Explosive News from Former Ukraine – false flag murder of Russian ex-PM, Eurovision scandal, Balakleya arms depot fire

The events in former Ukraine are ever accelerating to the logical conclusion outcome of what was started with Maidan coup d’etat of 2014 – complete self-destruction of the country. The economy and political system are already done. The situation is becoming more and more dire and surreal with every day.

In the latest 2 articles, Lada Ray reports of 3 recent events. Read on:

Lada Ray on Voronenkov Murder in Kiev & Eurovision 2017 Yulia Samoylova Scandal

False flag murder of Voronenkovs – to cast blame on Russia. Lada explains in this article who benefits from his death and why Kiev had to stage it now.

Earlier today ex-Russian Duma deputy Denis Voronenkov was gunned down in the center of Kiev, next to the luxury hotel Premier Palace. Voronenkov died on site. His bodyguard was wounded by the gunman but was able to shoot him in return. According to first info from Kiev, both wounded gunman and bodyguard were taken to the hospital. Later, Kiev authorities announced that the killer ‘probably won’t survive.’ The curious thing is that the name of the killer has not been made public. It was only said that he was from Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

People in the know surmise that the gunman was probably a member of one of the ukro-nazi battalions and former ATO member, who may have the blood of the Donbass people on his hands.

One of the connections, is the huge scandal around Ukraine banning Russian singer, Yulia Samoylova with her song “Flame Is Burning”

A couple of days ago Kiev announced that Yulia Samoylova is banned from Eurovision contest and from entry into Ukraine for 5 years because she has visited Crimea where she sang in a concert. Despite gross violation of the law, OSCE has declared that they see no problem. The organizers of Eurovision are trying to bury the scandal, while Western MSM has collectively developed sudden blindness.

I’ve just recalled the out-of-this-world howling that took place before the Sochi Olympics about alleged gays’ rights violations in Russia. Russians went out of their way to welcome everyone, including gays, who were parading around Sochi to the welcoming smiles of their Russian hosts.

Just imagine if a cripple in a wheelchair was denied participation in an international event in Russia. The stink from the ‘civilized world’ would have been heard for years. Here, not a single voice of any European ‘human rights’ or ‘handicapped defense’ organization. Complete silence. Where are petitions, protests and boycott of Kiev Eurovision?

And now comes the news of a huge fire at the Blakley arms depot, the largest in the former Ukraine. And of the madmen in the former Ukraine contaminating the borderland of Donbass with the radioactive materials from Chernobyl area!

Horrific catastrophe unfolding at Ukraine’s largest Balakleya arms depot!

For the second day the horrific cannonade is continuing, as the missiles and arms stored at Ukraine’s largest arms depot in Balakleya, Kharkov Oblast, mass explode. Allegedly the wholesale destruction of the largest storage of offensive weapons in Ukraine began as a result of a fire. Ukraine military is being accused of creating the catastrophe.

Over 20 thousand people have evacuated from the nearby city of Balakleya. Locals continue fleeing in haste. Casualties are unknown, being hushed up by Ukraine authorities.

The infamous Balakleya arms depot stored weapons used to kill the people of Donbass. Fewer weapons left in Ukraine means fewer deaths in Donetsk and Lugansk. Among weapons stored at this facility were the feared Tochka-U missiles, which Kiev army had unleashed on LDPR.

Radiation disaster in the making!

As a side note, the intel I receive is that Kiev army experiences a huge shortage of tanks and armored vehicles to attack Donbass.

To compensate for that, Poroshenko ordered to retrieve the old tanks and military vehicles once used by the USSR in Chernobyl remedial efforts and abandoned inside radioactive zone. Thousands of radioactive vehicles have been stored there. Now these are being repurposed by Kiev. Some are used as scrap, melted to manufacture new weapons; others are fixed up and sent straight to Donbass. Reportedly, a large percentage of the Kiev army ATO soldiers now suffer from radiation poisoning. Of course, the real condition and percentages of those affected are hushed up.

The newest worrying development: it appears Kiev decided to do the unthinkable – build a radioactive barrier between LDPR and Ukraine. Witnesses have been posting videos of Ukraine army hauling radioactive vehicles from Chernobyl and dumping them on the front line between LDPR and Kiev-controlled side. This includes heavy trucks and other machinery used by the USSR in Chernobyl remedial efforts. The result may be disastrous. All that radioactive machinery is moved through Ukraine countryside and cities, then maliciously dumped in E. Ukraine fields, possibly close to where people live and grow crops.

