrainian SSR

“Given the commonality of the economy, the proximity and close economic and cultural ties between the Crimean region and the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics RESOLVES:

Approve the joint submission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR on the transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic into the composition of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.”

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR K.VOROSHILOV
Secretary of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N.PEGOV
Moscow, The Kremlin, February 19, 1954.

And already on the 26th of April 1954 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR by the Law “On the transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of RSFSR in the composition of the Ukrainian SSR” approved the decree of its Presidium and made the appropriate changes to Articles 22 and 23 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Incidentally, we must note that the issue of transfer of the Crimea went in the agenda of the meeting of the Presidium of the CC CPSU as item XI or XL (it is not very clear from the publication of the document). In any case, this issue was not perceived as being particularly important. It is possible that this attitude has led to a certain constitutional legislative negligence in the design of the entire transfer procedure. The fact is, under Article 18 of the Constitution of USSR, which was in effect by 1954, the territory of a republic could not be altered without its consent. Such consent was given by both Republics in the form of a Ruling of the Presidium of the Supreme Councils of the two Republics. However, Article 33 of the Constitution of the RSFSR, which contained a list of the authorities given to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, there is no authority to change the boundaries of the RSFSR. Not to mention the fact that out of the 27 members of the meeting of the 5th of February 1954, during which the issue was addressed, only 15 were present.

Further considering the nature of the relationship of the then leadership of the USSR to the “Crimean issue”, one should also note the following. For example, in the relevant documents of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet it was claimed both wisely and pompously, “that the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR, taking into account the commonality of their economies, the proximity and close economic and cultural ties, is fully appropriate and is a testament to the boundless trust of the Russian people in the Ukrainian people…” This is how the “Ukrainians” at the helm thought back then. At the same time, the event itself passed completely unnoticed. It was not widely presented by the official propaganda to the Soviet and foreign public as another triumph of the party reason and higher justice. Probably for this reason, the Western press said nothing about this. While in the Soviet publications one can only find a couple of paragraphs about the symbolic meaning of this act in the context of the 300th anniversary of the “reunification” of Ukraine and Russia. However, the celebrations that took place in late May 1954 were generally devoted only to the anniversary. And even in the festive speech of Khrushchev, not a word was said about the Crimea. The absence of any indication to the transfer of Crimea in the Soviet sources of the time leads to some extent to a probable assumption, that the leaders of the Soviet Union intended to create in the perception of the peoples of the Soviet Union the idea, that the presence of the Crimea as part of Ukraine was a self-evident fact, and the decision to transfer the peninsula was represented as something long-overdue and almost as correction of a certain historical misunderstanding. But it is also quite possible that there was a feeling of voluntary overeagerness, and that there was no complete confidence that the decision, taken completely privately and without extensive discussion between the peoples of the two largest of the Soviet republics, would not cause public rejection. (Translator’s note: It did, at the “kitchen talk” level, much of which I heard first-hand, while spending many a summer of my youth in Crimea.)

N.S. Khruschev made a considerable progress towards senior management position of the country only in 1955 as a result of the nomenclature struggle for the removal of Malenkov from power. In 1955, Malenkov was dismissed from the post of Chairman of the USSR, and on the 29th of June 1957 he was removed from the Presidium of the CC CPSU. It is not known when exactly he ceased to be “presiding” at the Presidium meeting, but most likely in the very same 1955.

Since that time, that is, from the time when N.S. Khruschev, as the 1st Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, began to gradually strengthen his position as the sole leader of the Communist Party, we can say that the party organs as a whole began to regain the lead in the country’s leadership. However, until 1958 the high status and independence of the state and economic apparatus inherited from the Stalinist era remained. Chairman of the USSR from 1955 to 1958 was N.A. Bulganin, who previously, just like Malenkov, was one of the Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers of Stalin. It was only in 1958 that Bulganin was dismissed, and his position was also taken by N.S. Khruschev while still holding the post of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The defeat of the group of Bulganin, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov and Shepilov occurred in June 1957 when at first during the meeting of the Presidium (Politburo) of the Central Committee of the CPSU by a majority vote, it was decided to abolish the post of the 1st Secretary of the CPSU and to appoint Khrushchev Minister of Agriculture, and then during an urgently convened plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, as a result of the dramatically unfolding events and with Zhukov’s help, Khrushchev managed to turn the situation to his advantage, and called Bulganin/Malenkov’s group for “anti-party”. Only after 1958 can N.S. Khurshev be held solely responsible for the supreme power decisions in the country. The Crimean region was transferred to Ukraine at the beginning of 1954, while the opinion about the deciding role that Khrushchev played in it, was formed only later with the help of the official propaganda.

