Inadequate news from Ukraine, false flag in Avdeevka, plus an answer to a reader

Ever since the 2014 coup d’etat Ukraine was descending deeper and deeper into the state of self destruction and utter madness, and when you just start to think that they hit the bottom, somebody knocks from below…

In her article Heil Poroshenko! Ukraine junta bans Russian SM, prepares to ban Russian Orthodox Church, Lada Ray tells about the last week’s bouts of madness, when Russian social media, search engine, anti-virus software, accounting software, and church where outlawed in Ukraine.

But not only Ukraine is out with the fairies, the collective West is encouraging it and has come to believe its own propaganda to such a degree that they are actually following in the Ukraine’s footsteps.

I was expecting some outbreaks and false flags during the grandest celebration time of the Russian world – the Victory Day of the 9th of May, and OCSE and Kiev delivered.

First, according to an article from Arguments and Facts, OCSE observers classified the unarmed retro machinery of WWII participating in the Victory Parade in Donetsk for violation of the Misnk agreement. Never mind that those Katjushas and T-34s would never fire again… Never mind that OCSE observers were invited to inspect the machinery that was going to participate in the parade – they ignored the invitation.


The legendary WWII T-34 tank


ZiS-5 with a division cannon ZiS-3


Katjusha

However, what OCSE observers stubbornly DO NOT notice is the constant shelling of Donetsk from the heavy Grad artillery by the Ukro-Nazis.

As for the false flag, that happened too at Avdeevka village. Read this Graham Philips report for the reality on the ground: Avdeevka Shelling: Who Did It? The Real Story, here is a fragment:

“It is another provocation ordered by the commander of the Donetsk operations and tactical group with involvement of the 72nd separate mechanized brigade, the Right Sector (a far right group banned in Russia), Ukraine’s National Guard along with foreign media outlets in the run-up to the Minsk talks,” the Donetsk news agency quoted the spokesperson as saying.

The DPR explained how the provocation was staged.

“The 72nd brigade opens fire on the DPR position, whereas the Right Sector is shelling Avdeyevka and foreign media are recording,” he said.

Meanwhile, well-known blogger Colonel Cassad analysed the photos of the shelling, concluding that it had actually come from the Ukraine-held settlement of Vodyane, around 5km from Avdeevka –


A few weeks ago I published a translation article Roman Dmowski – “The Ukrainian Question” political prophecy of 1930 coming true, and reader Peter left a comment, some the points therein I want to reply to:

The Ukrainian Russian refugee problem in Russia is huge. According to the Duma there are between 2.5 and 3 million Ukrainian refugees in Russia, but it is thought to be in excess of 3 million. But they aren’t sure because no real records have been kept; only the financials relating to those who have applied for ‘displaced persons pension’ (whatever that is).

A lot of people in Ukraine have relatives not only in Russia, but also across of the whole former USSR and the artificial borders of today mean that many families became torn apart. Thus many in Ukraine (who have not succumbed to the brainwashing) and want to leave the mad house, simply go to their relatives, and not only to Russia, without registering anywhere, so the numbers are much higher – only since 2014 Ukraine lost about 10 million people of its population.

ADDITION: I want to add here a translation of a fragment from Alexander Rogers’ article Ukrainianism means death, regarding the population numbers and the emigration from Ukraine.


However many people would say nasty things about the Soviet Union, its population grew steadily (not counting the periods of wars that were caused by external circumstances). Take any period of peace, and see that the population grows – that from 1922 to 1941, from 1946 to 1989. The increase of the population is not only an economic factor. People have children when they:
a) healthy values, not affected by extreme selfishness and consumerism (of various “childfree” kinds);
b) there are goals in life and confidence in the future.
And it’s safe to say that in the USSR both were present.

The population of the Ukrainian SSR also grew steadily while in the USSR. Ukraine of 1913 had a population of 35 million inhabitants, and by 1991 it grew to 52 million (if not for the civil war after the announcement of the UPR, in which Ukraine lost 9 million inhabitants, and the invasion of the Nazis in the Great Patriotic War, which killed about 9 million of Ukrainians, it would be even more).

However, after gaining independence, Ukraine’s population has been steadily declining. If at the beginning of the “independence” the population exceeds 52 million people, then by 2001 (data for the only census for all years of Ukraine’s existence as a state) it decreased to 48.4 million. Of which that that moment already over 3 million were “temporarily missing”, that is left for work or permanent residence abroad.

After the 2001 census no more were carried out, so that “dead souls” could be used for election fraud, and the real statistics of population decline would not frighten the thinking people. In 2013, Ukraine came up with a formal population of 45.4 million people (actually less, but it is hard to say for sure by how much).

After “revolution of a worthiness” the population began to fall catastrophically. About 2 million people left for Russia, together with Crimea. More than 4 million separated with LDNR. Only a little over 38 million were left. Of whom over 1.2 million are already issued or are in the process of obtaining Russian citizenship. At least another 3 million are in Russia on earnings, and not going back. Roughly comparable number left to relocate or work in the West (only Poland last year issued over a million work visas).

In general, the real number of the remaining population of Ukraine today is estimated by experts to be at about 28-30 million people, which is confirmed by data on the consumption of bread. And out of this number, 12 million are pensioners.

Continuing with answering Peter’s comment:

Have you read: https://biblicisminstitute.wordpress.com/2015/03/17/the-truth-about-the-conflict-with-russia/ It goes into some of the historical background of the Jewish ‘grudge’ against the Slavic peoples. I’m not sure of its accuracy but it makes for very interesting reading and seems to back up what you have translated here.

I have read that article now, and it seems to be more of a half-truth, which is often more dangerous than an outright lie. I disagree with their presentation of Scythians/Sarmatians. For that I’d recommend you watching the following documentary that I newly translated: Yes, Scythians Are Us! (Documentary with EngSubs). It has an angle, which is much more in accordance with the old Russian historical documents that I’ve read so far. I know that you read Lada Ray’s works. In that regard, I’d highly recommend reading her Earth Shift Report 6 – NEW KHAZARIAN KHAGANATE? as it is presenting the historic development in those parts in a truthful way.

There has been one consistent idiom behind most of the wars over the last twenty fire years since the folding of the USSR; and I mean the wars in the Balkans, the Caucuses, and the Middle East; and now in Ukraine; and that is an attack on the Slavic peoples and their interests. It is so clear. So blatant. So consistent. Everywhere Russia and the Slavic peoples have interests, the West foments discord in order to try and upset the status quo.

You are right there! That was the main reason the the destruction of Yugoslavia, for example – among all the other attacks on all things Slav. I think the it was last political prisoner of Europe – Radovan Karadzhic, who said that he is imprisoned for saying that Yugoslavs (South Slavs) are just Southern Russians…

What an amazing find. And it was written eighty years ago. Gold. Absolute gold.
I’d love to read more stuff like this; and the article about Donbas etc. This stuff just isn’t available via the MSM; and Google deliberately doesn’t index it accurately.

Here it is always best to go to the source, to the publications that have journalists on the ground. Or lacking such, turn to the freelance journalists. You probably already know of RT and Lada Ray’s Futurist Trendcast.

I can recommend following the posts and the YouTube channel of Graham Philips.

Another freelance journalist on the ground, reporting from Donetsk through his Twitter channel is Patrick Lancaster. You’ll hear daily reports from him.

There are several English-language Russian newspapers out there. Russia Insider is a croud-funded edition, run by the Western journalists, who did not succumb to Russophobia and the degradation of the journalistic standards. Then there is an English edition of the ITAR-TASS Russian News Agency. And finally, Sputnik News – and English edition of RIA News (Russian Information Agency).

Russian soldier saved the world – WWII memorial song by Artjom Grishanov

Now that the Victory Day – the 9th of May – is drawing close, we constantly see the ever-increasing attempts to re-write the history of WWII and to erase the Russian-Soviet victory which cost us 21 million people’s lives.

So does grow the importance of remembrance and of not allowing to have this memory to become sullied. Song has always been one of the strongest conduits of people’s emotions and memory, and the song below is a very emotional tribute and reminder.

Artjom Grishanov has the talent for condensing the essence of a topic that he sings about into a few well-selected strong words, backed by equally concise and poignant imagery. Russian soldier saved the world shows in no uncertain terms what the West wants to have remaining of the memory, and what we really should be remembering. Please, take a moment to listen to it (with English subtitles) and to remember.


The motto of the 9th of May: I Remember. I Am Proud. In the colours of the St. George Ribbon.

Roman Dmowski – “The Ukrainian Question” political prophecy of 1930 coming true

A few years ago I wrote a translation of a documentary, called Project ‘Ukraine’, which very well covered the history, running up to the creation of the geopolitical entity, known as “Ukraine”.

I have now come across an unlikely source of information, corroborating and expanding on the theses put forth in the documentary above. It comes from a Polish politician Roman Dmowski and his 1930 work “Kwestia ukraińska” – “The Ukrainian Question”.

Below is my translation of a Russian article, which analyses his work: Year 1930: Roman Dmowski on Ukrainian Independence.

1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2Please note that translating a documentary film or an article takes a lot of time and emotional effort. I am doing it on a voluntary basis, but if someone feels like supporting my work, a Bitcoin donation to the following address is appreciated: 1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2


What is distinguishing a natural-born politician from a random rogue, hanging out on the political stage? The sense of political acumen, the ability to predict the course of events for decades to come signs that are little noticeable at the moment.

Roman Dmowski had this gift in abundance. The expert on Slavic history, active political leader of Poland of the first third of the twentieth century, opponent of Jozef Pilsudski. They say that in his youth Pilsudski stole Dmowski’s wife. Dmowski remained a bachelor, while in politics he seriously disagreed with Pilsudski.

Dmowski was a more measured politician than Pilsudski with his clinical Russophobia. During the revolution of 1905, Dmowski, remaining a Polish patriot, urged the Poles to ally with the Russian tsars, and during the First World War, unlike Pilsudski, he took the side of the Entente. However the proclaimed ultimate goal of his policy was always the building of a national Polish state.

Dmowski’s attitude to the Ukrainian question is noteworthy. Especially interesting is his extensive article “The Ukrainian Question” (“Kwestia ukraińska”). It does not exist in a Russian or Ukrainian translation, more’s the pity. The reader would be able to meet Dmowski’s predictions about the future of Ukrainian statehood and witness an amazing accuracy of his predictions. The “Ukrainian question” was written over 80 years ago – in 1930, when there was not even talk of independence of Ukraine, but Dmowski’s internal sense of politics foresaw much of what we are witnessing today. So…

From the first lines Dmowski indicates that the separate existence of the Ukrainian people begins only in the XIX century, and the dialect of the people “reached the level of literary language”, so the appearance of independent Ukraine on the world map was only a matter of time. The author agrees that the term “Ukraine” designated the lands near the Eastern edge of the Polish Commonwealth, and it had no political and national significance. Dmowski also acknowledges the fact of the unity of the Russian language from the Carpathian mountains to the Pacific ocean, and that the regional differences between the three Russian pieces (Greater Russia (Velikorossia), Rus Minor (Malorossia), Belorussia) was caused by the defeat of Kiev by the nomads.

As a cultural and historical whole, Ukraine does not exist for Dmowski. Different parts of it had different history and it makes no sense to speak of a single Ukrainian nation. He considered Chernigov and Poltava to be the most “Ukrainian”, while the spirit of Ukraine is expressed by “the great writer Gogol”. The author acknowledges that the tsarist authorities did not put obstacles in the way of literary and cultural ukrainophilism, but the Poles embarked on the transformation of this innocent ukrainophilism into a ukrainophilism of a different kind – political.

Ukraine is less interesting from the national-cultural point of view, than from the political-economic perspective, and that last factor is the key in the idea of Ukrainian independence. The populist idea that was so popular in the nineteenth century, became quickly adopted by the international powerhouses. Therefore, in the early twentieth century, the term “Ruthenian” (Rusin) – referring to the inhabitants of Galicia and Bukovina – is replaced by the term “Ukrainian” in the Austrian political discourse.

“The ease with which the official Vienna jumped from a local, narrow concept of “Rusin” (Ruthenian) to the broad concept of “Ukrainian” and thus the internal Ruthenian issue turned into an international Ukrainian issue is surprising,” writes Dmowski. Austria-Hungary, which was already associated with Germany in a close Union, went on to an even greater rapprochement with Berlin so as to have in the face of Germany as a second German state, an additional support for the Austrian Germans. It was just at that period that the common German political literature took up the production of a new state concept – Larger Ukraine. “A German Consulate is opened in Lvov – not for the German citizens, of which there were none in Eastern Galicia, but for the political cooperation with the Ukrainians, which subsequently became publicly disclosed”.

With the replacement of the “Ruthenian” question with the “Ukrainian” issue, the political centre of gravity shifted from Vienna to Berlin. There was no Ruthenian population in Germany, but the Ruthenian question very keenly interested the German strategists, who “on the eve of the First World War looked at Russia as an object of economic exploitation”. However, the discovery of coal and iron on the territory of Donbass (which would be transferred from the RSFSR to the UkSSR by the Soviet authorities) allowed the Russian Empire to begin strengthening their own industry, while for Germany that meant not only the closure of the Russian market for its exports, but also the emergence of a new competitor in the Asian markets.

Germany firmly asserted its presence in Turkey at the same time (during the First World War the Turks will act as the allies of the Germans), and they needed to remove Russia out of the way for the complete control over the Black Sea region and the Balkans: “All these dangers and difficulties were eliminated by the bold project of establishing an independent Ukraine. Given the national and cultural weakness of the Ukrainian population, its lack of solidity, the presence on the sea coast of peoples, who have nothing to do with Ukrainianism, a large Jewish population and a considerable number of German colonists in the Kherson region and Crimea, you can be sure that this new state will be easily subdued the Germanic influence. Independent Ukraine promises to be a political and economic branch of Germany”.

At the same time Russia would lose the opportunity to influence European policy, would be pushed away (albeit partially) from the Black Sea and would also lose influence in the Balkans, which improved the positions of the Ottoman Empire – a German ally and the eternal enemy of the Southern Slavs (Yugoslavs). In addition, the Ukrainian project was the German anti-Polish project, allowing to hit with one shot two German opponents – Poland and Russia.

For Dmowski the Ukrainian question was inseparably linked with oil. Due to the deposits of the Caucasian oil, Russia entered the small circle of privileged states with oil wealth. The oil of the New and Old world was already divided between the Western powers. Venezuelan, Colombian, Mexican, Peruvian crude oil was under US control; the Indian was under the control of the Dutch; Iranian and Iraqi – under the British control. The distribution of oil wealth meant the distribution of world powers and oil-rich Russia, with borders from the Pacific to the Carpathians was not included in the calculations of the West. “Ukraine has no oil… but if one understands its territorial scope in a wide sense, extending it to the Caspian sea, as some do, then the separation of Ukraine from Russia will lead to separation of the latter from the Caucasus and the liberation of the Caucasian oil from under her control,” concludes Dmowski, stating that the Ukrainian question is the issue of crude (Russian) oil.

How can one not remember the numerous statements of today’s national-patriots about “ethnic Ukrainian lands”, reaching the foothills of the Caucasus, and dashing statements of Michael Kolodzinski, a member of the OUN and the author of the military doctrine of Ukrainian nationalism: “We, who are building the Ukrainian state, must push the border of Europe to the Altai and Dzhungaria…. Ukraine aims to link this area with Europe politically, economically and culturally… and the phrase “on the border of two worlds” will get a real sense… Like Caesar, conquering Gaullia, opened the whole of Europe to the Roman culture and civilization, so will our nationalist revolutionary army must open to Western European culture the space, stretching to the South and South–East of Ukraine… This was the great goal of our life as nation and race, – to take possession of the steppes above the Black and Caspian seas and to build a new centre of world civilization on the verge of two continents”.

Dmowski insists on the rejection of the idyllic interpretations of the Ukrainian question as a matter of the people, suddenly awakened to political life in the nineteenth century. The Ukrainian problem got its scope due to the support of Germany, while the restoration of the Polish state only added urgency to it. An independent Ukraine with the deliberately undefined boundaries to the West became for Berlin a convenient way to get Poland to be flexible in determining the lines of the Polish-German border.

“In recent years, thanks to the coal and iron of the Donetsk basin and the Caucasus oil, Ukraine has become a subject of vivid interest of European and American capital and took a place in their plans for economic and political control of the world in the near future,” said Dmowski. External forces, causing the split between Ukraine and Russia, would never agree to the creation of a small Ukrainian state: “Only a large, as large as possible, Ukraine could solve the problems, that were giving the Ukrainian question such a broad meaning”.

“Ukraine has made a great career, but did the Ukrainians do so?” – the author asks the rhetorical question, alluding to the foreign trace in the Ukrainian question and predicting the future independent Ukraine hard times as soon as it becomes independent.

And it’s not from the machinations of “our enemies”, but from the future political elites’ lack of experience in managing such a large state and solving geopolitical problems of the country, something that they have never experienced before, being part of a larger geopolitical organism (Russian Empire, USSR).

Dmowski predicts the emergence of serious problems in the then non-Ukrainian Crimea and the Caucasus – as a consequence of the emergence of an externally controlled Ukraine next to Russia and the attempts of its creators to advance further into Russian territory. The Ukrainian people cannot solve all these problems, also due to the absence “of the outstanding instinct of statesmanship”, which characterizes Russians. According to Dmowski, stable and independent Ukraine is beyond the power of the Ukrainian people.

“However, there are those who can manage it [instead], but therein lies the tragedy. No human force is able to prevent the transformation of the independent and cut off from Russia Ukraine into a convergence spot for a bunch of speculators from all over the world, who can’t spread their wings in their own countries – the capitalists and seekers of capital, merchants, speculators, and schemers, thieves and prostitution organizers of all stripes. The Germans, the French, the Belgians, the Italians, the British and Americans would rush to the aid of nearby [ethnic] Russians, Poles, Armenians, Greeks, numerous, and most important, Jews… All these elements, with the aid… of the slyest of Ukrainians would create a ruling class, the elite… and no other state would be able boast such a rich set of international dregs”.

Here is the answer to the question why the Ukrainian government, comprised of people of different nationalities, remains the eternal guardian of Ukrainian nationalism! This is a business project, gentlemen, and no patriotism!

“Ukraine would become a boil on the body of Europe… – continues Dmowski, – and the people, dreaming of creating a cultural, healthy and strong Ukrainian nation, which would ripen in their own state, would see that instead of their own country they acquired an international enterprise, while instead of development they got a rapid progress of decay and rot. Those who think that… could it be otherwise, have not a penny’s worth of imagination. There are many managers of the Ukrainian question – both in Ukraine and abroad. Especially among the latter most clearly understand what they are aiming for. But there are also those who understand the project of Ukraine’s alienation from Russia in too a rural form. These naïve people would do well if they did not come near it.”

Sad, but true words.

Tribute to the victims of the St.Petersburg Metro bombing – by Graham Philips

The independent crowd-funded freelance journalist Graham Philips published a much-needed tribute to the now 14 victims of the blast in St.Petersburg.

St Petersburg Metro Terror Attack: Who Were the Victims? tells a short story of each of the person, whose life was so abruptly and pointlessly snuffed out.

Tragic news today, as it was announced that one of the victims, wounded in the 3rd April Metro attack in St Petersburg had passed away in hospital, taking the death toll to 14 now, with it only yesterday having been announced that all 13 victims of the blast had been laid to rest.

However, little attention in the western media has been given to any of the victims, those killed by the terror metro blast. So, here is who they were.

We shall remember them…

Russian industry before 1917, as seen from the Chicago Expo publication of 1893

I have earlier published a translation of a series of articles When Rouble Was Golden – Russia that we lost in the ashes of WWI and the coup d’etats of 1914-1917.

I am currently perusing in my free time reading of many of the old Russian books – as early as those dating back to 1600, and as a late as 1900. Interestingly, The Russian language of the 1600-1700 is very easy to read only equipped with the knowledge of the modern Russian language, and a few basic rules, which points to an organic development of the language, as opposed to many modern artificial languages (like Ukrainian), where the connection between the generations of language carriers was severed one or several times.

As a curious echo to the retrospective of the pre-revolution Russia, I acme across a 752-page long publication “Factory-industrial produce and trade of Russia”, published in 1893 to the Columbian Expo in Chicago. Here is its opening passage:

Marking the 400 years of the discovery of the New Worlds, the Congress of the Northern-American United States considered it most wise to organise an international competition in the peaceful venue of industry and trade, and with this in mind, this year sees opening of the International Fair in Chicago, called “Columbian” commemorating the name of the jubilant. Russia, heartened by the old sympathies connecting the American and the Russian peoples, responded to the invitation from the North-American Federation with the liveliest eager and participated in the exposition with many and diverse exhibits.

Highlighting is mine – have we ever had it, I wonder? Do we still have it at the grass-root level?

The publication includes much interesting statistics and descriptions of the blossoming Russian industry. The introductory section is written by Dmitrij Medleev, who is best remembers as the Russian chemistry scientist creating the periodic system of elements, though he himself view the creation of the customs system as his greatest achievement.

And now to the icing on the cake – the map of Russia and industrialisation in its different parts:

Legend is as follows: Colour represents the output in millions of the then gold roubles from 1-50 million in lightest to over 200 million in darkest hue.
Numbers in triangles: the population in million people
Thee number is squares from top to bottom are the number of factories/industries that are: exempt from tax, taxed, and mining
Number in the circle is the number of square geographic miles in thousands.
The lines are the railway connections.

As we can see, Moscow region (I) had the highest output and the highest population density, closely followed by the Baltic-Petersburg region (II) with St.Petersburg and Riga as their centres.

Finland (III) had its fair share of industrialisation and quite high output. Finland was on a position of a confederation subject within the Russian Empire, and a whole section of the publication is dedicated for Finland.

Another highly-industrialised area of Russia was Pre-Visla region with Warsaw as its centre.

The Southern region (IX) and Malorossia (XIII) with Rostov, Harkov and Kiev as their centres follow.

Note the railway, connecting Moscow and Simferopol in Crimea – it was built for the money that Russia received from the sale of Alaska to the Northern-American United States.

Even the contents at the top level of the Sections speaks volumes in that historical publication:

  1. Introduction and overview by D. Mendeleev
  2. Manufacturing industry
  3. Paper pruduction
  4. Leather production
  5. Rubber production
  6. Wood processing
  7. Manufacture of metal products
  8. Mechanical engineering
  9. Gglassmaking
  10. Ceramic production
  11. Chemical industry (this one is also written by D. Mendeleev)
  12. Match production
  13. Oil industry (also by D. Mendeleev)
  14. Cement production
  15. Sugar production
  16. Brewery and fermenting pruduction
  17. Tobacco produce
  18. Foods production (flour and oil)
  19. Shipbuilding and shipping
  20. Transportation production (incl. rubber tires)
  21. Overview of the Russian customs tariff system (by Timirjazjev)
  22. The foreign trade
  23. Domestic trade and fairs in Russia
  24. Fuel consumption for industrial purposes
  25. Wages and working hours in factories
  26. Industry Of The Grand Duchy Of Finland

The ”Wild 90s” in Russia, as reflected in people’s memory. Part 2.

Two years ago I published an article The ”Wild 90s” in Russia, as reflected in people’s memory, where I translated one testimonial of a survivor of the Yeltsin’s Wild 90’s in Russia. Such survivors are many, yet many more perished – in Russia more people died during Yeltsin than during WWII. In that article I also detailed Yeltsin’s coup d’etat of November 1993.

Now, a few days ago, the ignominious Navalny organised an “anti-corruption” rally in Moscow and several of Russia’s cities. I am not going to go into the details of how only 8000 people out of the 12 million population of Moscow was seen at this colour revolution attempt. I will not go into details of how Navalny turned to the political paedophilia, luring school-aged kids onto the streets with the promise of paying them €10000 if they manage to get arrested, and how the “political speeches” of said kids said that they want to buy sneakers. The use of kids seems to be in the instruction book of any colour revolt worth its name (see “protests” against Charles de Gaulle). I will not go into the details of how Navalny – a jobless man – manages to own expensive car, finance organisation of revolts and produce Hollywood-class films, and why this corruption fighter has several criminal corruption cases over him regarding illegal forest deals.

What I want to go into detail about, is the main chant of Navalny and co., of all the anti-Russian, Russophobic traitors organising such revolts: “Putin must go”. That’s all of their agenda. They say absolutely nothing about how Russia should be governed or about the future. At best they position themselves as the next presidents and say a few abstract words about how there’ll be no corruption and everyone will be equal. Aha! The same manifestos were proclaimed in 1917. And in 1991.

And this is what I am coming towards. All the Navalny-class “liberals” are aiming to bring Russia to the condition of the Yeltsin’s 1993-1999 era. The Desolation of Yeltsin as I like to call it, referring to the Desolation of Smaug.

By 1999 the “progress and democracy” in Russia reached such levels that the population was dying out from hunger, military and statehood all but destroyed. Foreign NATO-sponsored Islamic insurgency in Chechenia was at its peak. Here is a link to an article from Lenta.ru from 29.09.1999 with the telling title “Russia begs USA for a little more food”. Sad and detrimental, yet it fully reflects the reality of those days.

My family and I were touched by those events before we emigrated in 1993. I remember well how I had to stand at the entrance to a market, selling toys, books, plastic bags (yes, the Western plastic bags, if you could get your hands on them, were worth a few kopeks), various small items from home – anything, just to get some money so as to buy food and set something aside for the vague plans for the future. We were a middle-class family, my grandfather worked in the 50s at the Far East, where the Soviet government paid the so-called “Northern money”, so we were well-off, until 1992, when the whole country and its population got robbed over night. By the likes of Berezovskij, Yeltsin, Kuchma, Nemtsov, Khodorkovskij, Navalny, Kudrin, Yavlinskij and other “communists” cum “oligarchs” and “democrats”.

The upper right corner in the image below illustrates what it was like from my point of view, selling your last things.


Do you remember the 90s? All of the “civilised West” are our friends, while USA is the best pal.

Below I want to translate testimonials from several people of that time, as they recall it now, warning the youth of today not to repeat the same naïve mistake as the one that brought chaos on their own heads.

The first collection of testimonials starts as an open, public domain letter, titled “Anyone, who remembers well what happened in the 90s, should be grateful to this man…”, and it originally appeared at LiveJournal here.

I turned 17 in 1991.

All the trash that is now criticizing Putin was in power back then.

I don’t remember anything good of what they did. I remember how they destroyed my country, I remember how people were not paid wages for years, how a professor of nuclear physics worked with me and cleaned animal skins with a scythe, how my mother, having worked for 23 years as a head nurse of the paediatric intensive care unit and revived many a dozen children, became a “shuttle trader”. (Translator note for the Westerners: people went to China or West and bought some cheap goods, smuggled them and tried to make a living reselling)

I remember the gangs of bastards, collecting tributes, even from old ladies selling sunflower seeds. (Translator note: market gangs, the utmost dregs of society. Berezovskij came from that “environments”.) I remember how kidnapping for ransom in my city of Nalchik was turned into an industry, and how the filth that did that was considered respectable people.

I remember how happily Americans were let into the most secret military facilities, how for their sake aircraft, missiles, submarines and other achievements of my homeland were cut to pieces.

I remember the poor old people begging. I remember the downtrodden Afghan war veterans, who were mutilated in battles, served the orders of their Motherland, are now spat upon by today’s “liberasts” (Translator note: common in today’s Russia folk by-name, combining the words for “liberal” and “homosexual”).

Shall I continue???

I also remember how, two weeks after Putin came to power, the kidnappings stopped. I remember how the Chechens, whom I personally always respected, from the enemies of Russia were reborn into her faithful warriors.

I see how my country began again to build gas pipelines, aircraft, ships and so on. I see how my sons, like I in my childhood, become proud of their country. Everything is relative.

Hence is the question: How can “liberasts”, who sold their Homeland, have the audaciousness to blather all sorts of nonsense about Putin? What have they left after themselves to him, to bark that “Putin ruined” something?

It is, first and foremost, their fault in what is going on in Ukraine today, it is they, who have created this situation in 1991. Nemtsov and his ilk… there must be no monuments to them, least of all in the centre of Moscow. (Translator note: “Liberals” push for that after the Western sacrificial murder of Nemtsov in Moscow). They need to be burned and the ashes scattered to the wind.

Appeal to the young people: do NOT believe the “liberatst”, don’t look up at the “stars” (what a retarded term), like Ksenia Sobchak, do not take the example from prostitutes and bastards. They are all lying.

We are the greatest country in the world. Ask how many achievements ranging from military exploits and to science, sports, and everything else, belongs to our compatriots.

Do not let those, whom we taught to wash, teach us culture. (Translator note to the Westerners: Russian Anna Yaroslavna (born in 1024), when she became the Queen of France, brought with her the tradition of frequent washing – banja, which is common in Russia, yet was viewed as strange in the then W.Europe., as well as introducing at the French Court the custom of eating with silverware, of reading, and many other civilisational traits.)

Don’t let those who begot fascism, the Inquisition, and other atrocities, teach us the love of mankind. Those who marry perverts in the Churches, teach us human values.

We are Russia, and our path is different from theirs.”

© Authorship lost, anyone who survived during the restructuring can subscribe to this…

Comments from the post with additional testimonials:

Tatiana Potapova: “I, too, remember the gangs of bastards who held the markets in fear. Snickering masters of life. And I also remember homeless children, lousy, dirty, hungry, who raided the trading rows of the markets and would grab from the shelves anything edible. I pushed food into their hands. There were so many of them! The officials were not interested in their fate. Where they lived? If they had parents? Nobody picked them off the streets and into boarding schools for approximately ten years. Since Putin came to power, children were rounded up and sent to the boarding schools. Now, those officials who ruthlessly robbed the people and as a result small children ended up on the street, hungry, unwashed, not having seen any kindergartens or schools… now these officials hate Putin and call him a thief… They project their sin onto Putin. Probably because they can get neither sleep nor rest.”

Olga Malinova: “I remember the 90s. My brother and I wanted to eat one day, went to the kitchen, found the millet and vegetable oil. We shook their common savings and spent the money on a loaf of bread.”

Valery Vishnyakov: “We borrowed money from the neighbours for a half of a black bread. And our father was an oil industry worker. He was just not paid the money. I used to give my food to the younger brother. Parents still do not know about that… Give us back Stalin. The iron curtain. The Soviet Union…”

Liliya Karimova: “I Remember how bad it was. I went to the post office for aid money, but the money were not transferred for more than six months. Used to come home crying not knowing what to cook, it was good that the collective farm gave grain that we would bring to the mill – at least we got bread, and had our own cow, otherwise I would have died of hunger. Writing this now and crying.”

Maria Glova: “I was unable to go after the school to Institute, as parents – doctors – had their wages delayed and they were afraid that I would not be able to find food in another city. In those days we lived off the garden, planted potatoes, ploughed field 5 days in a week and spent 2 days in the garden.”

Eketerina Yasakova: “And I remember only too well the 90s. Terrible years. My children then were just toddlers”


The second testimonial article is titled “The answer to those, who say they live badly in Putin’s Russia”. This material is much more down to earth, gritty and grim, like the years it describes.


Subtext: “How I survived in the 90s in Russia without Putin”

A young man in his 20s wrote to me from his iPhone from Russia about how his life sucks “under Putin”. I briefly described to him how I lived without Putin in the late 90s.

I will write this again, maybe it will come in handy to someone from Ukraine.

Morning.

Woke up, thank God that I’m alive. Had breakfast, tea with jam from my grandmother. That’s all the food. There is nothing more to eat.

Later in the morning.

There is no work, the factory was bankrupted by Nemtsovs-Kasyanov and other f*ing privatizers, nothing to do… But the tea, even with jam is not food. It is necessary to find food. Mobiles did not yet exist, so I go to a friend who is in the same position, but worse, because he has a wife and a son. What are we going to do, where to look for food? Decided to go fishing.

Morning, closer to dinner.

Threw in the net from a boat probably constructed during Lenin’s time. Waited. While waiting, caught some frogs, made a campfire, roasted frog legs, ate them. Wanted to smoke, but have no money… walked down the street, collecting the “butts”, nearby others like us harvested, started swearing at us, saying that’s not our territory. We calm them down. Will not go into details of how… you survive however you can.

Dinner.

Rummaged through all of the waste dumps already, not a single thread of metal left. (Translator’s note: People scavenged any metal and sold it to collectors. Pipes, machinery, anything got melted. The same process is going in Ukraine now. If anyone wants a glorified fictitious parallel, think Rey from Star Wars, The Force Awakens.) Telling my friend – let’s go to the village nearby. We went. Knocked at the first house. Explained why we came to a grandmother, age 80. We collect metal, if you have any, we can help to dig up the garden lot as the payment of it… Grandmother asked to plough up 3 acres, flooded in the spring. We did that. Plus I, as a radio hobbyist, repaired antenna on her TV. She gave us 8 kilogrammes of aluminium pans, and even money!!!

After dinner.

For the money we immediately bought a pack of cigarettes and 2 Snickers. We ate the Snickers right away, to at least have some strength, had a smoke and went to deliver metal to the collectors. Delivered, got a few kopecks… But at least that’s something. Went to the nets.

Afternoon snack time.

Came to nets, and there see some blokes pulling them out and taking our fish. Without hesitation, we beat them up very very seriously, although we knew that they are in the same situation as us. But to steal at the time of hunger from your own people is worse than being a liberal! Took out fish and went home.

Evening.

Gave part of the fish to the wives, carried the other part to the market. Sold for a penny, but at least that’s something. Bought pasta and sugar. Brought that home. Bought for the remaining money 0.5l of homebrew from a local hag.

Late in the evening.

Sitting at the porch, drinking, smoking and looking to a brighter future. A radio of Chinese make says: An unknown to anyone Vladimir Putin may possibly become a temporary figure after the ailing Boris Yeltsin…

So, young people of 20-30 years. If your life is shitty in Russia, under Putin, look at Ukraine now, or at my personal experience of survival in the ’90s. Although, all the same, you’ll learn nothing.

Sincerely, Pavel Smirnov.


Putin’s promise in 2000: “I shall be with the Army, I shall be with the Fleet, I shall be with the People. And together we shall rebuild both the Army, the Fleet and the Country.” And he didn’t lie. Thank you, Vladimir Vladimirovich.

Explosive News from Former Ukraine – false flag murder of Russian ex-PM, Eurovision scandal, Balakleya arms depot fire

The events in former Ukraine are ever accelerating to the logical conclusion outcome of what was started with Maidan coup d’etat of 2014 – complete self-destruction of the country. The economy and political system are already done. The situation is becoming more and more dire and surreal with every day.

In the latest 2 articles, Lada Ray reports of 3 recent events. Read on:

Lada Ray on Voronenkov Murder in Kiev & Eurovision 2017 Yulia Samoylova Scandal

False flag murder of Voronenkovs – to cast blame on Russia. Lada explains in this article who benefits from his death and why Kiev had to stage it now.

Earlier today ex-Russian Duma deputy Denis Voronenkov was gunned down in the center of Kiev, next to the luxury hotel Premier Palace. Voronenkov died on site. His bodyguard was wounded by the gunman but was able to shoot him in return. According to first info from Kiev, both wounded gunman and bodyguard were taken to the hospital. Later, Kiev authorities announced that the killer ‘probably won’t survive.’ The curious thing is that the name of the killer has not been made public. It was only said that he was from Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

People in the know surmise that the gunman was probably a member of one of the ukro-nazi battalions and former ATO member, who may have the blood of the Donbass people on his hands.

One of the connections, is the huge scandal around Ukraine banning Russian singer, Yulia Samoylova with her song “Flame Is Burning”

A couple of days ago Kiev announced that Yulia Samoylova is banned from Eurovision contest and from entry into Ukraine for 5 years because she has visited Crimea where she sang in a concert. Despite gross violation of the law, OSCE has declared that they see no problem. The organizers of Eurovision are trying to bury the scandal, while Western MSM has collectively developed sudden blindness.

I’ve just recalled the out-of-this-world howling that took place before the Sochi Olympics about alleged gays’ rights violations in Russia. Russians went out of their way to welcome everyone, including gays, who were parading around Sochi to the welcoming smiles of their Russian hosts.

Just imagine if a cripple in a wheelchair was denied participation in an international event in Russia. The stink from the ‘civilized world’ would have been heard for years. Here, not a single voice of any European ‘human rights’ or ‘handicapped defense’ organization. Complete silence. Where are petitions, protests and boycott of Kiev Eurovision?

And now comes the news of a huge fire at the Blakley arms depot, the largest in the former Ukraine. And of the madmen in the former Ukraine contaminating the borderland of Donbass with the radioactive materials from Chernobyl area!

Horrific catastrophe unfolding at Ukraine’s largest Balakleya arms depot!

For the second day the horrific cannonade is continuing, as the missiles and arms stored at Ukraine’s largest arms depot in Balakleya, Kharkov Oblast, mass explode. Allegedly the wholesale destruction of the largest storage of offensive weapons in Ukraine began as a result of a fire. Ukraine military is being accused of creating the catastrophe.

Over 20 thousand people have evacuated from the nearby city of Balakleya. Locals continue fleeing in haste. Casualties are unknown, being hushed up by Ukraine authorities.

The infamous Balakleya arms depot stored weapons used to kill the people of Donbass. Fewer weapons left in Ukraine means fewer deaths in Donetsk and Lugansk. Among weapons stored at this facility were the feared Tochka-U missiles, which Kiev army had unleashed on LDPR.

Radiation disaster in the making!

As a side note, the intel I receive is that Kiev army experiences a huge shortage of tanks and armored vehicles to attack Donbass.

To compensate for that, Poroshenko ordered to retrieve the old tanks and military vehicles once used by the USSR in Chernobyl remedial efforts and abandoned inside radioactive zone. Thousands of radioactive vehicles have been stored there. Now these are being repurposed by Kiev. Some are used as scrap, melted to manufacture new weapons; others are fixed up and sent straight to Donbass. Reportedly, a large percentage of the Kiev army ATO soldiers now suffer from radiation poisoning. Of course, the real condition and percentages of those affected are hushed up.

The newest worrying development: it appears Kiev decided to do the unthinkable – build a radioactive barrier between LDPR and Ukraine. Witnesses have been posting videos of Ukraine army hauling radioactive vehicles from Chernobyl and dumping them on the front line between LDPR and Kiev-controlled side. This includes heavy trucks and other machinery used by the USSR in Chernobyl remedial efforts. The result may be disastrous. All that radioactive machinery is moved through Ukraine countryside and cities, then maliciously dumped in E. Ukraine fields, possibly close to where people live and grow crops.

Yes, Scythians Are Us! (Documentary with EngSubs)

In 2014 Russian TV channel Culture aired a documentary, looking through depth of time, trying to decipher who are Scythians, Sarmatians, Slavs and Russians, if they are one and the same people. The conclusion was mostly positive – yes, they are. The authors looked at the data from the chronicles, archaeology, linguistics and genetics, weighing arguments both for and against.

The film’s conclusion is open, and in a typical Russian way advocating peace and cooperation of all peoples, whoever their ancestors may be.

1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2Please note that translating a documentary film or an article takes a lot of time and emotional effort. I am doing it on a voluntary basis, but if someone feels like supporting my work, a Bitcoin donation to the following address is appreciated: 1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2

I want to add one material to better illustrate the point, made at 24:04, and citing Lavrentij Chronicles. I have the copies of those texts, and present the excerpt below with the words “Great Scythia” highlighted.


In the year 6415 Oleg went against Greece, having left Igor in Kiev; taking the multitude of Varjags, Slovens, Chudis, Krivichis, Merjus, Poljans, Severjan (Northerners), Drevljans (elder ones), Radimichis, Horvats (Croats), Dulebs, Tiverce, who are known as Tolkovny (Tolmachi – interpreters): and together they are called the Great Scythia (Velikaja Skuf’). And together with all of these Oleg went astride horses and in the ships, and the ships were counting 2000. And when they arrived at Czargrad, and Greece…

One notable thing, besides the mention of the Scythians as a collective name of the Slav people, is the date: year 6415. That is a separate topic of the Russia calendar, that was discarded by Peter I, and which lead to shortening and subsequent rewriting of the Russian history to suit the needs of the influentially growing Germanic aristocracy that was slowly taking over Russia’s political life at that time. I am going to publish a separate article about it soon.