Soviet newspapers, like mirrors, reflected the change in the ratio of different branches of power in the USSR. The newspaper “Pravda” of the 21st of December 1955 in its report on the national meeting of the top performers of agriculture in Tashkent, said: “spacious auditorium of the theatre named after Alisher Navoi was filled to capacity. 11 am. Loud and prolonged applause greeted the appearance at the meeting the Chairman of the presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers N. Bulganin and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, N.S. Khrushchev. Places on the podium are occupied by the first secretary of Central Committee of the Communist Party: Uzbekistan – A.I. Niyazov, Kazakhstan – LI Brezhnev, Tajikistan – BG Gafurov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers: Uzbek SSR – N.A. Mukhitdinov, Tajik SSR – T. Uldzhabaev, Turkmen SSR – B. Ovezov, Kirghiz SSR – A. Suerkulov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR Sh.R. Rashidov.” Here, the Chairman of the USSR Council is still mentioned in the first place, while the first secretary of the Communist Party – in the second, as a figure of lesser importance.

But already in 1960, at the height of Khrushchev’s personality cult, there is a dominating and familiar us from the days of Stagnation formula, where the Central Committee of the Communist Party is mentioned in the first place: “The workers of agriculture of the Penza region report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government and personally to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev that, realizing the historical decision of the XXI Congress of the CPSU, collective and state farms, overcoming the difficulties created in the current year due to adverse weather conditions, have grown a good harvest, and completed the plan to sell grain to the state ahead of schedule – on August the 9th – using 20 working days.” (“Pravda” of the 12th of August 1960).

There are some important considerations at the end of this brief historical sketch of this dramatic episode in the history of Russia. In that harsh time P.I. Titov became the forerunner of the modern Communist Party of the Russian Federation in that part of its activity, which is directed today to protect the all-Russian interests. It is a pity that his name have not become a symbol of the 23-year-long modern struggle for liberation of the Russian-speaking people of the Crimea against the Ukrinising occupants. In light of the events of the modern Russian history, that person is worthy of his memory being perpetuated at least by a commemorative plaque in Simferopol, and at least a mention of him in the future textbooks of the history of the Fatherland as a Russian citizen, who was not afraid to go against the voluntarist projects of omnipotent Russian Ukrainophile Khrushchev. The country and the people need to know their heroes, and not only the negative ones.

Below is a translation of the closing speech by K.E Voroshilov from the stenography of the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from the 19th of February 1954. As the commentary note at the top of that site says, “The Communist regime held no referendum or any opinion poll among the Crimeans regarding their transfer into the Ukrainian SSR”. All highlighting in the translation is mine.

Comrades, the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the joint proposal of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR regarding the transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic into the composition of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a testament to further strengthening of the unity and indestructible friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples within the great powerful fraternal family of the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This significant act of great national importance once again confirms that the relationship between sovereign allied socialist republics in the USSR is based on genuine equality and a real understanding and respect for mutual interests, aimed at the prosperity of all of the Union republics.

In history, there is no – and can not be – other such relation between States. In the past, especially under capitalism, at the very root of relations between states there was an aspiration for territorial conquest, the pursuit of strong states profiteering at the expense of territories of weaker countries. Only within the conditions, created by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may there be such a fair resolution of all issues between Union Republics, decisions based on economic feasibility and sensibility, full of mutual friendship and fraternal co-operation of their peoples. The transfer of the Crimean region of the RSFSR into the Ukrainian SSR is in the interest of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, and meets the national interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Crimean region, due to its historical development, due to its territorial and economic status, is important for the whole of the Soviet state. And in the distant and recent past enemies have repeatedly tried to take away the Crimean peninsula from Russia, use it to plunder and ruin Russian and Ukrainian lands, establish a base there for attacks on Russia and Ukraine. However the Russian and Ukrainian peoples had more than once, in their common struggle, severely beaten the arrogant invaders and thrown them out of the borders of Ukraine and Crimea. Ukraine and Crimea are closely linked by common economic interests – this has already been eloquently stated both by the presenters and by comrade speakers. Cultural relations between Crimea and Ukraine in particular have increased and deepened. The transfer of the Crimean region into the Ukrainian SSR will undoubtedly further strengthen the traditional ties.