Addendum: a 1531 map of the Turkish admiral Piri-Reis came to my attention:

Piri Reis Map

Leaving aside the fact that it shows the coastline of Antarctica, uncovered by ice – probably from before the quite recent Flood time, when that continent’s coastline was accessible, we can look at the following part of Eurasia and see…

Scytia – mentioned twice, as well as Tartaria, Russia, and Bulgaria – the latter where it was supposed to start, along the Volga (Volgari-Bolgari) river bank, Est from the Crimean meridian.

And now, on to the documentary…

The formatted subtitle file in ASS format can be downloaded separately. Full text of the script is below the video frame.

In 2001, in the village of Kostjonka in Vornezh oblast, archaeologists found a fragment of a figure –
a head of a person, carved from a mammoth tusk by an ancient master.
Such finds happen from time to time, awakening interest only among those interested in archaeology.
However, the nuclear-carbon dating showed the age of the figure: between 33000 and 38000 years.
Paleomagnetic measurements gave a more precise reading: the Kostjonka find is 42000 years old.
This was a true world sensation.
Never before were such ancient human depictions found anywhere in the world.
From this fact one can draw the conclusion – it was here, in Russia, that the Homo Sapience civilisation took root.
YES, SCYTHIANS ARE US!
In the times long gone people lived here,
they built dwellings, hunted mammoth, created tools from bone and stone,
as wells as statuettes like these.
A small figurine of a pregnant woman, created by an unknown artist,
is the first in a long row of the immortal works of art.
The human history has not yet started,
the deathly breath of the ice was still felt,
and tens of thousands of years are yet to pass before Mesopotamia is populated,
before the human voices are to be heard on the shores on Nile, Huan He and Ganges,
before the walls of Athens and Rome would rise,
while on the Don-river there is already a proto-city with a population of 300 people.
Maybe it is from here that people would set off to conquer and populate the planet?
[Anatolij Kljosov: Professor, Doctor of Chemistry]
For some reason, in the academic historic science, there is a custom to explicitly devalue the significance of Slavs, of Russians.
As the result one has a complete undervaluation of the history of the Russian people.
Take, for example, the term “Slav”, and ask any historian when Slavs appeared.
He’d reply, around tear 500AC, 1500 years ago.
That’s when the Slavic group of _languages_ appears.
A group of languages, which got transposed into the historic category, while it’s a linguistic one.
Didn’t they father and mother before that?
Well, they’d reply, they were not yest Slavs. But that’s their opinion.
That’s how you called it and that naming fossilised.
In reality those people and their ancestors lived there for thousands of years.
The history of the appearence of the Russian people is dark and mysterious.
The acknowledged chronicle texts tell about the events, starting from the 9th century.
But tell nothing of what happened before that.
Let us again open the “Tale of the Times” and read:
The German philosopher Hegel described the Russian people among all the Slav peoples as “non-historic”.
The Russian philosopher Chaadaev postulated that Russia has no history,
that Russia belongs to a non-organised, non-historic type of cultural phenomena.
However, here is how the poet Osip Maldenstam would reply to them in the 20th century:
“Such a highly-organised, such an organic language is not just a doorway the the history, but the history herself.”
Even Pushkin wrote that “The Tale of Igor’s Army” lists so many languages that were in use then,
[Jurij Yahontov: Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences]
but so as to write such an ingenious work, one had to know all those languages, which is unrealistic.
This means that it most probably was written in a common Slavic language.
It also appears that at the time when Rurik was invited (to rule The Novgorod Republic), they spoke a common Slavic language –
everyone understood each other.
It appears that before Oleg, that is before the Rurik dynasty, there were some kinds of Slavic states.
[Andreij Burovskij: Professor, Doctor of Historical Science]
At least 3 or 4 are mentioned.
Some think that on the Central Dnepr there was a so-called Russian Khaganat,
that is some state was created with the help of Khazars.
And even without it, at least 3 are mentioned and are recognisable.
The Arabic sources of the 7th-8th centuries speak of Artania, Kujavia and Slavia.
The location of Artania is still being looked for.
But most definitely, Kujavia is Kiev, Kievan Rus,
while Slavia is most probably the surroundings of the Ilmenskj Slovens –
that is the surroundings of the modern Great Novgorod.
Russian language, Russian culture, the Russian way of life, the Russian state, the great Russian contribution to the world civilisation.
Could all this have sprung out of a void?
If yes, then Russia is resembling a building without the first floors, a building suspended in thin air.
The further we descend into the haze of time, the more puzzles and strange coincidences start to appear.
It is customary to think that Slavs were the ancestors of the Russians.
The first detailed and historically correct information about them is dated by the middle of the first century.
However, by that time, the Slavs are already the most numerous nation in Europe. How can this be?
Where were they hiding before that from the eye of the inquisitive neighbours?
Sarmats lived on these territories before the Slavs.
And before them – Scythians.
Both mysteriously vanished from the Eurasian steppes.
On the same land, one and the same play with abrupt appearing and mysterious disappearing
was played out with three different peoples.
Historians have long ago noticed this historical paradox.
“A nation cannot vanish like fog and move about like checkers.”
Egor Klassen, a Russian scientist, tried to convince his colleges and the reading audience.
When they say that Sarmatians destroyed Scythians. Whom did they destroy? Slaughtered millions of people? I don’t believe that.
Hundreds of thousands? Little probable.
The elites, the most symbolic people were eliminated.
While the mass of those, who were called Scythians, became a part of Sarmatians.
This wasn’t so much a vanishing mystery, as a mystery of their abandoning of a large territory.
Two reasons are usually pointed out: ecological changes, and the second is
[Vladimir Malyshev: Fellow of Science of Archaeology at the Russian Academy]
the inflow of the Sarmatians, which, according to the old sources, resulted in Sarmatians massacring the whole population of Scythians.
However, as is known, there were no genocides in that epoch.
The practise of genocide is a much later phenomenon.
Total extermination did not happen.
Most probably people simply left and abandoned that territory.
The history knows many case when nations and their names live different lives.
In the ancient times, a name of a nation was often short-lived.
It could be connected to the geographic location, and would change as the nation moved to another place.
An accurate nickname, given by the neighbours, would reflect the characteristics and the trade of a people.
But time would change a people, and the nickname would become outdated.
Could the same have happened to the Scythians?
Could have they lost this name, which was given to them by the Greek, and attain a different name?
Could have the descendants of Scythians be hiding under the name of Slavs?
Most of the Russian, and later, Soviet historians responded negatively to this question.
Lomonosov, however, was convinced that this is exactly what happened.
“Among the ancient ancestors of the present Russian people,
Scythians comprise not the least part.”, wrote the great Russian scientist.
Historian Tatishev argued that the worth Scyth is a deformed by the Greek Russian word Skit,
as the root in the modern Russian “skitalec” – “wanderer”.
The romantic idea of the kinship of Russians and Scythians
had literally enthralled our society at the beginning of the 20th century.
Alexander Block exclaimed: “Yes, Scythians are us!”
This poetic image is probably
[Ekaterina Devlet: Professor, Doctor of History]
both a world-view and a poetic attempt
to find in the distant history, though not that distant as history goes,
an understanding for the events that went on in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century.
The famous Russian historian and archaeologist Ivan Zabelin founded the theory of Scythians as the forebears of the Slavs.
He pointed out the identity between the Scythian tribes and the Slavs.
The same earth tilling in the Middle Dnepr, the same trade with Greece,
the same sea raids on the shores of the Little Asia.
Zabelin turned to the language spoken by the Scythians.
To the language, that has only a few geographic and tribal names left from it.
Zabelin stated that Borisfen is a mutated by the Greek name of Berezina.
That’s how Dnepr was called in the old times.
Istr – Danube. Parata – prud (pond). He viewed them as undoubtedly Slavic names.
His opponents countered that that is nothing but guesswork.
There was, however, one Scythian word, which was Slavic without a shadow of a doubt.
Herodotus called them for “Scythians”, but at the same time we mentioned their own name for themselves – Skoloty.
The root of the word is “kolo”.
Dahl’s dictionary, in addition to the meanings “radius, wheel”, also defines it as “wheeled wagon, cart”.
Based on this, one can decipher the word “skoloty” as “people of a certain area”,
or it can be interpreted differently: “people on the carts”.
Either way, “skoloty” is a undoubtedly a Slavic – even Russian – word.
Zabelin’s arguments became forgotten with time.
They became pushed out by other theories.
Slowly the opinion that the language of the Black Sea Scythians,
was belonging to the Iranian group of the Indo-European language family too hold.
After the Scything kingdom disintegrated,
at the end of the III – beginning of the IV century, and the Scythians moved almost entirely into Crimea and lower Dbepr,
[Vladimir Malashev: Science fellow of Archaeology of the Russian Academy]
where they lived until the middle of the III century, while the Slavic cultures begin to form only at about this time,
while mostly in the V century, then the distance between the classic Scythia,
the Black Sea Scythia at its height, and the early Slavic cultures is about 1000 years.
Which continuity can one speak of?
The same thing is with the language.
Even though Scythian as one of the Iranian languages,
and Russian language belong to the Indo-European languages, but they are of different groups.
All Slavic tribes consisted of three tribal unions.
[Jurij Yahontov: Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences]
This is coming from historic documents.
Those were: Ross, Scyth and Sarmat.
Thus all these tribes were Slavic tribes.
The question of the language belonging of Scythians is very important.
As anthropologists confirmed that one and the same population lived for over 5000 years
on the Eastern-European plains, this is a very central question.
Scythians. It is hard to find in the depths of ages another such people that would hold so many secrets.
Where did they come from? How and where to did they disappear? Which language did they speak?
Did they have a state, and how was it organised?
Disputes will be going on for a long time still.
A golden vessel was found in Kuljab burial mound (Kurgan),
[Kirill Firsov: Head antiquarian of archaeology of the State historical Museum]
depicting one of the myths of the origins of Scythians,
and it depicts Scythians in their typical clothing.
History’s Father, Herodotus describes several myths of the Scythian origins.
One of them is depicted on this vessel from Kulabe and tells that Hercules is the forefather of the Scythians.
During his travels over the Northern Black Sea, he got sons from the half-woman half-snake – Echidna
When he left those places, he left his sons a bow with a bowstring.
He took off the bowstring and said – tat who will be able to set it back, will continue the Scythian kin.
The first son started to set the bowstring, and it backfired at his tooth.
That vessel shows how Scythians sit abound an inspect his tooth.
The second sone tried his luch, and the bowstring hit him in the foot. He’s depicted bandaging his foot.
And only the thirds son managed to string the bow.
And he it shows that he became the forbearer of the Scythians. That’s one of the legends.
Historian Phukidit tells that not only the European kingdoms could not match Scythians on the field of battle,
but even Asia has no people, who could stand against Scythians in a one-on-one battle,
as long as all Scythians stand united.
But they don’t hold their own compared to other peoples, when it comes to common sense and understanding of the everyday life.
Scythian military deeds are well-known. Persian king Darij I, who by 500BC conquered
the whole of the Near Asia, could not conquer them.
Philip of Macedonia, having beaten the Scythian vanguard in Frakia (France) in 339BC,
did not dare to push forward into the Scythian heartlands,
where only death and no loot would be awaiting the Macedonians.
And in 331BC, at the walls of Ulvia, Scythians beat the army of Zaperion, a governor of Frakia.
Possessing an immense military power, they had no interest in destroying such same settlements, in which they themselves lived –
[Vera Kovalevskaja: Doctor of History]
half-earth houses without any luxury items.
Therefore their aspirations were directed towards Near East, where they destroyed
richly decorated houses, and more importantly, they always conquered and destroyed treasuries and temples.
Battle bow is a Scythian object of pride.
It was crafted from hard tree sorts, tendrils and horn plates.
It had an incredible range.
One can read on a stone stella, discovered in the Greek colony of Olvia, that some Onaxogor
performed a record-breaking shot from a Scythian bow – the arrow covered a distance of 520 meters.
Here there was a find of is an iron helmet from the 4th century.
[Leonid Jablonskij: Doctor of History]
This is the compulsory short sword, called Akinak, which is fastened to the baldric.
A baldric buckle, which was situated at the crossing of the shoulder and waist belts.
This is a quiver with arrows.
Not even a quiver, but a so-called saadak – a travel bag, which incorporates a quiver.
In addition it could hold the bow, it had pockets for various knick-knacks that a warrior may need:
such as a knife and a sharpening stone could be fitted there.
According to specialists, Scythian armament was on par with that of a medeival knight.
For long range: bow with arrows, and a sling.
For middle range: throwing spears and darts.
For short range: sword, axe, dagger.
Protective gear: armour, helmet, leg-covers, shields.
Swords were made from high-alloying steel – they already possessed the skill of making such hardened steel.
Scythians are nomads. Slavs are farmers. Thus Scythians cannot be the predecessors of the Slavs.
This is the essence of the theory of the opponents of Scythian-Slavic kinship.
Indeed, both the ancient Greek and the modern authors call Scythians for nomads.
But is this such a flawless definition?
Herodotus mentions strange Scythians – ploughmen and farmers.
Such battles ranged in scientific circles because of that!
Who are they. They were often called for Slavs.
Ploughing Scythians? Who are they – people living behind Scythians in the forest-steppe land?
They are poorly-known, an Iranian-language people.
Two tribal unions are known from Nestor’s chronicles: Uglichi and Tiberian – they spoke Iranian languages.
Possibly their ancestors were those Scythian-ploughmen.
Places that have compact Scythian settlements, townships,
probably had some kind of a settled life.
There were workshops, etc.
But the nomad Scythians did not do that.
Another thing that Herodotus pointed out, was that among the Scythian gods,
the most celebrated were Geistia – the goddess of the home hearth, and Geia – the patron of agriculture.
There were also Scythian metallurgists.
They produced iron from ore, transformed it into steel, using various techniques of forging, hardening, carburizing, welding.
The people of Eurasia learnt about the new metal from Scythians.
They copied from the Scythians the craft of iron processing.
We are probably seeing a uniquely-organised civilisation.
Each of the tribes were doing its own craft, but together they were bound by unseen strong bonds,
they comprised a united Scythian World.
Excuse me, what about the Siberian Scythians?
Many heard of the Siberian Scythians, of the Central- and Middle-Asia Scythians.
It was a belt of Scythian states – or proto-states, counties – that stretched from Danube to the Central Asia.
Who heard of the Scythians of the Huan He river delta? They existed too.
For the longest time, the scientists studying the ancient world set a demarcation line between “civilisation” and “barbarians”.
Greeks and Romans were placed on one side of it.
Scythians and other “unlearned bloodthirsty people” on the other.
But here is what’s curious: in everything that the Greeks were telling about the Scythians,
one can clearly feel fear, amazement, and an undoubted respect.
Herodotus considered Scythians to be the inventors of the nomad lifestyle, and praised it as the most convenient.
The eldest Greek poet Hesiod wrote about Scythians in the 8th century BC.
He postulated that the best known ancient hero of Greece, Heracles,
was presented with his bow by a Scythian named Tevtar, who also taught Heracles how to shoot from the bow.
Legends of Scythians can be found in the eldest myths.
They attribute the inventions of agriculture and copper melting are attributed to the Scythians.
Greek myths speak of a Scythian Anaharsis.
The Greek name him as the foremost sages of the world.
Iphor(?) attributes him with the invention of such useful things as a double-sided anchor, bellows, and the pottery ring.
Another Scythian, Taksaris, was elevated to the demi-god hero status by the Areopag of Athens, for stopping a plague epidemic in Athens.
A sacrificial alter was placed in his honour, and a decree
that a white horse should be sacrificed in his honour annually.
Herodotus ends his description of the Scythians with the following words:
“We know of no other such intellectually distinguished peoples, but the Scythian people.”
“The Scythian people were the wisest of all living on the other side of Pont.”
So who are Scythians after all?
Enemies of civilisation and destroyers of cultures?
Or a progressive people, who enriched the humanity with inventions and innovations?
Scythian civilisation probably had a half-nomad level of development.
That did not let them to transition into a higher civilisation form:
With a permanent territory, with stability in food production, with emergence of a clerical and warrior cast.
Maybe that already emerged in a form of chieftain.
If we are to take the quality of their works – for example, the legendary Scythian gold – it is very high.
We see clearly that they had high level of craftsmanship.
We now know next to nothing of Scythian tales, legends, their written history.
But if we were to uncover that oral dimension, it would have been very interesting –
after all, it’s not a coincidence that Greeks held Scythians in high regard.
Nomadic Scythians were first and foremost stockbreeders, used animal produce, rode in carts.
They moved from place to place, and thus their objects were distributed so far and wide.
The military objects were also similar in this wide area because they were moving about fast and were fast spreading those new inventions.
And the most efficient types of armour were spread first.
Okinak proved to be efficient and thus it became widespread.
This bridle was the most modern for that time, and thus it quickly became widespread.
And this animalistic (ornamental) style was liked by all that thus became widespread.
Let us again open the “Tale of Times”
And in peace they lived: Poljane, Drevljane (Woodlanders), Severjane (Northerners), Rodimichi, Vjatichi and Horvaty (Croats).
Doleby lived on the high plains, where Volenjany (Free ones) live,
while Ulichi and Tivercy lived along Dnestr and Danube.
There were many of them and they lived along Dnestr until the very Sea,
and their cities stand until this day, and the Greek called them The Great Scythia.
And here, the same, under year 907:
Oleg want against the Greek, leaving Igor in Kiev, and taking with him many Varjags, and Slovens (Slavs),
and Chudi, and Krivichi, and Merju, and Drevljane, and Rodimiche, and Poljane, and Severjane, and Vjatichi, and Horvaty, and Duleby,
and Tivercy, known as Tolmachi, and they were all called by the Greek for The Great Scythia.
The compiler of the first Byzantine Encyclopaedia Anna Komnina does indeed call the Rus people of the 11th century as Scythians.
And Konstantin Bagrjanorodnyj calls Russians for Tauric-Scythians.
The Byzantine writers – Patriarch Fotij, Georgij Amartol and other – who wrote about the Russian attacks on Czar-city,
never call them by the name of Slavs.
When defining the people, who besieged Czar-city, they call them “Ross, the people of the Scythian origin”.
At the same time geographer Ravenskij, when listing the European countries, calls Scythia for the homeland of the Slavs.
Confirming this, in the Lev Diakon’s history, Russians are called Scythians 63 times.
Mazurinsk Chronicles (1678-1682) say “the newcomers, Scythians, who cometh to be called Slavs”.
Nikon’s Chronicles say openly: “Slovenic language as spoken on Danube has come from Scythians.”
What more proof is needed that Scythians are Slavs?!
Thus Scythian language is the Slav language, the common Slav language.
A vase, found in the mound Kuljaba, near Kerch, holds several scenes depicting of the everyday life of the Scythians.
If we compare these images with the Russian lithographic prints (Lubok),
we will be struck not only by a commonality in styles, but also an amazing outward similarity of the faces and characters.
Greek chroniclers, who knew Scythians wrote that they were handsome, well-built people.
Scythians, depicted in the Scythian mounds are of European look.
Depiction of the Scythians on these vessels were of a genealogical mythology, and not of a mundane character of say, pulling a tooth.
But in general, they were very much looking like a typical Russian man, bearded and with unruly hair,
and with a definitely European face.
There were no Asian depictions at all.
Studying in detail the everyday life of Scythians and Slavs, we come across striking similarities at every turn.
Both Scythians and ancient Slavs worshipped the forces of Nature.
Their principal deity was a great female goddess, called Tabitia. She was the goddess of fire and of the living things.
Later with the Slavs she became goddess Zhiva (Zhizn’ – life).
Neither Scythians not Slavs built temples. Both made sacrifices to their gods, and held the god of war in high regard.
They didn’t need priests, but they honoured soothsayers, healers, sages, sorcerers.
There were no atheists in the ancient times.
Scythians worshipped the long sword.
With the combative lifestyle, that was understandable.
Scythians held both short and long swords in their okinaki.
A long sword was 1 to 1,10 meters.
That could be such a splendid meter-long sword with a beautiful golden hilt.
Such a sword would be glittering in the sun at a mound top.
Burial rituals of the Scythians and Slav-Rus people are strikingly similar.
Scythians would strangle one of the Czar’s wives and would bury her with the Czar.
The same fate was in store for the czar’s servants – winer, stableman, and others.
Ancient Slavs did exactly the same.
Scythians built an earth mound above the Czar’s grave, and a year later they would hold commemoration on top of it,
and a new sacrifice would be made – 50 horsemen.
The ancient Slavs also held a commemorative service for their departed on a burial mound.
Both Scythians and ancient Slavs would honour their horses that were killed in battle.
The custom to put a sword beside a newborn son and to sit him on a horse when he reaches 3 years were also in common.
Archaeologists state a complete identity between the first Slav burials and the Scythian burials.
A complete identity. Everything is in common, including construction of the mounds.
Maybe some changes came later with the adoption of Christianity, when bodies were not cremated, but buried.
But the first burials were identical.
Each burial, however many we uncover, adds some new knowledge,
as each burial contains new finds, yet unknown to us.
For example: we for the first time discovered a wicker box, filled to the brim with big black beetles.
We are yet to determine the species of these beetles.
In addition we found for the first time gold-plated steel needles for application of tattoos,
as well as stone palettes for mixing of the pigments.
The tattoos themselves are not preserved, but they had such tradition, and the tattoos were made in colour.
Archaeologists will probably never say with 100% certainty what such a burial means,
but is we are to talk about the Scythian burials, then their splendour, the selection of the accompanying inventory, as we say,
a huge number of various military items,
a typical for many mounds accompanying burials of horses and people,
the timespan, over which the mound complexes, such as Arzhan-2, were formed,
all this speaks of a great might, of a special status, and of a colossal potential possessed by the nobility of that time.
Are we Scythians or not?
Ancient writers hint at our kinship.
Linguistics mixes up things and doubts.
Anthropology answers in the affirmative.
The striking sameness in the appearance, character, temperament,
continuity of the material culture adds votes for this theory.
However, the 21st century gave scientists a completely new set of tools to study ancient history.
These are mathematical studies of the history, and statistical modelling of the large-scale historical process,
and of course – modern genetics.
A new scientific branch appeared – DNA genealogy,
which can give a precise, mathematically proven answer to a question of who we are and where do we come from.
Its main premise is that the male Y-chromosome is transferred only from father to son, and women do not affect it.
In other words, unlike the genes that shuffle with every generation thanks to an almost equal input from mother and father,
the Y-chromosome is transferred between generations almost unchanged.
The “almost” comes from the fact that mutations occur in it at a specific average rate.
According to scientists, DNA-genealogy allows to identify in each person a marker of his ancient lineage.
This marker is called SNP and defines the haplogroup to which a person belongs.
If there are 10 mutations between us, that’s one thing, if there is only 1 – another case, and if 1000 mutations, yet something else.
Thus we can compare any group of people and calculate when their common ancestor lived.
[Anatolij Kljosov: Professor, Doctor of Chemistry]
Let’s say that Rjurik was the common ancestor of his descendant group.
Then we can calculate when he lived.
We can find an answer to the question when lived the common ancestor of all Russians.
For how many thousand years ago he lived.
Or when lived the common ancestor of Russians and Poles.
Or of Russians and Spaniards, etc.
Those who possess haplogroup R1a1 constitute now 70% of all the male population of Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia.
While in the ancient Russian settlements that number is up to 80%.
R1a1 is the biological marker of the Russian ethnos.
This collection of nucleotides is that Russianness from the genetics perspective.
Scientists, who conducted the research say that the Russian people in the genetically contemorary form,
appeared in the European part of the modern Russia about 4500 years ago.
The boy with the mutation R1a1 became the forefather of all the contemporary men,
who have this haplogroup in their DNA.
They are all his biological descendants or, as they said before, of the same bloodline.
And among them their are the kin that comprises one people – Russian.
As for Scythians-Sarmatians, when they started digging and analysed the DNA, it turned out,
cutting to the chase, that Aryans, Scythians, Slavs are one and the same people.
This is a thunderous news! This is not present in the literature yet – only a few articles having been written so far.
They are all R1a.
Aryans are R1a, as they came to India, we know it from their DNA.
Scythians are those, who stayed on this whole vast stretch from Danube to Mongolia,
and to Altai – they wandered across this huge band,
they are too R1a, at least that what we could study.
Slavs too R1a. In any case this is the same genealogical line.
Maybe some time will pass and the specialists in DNA genealogy will give a conclusive answer
about the kinship of the Scythians, Slavs and the modern Russians.
And it may well turn out that the people of the stone age, who left traces on this Earth 50,000 years ago,
are indeed our distant ancestors.
At may turn out that we are of the same bloodline with Aryans, and with Scythians and Sarmatians, in general being the oldest people of Earth.
But a different outcome is possible.
Maybe science will advance and prove fallacy of trying to find ancestors in the Y-chromosome.
The the ancestry field will remain unfilled in the peoples biography.
Each people contributed to the history of the world civilisation. Each people has something to be proud of.
We are all different, but our difference makes the world multicoloured and bright.
And however insurmountable the inter-national conflicts may seem today, however sharp the contradictions are,
a time will neceserally come, when people will realise that they comprise a united community of peoples.
People of Earth. Humanity, which has one common past, and one common future.


As a postscript: The R1a1 haplogroup is also something that your truly belongs to. At the time when Icelandic DecodeMe project was operational, I ordered decoding of my own DNA profile, and the R1a1 belonging was an expected outcome, that got verified.

Below is the information that DecodeMe project presented, but as you now know, the percentage for the R1a1 haplogroup in the Greater Russia is 70%, and not 40-50%% as Wikipedia would want one to believe.

Celebrating 3 years of Crimea’s reunification

Three years ago, on the 16th of March 2014 Crimeans unanimously voted to return home. Below are two maps with the results of that pivotal referendum:

ADDED! Lada Ray has showcased several more videos of the celebration and the 2014 flashbacks at Futurist Trendacst: Russia Celebrates Three Years of Reunification with #Crimea. #Putin 2014 Flashbacks

ADDED! Independent British journalist Graham Philips published at his blog The Truth Speaker a series of videos that he filmed in Crimea prior and during the referendum: Crimea: March 16th, 2014 – As It Really Was. Highly recommended!

ADDED! Fireworks in Moscow on the 18th!

Photos from today’s celebrations in Crimea


Percentages of the turnout per region. Total electorate: 1.543.815 people.


Percentages show the number who voted for the reunification with Russia. Background colour is the turnout from the total electorate. Orange (Lenin region) did not have the opportunity to participate in the referendum.

Following the coup d’etat in Kiev and preceding the referendum, people were already on the streets, as can be seen from the image below from the 23rd of February from Sevastopol. People were forming militia to stand up to the nazi thugs, who were heading towards Crimea. Luckily, the worst case scenario was avoided, though several Crimeans – who were in Kiev protesting against the coup d’etat – were accosted on their way back to the peninsular and killed.

So when reunification happened, the relief and joy were palpable. Crimeans were and are happy to be back home. And for all Russians, despite the demonstration and sanctions that followed, that was the most important, the brightest event of this century so far.



Crimea is Russia

And for all the neigh-sayers, I have it from a reliable source that Russian Crimeans are willing to fight if someone tries to deprive them of this victory. It won’t be the first time. Here is a photo from my photo album, which I took in 2010, while Crimea was still under Ukraine. Ask yourself, would the people who were so meticulously taking care of their history, of they heroism against the German nazi occupation, take kindly to a nazi regime that took over Ukraine, a regime, that banned and criminalised all the symbols of the 1945 victory?


Steam Engine of the legendary armoured train “Zheleznjakov”, which took part in the heroic defence of Sevastopol in 1941-1942. Inscription on the side of the engine: “Death to Fascism”.

Will Russia have to fend off NATO invasion too..?

The image below speaks volumes, without words. It speaks of Russia’s history past, and of the precarious future. The Russian Bear sitting on his land of old, looking with suspicion at the ever growing tentacles of the US/NATO, already consuming neighbouring lands in blood – Yugoslavia, former Ukraine – Malorossia and Novorossia, Middle-East. And besides The Bear is a compost heap of history, where one can see the the tentacles of the past that dared to choke Russia and got pruned. Will Russia again be forced to end another war that someone starts in the hopes of eliminating Russia, freedom, history, from the face of the world?

For those, not so well-versed in history, here is what the dates in the compost heap of history signify. I added a few more – on average Russia got invaded once every 50 years, and this time is not different, though the method of warfare changed.

  • 1242 – The Germanic Teutonic invasion and the Ice Battle on the Ladoga lake.
  • 1612 – Polish invasion into Russia and occupation of Moscow. Beaten by the people’s militia of Minin and Pozharskij, the memorial to whom you will find on the Beautiful Square in Moscow.
  • 1709 – Karl XII of Sweden said that “Russia is a dwarf, whom I shall put on its knees” and attacked. After that Sweden lost its status of a superpower.
  • 1759 – (not on the image). Freidrich I moved against Russia with the words “I shall conquer the backward Russia” and in 1759 Russian army entered Berlin.
  • 1812 – Napoleon is famous for his saying that “Russia is a giant on clay feet”. This giant made the Napoleonic army turn in 1812 after the battle of Borodino and a tactical surrender of Moscow, and in 1814 Russian army was marching down the streets of Paris. By the way, Russian Don Cossacks also had to restore some of Europe, for which they were promptly forgotten.
  • 1854-1855 – (not on the image) French, Brits and Turks attacked Crimea, and Russia held the defence of Sevastopol. Russia won that war, which in reality lasted between 1853 and 1856, and was the first really world war. Brits presented the history otherwise, claiming victory in the “Crimean War”, which was really only one of many battles. But if they won, how come Crimea remained Russian?
  • 1914-1918 – First World War, or the “War of 4 Cousins”, Russia had nothing to win in that war and got mixed in it responding to a provocation (much the same as what the West hoped to achieve in Ukraine, yet it didn’t work this time). Though Russia was on the winning side, the country got destroyed in the process. Still Russia managed to hold its own against the subsequent foreign intervention and even chased the Poles (who tried to repeat their failure of 1612) from Moscow suburbs to Warsar.
  • 1941-1945 – Hitler proclaimed that he’d conquer USSR by the end of 1941. In 1945 Russian troops entered Berlin (again, as in 1759 – they never learn).
  • 2014 NATO – Obama famously said a few years back that “Russia is only a regional power, and US will destroy its economy”. When will the pruning begin, and have the streets of Washington been prepared for the welcoming of the liberating army..?

As I wrote earlier, Russia Means Peace, Russia loves peace, but knowing it’s own history of defence, it is always prepared to end wars.

For those suffering from historic amnesia, here is a song of revelations from Artjom Grishanov – Russian Soldier Saved the World (with English subtitles of the news items showcasing history rewriting, and of the lyrics):

In his article Washington’s Benevolent Mask Is Disintegrating Paul Craig Roberts writes:

By orchestrating Russophobia in the West, Washington has put all of humanity at risk. The Russians have watched Washington’s false accusations against Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya, Yeman, Pakistan, Iran and against Russia herself—“invasion of Ukraine.” False accusations have in the 21st century always been Washington’s set-up of the target country for invasion or bombing.

These provocations issued daily by the idiot Western press, the idiot Western governments, and the idiot commentators have prepared the groundwork for a misunderstanding that can result in thermo-nuclear war and the end of life on earth.

When you read the New York Times, the Washington Post, or listen to CNN, NPR, or MSNBC or the British, Canadian, German, French, and Australian media, you are being indoctrinated with war with Russia (and China) and, thus, you are being prepared for your funeral.

Hopefully it will not come to this, for Russia will do its utmost to preserve this good Earth.

And as an after word, the picture below is well-known by now (with the correction, that Kazahstan never had a NATO base, though some of the neighbouring republics did have advisors):

Remembering the Slain Children of Donbass – #101LIFE

In my previous post I pointed my readers to a documentary about commander Givi. He was a soldier – just like hundreds of other Russian soldiers of Donbass – giving his life defending the land of his father from a Ukro-nazi invasion.

The other tragic side of this war, are all the lives of the people of Donbass lost to the Ukro-nazi artillery shellings, the lives of civilians – women and children, elderly…

I encourage everyone to go to 101 Life – referring to 101 child killed so far, to learn about the victims of the war, and to sign a petition for the Western powers to stop the madness.

Spread the word!

Below are several outstanding songs by Artem Grishanov…

When the enemy is at the gates… At 4:30 onwards, you can see what those brave souls are defending, can you say that that girl, reading a poem with tears in her eyes is the “terrorist” that Poroshenko tries to show the people of Donbass to be?

Here are the “toys” that Poroshenko sends to the children of Donbass – Grad shells and mines… And the children, asking for peace #ИгрушкиДляПорошенко


This is how it started…

Another song, which shows that tragedy of the anger–riddled, brainwashed children of Ukraine. While in Donbass the people wish for peace, for everyone, in Ukraine they talk war. Also, not that while in Ukraine the Ukro-Nazis mistreat the Novorossian flag, in Donbass Zaharchenko carefully folds the Ukrainian flag of a defeated battalion.

Donbass in the Line of Fire: Givi

Mihail Sergeevich Tolstyh – better known under the call sign of Givi – was one of the commanders of the Donetsk People’s Republican army, and he was the second commander, after Motorola, to have been murdered by Kiev in a terrorist attack.

So far, the West was in an almost total information black-out, when news from the civil war in Ukraine and the general disastrous state of affairs in that former country were concerned. A few European journalists woudl try to give a picture of the events, but their message would largely remain unheard. The best sources of information so far were Lada Ray’s Futurist Trendcast, The Saker, reports from the ground by the freelance croud-funded journalist Graham Philips, who was there since the day of the referendum of 2014, which Kiev suppressed with artillery. Of the larger news agencies I can mention RT, croud-funded Russia Insider, and some reports on EuroNews.

NewsFront and Inessa S published newly an English translated documentary about Givi, those soldiers he was responsible and their motivation to defend their land.

Graham Philips has published his own tribute to Givi:

One of the YouTube commenters nails it:

Nate Sinadinovic
Reminder for Western viewers that just might have drank the Cool Aid of MSM Here is information detailed by somebody whom has taken a interest and information is realistic. Givi wasnt just some bum off the street, Givi served in the Ukraine army for 2-3 years and rose to the rank of Sargent and commander he finished his service and then returned to life as a civilian. When the Coup d’etat happened in Kiev in 2014 Givi was the one of the 1st to take up Arms when the New Regime announced the ATO operation in the East which Kiev said ‘Would take 72 hours’ 25,000 hours later and that ATO operation is still going on.
What Givi did is exactly what I would have done.

Real Democracy at Work: Serbian Parliamentarians Booed Mogherini During Speech to Serbian Parliament

Lada once again brings good news of awakening:

Lada’s thoughts on the end of NWO: ‘Serbia and Russia! No EU!’ Mogherini booed in Serbian Parliament

You can’t hear a word she is saying, and that’s how I like her. I wonder how this Rothschild-installed globalist hypocrite felt, for once getting a long-deserved taste of her own medicine.

Just another small confirmation of The Great Earth Shift at work, the breakdown of the old NWO system and the budding of the new. It is also another confirmation of the rebalancing work Russia The Great Balancer is doing, as we speak, on our planet.

The great changes happening now are just the beginning! More to follow!

This is the real voice of the people in Serbian Parliament – how Serbs really feel about EU, which is being shoved down their throats in spite of their resistance. Incidentally, the neighboring Montenegro and Macedonia are in the same situation. There is a veritable anti-NATO and anti-EU revolution happening in Montenegro, mass protests have been ongoing since last year. At one point, 10% of the population has been out on streets protesting. Yet no one notices it and the sold-out government continues dragging the country into NATO. Bulgaria is also being forced to stay in NATO and EU, despite people’s sympathies to Russia and aversion to NATO/EU Russophobia.

The people of Serbia are demonstrating how real democracy works, as it should. I wonder why the ‘world’s No.1 defender of democracy’ EU doesn’t like it?

Read on at Lada Ray’s Futurist Trendcast

After what EU and NATO did to Yugoslavia at large and Serbia in particular, booing is just too soft a protest. Radovan Karadzic is still the political prisoner of EU for saying that Serbs are Southern Russians. Yugoslavia was bombed to pieces with radioactive munitions, leaving the land contaminated and the people with cancer. And then Yugoslavia was partitioned and Serbs driven from their historic heartland – Kosovo, which is now occupied by the NATO installed entities. And all this was done, while Russia itself was on the verge of collapse and destruction during the Wild 90’s of the desolation of Yeltsin.

And after that the NATO/EU was expecting a friendly welcoming? What duplicity!

The Magic of the Children’s Films from the Soviet Union

One characteristic of the Soviet films that I hold dear, is that they are humane, moral (often without being moralising), centre on the characters, rather than action and events. The films for grown-ups, be it a war-time film or a film about a mundane everyday life, would always have several layers of meaning – good film makers knew how to convey what they wanted to say to the audience without raising the alarms of censorship. All that resulted in films that would have depth, satire, criticism, thoughtfulness in them.

But here I want to write about children films. The films that formed our, my, world view, that taught us about fairness, compassion, friendship, the pitfalls of negative relations. They were a joy to watch, and they left a trace in your heart, a moral compass that no religion can give you, as morality was based on your own desire to do good, rather than fearing a punishment from the holder of the scriptures if you do wrong.

One such outstanding film is “Visitor from the Future”, released in 1985 and filmed at the Central Studio of Children and Youth Films named after M. Gorky in Moscow. And the bright star of that film is its title song, “The Beautiful Faraway”. In 1985 nothing was outwardly speaking of the time of troubles that lay ahead, in just short 7 years, the Wild 90’s and the Desolation of Yeltsin. But in retrospect, this song turned out to be prophetic, and at the same time it was a testament, an oath of how to conduct oneself in the difficult times ahead, how to stay strong. The song does not promise paradise lands, but rather trials and only asks to not be treated too cruelly along the way to the unknown future, walking the untrodden path towards the future of 2084.

Staring into the eyes of the girl who looks at me from the screen, I see a reflection of me, of my childhood, and the promise that I made to myself in my early youth – to never forget my childhood and the values that I learnt back then, no matter what life throws at me. And I know that many of my generation were influenced by this film in the same way, something that allowed us to stay strong in the chaos that came shortly after.

Listen to it (the English translation is below), as sung in its original form. The video presents cuts of main character of the film, played by Natasha Guseva, an actress, who, when she grew up, continued to live by the moral code of the film through the Wild 90’s and till this day…

Слышу голос из прекрасного далёка,
Голос утренний в серебряной росе,
Слышу голос, и манящая дорога
Кружит голову, как в детстве карусель.

Прекрасное далёко, не будь ко мне жестоко,
Не будь ко мне жестоко, жестоко не будь.
От чистого истока в прекрасное далёко,
В прекрасное далёко я начинаю путь.

Слышу голос из прекрасного далёка,
Он зовёт меня не в райские края,
Слышу голос, голос спрашивает строго —
А сегодня что для завтра сделал я.

Прекрасное далёко, не будь ко мне жестоко,
Не будь ко мне жестоко, жестоко не будь.
От чистого истока в прекрасное далёко,
В прекрасное далёко я начинаю путь.

Я клянусь, что стану чище и добрее,
И в беде не брошу друга никогда,
Слышу голос, и спешу на зов скорее
По дороге, на которой нет следа.

Прекрасное далёко, не будь ко мне жестоко,
Не будь ко мне жестоко, жестоко не будь.
От чистого истока в прекрасное далёко,
В прекрасное далёко я начинаю путь.

Прекрасное далёко, не будь ко мне жестоко,
Не будь ко мне жестоко, жестоко не будь.
От чистого истока в прекрасное далёко,
В прекрасное далёко я начинаю путь.

I hear the voice from the beautiful faraway,
A morning voice in a silvery dew,
I hear the voice, and the tempting road
Spins my head, as a carousel of my childhood.

Beautiful faraway, don’t be cruel to me,
Don’t be cruel to me, don’t be.
From the clear beginnings into the beautiful faraway,
Into the beautiful faraway I start my journey.

I hear the voice from the beautiful faraway,
It calls me not to the paradise lands,
I hear the voice, and the voice is asking sternly –
What have I done today for the sake of tomorrow.

Beautiful faraway, don’t be cruel to me,
Don’t be cruel to me, don’t be.
From the clear beginnings into the beautiful faraway,
Into the beautiful faraway I start my journey.

I swear that I’ll become purer and kinder,
And will never abandon a friend in need,
I hear the voice, and hasten to the call
Along the untrodden road with no trail.