Comrades, this friendly act takes place in the days when the Soviet people solemnly celebrate the remarkable historical date of the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Russia and Ukraine. This is a great traditional celebration not only of the Ukrainian people, but also for all the peoples of the USSR. Friendship of peoples – one of the foundations of our great multinational Soviet state, the source of its invincible might, of its prosperity and power. We know and rejoice that the Russian, Ukrainian and other peoples of our vast country, will also in the future continue to develop and strengthen their brotherly friendship. Let our great Motherland – the fraternal Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – develop and grow stronger!

”The Shepherd’s Crown” – A Fare You Well from to Granny Sir Terry Pratchett

Posted on February 6, 2016 by Stanislav

It is now almost a year since my blog started transmitting “GNU Terry Pratchett” in the X-Clacks-Overhead of each HTTP header of each response – to keep the name of Sir Terry in the wires. And it is only now that I found resolve to read the final Discworld book – The Shepherd’s Crown.

The Sheperd’s Crown is, just like all the Discworld books, a masterpiece. But it is much more than that. It encompasses both a parting of the author with his audience, a farewell to the beloved characters, who accompanied us for all these years, and ultimately, Sir Terry’s testament and guidance to his readers, no, to humanity at large.

Pratchett introduced a new character his final book – Geoffrey, who is a male witch and a “peace-weaver”. I felt an instant liking to this character – we need more such peace-weavers in our Roundworld gone mad, someone who can talk reason and calmness in the situations when the elves of our world are souring not just beer, but the good neighbourly relations between peoples, putting peoples at loggerheads.

I am not one, who cries when reading a book, but one chapter, where as a result of a monumental shifting event, almost each of the key characters of Discworld made a cameo appearance, made me cry. Those were the bitter-sweet tears of parting, coming out despite all the admonishing that we should not grieve the passage of those, who left the world as a slightly better place, than how it was, when they found it…

And so, the window that we had into the living, breathing, working world of Discworld has closed, after being open for just 32 years. We were privileged to be able to peek into this world! And as we leave it, we know that it will continue to live and function somewhere out there in the multiverse, unbeknownst to us, as the great narrator of Discworld, Sir Terry Pratchett, is no longer here to relay its story.

The First to the Orbit, Moon and Mars – Remembering Sergei Korolev

Posted on February 2, 2016 by Stanislav

16th of January 2016 marks 50 years since the death of a the brilliant Russian space engineer, Sergei Pavlovich Korolev. Everyone remembers the heroic deed of Yurij Gagarin, the first man to fly into space. But it was the visionary thought and ingenuity of Korolev that made that flight, as well as many other “firsts” in space exploration, possible.

Russian news weekly “Argumenty i Fakty” published an article about this outstanding man. About his illness and death, about his life and work, about the repressions, about his realistic view on USSR’s outlook for taking the lead (he though that USSR would only be able to take the second place in the space race), and how he, with his out-of-the-box thinking managed to prove himself wrong on that account.

In this post I want to concentrate on translating two infographics. The first is the list of the “firsts” in space, largely achieved thanks to Korolev. The second is a short collection of ideas and sketches that Korolev had, but which were never implemented.

The following infographics was taken from AiF article “The First to Mars and Moom. The achievements of our space exploration.” Translation follows below the image.

Moon program

3rd of February 1966. Soviet lander “Luna-9” is the first to make a soft landing on the Earth’s satellite and transmits images of the lunar surface.
21st of September 1968. Return of the probe “Zond-2” after making a flight around the Moon. The probe contained living creatures: tortoises, fruit flies, worms, bacteria.
24th of September 1970. Station “Luna-16” returns to earth first samples of the Moon rock. This was the first automatic space probe that brought to Earth extraterrestrial material.
17th of November 1970. The first in history remote-controlled rover intended for exploration of an extraterrestrial body arrives to the Moon. It was the Soviet “Lunokhod-1”. It worked there for three times as long as initially designed, covered 10.5km and transmitted to Earth 25000 images.