Beautiful faraway, don’t be cruel to me,
Don’t be cruel to me, don’t be.
From the clear beginnings into the beautiful faraway,
Into the beautiful faraway I start my journey.

Beautiful faraway, don’t be cruel to me,
Don’t be cruel to me, don’t be.
From the clear beginnings into the beautiful faraway,
Into the beautiful faraway I start my journey.

Here are all 5 episodes with English subtitles of this marvellous and thoughtful, funny and sad film:

Episode 1:

Episode 2:

Episode 3:

Episode 4:

Episode 5:


Reading viewer’s comments on YouTube to this and the other films that I reference below, one will find a wide range of testimonials, both from those, who, like me, were born in the USSR and grew up together with these films, and those born at the end of the century, expressing regret of not having been able to witness what it was like to be a kid in the USSR.

There were literally dozens more of such pivotal children’s films that formed the moral and the world view of my generation, that taught us to see right from wrong. Here are a few other films from different years and studios.

“The Adventures of Electronic” is from 1979, filmed at Odessa Film Studio (present-day Ukraine, where the studio is all but in shatters, tragically just like the rest of the country, and where this film, along with the other Soviet heritage is forbidden by law). It has a theme song that too became symbolic for my generation: “Winged Swings”

В юном месяце апреле
В старом парке тает снег,
И весёлые качели
Начинают свой разбег.

Позабыто всё на свете,
Сердце замерло в груди,
Только небо, только ветер,
Только радость впереди.
Только небо, только ветер,
Только радость впереди.

Взмывая выше ели,
Не ведая преград,
Крылатые качели
Летят, летят, летят.
Крылатые качели
Летят, летят, летят.

Детство кончится когда-то,
Ведь оно не навсегда,
Станут взрослыми ребята,
Разлетятся кто куда.

А пока мы только дети,
Нам расти ещё расти,
Только небо, только ветер,
Только радость впереди.
Только небо, только ветер,
Только радость впереди.

Взмывая выше ели,
Не ведая преград,
Крылатые качели
Летят, летят, летят.
Крылатые качели
Летят, летят, летят.

Шар земной быстрей кружится
От весенней кутерьмы,
И поют над нами птицы,
И поём, как птицы, мы.
Позабыто всё на свете,
Сердце замерло в груди,
Только небо, только ветер,
Только радость впереди.
Только небо, только ветер,
Только радость впереди.

Взмывая выше ели,
Не ведая преград,
Крылатые качели
Летят, летят, летят.
Крылатые качели
Летят, летят, летят.

In the young month of April
The snow is melting in the old park,
And the merry swings
Are staring their take-off

Everything in the world is forgotten,
The heart has stopped in the chest,
Only the sky, only the wind,
Only happiness is ahead.
Only the sky, only the wind,
Only happiness is ahead.

Soaring above the fir-tree,
Not knowing any limits,
The winged swings
Are flying, flying, flying.
The winged swings
Are flying, flying, flying.

Childhood will end at one point,
After all, it’s not forever,
The kids will grow up,
And will fly off in all directions.

But now we are just children,
We are yet to grow and grow
Only the sky, only the wind,
Only happiness is ahead.
Only the sky, only the wind,
Only happiness is ahead.

Soaring above the fir-tree,
Not knowing any limits,
The winged swings
Are flying, flying, flying.
The winged swings
Are flying, flying, flying.

The Earth is spinning ever faster
From the spring commotion,
And the birds are singing above us,
And like birds we wing.
Everything in the world is forgotten,
The heart has stopped in the chest,
Only the sky, only the wind,
Only happiness is ahead.
Only the sky, only the wind,
Only happiness is ahead.

Soaring above the fir-tree,
Not knowing any limits,
The winged swings
Are flying, flying, flying.
The winged swings
Are flying, flying, flying.

Those who did not grow up in the USSR, will, probably not know what kind of swing this song is about. It’s a standing kind, which can be made to soar high up, and even make loops if one dared. I found a video of the now, sadly, defunct and abandoned small version of such swings:


Exploration of Space tingled the imagination of the kids of my age, and the two films from 1973 and 1974 – “Moscow-Cassiopea” and “Moscow-Cassiopea – Teens in the Universe” were special to us with that regard. I remember many hours of discussions with my coevals at a Pioneer camp about how such travels could be made possible, what kind of technology would be needed… And it seems to be able to capture the imagination of the contemporary Western viewers too, to which one comment bears witness: “This is one of the best sci-fi films I have seen! I like this better than Star Wars and Star Trek. This is just amazing! So philosophical, fresh, unique, artistic, creative, special, and original!” Philosophical is what can be said about most Soviet films – films were not just an entertainment, they had to make a viewer think.

This film has a philosophical and quiet song to it, that we all loved: “The Night Has Passed”. It is one such song that I start crying, when I listen to it, and when I sing along. And that song carries that promise of which I wrote above: to never forget, so as to be accepted by the stars…

Ночь прошла, будто прошла боль,
Спит земля, пусть отдохнет, пусть.
У Земли, как и у нас с тобой,
Там впереди, долгий, как жизнь, путь.

Я возьму этот большой мир,
Каждый день, каждый его час,
Если что-то я забуду,
Вряд ли звезды примут нас.
Если что-то я забуду,
Вряд ли звезды примут нас.

Я возьму память земных верст,
Буду плыть в спелом, густом льне.
Там вдали, там, возле синих звезд,
Солнце Земли, будет светить мне.

Я возьму этот большой мир,
Каждый день, каждый его час,
Если что-то я забуду,
Вряд ли звезды примут нас.
Если что-то я забуду,
Вряд ли звезды примут нас.

Я возьму щебет земных птиц,
Я возьму добрых ручьев плеск,
Я возьму свет грозовых зарниц,
Шепот ветров, зимний густой лес…

Night has passed, as if the pain passed,
The Earth is asleep, let is rest, let it.
The Earth, just like we,
There ahead, has a lifetime long road.

I shall take this big world,
Every day, every its hour,
If I forget something,
The stars are unlikely to accepts us.
If I forget something,
The stars are unlikely to accepts us.

I shall take the memory of the earthly miles,
I shall sail in the ripe, thick flax.
There far away, there, near the blue stars,
the Sun of the Earth shall lit my path.

I shall take this big world,
Every day, every its hour,
If I forget something,
The stars are unlikely to accepts us.
If I forget something,
The stars are unlikely to accepts us.

I shall take the chirping of the earthly birds,
I shall take the splashing of the kind creeks,
I shall take the light of the thunderstorms,
The whispering of the winds, the thick winter forests…

The last passage in italics is not in the film version of the song.

Here are both films with English subtitles:


Having started this post with “Visitor from the Future”, I will round off with another film, screened to Kir Bulychov’s book, where Natasha Guseva also plays the lead role. She only ever played in these two films, refusing other offers later on, and leaving her image associated with the beloved character of Alice.

Film “Purple Ball” appeared in 1987, filmed at the Yalta (Crimea) filial of the Central Studio of Children and Youth Films named after M. Gorky. The time of trouble was neigh, and the uncertainties were mounting. And that, along with the hope for the future, is reflected in this space adventure, and its title song, “If Only We Could Take One Look”:

Чего только нету, чего только нет
На этом на белом на свете,
Нам выпал счастливый, но трудный билет –
Мы века двадцатого дети.

Небесная высь, океанское дно
Раскроют секреты однажды,
Нам жить интересно и весело, но…
Но всё-таки хочется, хочется страшно.

Хоть глазочком заглянуть бы,
Заглянуть в грядущий век,
И узнать бы, что за судьбы,
И узнать бы, что за судьбы
Ждут тебя, ждут тебя, человек?

Чего только нету, чего только нет
На этом на белом на свете,
Повсюду минувшего времени след,
А мы за сегодня в ответе.

С тобою нам дом возвести суждено,
В дне завтрашнем вспомнят вчерашний,
Нам жить интересно и весело, но…
Но всё-таки хочется, хочется страшно.

Хоть глазочком заглянуть бы,
Заглянуть в грядущий век,
И узнать бы, что за судьбы,
И узнать бы, что за судьбы
Ждут тебя, ждут тебя, человек?

Хоть глазочком заглянуть бы,
Заглянуть в грядущий век,
И узнать бы, что за судьбы,
И узнать бы, что за судьбы
Ждут тебя, ждут тебя, человек?

So many things, so many things
There are in this wide world,
We drew a lucky, yet difficult lot –
We are the children of the 20th century.

The height of the skies, and the depth of the seas
Will once reveal their secrets,
It’s interesting and joyful for us to live, but…
It’s terribly, terribly tempting.

If only we could take one look,
Take a look into the coming century,
To learn what kind of fates,
To learn what kind of fates,
Are awaiting you, are awaiting you, man?

So many things, so many things
There are in this wide world,
Everywhere are the traces of the times past,
While we are responsible for today.

Together we are fated to build a common home,
In tomorrow’s day, yesterday will be remembered,
It’s interesting and joyful for us to live, but…
It’s terribly, terribly tempting.

If only we could take one look,
Take a look into the coming century,
To learn what kind of fates,
To learn what kind of fates,
Are awaiting you, are awaiting you, man?

If only we could take one look,
Take a look into the coming century,
To learn what kind of fates,
To learn what kind of fates,
Are awaiting you, are awaiting you, man?

We’ve taken a peek into the 21st century… And what we saw is horrifying, terrible, devastating… For the purple ball – the time bomb containing the virus of hostility – was not neutralised in our timeline. Not yet? Can we go back? Please?

Here is the complete film The Purple Ball with English subtitles:


Here are more English-subtitled Soviet must-see children’s classics. Mosfilm and Lenfilm studios are uploading many of the Soviet-era films into public domain, making them the part of the world heritage of humanity.

Some of the Mosfilm films cannot be embedded, so I add them as links to YouTube.

1947, Cinderella (colourised), Lenfilm

1976, Rusalochka. Cooperation product of Gorky Film Studio, Moscow and “Za igralni filmi”, Sophia. This Soviet rendition from 1976 of the Little Mermaid by H.C. Andersen is one of the closest to the original book. Haunting and deep and tragic. When shown in the cinemas in USSR, it was rated for 16+ audience.

1939, The Beautiful Vasilisa. SojuzDetFilm.

1939, The Golden Key (Buratino), Mosfilm. The sound in this film is from 1959.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MuurQgbg6Vc

1956, Ilja Muromec. Mosfilm. The film is known for the largest in the history of cinematography number of extras: 106000 soldiers and 11000 horses.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hooaKxdXbfM

1982, The Donkey’s Hide. Lenfilm. A deeply touching fairytale.

1952, Sadko. Mosfilm.

1976, Stepan’s Reminder. Lenfilm

1966, Aladdin’s Lamp. Gorky Film

1944, Kaschei the Deathless (without subtitles). This children’s folk Russian fairy tale was filmed at the time of the Great Patriotic War, and the parallels with the invading hordes were striking.

1972, Ruslan and Ludmila, Mosfilm. 2 parts

1946, The Stone Flower, Mosfilm
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k6QNtZRtsjM

1961, Scarlet Sails, Mosfilm
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5YzwW4hxrx4

The Simple Miracle, Mosfilm, 2 parts:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gZiKrWSzNBo
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mzpJq23cuKc

1968, The Snow Maiden, Lenfilm

1966, Snow Queen, Lenfilm. The real, gritty fairytale, not the sugary Disney “Frozen”.

1968, The Old Old Tale, Lenfilm


As I won’t be able to showcase all the wonderful Soviet films, I want to round off on this joyful piece. 1975 saw the excellent film “Buratino” (“Pinnochio”), filmed at Belarusfilm studio. Here is its memorable, joyful closing song:

RVISION’s YouTube channel holds a lot Russian and Soviet films with English subtitles.


Russian texts of the Soviet film songs can be found at http://pesnifilm.ru/.

The Plan to Destroy Russia. Conceived and Started in 1948. Concluded in 1993? Or Not…

After the hot war phase on Russia(USSR) between 22nd of April 1941 and the 9th of May 1945, executed through Germans, but lavishly funded by US (for example grandfather of the Bush presidential clan), USA did not view 1945 as a year of defeat. Along with preparation for a carpet nuking of the key cities in USSR, USA also devised a plan to politically change and destroy USSR/Russia from within. In the document below, Russia and USSR are referred interchangeably.

The document, presented in full below my analysis, is copied from this resource, which also provides the raw scanned pages of the text.

It demonstrates well the strategy of “divide and conquer” that that US were going to employ, as well as their understanding that the only way to destroy Russia, is from within – something that the “liberal” 5th column is doing in Russia of today. Remember that USSR, is never the stated final objective in the document below – Russia is. On the other hand, they do not understand many aspects of the Russian World, illustrated well by this fallacious statement “Before the revolution of 1918, Russian nationalism was solely Russian.”, as Russian Empire of pre 1917 was also a multi-national and multi-confessional state.

Let me extract the key-points of the doctrine first, and then I’ll let you read through the whole text, leaving to you to decide if there is even a gram of good in the outlined intents…

Our basic objectives with respect to Russia are really only two:

a. To reduce The power and influence of Moscow to limits in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international society; and

b. To bring about a basic change in the theory’ and practice of international relations observed by the government in power in Russia. If these two objectives could be achieved, the problem which this country faces in its relations with Russia would be reduced to what might be considered normal dimensions.

Our difficulty with the present Soviet Government lies basically in the fact that its leaders are animated by concepts of the theory and practice of international relations which are not only radically opposed to our own but are clearly inconsistent with any peaceful and mutually profitable development of relations between that government and other members of the international community, individually and collectively.

Prominent among these concepts are the following:

(a) That the peaceful coexistence and mutual collaboration of sovereign and independent governments, regarding and respecting each other as equals, is an illusion and an impossibility;

(h) That conflict is the basis of international life wherever, as is the case between the Soviet Union and capitalist countries, one country does not recognize the supremacy of the other;

(c) That regimes which do not acknowledge Moscow’s authority and ideological supremacy are wicked and harmful to human progress and that there is a duty on the part of right-thinking people everywhere to work for the overthrow or weakening of such regimes, by any and all methods which prove tactically desirable;

(d) That there can be, in the long run, no advancement of the interests of both the communist and non-communist world by mutual collaboration, these interests being basically conflicting and contradictory;

and

(e) That spontaneous association between individuals in the communist-dominated world and individuals outside that world is evil and cannot contribute to human progress.

Plainly, it is not enough that these concepts should cease to dominate Soviet, or Russian, theory and practice in international relations. It is also necessary that they should be replaced by something approximating their converses.

These would be:

(a) That it is possible for sovereign and equal countries to exist peaceably side by side and to collaborate with each other without any thought or attempt at domination of one by the other;

(b) That conflict is not necessarily the basis of international life and that it may be accepted that peoples can have common purposes without being in entire ideological agreement and without being subordinated to a single authority;

(c) That people in other countries do have a legitimate right to pursue national aims at variance with Communist ideology, and that it is the duty of right-thinking people to practice tolerance for the ideas of others, to observe scrupulous non-interference in the internal affairs of others on the basis of reciprocity, and to use only decent and honorable methods in international dealings;

(d) That international collaboration can, and should, advance the interests of both parties even though the ideological inspiration of thc two parties is not identical; and

(e) That the association of individuals across international borders is desirable and should be encouraged as a process contributing to general human progress.

Note: the above were not just concepts, they were practised by USSR, and are now professed and practised by the Russian Federation. So the Empire of Chaos, already in 1948 set about to exploit any rifts, widening them into chasms

It may he stated, accordingly, that our first aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to encourage and promote by means short of war the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present satellite area and the emergence of the respective eastern European countries as independent factors on the international scene,

We should encourage by every means at our disposal tile development in the Soviet Union of institutions of federalism which would permit a revival of the national life of the Baltic peoples.

We may say, therefore, that our second aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is, by informational activity and by every other means at our disposal, to explode the myth by which people remote from Russian military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the Soviet Union for what it is and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward it.

Then comes the undermining from within, in the chapter of “THE ALTERATION OF RUSSIAN CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS” – in other words making a not-Russia out of Russia

We must say, therefore, that our third aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to create situations which will compel the Soviet Governntent to recognise the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving, at least outwardly, as though it were the converse of those concepts that were true.

This is of course primarily a question of keeping the Soviet Union politically, militarily, psychologically weak in comparison with the international forces outside of its control and of maintaining a high degree of insistence among the non-communist countries on the observance by Russia of the ordinary international decencies.

That phase was started in 1980s with the coming of Gorbachev.

They had the plans for war, of course. And whereas Russian military doctrine is to defend its territory, the American one is written like this:

The first of our war aims must naturally be she destruction of Russian military influence and domination in areas contiguous to, but outside of, the borders of any Russian state.

However that may be, we must leave nothing to chance; and it should naturally be considered that one of our major war aims with respect to Russia would be to destroy thoroughly the structure of relationships by which the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens, or groups of citizens, in countries not under communist control.

In other words, being cowardly to go head on, attack the weaker parts, and then divide and conquer. It is interesting to observe that throughout the 90s, in the accursed Yeltsin era, USA were already implementing the war-time part of the 1948 plan towards Russia:

we may definitely conclude that we could not consider our military operations successful if they left a communist regime in control of enough of the present military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable them to wage war on comparable terms with any neighboring state or with any rival authority which might be set up on traditional Russian territory.

It is impossible to forecast what the nature of such terms [of surrender of Russia] should be. The smaller the territory left at the disposal of such a regime, the easier the task of imposing terms satisfactory to our interests. Taking the worst case, which would be that of the retention of Soviet power over all, or nearly all, of present Soviet territory, we would have to demand:

(a) Direct military terms (surrender of equipment, evacuation of key areas, etc.) designed to assure military helplessness for a long time in advance;

(b) Terms designed to produce a considerable economic dependence on the outside world;

(c) Terms designed to give necessary freedom, or federal status, to national minorities (we would at least have to insist on the complete liberation of the Baltic States and on the granting of some type of federal status to the Ukraine which would make it possible for a Ukrainian local authority to have a large measure of autonomy); and

(d) Terms designed to disrupt the iron curtain and to assure a liberal flow of outside ideas and a considerable establishment of personal contact between persons within the zone of Soviet power and persons outside it.

Funny how Project Ukraine is playing out now. USA got more than what they bargained for in 1948.

Furthermore, here is what Yeltsin implemented in Russia after the November 1993 coup d’etat, almost to the letter of the 1948 document:

First of all, it should be said that regardless of the ideological basis of any such non-communist authority and regardless of the extent to which it might be prepared to do lip service to the ideals of democracy and liberalism, we would do well to see that in one way or another the basic purposes were assured which flow from the demands listed above. In other words, we should set up automatic safeguards to assure that even a regime which is non-communist and nominally friendly to us:

(a) Does not have strong military power;

(b) Is economically dependent to a considerable extent on the outside world;

(c) Does not exercise too much authority over the major national minorities; and

(d) Imposes nothing resembling the iron curtain over contacts with the outside world.

In the case of such a regime, professing hostility to the communists and friendship toward us, we should doubtless wish to take care i.o impose these conditions in a manner which would not be offensive or humiiiating. But we would have to see to it that in one way or another they were imposed, if our interests and the interests of world peace were to be protected.

In the 90’s and the beginning of 00’s (on inertia) military destroyed (check); economical dependence on pertodollar (check); provocation of conflicts and civil wars on ethnic grounds (check); total inability to withstand outside informational influence (check). Funnily, once Russia started to come back to it’s ow in 2007 (Putin’s München Speech), the West slammed an iron curtain on Russia from their own side, blocking almost all of information coming from Russia to the west.

We are therefore safe in saying that it should be our aim in the event of war with the Soviet Union, to see to it that when the war was over no regime on Russian territory is permitted:

(a) To retain military force on a scale which could be threatening to any neighboring stale;

(b) To enjoy a measure of economic autarchy which would permit the erection of the economic basis of such armed power without the assistance of the western world;

(c) To deny autonomy and self-government to the main national minorities; or

(d) To retain anything resembling the present iron curtain. If these conditions are assured, we can adjust ourselves to any political situation which may ensue from the war. We will then be safe, whether a Soviet government retains the bulk of Russian territory or whether it retains only a small part of such territory or whether it disappears altogether. And we will be safe even though the original democratic enthusiasm of a new regime is short-lived and tends to be replaced gradually by the a-social concepts of international affairs to which the present Soviet generation has been educated.

The above should be adequate as an expression of our war aims in the event that political processes in Russia take their own course under the stresses of war and that we are not obliged to assume major responsibility for the political future of the country. But there are further questions to be answered for the event that Soviet authority should disintegrate so rapidly and so radically as to leave the country in chaos, making it encumbent upon us as the victors to make political choices and to take decisions which would be apt to shape the political future of the country. For this eventuality there are three main questions which must be faced.

That disintegration cost more Russian lives in the Wild 90’s than what was lost during the whole of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945!

Also, note how the Ukrainian project is spun. In 1917 Lenin built Ukraine, at the expense of Russia, in 1945 Stalin added to it at the expense of Poland, Romania, Hungary, in 1954 Khrishev expanded it at the expense of Russia again, yet the US “masterminds” are persuing the aim that the “nationalistic organizations” [Read Galicina SS, Bandera follower] are most vocal abroad about. It was in 1948 that the disaster of today with Ukro-Nazis 3-year long shelling of Donbass and the total destruction of the USSR-inherited Ukrainian economy that we are observing now.

First of all, would it be our desire, in such a case, that the present territories of the Soviet Union remain united under a single regime or that they be partitioned? And if they are to remain united, at least to a large extent, then what degree of federalism should be observed in a future Russian government? What about the major minority groups, in particular the Ukraine?

We have already taken note of the problem of the Baltic states. The Baltic states should not be compelled to remain under any communist authority in the aftermath of another war. Should the territory adjacent To the Baltic slates be controlled by a Russian authority other than a communist authority, we should be guided by the wishes of the Baltic peoples and by the degree of moderation which that Russian authority is inclined to exhibit with respect to them.

In the case of the Ukraine, we have a different problem. The Ukrainians are the most advanced of the peoples who have been under Russian rule in modern times. They have generally resented Russian domination; and their nationalistic organizations have been active and vocal abroad. It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that they should be freed, at last, from Russian rule and permitted to set themselves up as an independent slate.

And when the collapse was the accomplished fact, first Yeltsin got installed as a president (cemented during the 1993 coup d’etat), and then they tried to install Khodorkovskij…

In the event of a disintegration of Soviet power, we are certain to be faced with demands for .support on the part of the various competing political elements among the present Russian opposition groups. It will be almost impossible for us to avoid doing things which would have the effect of favoring one or another of these groups over its rivals. But a great deal will depend on ourselves, and on our concept of what we are trying to accomplish.

We have already seen that among the existing and potential opposition groups there is none which we will wish to sponsor entirely and for whose actions, if it were to obtain power in Russia, we would wish to take responsibility.

On the other hand, we must expect that vigorous efforts will be made by various groups to induce us to take measures in Russian internal affairs which will constitute a genuine commitment on our part and make it possible for political groups in Russia to continue to demand our support. In the light of these facts, it is plain then we must make a determined effort to avoid taking responsibility for deciding who would rule Russia in the wake of a disintegration of the Soviet regime.

In 1948 they even planned for “decommunisation” – a term that was popular in Ukraine anno 2014, when physical violence, banning and disappearances became the norm. They did indeed give “plenty of arms and help” to the “non-communist authority” of Ukro-Nazis and Banderites. In the Baltic countries that manifested as apartheid…

We would be wiser, therefore, in the case of territories freed from communist control, to restrict ourselves to seeing to it that individual ex-communists do not have the opportunity to reorganize as armed groups with pretenses to political power and that the local non-communist authority is given plenty of arms and help in any measures which they may desire to take with respect to them.

We may say, therefore, that we would not make it our aim to carry out with our own forces, on territory liberated from the communist authorities, aпy large-scale program of de-communication, and that In general we would leave this problem to whatever local authority might supplant Soviet rule.

And now the whole documents, one of a planned infestation and murder of a country…


Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds.,
Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy,
1945-1950


U.S. OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIA

TOPSECRET

August 18, 1948

[Source; Records of the National Security Council on deposit in the Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives, Washington. D.C.]

NSC 20/1 originated in response to a request from Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal for a "comprehensive statement of national policy’" with regard to the Soviet Union, on the grounds that until such a statement was prepared, "no logical decisions can be reached as to the proportion of our resources which should be devoted to military purposes. . . ..” (*1) Drafted by the Policy Planning Staff, this document represented the most complete exposition up to that time of the objectives the policy of containment was supposed to accomplish.

(*1). Forrestal to Sidney W. Souers, July 10, 1948, quoted in NSC 20, “Appraisal of the
Degree and Character of Mllilary Preparedness Required by the World Situiilion,” July 12,
1948, Foreign Relations of the United Stales: 1948, I (part 2) 589-592.

The document established two basic goals for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union: (1) reduction of the power and influence of the U.S.S.R. to the point that they would no longer threaten international stability; and (2) accomplishment of a fundamental change in the theory and practice of international relations as applied by the Soviet govemment. Unlike NSC 7 (Document 20), NSC 20/1 stressed the distinction between the Soviet Union and the international communist movement, and, in line with the reasoning in PPS 35 (Document 21), held out the possibility of driving a wedge between the two of them as a means of implementing U.S. policy objectives.

NSC 20/1 emphasized the desirability of achieving containment’s desired results by means short of war, although it recognized the possibility that war might come, whether by inadvertence or design. The final portion of the document dealt with the question of what U.S. policy should be in that eventuality. It is noteworthy for its stress on the neutralization, rather than the elimination, of Soviet power, and for its implied rejection of the World War II doctrine of unconditional surrender.

I. Introduction

It is plain that Russia, both as a force in its own right and as a center for the world communist movement, has become for the time being the outstanding problem of U.S. foreign policy, and that there is deep dissatisfaction and concern in this country over the aims and methods of the Soviet leaders. The policies of this Government are therefore determined in considerable measure by our desire to modify Soviet policies and to alter the international situation to which they have already led.

However, there has yet been no clear formulation of basic U.S. objectives with respect to Russia. And it is particularly important, in view of the preoccupation of this Government with Russian affairs, that .such objectives be formulated and accepted for working purposes by all branches of our Government dealing with the problems of Russia and communism. Otherwise, there is a possibility of serious dissipation of the national effort on a problem of outstanding international importance.

II. Background Considerations

There are two concepts of the relationship of national objectives to the factors of war and peace.

The first holds that national objectives be constant and should not be affected by changes in the country’s situation as between war and peace; that they should be pursued constantly by means short of war or by war-like means, as the case may be. This concept was best expressed by Clausewitz, who wrote that, "War is a continuation of policy, intermingled with other means."

The opposite concept is that which sees national objectives in peace and national objectives in war as essentially unrelated. According to this concept, the existence of a state of war creates its own specific political objectives, which generally supersede the normal peacetime objectives. This is the concept which has generally prevailed in this country. Basically, it was the concept which prevailed in the last war, where the winning of the war itself, as a military operation, was made the supreme objective of U.S. policy, other considerations being subordinated to it.

In the case of American objectives with respect to Russia, it is clear that neither of these concepts can prevall entirely.

In the first place, this Government has been forced, for purposes of the political war now in progress, to consider more definite and militant objectives toward Russia even now, in time of peace, than it ever was called upon to formulate with respect either to Germany or Japan in advance of the actual hostilities with those countries.

Secondly, the experience of the past war has taught us the desirability of gearing our war effort to a clear and realistic concept of the long-term political objectives which we wish to achieve. This would be particularly important in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. We could hardly expect to conclude such a war with the same military and political finality as was the case in the recent war against Germany and Japan, Unless, therefore, it were
clear to everyone that our objectives did not lie in military victory for its own sake, it might be hard for the U.S. public to recognize what would in reality be a favorable issue of the conflict. The public might expect much more in the way of military finality than would be necessary, or even desirable, from the standpoint of the actual achievement of our objectives. If people were to get the idea that our objectives were unconditional surrender, total occupation and military government, on the patterns of Germany and Japan, they would naturally feel that anything short of these achievements was no real victory at all, and might fail to appreciate a really genuine and constructive settlement,

Finally, we must recognize that Soviet objectives themselves are almost constant. They are very little affected by changes from war to peace. For example, Soviet territorial aims with respect to eastern Europe, as they became apparent during the war, bore a strong similarity to the program which the Soviet Government was endeavoring to realize by measures short of war in 1939 and 1940, and in fact to certain of the strategic-political concepts which underlay Czarist policy before World War I, To meet a policy of such constancy, so stubbornly pursued through both war and peace, it is necessary that we oppose it with purposes no less constant and enduring- Broadly speaking, this lies in the nature of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the outside world, which is one of permanent antagonism and conflict, taking place sometimes within a framework of formal peace and at other times within the legal framework of war. On the other hand, it is clear that a democracy cannot effect, as the totalitarian state sometimes does, a complete identification of its peacetime and wartime objectives. Its aversion to war as a method of foreign policy is so strong that it will inevitably be inclined to modify its objectives in peacetime, in the hope that they may be achieved without resort to arms. When this hope and this restraint are removed by the outbreak of war, as a result of the provocation of others, the irritation of democratic opinion generally demands either the formulation of further objectives, often of a punitive nature, which it would not have supported in time of peace, or the immediate realization of aims which it might otherwise have been prepared to pursue patiently, by gradual pressures, over the course of decades. It would therefore be unrealistic to suppose that the U.S. Government could hope to proceed in time of war on the basis of exactly the same set of objectives, or at least with the same time-table for realization of objectives, which it would have in time of peace.

At the same time, it must be recognized that the smaller the gap between
peacetime and wartime purposes, the greater the likelihood that a successful military effort will be politically successful as well. If objectives are really sound from the standpoint of national interest, they are worth consciously formulating and pursuing in war as in peace. Objectives which cumc into being as a consequence of wartime emotionalism are not apt to reflect a balanced concept of long-term national interest. For this reason, every effort should be made in government planning now, in advance of any outbreak of hostilities, to define our present peacetime objectives and our hypothetical wartime objectives with relation to Russia, and to reduce as far as possible the gap between them.

III. Basic Objectives

Our basic objectives with respect to Russia are really only two:

a. To reduce The power and influence of Moscow to limits in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international society; and

b. To bring about a basic change in the theory’ and practice of international relations observed by the government in power in Russia. If these two objectives could be achieved, the problem which this country faces in its relations with Russia would be reduced to what might be considered normal dimensions.

Before discussing the manner in which these objectives could be pursued in peace and in war, respectively, let us first examine them in somewhat greater detail.

1 . THE GEOGRAPHIC REDUCTION OF RUSSIAN POWER AND INFLUENCE

There are two spheres in which the power and the influence of Moscow have been projected beyond the borders of the Soviet Union in ways detrimental to the peace and stability of international society.

The first of these spheres is what may be defined as the satellite area:
namely, the area in which decisive political influence is exercised by the Kremlin. It should be noted that in this area, which is, as a whole, geographically contiguous to the Soviet Union, the presence, or proximity, of Soviet armed power has been a decisive factor in the establishment and maintenance of Soviet hegemony.

The second of these spheres embraces the relation between, on the one hand, the power center which controls the Soviet Union and, on the other,
groups or parties in countries abroad, beyond the limits of the satellite area, which look to Russia for their political inspiration and give to it, consciously or otherwise, their basic loyalty.

In both of these spheres the projection of Russian power beyond its legitimate limits must be broken up if the achievement of the first of the objectives listed above is to be effectively served. The countries in the satellite area must be given the opportunity to free themselves fundamentally from Russia domination and from undue Russian ideological inspiration. And the myth which causes millions of people in countries far from the Soviet borders to look to Moscow as the outstanding source of hope for human betterment must be thoroughly exploded and its workings destroyed.

It should be noted that in both cases the objective can conceivably be achieved for Ihe most part without raising issues in which the prestige of the Soviet state, as such, need necessarily be decisively engaged.

In the second of the two spheres, a complete retraction of undue Russian power should be possible without necessarily engaging the more vital interests of the Russian state; for in this sphere Moscow’s power is exerted through carefully concealed channels, the existence of which Moscow itself denies. Therefore, a withering away of the structure of power which was formerly known as the Third International, and which has survived the disuse of that name, need involve no formal humiliation of the government in Moscow and no formal concessions on the part of the Soviet State.

The same is largely true of the first of these two spheres, but not entirely, In the satellite area, to be sure, Moscow likewise denies the formal fact of Soviet domination and attempts to conceal its mechanics. As has now been demonstrated in the Tito incidents, a breakdown of Moscow control is not necessarily regarded as an event affecting the respective states as such. In this instance, it is treated as a party affair by both sides; and particular care is taken everywhere to emphasize that no question of state prestige is involved. The same could presumably happen everywhere else throughout the satellite area without involving the formal dignity of the Soviet State.

We are confronted, however, with a more difficult problem in the actual extensions of the borders of the Soviet Union which have taken place since 1939. These extensions cannot in all cases be said to have been seriously detrimental to international peace and stability; and in certain instances it can probably be considered, from the standpoint of our objectives, that they can be entirely accepted for the sake of the maintenance of peace, In other cases, notably that of the Baltic countries, the question is more difficult. We cannot really profess indifference to the further fate of the Baltic, peoples.

This has been reflected in our recognition policy to date with respect to those countries. And we could hardly consider that international peace and stability will really have ceased to be threatened as long as Europe is faced with the fact that it has been possible for Moscow to crush these three small countries which have been guilty of no real provocation and which have given evidence of their ability to handle their own affairs in a progressive manner, without detriment to the interests of their neighbors. It should therefore logically be considered a part of U.S. objectives to see these countries restored to something at least approaching a decent state of freedom and independence.

It is clear, however, that their complete independence would involve an actual cession of territory by the Soviet Government. It would therefore raise an issue directly involving the dignity and the vital interests of the Soviet State as such. It is idle to imagine that this could be brought about by means short of war. If, therefore, we are to consider that the basic objective outlined above is one which would be valid for peace as well as for war, then we must logically state that under conditions of peace our objective would be merely to induce Moscow to permit the return to the respective Baltic countries of all of their nationals who have been forcibly removed therefrom and the establishment in those countries of autonomous regimes generally consistent with the cultural needs and national aspirations of the peoples in question. In the event of war, we might, if necessary, wish to go further. But the answer to this question would depend on the nature of the Russian regime which would be dominant in that area in the wake of another war; and we need not attempt to decide it in advance.

In saying, consequently, that we should reduce the power and influence of The Kremlin to limits in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international society, we are entitled to consider that this is an objective which can be logically pursued not only in the event of a war but also in time of peace and by peaceful means, and that in the latter case it need not necessarily raise issues of prestige for the Soviet Government which would automatically make war inevitable.

2. THE CHANGE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNAT10NAI-RELATIONS AS OBSERVED IN MOSCOW

Our difficulty with the present Soviet Government lies basically in the fact that its leaders are animated by concepts of the theory and practice of international relations which are not only radically opposed to our own but are clearly inconsistent with any peaceful and mutually profitable development
of relations between that government and other members of the international community, individually and collectively.

Prominent among these concepts are the following:

(a) That the peaceful coexistence and mutual collaboration of sovereign and independent governments, regarding and respecting each other as equals, is an illusion and an impossibility;

(h) That conflict is the basis of international life wherever, as is the case between the Soviet Union and capitalist countries, one country does not recognize the supremacy of the other;

(c) That regimes which do not acknowledge Moscow’s authority and ideological supremacy are wicked and harmful to human progress and that there is a duty on the part of right-thinking people everywhere to work for the overthrow or weakening of such regimes, by any and all methods which prove tactically desirable;

(d) That there can be, in the long run, no advancement of the interests of both the communist and non-communist world by mutual collaboration, these interests being basically conflicting and contradictory;

and

(e) That spontaneous association between individuals in the communist-dominated world and individuals outside that world is evil and cannot contribute to human progress.

Plainly, it is not enough that these concepts should cease to dominate Soviet, or Russian, theory and practice in international relations. It is also necessary that they should be replaced by something approximating their converses.

These would be:

(a) That it is possible for sovereign and equal countries to exist peaceably side by side and to collaborate with each other without any thought or attempt at domination of one by the other;

(b) That conflict is not necessarily the basis of international life and that it may be accepted that peoples can have common purposes without being in entire ideological agreement and without being subordinated to a single authority;

(c) That people in other countries do have a legitimate right to pursue national aims at variance with Communist ideology, and that it is the duty of right-thinking people to practice tolerance for the ideas of others, to observe scrupulous non-interference in the internal affairs of others on the basis of reciprocity, and to use only decent and honorable methods in international dealings;

(d) That international collaboration can, and should, advance the interests of both parties even though the ideological inspiration of thc two parties is not identical; and

(e) That the association of individuals across international borders is desirable and should be encouraged as a process contributing to general human progress.

Now the question at once arises as to whether the acceptance of such concepts in Moscow is an objective which we can seriously pursue and hope to achieve without resort to war and to the overthrow of the Soviet Government. We must face the fact that the Soviet Government, as we know it today, is, and will continue to be a constant threat to the peace of this nation and of the world.

It is quite clear that the present leaders of the Soviet Union can themselves never be brought to view concepts such as those indicated above as intrinsically sound and desirable. It is equally clear that for such concepts to become dominant throughout the Russian communist movement wou!d mean, in present circumstances, an intellectual revolution within that movement which would amount to a metamorphosis of its political personality and a denial of its basic claim to existence as a separate and vital force among the ideological currents of the world at large. Concepts such as these could become dominant in the Russian communist movement only if, through a long process of change and erosion, that movement had outlived in name the impulses which had originally given it birth and vitality and had acquired a completely different significance in the world than that which it possesses today.

It might be concluded, then (and the Moscow theologians would be quick to put this interpretation on it), that to say that we were seeking the adoption of these concepts in Moscow would be equivalent to saying that it was our objective to overthrow Soviet power. Proceeding from that point, it could be argued that this is in turn an objective unrealizable by means short of war, and that we are therefore admitting that our objective with respect to the Soviet Union is eventual war and the violent overthrow of Soviet power. ,

It would be a dangerous error to accept this line of thought.

In the first place, there is no time limit for the achievement of our objectives under conditions of peace. We are faced here with no rigid periodicity of war and peace which would enable us to conclude that we must achieve our peacetime objectives by a given date "or else". The objectives of national policy in times of peace should never be regarded in static terms. In so far as they arc basic objectives, and worthy ones, they are not apt to be ones capable of complete and finite achievement, like specific military objectives in war. The peacetime objectives of national policy should be thought of rather as lines of direction than as physical goals.

In the second place, we are entireiy within our own rights, and need feel no sense of guilt, in working for the destruction of concepts inconsistent with world peace and stability and for their replacement by ones of tolerance and international collaboration. It is not our business to calculate the internal developments to which the adoption of such concepts might lead in another country, nor need we feel that we have any responsibility for those developments. If the Soviet leaders find the growing prevalence of a more enlightened concept of international relations to be inconsistent with the maintenance of their internal power in Russia, that is their responsibility, not ours. That is a matter for their own consciences, and for the conscience of the peoples of the Soviet Union. We are not only within our moral rights but within our moral duty in working for the adoption everywhere of decent and hopeful concepts of international life. In doing so, we are entitled to let the chips tali where they may in terms of internal development.

We do not know for certain that the successful pursuit by us of the objectives in question would lead to the disintegration of Soviet power; for we do not know the time factor here involved. It is entirely possible that under the stress of lime and circumstance certain of the original concepts of the communist movement might be gradually modified in Russia as were certain of the original concepts of the American revolution in our own country.

We are entitled, therefore, to consider, and to state publicly, that it is our objective to bring to The Russian people and government, by every means at our disposal, a more enlightened concept of international relations, and that in so doing we are not taking any position, as a government, with respect to internal conditions in Russia.

In the case of war, there could clearly be no question of this nature. Once a state of war had arisen between this country and the Soviet Union, this Government would be at liberty to pursue the achievement of its basic objectives by whatever means it might choose and by whatever terms it might wish to impose upon a Russian authority or Russian authorities in the event of a successful issue of military operations. Whether these terms would embrace the overthrow of Soviet power would he only a question of expediency, which will be discussed below.

This second of the two basic objectives is therefore also one likewise susceptible of pursuit in lime of peace as in time of war. This objective, like the first, may accordingly be accepted as an underlying one, from which the formulation of our policy, in peace as in war, may proceed.