Exploration of Venus

1st of March 1966. The first in history flight of a probe from Earth to another planet. Station “Venera-3” reached the surface of Venus, delivering there the pennant of USSR. It is noteworthy that the probe was launched while Korolev was still alive, but he didn’t live to see the end of the mission.
18th of October 1967. Station “Venera-4” for the first time in history performs a flowing descent in the atmosphere of another planet.
15th of December 1970. Probe “Venera-7” made the first soft landing on the surface of Venus.
October 1975. Probes “Venera-9” and “Venera-10” sent to Earth the first photo images of Venus’s surface.

Exploration of Mars

27th of November 1971. Soviet station “Mars-2” reached the red planet. That was the first man-made object to end up on the surface of Mars.
2nd of December 1971. Lander “Mars-3” for the first time in history performs a soft landing on the Martian surface.

Couplings

30th of October 1967. The first coupling of 2 unmanned vehicles is performed – “Kosmos-186” and “Kosmos-188”.
16th of January 1969. “Sojuz-4” and “Sojuz-5” perform the first in history coupling of two manned space ships.

Orbital Stations

19th of April 1971. The first orbital station/laboratory “Saljut-1” is placed into orbit. It existed for 175 days.
20th of February 1986. The basic module of space station “Mir” is placed into orbit. This was the first in history orbital station with modular composition.

The first “freighter”

20th of January 1978. The first automatic cargo transport cargo ship “Progress” is sent into orbit.

The infographics below was taken from AiF article “Into Space despite the rules. How Sergei Korolev ensured USSR’s leadership in space”. It showcases some of Korolev’s sketches, which were realistic, but never implemented as finished projects. Translation follows below the image.

Martian project

The most ambitious and beautiful of Korolev’s visions. It was planned to send to Mars a crew of 3 people. Start of the expedition – 8th of June 1971. Return on the 10th of June 1974. A Heavy Interplanetary Spaceship (HIS), weighing 83.1 tonnes was to travel to Mars. To build the system in Earth’s orbit, 15 launches of super-heavy rocket N1 were planned, each having the length of 105 metres and having a lifting capacity of 100 tonnes.

The development of the project was started already in 1959. The Council of Ministers of USSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party approved the Martian project in 1960. However, it was shut down because of the “Moon race”.

Lunar expedition

On the 3rd of August 1964, the Central Committee of the Communist Party sets Korolev the following goal – to bypass Americans in landing on the Moon. A Lunar expedition project is initiated in all haste.

A robotic lunar rover was to be sent first. Its task would be to scout the landing site and to act as a radio beacon.

It was also planned to build the ship in orbit. 3 launches of the super-heavy rocket N1 were to deliver there the components of the Lunar space ship, weighing in total 180 tonnes. The ship carrying a crew of 3 was to reach the Moon. Soviet cosmonauts were to spend 10 days on the Earth’s satellite. It was planned to implement the project in 1968.

Lunar base

To be more precise – the whole 2 bases. The first was to become a satellite orbiting around the Moon and act as a kind of base of operations en route between the Earth and the Moon. The second was to be assembled on the lunar surface. 9 modular blocks-cylinders – 3 living quarters, command centre, workshop, medical centre with a sports hall, kitchen with the canteen, laboratory. Capacity – 12 people. The development of the project was started in 1962 and finished in 1971. Later the defence minister of USSR, Ustinov, rejected the project, citing too high price tag – 50 billion roubles.

Heavy orbital station

In a note to the minister of defence, dated 23rd of June 1960, Korolev writes: “A manoeuvrable station weighing 60-70 tonnes and having a crew of 3 to 5 people, could perform the following military tasks: surveillance, battle actions against enemy vessels, destruction of the enemy’s ballistic rockets…”

In 1965 a draft project was initiated and a mock-up of the station was built.

A special note about Korolev’s manned lunar landing project, and how it contrasts to the American faked lunar landing.

After sending living organisms to fly around the Moon, it looked like Korolev was aware of the need for proper shielding of the crew – thus the design of a super heavy space craft, which could require multiple component launches and in-orbit assemby.

Korolev was truly a visionary and such a man, about who it is usually said: He was born ahead of his time.

Ukraine: Still Smouldering Tinderbox (I) [Re-blog with comments]

Posted on February 1, 2016 by Stanislav

Below is a re-blog of Michael Jabara CARLEY’s article Ukraine: Still Smouldering Tinderbox (I) published at the Strategic Culture Foundation site.

But before I present the text, I want to add a few comments of my own, which the reader can keep in mind while reading the article.

The city of Odessa was founded in 1794 by Russian Empress Catherine II and was the first free trade port in Russia.

The city of Nikolaev was founded in 1789 by Russian Count Potjomkin as a ship-building docks. It got its present name in commemoration of the victory by the Russian troops, when Turkish fortress Ochakov was taken in 1788 on the day of St.Nikolaj.

Regarding what the American handler of the Ukrainian puppet government, Proconsul Pyatt was saying, that Russia wants to “create Novorossia”. Russia has no need to create Novorossia. Novorossia is actually an old concept – it was an administrative region within Russia at the time, when the European emigrants were still stealing the land from the Native Americans. For an in-depth look at Novorossia, see my article Two Ukraines.

Ukraine is indeed a smouldering tinderbox. For a look at what is going on, I recommend watching the English-subtittled Donetsk Republic’s Ministry of Defence Briefing: Jan. 29, 2016 Ceasefire Violations by Kiev, published at Lada Ray’s blog.

And finally, I disagree with the author’s conclusion in the last paragraph. Putin is not intimidated, but is rather trying to resolved the conflict and free Ukraine from the American occupation diplomatically and not militarily. There was also no homogeneous resistance in Donbass, but rather several groups with varying interests, which were united by not wishing to cow-tow to the coup government. This cost Donbass the loss of momentum. The situation is all to close to what Russia (an by that I also mean Ukraine) experienced after the coup d’etat of 1917 and the subsequent civil war and Western interventionism…

The international situation is very dangerous. Syria seems to be holding everyone’s attention, but the Ukrainian tinderbox still smoulders. Fascists hold power in Kiev. They do not miss an opportunity to make provocative declarations or commit hostile acts against Russia or against Russian people in Ukraine. The Kiev junta is a repressive, murderous regime intolerant of political opposition.

Former Nazi collaborators like Stepan Bandera have been transformed into national heroes remembered in torch light parades evocative of Nazi Germany. Violence is exalted and tawdry fascist masculinity is openly celebrated.

Recently, Petro Poroshenko, the president of Ukraine declared that in 2016 the junta would retake control of the Donbass and Crimea. Whilst the fate of the Donbass remains uncertain, the status of Crimea is clear. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said recently, Crimea is an integral part of the Russian Federation and there is nothing to «negotiate» about it. In fact, the only way Ukraine can hope to take over Crimea would be in the aftermath of a Third World War won by the United States and its NATO vassals. To say the least, this is an unlikely eventuality. Not that a world war would overly trouble the burlesque Poroshenko, who still seeks to drag the European Union (EU) and the United States deeper into the Kiev junta’s conflict with Moscow. It is his lone hope for success.

Poroshenko is only nominally «president» of Ukraine. In fact, he is an executor of directives received from the US embassy in Kiev or the US government in Washington.

He has presided over the destruction and looting of the Ukrainian economy, but he continues in power, propped up by the United States and its EU vassals. The fascist or Maidan coup d’état in February 2014, backed by the United States, has enabled Washington to seize control of Ukraine though without Crimea and Donbass. Thus it is a victory which may eventually lead to a defeat.