IV. The Pursuit of Our Basic. Objectives in Time of Peace

In discussing the interpretation which would be given to these basic objectives in time of peace or in time of war respectively, we arc confronted with a problem of terminology. If we continue to speak of the particular orientation lines of our policy in peace or in war as ”objectives", we may find ourselves falling into a semantic confusion. Solely for the purposes of clarity, therefore, we will make an arbitrary distinction. We will speak of objectives only in the sense of the basic objectives outlined above, which are common both to war and peace. When we refer to our guiding purposes as applied specifically in our wartime or peactime policy, respectively, we will speak of "aims" rather than of "objectives".

What then would be the aims of U.S. national policy with respect to Russia in time of peace?

These should flow logically from the two main objectives discussed above,

1. THE RETRACTION OF RUSS1AN POWER AND INFLUENCE

Let us first consider the retraction of undue Russian power and influence. We have .seen that. this divided into the problem of the satellite area and the problem of communist activities and Soviet propaganda activities in countries farther afield.

With respect to the satellite area, the aim of U.S. policy in time of" peace is to place the greatest possible strain on the structure of relationships by which Soviet domination of this area is maintained and gradually, with the aid of the natural and legitimate forces of Europe, to maneuver the Russians out of their position of primacy and to enable the respective governments to regain their independence of action. There are many ways in which this aim can be, and is being, pursued. The most striking step in this direction was the original proposal for the ERP, as stated in Secretary Marshall’s Harvard speech on June 5, S947. By forcing the Russians either to permit the satellite countries to enter into a relationship of economic collaboration with the west of Europe which would inevitably have strengthened east-west bonds and weakened The exclusive orientation of these countries toward Russia or to force them to remain outside this structure of collaboration at heavy economic sacrifice to themselves, we placed a severe strain on the relations between Moscow and the satellite countries and undoubtedly made more awkward and difficult maintenance by Moscow of its exclusive authority in the satellite capitals. Everything, in fad, which operates to tear off the veil with
which Moscow likes to screen its power, and which forces the Russians to reveal the crude and ugly outlines of their hold over the governments of the satellite countries, serves to discredit the satellite governments with their own peoples and to heighten the discontent of those peoples and their desire for free association with other nations.

The disaffection of Tito, to which the strain caused by the ERP problem undoubtedly contributed in some measure, has clearly demonstrated that it is possible for stresses in the Soviet-satellite relations to lead to a real weakening and disruption of the Russian domination,

It should therefore be our aim to continue to do all in our power to increase these stresses and at the same time to make it possible for the satel-lile governments gradually to extricate themselves from Russian control and to find, if they so wish, acceptable forms of collaboration with the governments of the west. This can be done by skillful use of our economic power, by direct or indirect informational activity, by placing the greatest possible strain on the maintenance of the iron curtain, and by building up the hope and vigor of western Europe to a point where it comes to exercise the maximum attraction to the peoples of the east, and by other means too numerous to mention.

We cannot say, of course, that the Russians will sit by and permit the satellites to extricate themselves from Russian control in this way. We cannot be sure that at some point in this process the Russians will not choose to resort to violence of some sort; i.e., to forms of military re-occupation or possibly even to a major war, to prevent such a process from being carried to completion.

It is not our desire that they should do this; and we, for our part, should do everything possible to keep the situation flexible and to make possible a liberation of the satellite countries in ways which do not create any unanswerable challenge to Soviet prestige. But even with the greatest of circumspection we cannot be sure that they will not choose to resort to arms. We cannot hope to influence their policy automatically or to produce any guaranteed results.

The fact that we embark on a policy which can lead to these results does not mean that we are setting our course toward war; and we should be extremely careful to make this plain on all occasions and to refute accusations of this character. The fact of the matter is that, granted the relationship of antagonism which is still basic to the entire relationships between the Soviet Government and non-communist countries at this time, war is an ever-present possibility and no course which this Government might adopt would appre-
ciably diminish this danger. The converse of the policy set forth above, namely to accept Soviet domination of the satellite countries and to do nothing to oppose it, would not diminish in any way the danger of war. On the contrary, it can be argued with considerable logic that the long-term danger of war will inevitably be greater if Europe remains split along the present lines than it will be if Russian power i.s peacefully withdrawn in good time and a normal balance restored to the European community.

It may he stated, accordingly, that our first aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to encourage and promote by means short of war the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present satellite area and the emergence of the respective eastern European countries as independent factors on the international scene,

However, as we have seen above, our examination of this problem is not complete unless we have taken into consideration the question of areas now behind the Soviet border. Do we wish, or do we not, to make it our objective to achieve by means short of war any modification of the borders of the Soviet Union? We have already seen in Chapter III the answer to this question.

We should encourage by every means at our disposal tile development in the Soviet Union of institutions of federalism which would permit a revival of the national life of the Baltic peoples.

It may be asked: Why do we restrict this aim to the Baltic peoples? Why do we not include the other national minority groups of the Soviet Union? The answer is that the Baltic peoples happen to be the only peoples whose traditional territory and population are now entirely included in the Soviet Union and who have shown themselves capable of coping successfully with the responsibilities of statehood. Moreover, we still formally deny the legitimacy of their violent inclusion in the Soviet Union, and they therefore have a special status in our eyes.

Next we have the problem of the disruption of the myth by which the people in Moscow maintain their undue influence and actual disciplinary authority over millions of people in countries beyond the satellite area. First a word about the nature of this problem.

Before the revolution of 1918, Russian nationalism was solely Russian. Except for a few eccentric European intellectuals of the 19th Century, who even then professed to a mystical faith in Russia’s power to solve the ills of civilization (*2) Russian nationalism had no appeal to people outside Russia. On the contrary, the relatively mild despotism of the 19th Century Russian
rulers was perhaps better known and more universally deplored in the western countries than has since been the case with the far greater cruelties of the Soviet regime.

(*2) Karl Marx was not one of these people. He was not, as he himself put it, “one of those
who believed that the old Europe could be revived by Russian blood,” [Note in source text]

After the revolution, the Bolshevik leaders succeeded, through clever and systematic propaganda, in establishing throughout large sections of the world public certain concepts highly favorable to their Own purposes, including the following: that the October Revolution was a popular revolution;
that the Soviet regime was the first real worker’s government; that Soviet power was in some way connected with ideals of liberalism, freedom and economic security; and that it offered a promising alternative to the national regimes under which other peoples lived. A connection was thus established in the minds of many people between Russian communism and the general uneasiness arising in the outside world from the effects of urbanization and industrialization, or from colonial unrest.

In this way Moscow’s doctrine became to some extent a domestic problem for every nation in the world. In Soviet power, western statesmen arc now facing something more than just another problem of foreign affairs. They are facing also an internal enemy in their own countries—an enemy committed to the undermining and eventual destruction of their respective national societies.

To destroy this myth of international communism is a dual task. It takes two parties to create an inter-action such as that which exists between the Kremlin, on the one hand, and the discontented intellectuals in other countries (for it is the intellectuals rather than the "workers" who make up the hard core of communism outside the USSR), on the other. It is not enough to tackle this problem by aiming to silence the propagator. It is even more important to arm the listener against this sort of attack. There is some reason why Moscow propaganda is listened to so avidly, and why this myth takes hold so readily, among many people far from the boundaries of Russia. If it were not Moscow these people listened to, it would be something else, equally extreme and equally erroneous, though possibly less dangerous. Thus the task of destroying the myth on which international communism rests is not just an undertaking relating to the leaders of the Soviet Union. It is also something relating to the non-Soviet world, and above all to the particular society of which each of us forms a part. To the extent to which we can dispel the confusion and misunderstandings on which these doctrines thrive—to the extent that we can remove the sources of bitterness which drive people to irrational and Utopian ideas of this sort—we will succeed in breaking down the ideological influence of Moscow in foreign countries. On the other hand- we must recognize that only a portion of international
communism outside Russia is the result of environmental influence and subject to correction accordingly. Another portion represents something in the nature of a natural mutation of species. It derives from a congenital fifth-columnism with which a certain small percentage of people in every community appear to be affected, and which distinguishes itself by a negative attitude toward the native society and a readiness to follow any outside force which opposes it. This element will always be present in any society for unscrupulous outsiders to work on; and the only protection against its dangerous misuse will be the absence of the will on the part of great-power regimes to exploit this unhappy margin of human nature.

Fortunately, the Kremlin has thus far done more than we ourselves could ever have done to dispel the very myth by which it operates. The Yugoslav incident is perhaps the most striking case in point; but the history of the Communist International is replete with other instances of the difficulty non-Russian individuals and groups have encountered in trying to be the followers of Moscow doctrines. The Kremlin leaders are so inconsiderate, so relentless, so over-bearing and so cynical in the discipline they impose on their followers that few can stand their authority for very long.

The Leninist-Stalinist system is founded, basically, on the power which a desperate, conspiratorial minority can always wield, at least temporarily, over a passive and unorganized majority of human beings- For this reason, the Kremlin leaders have had little concern, in the past, about the tendency of their movement to leave in its train a steady backwash of disillusioned former followers. Their aim was not to have communism become a mass movement but rather to work through a small group of faultlessly disciplined and entirely expendable followers. They were always content to let those peoples go who could not stomach Their particular brand of discipline.

For a long time, this worked reasonably well. New recruits were easy to obtain; and the Party lived by a steady process of natural selection-out, which left within its ranks only the most fanatically devoted, the most unimaginative, and the most obtusely unscrupulous natures.

The Yugoslav case has now raised a great question mark as to how well this system will work in the future, Heretofore, heresy could safely be handled by police repression within The limits of Soviet power or by a tested process of excommunication and character-assassination outside those limits. Tito has demonstrated that in the case of the satellite leaders, neither of these methods is necessarily effective. Excommunication of communist leaders who are beyond the effective range of Soviet power and who themselves have territory, police power, military power, and disciplined fol-
lowers, can split the whole communist movement, as nothing else was ever able to do, and cause the most grievous damage to the myth of Stalin’s omniscience and omnipotence.

Conditions are therefore favorable to a concentrated effort on our part designed to take advantage of Soviet mistakes and of the rifts that have appeared, and to promote the steady deterioration of the structure of moral influence by which the authority of the Kremlin has been carried to peoples far beyond the reach of Soviet police power.

We may say, therefore, that our second aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is, by informational activity and by every other means at our disposal, to explode the myth by which people remote from Russian military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the Soviet Union for what it is and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward it.

2. THE ALTERATION OF RUSSIAN CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

We come now to the interpretation, in terms of peacetime policy, of our second major objective: namely, to bring about an alteration of the concepts of international relations prevalent in Moscow governing circles.

As has been seen above, There is no reasonable prospect that we will ever be able to alter the basic political psychology of the men now in power in the Soviet Union. The malevolent character of their outlook on the outside world, their repudiation of the possibility of permanent peaceful collaboration, their belief in the inevitability of the eventual destruction of the one world by the other: these things must remain, if only tor the simple reason that the Soviet leaders are convinced that their own system will not stand comparison with the civilization of the west and that it will never be secure until the example of a prosperous and powerful western civilization has been physically obliterated and its memory discredited. This is not to mention the fact that these men are committed to the theory of inevitable conflict between the two worlds by the strongest of all commitments: namely, the fact that they have inflicted the punishment of death or of great suffering and hardship on millions of people in the name of this theory.

On the other hand, the Soviet leaders are prepared to recognize situations, if not arguments. If, therefore, situations can be created in which it is clearly noi. to the advantage of their power to emphasize the elements of conflict in their relations with the outside world, then their actions, and even the tenor of their propaganda to their own people, can be modified. This was made
evident in the recent war when the circumstances of their military association with the western powers had the effect just described. In this instance, the modification of their policies was of relatively short duration; for with the end of hostilities they thought they saw an opportunity for gaining important objectives of their own regardless of the feelings and views of the western powers. This meant that the situation which had caused them to modify their policies no longer appeared to them to exist.

If, however, analogous situations could again be created in the future and the Soviet leaders compelled to recognize their reality, and if these situations could be maintained for a longer time, i.e., for a period long enough to encompass a respectable portion of the organic process of growth and change in Soviet political life, then they might have a permanent modifying effect on the outlook and habits of Soviet power. Even the relatively brief and perfunctory lip service done during the recent war to the possibility of collaboration among the major allies left a deep mark on the consciousness of the Russian public, and one which has undoubtedly caused serious difficulties to the regime, since the end of the war, in its attempt to revert to the old policies of hostility and subversion toward the western world. Yet all this occurred in a period in which there was absolutely no turnover of any importance in the Soviet leadership and no normal evolution of internal political life in the Soviet Union- Had it been necessary for the Soviet Government to observe these policies of circumspection and moderation toward the west for so long a period that the present leaders would have had to yield to other ones and that there would have been some normal evolution of Soviet political life in the face of these necessities, then it is possible that some real modification in Soviet outlook and behavior might eventually have been achieved.

It flows from this discussion that whereas we will not be able to alter the basic political psychology of the present Soviet leaders, there is a possibility that if we can create situations which, if long enough maintained, may cause them to soft-pedal their dangerous and improper attitude toward the west and to observe a relative degree of moderation and caution in their dealings with western countries. In this case, we could really say that we had begun to make progress toward a gradual alteration of the dangerous concepts which now underlie Soviet behavior.

Again, as in the case of the retraction of Soviet power, and, in fact, as in the case of any sound program of resistance to Soviet attempts at the destruction of western civilization, we must recognize that the Soviet leaders may see the writing on the wall and may prefer to resort to violence rather
than to permit these things to occur. It must be reiterated: that is the risk which we run not just in this, but in any sound policy toward the Soviet Union. It is inherent in the present nature of the Soviet Government; and nothing we may do can alter or remove it, This is not a problem new to the foreign relations of the United Stales. In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton stated:

"Let us recollect that peace or war will not always be left to our option;
that however moderate or unambitious we may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the ambition, of others."

In setting out, therefore, to alter the concepts by which the Soviet Government now operates in world affairs, we must again concede that the question of whether this aim can be achieved by peaceful means cannot he answered entirely by ourselves. But this does not excuse us from making the attempt.

We must say, therefore, that our third aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to create situations which will compel the Soviet Governntent to recognise the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving, at least outwardly, as though it were the converse of those concepts that were true.

This is of course primarily a question of keeping the Soviet Union politically, militarily, psychologically weak in comparison with the international forces outside of its control and of maintaining a high degree of insistence among the non-communist countries on the observance by Russia of the ordinary international decencies.

3. SPECIFIC AIMS

The aims listed above are all general in nature. To attempt to make them specific would lead us into an endless maze of attempts at verbal classification and would probably be more confusing than clarifying. For this reason, no attempt will be made here to spell out the possible forms of specific application of these aims. Many of these forms will easily suggest themselves to any who give thought to the interpretation of these, general aims in terms of practical policy and action. It will be seen for example, that a major factor in the achievement of all of these aims without exception, would be the degree to which we might succeed in penetrating or disrupting the iron curtain.

However, the question of specific interpretation may be considerably clarified by a brief indication of the negative side of the picture: in other words, by pointing out what our aims are not.

First of all, it is not our primary aim in time of peace to set the stage for a war regarded as inevitable. We do not regard war as inevitable. We do not repudiate the possibility that our overall objectives with respect to Russia may be successfully pursued without resort to war, We have to recognize the possibility of war, as something flowing logically and at all times from the present attitude of The Soviet leaders; and we have to prepare realistically for that eventuality.

But it would be wrong to consider that our policy rested on an assumption of an inevitability of war and was confined to preparations for an armed conflict. Thal is not the case. Our task at present, in the absence of a state of war automatically brought about by the actions of others, is to find means of pursuing our objectives successfully without resort to war ourselves. It includes preparations for a possible war, but we regard these as only subsidiary and precautionary rather than as the primary element of policy. We are still hoping and striving to achieve our objectives within the framework of peace. Should we at any time come to the conclusion (which is not excluded) that this is really impossible and that the relations between communist and non-communist worlds cannot proceed without eventual armed conflict, then The whole basis of this paper would be changed and our peacetime aims. as set forth herein, would have to be basically altered.

Secondly, it is not our peacetime aim to overthrow the Soviet Government. Admittedly, we are aiming at the creation of circumstances and situations which would be difficult for the present Soviet leaders to stomach, and which they would not like. It is possible that they might not be able, in the face of these circumstances and situations, to retain their power in Russia. But it must be reiterated: that is their business, not ours. This paper implies no judgment as to whether it is possible for the Soviet Government to behave with relative decency and moderation in external affairs and yet to retain its internal power in Russia. Should the situations to which our peacetime aims are directed actually come into being and should they prove intolerable to the maintenance, of internal Soviet power and cause the Soviet Government to leave the scene, we would view this development without regret; but we would not assume responsibility for having sought it or brought it about.

V. The Pursuit of our Basic Objectives in Time of War

This chapter treats of our aims with respect to Russia in the event that a state of war should arise between the United States and the USSR. It pro-
poses to set forth what we would seek as a favorable issue of our military operations.

1. THE IMPOSSIBILITIES

Before entering into a discussion of what we should aim to achieve in a war with Russia, let us first be clear in our own minds about those things which we could not hope to achieve.

In the first place we must assume that it will not be profitable or practically feasible for us To occupy and take under our military administration the entire territory of the Soviet Union. This course is inhibited by the size of that territory, by the number of its inhabitants, by the differences of language and custom which separate its inhabitants from ourselves, and by the improbability that we would find any adequate apparatus of local authority through which we could work.

Secondly, and in consequence of this first admission, we must recognize that it is not likely that the Soviet leaders would surrender unconditionally to us. It is possible that Soviet power might disintegrate during the stress of an unsuccessful war, as did that of the tsar’s regime during World War I. But even this is not likely. And if it did not so disintegrate, we could not be sure that we could eliminate it by any means short of an extravagant military effort designed to bring all of Russia under our control. We have before us in our experience with the Nazis an example of the stubbornness and tenacity with which a thoroughly ruthless and dictatorial regime can maintain its internal power even over a territory constantly shrinking as a consequence of military operations. The Soviet leaders would be capable of concluding a compromise peace, if pressed, and even one highly unfavorable to their own interests. But it is not likely that they would do anything, such as to surrender unconditionally, which would place themselves under The complete power of a hostile authority. Rather than do that, they would probably retire to the most remote village of Siberia and eventually perish, as Hitler did, under the guns of the enemy.

There is a strong possibility that if we were to take the utmost care, within limits of military feasibility, not to antagonize the Soviet people by military policies which would inflict inordinate hardship and cruelties upon them, there would be an extensive disintegration of Soviet power during the course of a war which progressed favorably from our standpoint, We would certainly he entirely Justified in promoting such a disintegration with every means at our disposal. This does not mean, however, that we could be sure of achieving the complete overthrow of the Soviet regime, in the sense of
the removal of its power overall the present territory of the Soviet Union.

Regardless of whether or not Soviet power endures on any of the present Soviet territory we cannot be sure of finding among the Russian people any other group of political leaders who would he entirely "democratic" as we understand that term.

While Russia has had her moments of liberalism, the concepts of democracy arc not familiar to the great mass of the Russian people, and particularly not to those who are temperamentally inclined to the profession of government. At the present rime, there are a number of interesting and powerful Russian political groupings, among the Russian exiles, all of which do lip service to principles of liberalism, to one degree or another, and any of which would probably he preferable to the Soviet Government, from our standpoint, as the rulers of Russia. But just how liberal these groupings would be, if they once had power, or what would be their ability to maintain their authority among the Russian people without resort to methods of police terror and repression, no one knows. The actions of people in power are often controlled far more by the circumstances in which they arc obliged to exercise that power than by the ideas and principles which animated them when they were in the opposition. In turning over the powers of government to any Russian group, it would never be possible for us to be certain that those powers would be exercised in a manner which our own people would approve. We would therefore always be taking a chance, in making such a choice, and incurring a responsibility which we could not be sure of meeting creditably.

Finally, we cannot hope really to impose our concepts of democracy within a short space of time upon any group of Russian leaders. In the long run, the political psychology of any regime which is even reasonably responsive to the will of the people must be that of the people themselves- But it has been vividly demonstrated through our experience in Germany and Japan that the psychology and outlook of a great people cannot be altered in a short space of time at the mere dictate or precept of a foreign power, even in the wake of total defeat and submission. Such alteration can flow only from the organic political experience of the people in question. The best that can be done by one country to bring about this sort of alteration in another is to change the environmental influences to which the people in question are subjected, leaving it to them to react to those influences in their own way.

All of the above indicates that we could not expect, in the aftermath of successful military operations in Russia, to create there an authority entirely submissive to our will or entirely expressive of our political ideals. We must
reckon with the strong probability that we would have to continue to deal, in one degree or another, with Russian authorities of whom we will not entirely approve, who will have purposes different from ours, and whose views and desiderata we wiil be obliged to take into consideration whether we like them or not. In other words, we could not hope to achieve any total assertion of our will on Russian territory, as we have endeavored to do in Germany and in Japan. We must recognize that whatever settlement we finally achieve must be a political settlement, politically negotiated.

So much for the impossibilities. Now what would be our possible and desirable aims in the event of a war with Russia? These, like the aims of peace, should flow logically from the basic objectives set forth in Chapter III.

2. THE RETRACTION OF SOCIET POWER

The first of our war aims must naturally be she destruction of Russian military influence and domination in areas contiguous to, but outside of, the borders of any Russian state.

Plainly, a successful prosecution of the war on our part would automatically achieve this effect throughout most, if not all, of the satellitc area. A succession of military defeats to the Soviet forces would probably so undermine the authority of the communist regimes in the eastern European countries that most of them would be overthrown. Pockets might remain, in the form of political Tito-ism, i.e., residual communist regimes of a purely national and local character. These we could probably afford to by-pass. Without the might and authority of Russia behind them, they would be sure either to disappear with lime or to evolve into normal national regimes with no more and no less of chauvinism and extremism than is customary to strong national governments in that area. We would of course insist on the cancellation of any formal traces of abnormal Russian power in that area, such as treaties of alliance, etc.

Beyond this. however, we have again the problem of the extent lo which we. would wish Soviet borders modified as a result of a successful military action in our part. We must face frankly the fact that we cannot answer this question at this time. The answer depends almost everywhere on the type of regime which would be left, in the wake of military operations, in the particular area in question. Should this regime be one which held out at least reasonably favorable prospects of observing the principles of liberalism in internal affairs and moderation in foreign policy, it might be possible to leave under its authority most, if not all, of the Territories gained by the So-
viet Union in the recent war. If, as is more probable, little dependence could be placed on the liberalism and moderation of a post-hostilities Russian authority, it might be necessary to alter these borders quite extensively. This must simply be chalked up as one of the questions which will have to be left open until the development of military and political events in Russia reveals to us the full nature of the post-war framework in which we will have to act.

We then have the question of the Soviet myth and of the ideological authority which the Soviet Government now exerts over people beyond The present satellite area. In the first instance, this will of course depend on the question of whether or not the present All-Union Communist Party continues to exert authority over any portion of the present Soviet territory, in the aftermath of another war. We have already seen that we cannot rule out this possibility. Should communist authority disappear, this question is automatically solved. It must be assumed, however, that in any event an unsuccessful issue of the war itself, from the Soviet standpoint, would probably deal a decisive blow to this form of the projection of Soviet power and influence.

However that may be, we must leave nothing to chance; and it should naturally be considered that one of our major war aims with respect to Russia would be to destroy thoroughly the structure of relationships by which the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens, or groups of citizens, in countries not under communist control.

3. THE ALTERATION OF THE RUSSIAN CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Our next problem is again that of the concepts by which Russian policy would be governed in the aftermath of a war. How would we assure ourselves that Russian policy would henceforth be conducted along lines as close as possible to those which we have recognized above as desirable? This is the heart of the problem of our war aims with respect to Russia; and it cannot be given too serious attention.

In the first instance this is a problem of the future of Soviet power; that is, of the power of the communist party in the Soviet Union. This is an extremely intricate question. There is no simple answer to it. We have seen that while we would welcome, and even strive for, the complete disintegration and disappearance of Soviet power, we could not be sure of achieving this entirely. We could therefore view this as a maximum, but not a minimum, aim.

Assuming, then, that there might be a portion of Soviet territory on which we would find it expedient to tolerate the continued existence of Soviet power, upon the conclusion of military operations, what should be our relationship to it? Would we consent to deal with it at all? If so, what sort of terms would we be willing to make?

First of all, we may accept it as a foregone conclusion that we would not be prepared to conclude a full-fledged peace settlement and/or resume regular diplomatic relations with any regime in Russia dominated by any of the present Soviet leaders or persons sharing their cast of Thought. We have had too bitter an experience, during the past fifteen years, with the effort to act as though normal relations were possible with such a regime; and if we should now be forced to resort to war to protect ourselves from the consequences of their policies and actions, our public would hardly be in a mood to forgive the Soviet leaders for having brought things to this pass, or to resume the attempt at normal collaboration.

On the other hand, if a communist regime were to remain on any portion of Soviet territory, upon the conclusion of military operations, we could not afford to ignore it entirely. It could not fail to be, within the limits of its own possibilities, a potential menace to the peace and stability of Russia itself and of the world. The least we could do would be to see to it that its possibilities for mischief were so limited that it could not do serious dam’ age, and that we ourselves, or forces friendly to us, would retain all the necessary controls.

For this, two things would probably be necessary. The first would be the actual physical limitation of the power of such a residual Soviet regime to make war or to threaten and intimidate other nations or other Russian regimes. Should military operations lead to any drastic curtailment of the territory over which the communists held sway, particularly such a curtailment as would deprive them of key factors in the present military-industrial structure of the Soviet Union, this physical limitation would automatically flow from that. Should the territory under their control not be substantially diminished, the same result could be obtained by extensive destruction of important industrial and economic targets from the air. Possibly, both of these means might be required. However that may be, we may definitely conclude that we could not consider our military operations successful if they left a communist regime in control of enough of the present military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable them to wage war on comparable terms with any neighboring state or with any rival authority which might be set up on traditional Russian territory.

The second thing required, if Soviet authority is to endure at all in the traditional Russian territories, will probably be some sort of terms defining at least its military relationship to ourselves and to the authorities surrounding it. In other words, it may be necessary for us to make some sort of deal with a regime of this sort. This may sound distasteful to us now, but it is quite possible that we would find our interests better protected by such a deal than by the all-out military effort which would be necessary to stamp out Soviet power entirely.

It is safe to say that such terms would have to be harsh ones and distinctly humiliating to the communist regime in question. They might well be something along the lines of the Bresl-Litovsk settlement of 1918(*3) which deserves careful study in this connection. The fact that the Germans made this settlement did not mean that they had really accepted the permanency of the Soviet regime. They regarded the settlement as one which rendered the Soviet regime momentarily harmless to them and in a poor position to face the problems of survival. The Russians realized that this was the German purpose. They agreed to the settlement only with the greatest of reluctance, and with every intention of violating it at every opportunity. But the German superiority of force was real; and the German calculations realistic. Had Germany not suffered defeat in the west soon after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk agreement, it is not likely that the Soviet Government would have been able to put up any serious opposition to the accomplishment of German purposes with respect to Russia. It is in this sense that it might be necessary for this Government to deal with the Soviet regime in the latter phases of an armed conflict.

(*3). Treaty of Brest-Lilovsk, signed March 3, 1918, ended hostilities between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers on the basis of provisions that included the independence of the Ukraine, Georgia. Finland, the transfer to the Central Powers of Poland, the Baltic States, and portions of Byelorussia, and the cession of Kars, Ardahan. and Batum to Turkey. As part of the armistice agreement between Germany and the Western Powers on November II. 1918, Germany was forced to repudiate this treaty. [Ed. note]

It is impossible to forecast what the nature of such terms should be. The smaller the territory left at the disposal of such a regime, the easier ihe task of imposing terms satisfactory to our interests. Taking the worst case, which would be that of the retention of Soviet power over all, or nearly all, of present Soviet territory, we would have to demand:

(a) Direct military terms (surrender of equipment, evacuation of key areas, etc.) designed to assure military helplessness for a long time in advance;

(b) Terms designed to produce a considerable economic dependence on the outside world;

(c) Terms designed to give necessary freedom, or federal status, to national minorities (we would at least have to insist on the complete liberation of the Baltic States and on the granting of some type of federal status to the Ukraine which would make it possible for a Ukrainian local authority to have a large measure of autonomy); and

(d) Terms designed to disrupt the iron curtain and to assure a liberal flow of outside ideas and a considerable establishment of personal contact between persons within the zone of Soviet power and persons outside it.

So much for our aims with respect to any residual Soviet authority. There remains the question of what our aims would be with respect to any non-communist authority which might be set up on a portion or all of Russian territory as a consequence of the events of war.

First of all, it should be said that regardless of the ideological basis of any such non-communist authority and regardless of the extent to which it might be prepared to do lip service to the ideals of democracy and liberalism, we would do well to see that in one way or another the basic purposes were assured which flow from the demands listed above. In other words, we should set up automatic safeguards to assure that even a regime which is non-communist and nominally friendly to us:

(a) Does not have strong military power;

(b) Is economically dependent to a considerable extent on the outside world;

(c) Does not exercise too much authority over the major national minorities; and

(d) Imposes nothing resembling the iron curtain over contacts with the outside world.

In the case of such a regime, professing hostility to the communists and friendship toward us, we should doubtless wish to take care i.o impose these conditions in a manner which would not be offensive or humiiiating. But we would have to see to it that in one way or another they were imposed, if our interests and the interests of world peace were to be protected.

We are therefore safe in saying that it should be our aim in the event of war with the Soviet Union, to see to it that when the war was over no regime on Russian territory is permitted:

(a) To retain military force on a scale which could be threatening to any neighboring stale;

(b) To enjoy a measure of economic autarchy which would permit the erection of the economic basis of such armed power without the assistance of the western world;

(c) To deny autonomy and self-government to the main national minorities; or

(d) To retain anything resembling the present iron curtain. If these conditions are assured, we can adjust ourselves to any political situation which may ensue from the war. We will then be safe, whether a Soviet government retains the bulk of Russian territory or whether it retains only a small part of such territory or whether it disappears altogether. And we will be safe even though the original democratic enthusiasm of a new regime is short-lived and tends to be replaced gradually by the a-social concepts of international affairs to which the present Soviet generation has been educated.

The above should be adequate as an expression of our war aims in the event that political processes in Russia take their own course under the stresses of war and that we are not obliged to assume major responsibility for the political future of the country. But there are further questions to be answered for the event that Soviet authority should disintegrate so rapidly and so radically as to leave the country in chaos, making it encumbent upon us as the victors to make political choices and to take decisions which would be apt to shape the political future of the country. For this eventuality there are three main questions which must be faced.

4. PARTITION VS. NATIONAL UNITY

First of all, would it be our desire, in such a case, that the present territories of the Soviet Union remain united under a single regime or that they be partitioned? And if they are to remain united, at least to a large extent, then what degree of federalism should be observed in a future Russian government? What about the major minority groups, in particular the Ukraine?

We have already taken note of the problem of the Baltic states. The Baltic states should not be compelled to remain under any communist authority in the aftermath of another war. Should the territory adjacent To the Baltic slates be controlled by a Russian authority other than a communist authority, we should be guided by the wishes of the Baltic peoples and by the degree of moderation which that Russian authority is inclined to exhibit with respect to them.

In the case of the Ukraine, we have a different problem. The Ukrainians are the most advanced of the peoples who have been under Russian rule in modern times. They have generally resented Russian domination; and their nationalistic organizations have been active and vocal abroad. It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that they should be freed, at last, from Russian rule and permitted to set themselves up as an independent slate.

We would do well to beware of this conclusion. Us very simplicity condemns it in terms of eastern European realities.

It is True that the Ukrainians have been unhappy under Russian rule and that something should be done to protect their position in future. But there are certain basic fads which must not be lost sight of. While the Ukrainians have been an important and specific element in the Russian empire, they have shown no signs of being a ‘"nation" capable of bearing successfully the responsibilities of independence in the face of great Russian opposition. The Ukraine is not a clearly defined ethnical or geographic concept. In general, the Ukrainian population made up of originally in large measure out of refugees from Russian or Polish despotism shades off imperceptibly into the Russian or Polish nationalities. There is no clear dividing line between Russia and the Ukraine, and it would be impossible to establish one. The cities in Ukrainian territory have been predominantly Russian and Jewish. The real basis of "Ukrainianism" is the feeling of "difference" produced by a specific peasant dialect and by minor differences of custom and folklore throughout the country districts. The political agitation on the surface is largely the work of a few romantic intellectuals, who have little concept of the responsibilities of government.

The economy of the Ukraine is inextricably intertwined with that of Russia as a whole. There has never been any economic separation since the territory was conquered from the nomadic Tatars and developed for purposes of a sedentary population. To attempt to carve it out of the Russian economy and to set it up as something separate would be as artificial and as destructive as an attempt to separate the Corn Belt, including the Great Lakes industrial area, from the economy of the United States.

Furthermore, the people who speak the Ukrainian dialect have been split, like those who speak the White Russian dialect, by a division which in eastern Europe has always been the real mark of nationality: namely, religion- If any real border can be drawn in the Ulcraine, it should logically be the border between the areas which traditionally give religious allegiance to the Eastern Church and those which give it to the Church of Rome.

Finally, we cannot he indifferent to the feelings of the Great Russians themselves. They were the strongest national element in the Russian Empire, as they now are in the Soviet Union. They will continue to be the strongest national element in that general area, under any status. Any long-term U.S. policy must be based on their acceptance and their cooperation. The Ukrainian territory is as much a part of their national heritage as the Middle West is of ours, and they are conscious of that fact. A solution which attempts to separate the Ukraine entirely from the rest of Russia is
bound TO incur their resentment and opposition, and can be maintained, in the last analysis, only by force- There is a reasonable chance that the Great Russians could be induced to tolerate the renewed independence of the Baltic states. They tolerated the freedom of those territories from Russian rule for long periods in the past; and they recognize, subconsciously if not other’ wise, that the respective peoples are capable of independence. With respect to the Ukrainians, things arc different. They are loo close to the Russians to be able to set themselves up successfully as something wholly different, For better or for worse, they will have to work out their destiny in some sort of special relationship to the Great Russian people.

It seems clear that this relationship can be at best a federal one, under which the Ukraine would enjoy a considerable measure of political and cultural autonomy but would not be economically or militarily independent. Such a relationship would be entirely just to the requirements of the Great Russians themselves, it would seem, therefore, to be along these lines that U.S. objectives with respect to the Ukraine should be framed.

It should be noted that this question has far more than just a distant future significance. Ukrainian and Great Russian elements among the Russian emigre-opposition groups are already competing vigorously for U.S. support. The manner in which we receive their competing claims may have an important influence on the development and success of the movement for political freedom among the Russians, It is essential, therefore, that we make our decision now and adhere to it consistently. And that decision should be neither a pro-Russian one nor a pro-Ukrainian one, but one which recognizes the historical geographic and economic realities involved and seeks for the Ukrainians a decent and acceptable place in the family of the traditional Russian Empire, of which they form an inextricable part.

It should be added that while, as stated above, we would not deliberately encourage Ukrainian separatism, nevertheless if an independent regime were to come into being on the territory of the Ukraine through no doing of ours, we should not oppose it outright. To do so would be to undertake an undesirable responsibility for internal Russian developments. Such a regime would be bound to be challenged eventually from the Russian side. If it were to maintain itself successfully, mat would be proof that the above analysis was wrong and that the Ukraine docs have the capacity for, and the moral right to, independent status. Our policy in the first instance should be to maintain an outward neutrality, as long as our own interests—military or otherwise—were not immediateiy affected. And only if it became clear that an undesirable deadlock was developing, we would encourage a composing
of the differences along the lines of a reasonable federalism. The same would apply to any other efforts at the achievement of an independent status on the part of other Russian minorities. It is not likely that any of the other minorities could successfully maintain real independence for any length of time. However, should they attempt it (and it is quite possible that the Caucasian minorities would do this), our attitude should be the same as in the case of the Ukraine. We should be careful not to place ourselves in a position of open opposition to such attempts, which would cause us to lose permanently the sympathy of the minority in question. On the other hand, we should not commit ourselves to their support to a line of action which in the long run could probably be maintained only with our military assistance.

5. THE CHOICE OF A NEW RULING GROUP

In the event of a disintegration of Soviet power, we are certain to be faced with demands for .support on the part of the various competing political elements among the present Russian opposition groups. It will be almost impossible for us to avoid doing things which would have the effect of favoring one or another of these groups over its rivals. But a great deal will depend on ourselves, and on our concept of what we are trying to accomplish.

We have already seen that among the existing and potential opposition groups there is none which we will wish to sponsor entirely and for whose actions, if it were to obtain power in Russia, we would wish to take responsibility.

On the other hand, we must expect that vigorous efforts will be made by various groups to induce us to take measures in Russian internal affairs which will constitute a genuine commitment on our part and make it possible for political groups in Russia to continue to demand our support. In the light of these facts, it is plain then we must make a. determined effort to avoid taking responsibility for deciding who would rule Russia in the wake of a disintegration of the Soviet regime. Our best course would be to permit all the exiled elements to return to Russia as rapidly as possible and to see to it, in so far as this depends on us, that they are all given roughly equal opportunity to establish their bids for power. Our basic position must be that in the final analysis the Russian people will have to make their own choices, and that we do not intend to influence those choices. We should therefore avoid having proteges, and should try to see to it that all of the competing groups receive facilities for putting their case to the Russian people through the media of public information. It is probable that there will be violence between these groups. Even in this instance, we should not interfere unless our military interests are affected or unless there should be an attempt on the part of one group to establish its authority by large-scale and savage repression along totalitarian lines, affecting not just the opposing political leaders but the mass of the population itself.

6. THE PROBLEM OF "DE-COMMUNIZATION"

In any territory which is freed of Soviet rule, we will be faced with the problem of the human remnants of the Soviet apparatus of power.

It is probable that in the event of an orderly withdrawal of Soviet forces from present Soviet territory, the local communist party apparatus would go underground, as it did in the areas taken by the Germans during the recent war. It would then probably reemerge in part in the form of partisan bands and guerrilla forces. To this extent, the problem of dealing with it would be a relatively simple one; for we would need only to give the necessary arms and military support to whatever non-communist Russian authority might control the area and permit that authority to deal with the communist bands through the traditionally thorough procedures of Russian civil war.

A more difficult problem would be presented by minor communist party members or officials who might be uncovered and apprehended, or who might throw themselves on the mercy of our forces or of whatever Russian authority existed in the territory.

Here, again, we should refrain from taking upon ourselves the responsibility of disposing of these people or of giving direct orders to the local authorities as to how to do so. We would have a right to insist that they be disarmed and that they not come into leading positions in government unless they had given clear evidence of a genuine change of heart. Bul basically this must remain a problem for whatever Russian authority may take the place of the communist regime. We may be sure that such an authority will be more capable than we ourselves would be to judge the danger which ex-communists would present to the security of the new regime, and to dispose of them in such ways as to prevent their being harmful in the future. Our main concern should be to see that no communist regime, as such, is re-established in areas which we have once liberated and which we have decided should remain liberated from communist control. Beyond that, we should be careful not to become entangled in the problem of "de-communization."

The basic reason for this is that the political processes of Russia are strange and inscrutable. They contain nothing that is simple, and nothing that can be taken for granted. Rarely, if ever, are the colors straight black or
white. The present communist apparatus of power probably embraces a large proportion of those persons who are fitted by training and inclination to take part in the processes of government, Any new regime will probably have to utilize the services of many of these people in order to be able to govern at all. Furthermore, we are incapable of assessing in each individual case the motives which have brought individuals in Russia into association with the communist movement. We are also incapable of assessing the degree to which such association will appear discreditable or criminal to other Russians, in retrospect. It would be dangerous for us to proceed on the basis of any fixed assumptions in such matters. We must always remember that to be the subject of persecution at the hands of a foreign government inevitably makes local martyrs out of persons who might otherwise only have been the objects of ridicule.

We would be wiser, therefore, in the case of territories freed from communist control, to restrict ourselves to seeing to it that individual ex-communists do not have the opportunity to reorganize as armed groups with pretenses to political power and that the local non-communist authority is given plenty of arms and help in any measures which they may desire to take with respect to them.

We may say, therefore, that we would not make it our aim to carry out with our own forces, on territory liberated from the communist authorities, aпy large-scale program of de-communication, and that In general we would leave this problem to whatever local authority might supplant Soviet rule.