US intervention in Ukraine is a grave matter and a direct attack on the security of the Russian Federation. It is also an attempt to change the course of history and to break the bonds of culture, religion and kinship dating back more than one thousand years. The first Russian state was established at Kiev in the 9th century. During the Late Medieval and Early Modern periods Ukraine was a contested borderland and no-man’s land between Muscovy, then tsarist Russia, Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire. Before 1991 Ukraine never existed as an independent state, or did so only in Kiev for a few months in 1918 and 1919, and then as a puppet regime of Wilhelmine Germany or France. It is ironic that so-called Ukrainian «nationalists», then as now, could only establish their putative authority under foreign domination. Then as now, foreign powers seek to use a Ukrainian client state as a place d’armes or as a proxy to attack Russian power in Moscow.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky, an eccentric politician and member of the State Duma in Russia, had this to say recently about Ukraine. Zhirinovsky often speaks the blunt truth that others may not want to hear or will not say. «All of the present day Ukraine», he said on a Russian talk show, «are the historical lands of Russia… All of Ukraine, this is Russia… When the Russian princes sat in Kiev [9th-13th centuries], was Ukraine ever a word? Who built [the cities of] Chernigov… Odessa, Nikolaiev?» It was not Ukrainians, Zhirinovsky concluded in so many words, it was Russians.

Of course, this is a Russian point of view for which the US government has no respect. Who would dare to make a claim on parts of the United States just because at one time or another they belonged to someone else? We stole those territories, fair and square, or made war to get them, an American joker might reply, and we’re not giving them back. The US ambassador or proconsul in Kiev, Geoffrey Pyatt, declared recently on Ukrainian television that Kharkov and Odessa would never again be part of Russia. «You have managed to defeat Putin», he said, «When the troops came to the Donbass the Kremlin wanted to seize Ukraine, it wanted to create Novorossia and seize Odessa, it wanted Kharkov. Now it will never happen. What Russia and terrorists supported by it are left with is a little piece of the Donbass. We will do our best to help you regain these territories». What an American fairy story.

More candidly, the US proconsul might have said (he certainly came close to saying it): «we’ve hijacked Ukraine right from under your nose, Mr Putin, and you can’t do anything about it». Does American pride go before a fall?

It remains to be seen how the crisis in Ukraine will evolve. In the meantime, Poroshenko plays the role of a dangerous US popinjay and bootblack who can only justify his existence by selling off Ukrainian resources and spewing out clownish threats against Russia.

The Kiev junta might make a great story line for an Opéra bouffe, except that it’s no laughing matter. Kiev’s fascist militias wage war against civilians and repress political opposition. In fact, any activities connected to the USSR are illegal. Sing the Internationale, for example, and hop!, you could get ten years in prison. Come to think of it, an Opéra bouffe is not the right way to showcase fascist Ukraine; better a dark Kafkaesque theatre of the absurd, or vaudeville mixed with horror.

The Kiev junta has refused to repay a $3 billion loan to Russia and blockaded Crimea, cutting off water, electricity, and food supplies. It bombards Donbass cities, targeting civilians, on a daily basis. Yet it expects cheap natural gas from Russia and transit payments for gas intended for Europe (which it often siphons off), trade benefits, and various other advantages.

The Russian government has in return attempted to avert an all-out confrontation by dampening down the anti-fascist resistance movement in Novorossia and by promoting the Minsk accords. For those who may not remember, these accords resulted from the defeat, not once but twice, of Ukrainian punitive forces attempting to put down the anti-fascist resistance in the east. Notwithstanding Proconsul Pyatt’s peculiar narrative, the Donbass opolchentsy won the war and lost the peace. They did not have much choice for they counted on Russian support, and Moscow insisted on Minsk. Novorossia became a concept to be forgotten. Militia commanders who spoke too much about independence or Russia were mysteriously assassinated. Anti-fascist élan has been doused, though not extinguished.

Why does the Russian government pursue such a sinuous, seemingly self-defeating policy? Well, for one thing, Moscow was faced with damaging western economic sanctions and growing Russophobic hysteria excited by the United States and its EU Atlanticist vassals. Only people with top secret security clearances in Moscow or Washington can say, but the United States may have threatened the Russian government with war if it did not take a less forward policy in Ukraine. Responding as though he might have been threatened, Putin endorsed the Minsk accords, although this meant accepting the continuation of the fascist junta in Kiev and accepting in effect the US hijacking of Ukraine out of the Russian world. Putin does not use the word «fascist» to describe his Ukrainian «partners», even as the Russian Federation celebrates annually the Red Army’s triumph over Nazi Germany. The Donbass is different from Crimea, Putin says in effect. Therefore, autonomy will have to do, whatever the people in the Donbass might want.

(to be continued)

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Monthly Archives: February 2016