Yes, Scythians Are Us! (Documentary with EngSubs)

In 2014 Russian TV channel Culture aired a documentary, looking through depth of time, trying to decipher who are Scythians, Sarmatians, Slavs and Russians, if they are one and the same people. The conclusion was mostly positive – yes, they are. The authors looked at the data from the chronicles, archaeology, linguistics and genetics, weighing arguments both for and against.

The film’s conclusion is open, and in a typical Russian way advocating peace and cooperation of all peoples, whoever their ancestors may be.

1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2Please note that translating a documentary film or an article takes a lot of time and emotional effort. I am doing it on a voluntary basis, but if someone feels like supporting my work, a Bitcoin donation to the following address is appreciated: 1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2

I want to add one material to better illustrate the point, made at 24:04, and citing Lavrentij Chronicles. I have the copies of those texts, and present the excerpt below with the words “Great Scythia” highlighted.


In the year 6415 Oleg went against Greece, having left Igor in Kiev; taking the multitude of Varjags, Slovens, Chudis, Krivichis, Merjus, Poljans, Severjan (Northerners), Drevljans (elder ones), Radimichis, Horvats (Croats), Dulebs, Tiverce, who are known as Tolkovny (Tolmachi – interpreters): and together they are called the Great Scythia (Velikaja Skuf’). And together with all of these Oleg went astride horses and in the ships, and the ships were counting 2000. And when they arrived at Czargrad, and Greece…

One notable thing, besides the mention of the Scythians as a collective name of the Slav people, is the date: year 6415. That is a separate topic of the Russia calendar, that was discarded by Peter I, and which lead to shortening and subsequent rewriting of the Russian history to suit the needs of the influentially growing Germanic aristocracy that was slowly taking over Russia’s political life at that time. I am going to publish a separate article about it soon.

Addendum: a 1531 map of the Turkish admiral Piri-Reis came to my attention:

Piri Reis Map

Leaving aside the fact that it shows the coastline of Antarctica, uncovered by ice – probably from before the quite recent Flood time, when that continent’s coastline was accessible, we can look at the following part of Eurasia and see…

Scytia – mentioned twice, as well as Tartaria, Russia, and Bulgaria – the latter where it was supposed to start, along the Volga (Volgari-Bolgari) river bank, Est from the Crimean meridian.

And now, on to the documentary…

The formatted subtitle file in ASS format can be downloaded separately. Full text of the script is below the video frame.

In 2001, in the village of Kostjonka in Vornezh oblast, archaeologists found a fragment of a figure –
a head of a person, carved from a mammoth tusk by an ancient master.
Such finds happen from time to time, awakening interest only among those interested in archaeology.
However, the nuclear-carbon dating showed the age of the figure: between 33000 and 38000 years.
Paleomagnetic measurements gave a more precise reading: the Kostjonka find is 42000 years old.
This was a true world sensation.
Never before were such ancient human depictions found anywhere in the world.
From this fact one can draw the conclusion – it was here, in Russia, that the Homo Sapience civilisation took root.
YES, SCYTHIANS ARE US!
In the times long gone people lived here,
they built dwellings, hunted mammoth, created tools from bone and stone,
as wells as statuettes like these.
A small figurine of a pregnant woman, created by an unknown artist,
is the first in a long row of the immortal works of art.
The human history has not yet started,
the deathly breath of the ice was still felt,
and tens of thousands of years are yet to pass before Mesopotamia is populated,
before the human voices are to be heard on the shores on Nile, Huan He and Ganges,
before the walls of Athens and Rome would rise,
while on the Don-river there is already a proto-city with a population of 300 people.
Maybe it is from here that people would set off to conquer and populate the planet?
[Anatolij Kljosov: Professor, Doctor of Chemistry]
For some reason, in the academic historic science, there is a custom to explicitly devalue the significance of Slavs, of Russians.
As the result one has a complete undervaluation of the history of the Russian people.
Take, for example, the term “Slav”, and ask any historian when Slavs appeared.
He’d reply, around tear 500AC, 1500 years ago.
That’s when the Slavic group of _languages_ appears.
A group of languages, which got transposed into the historic category, while it’s a linguistic one.
Didn’t they father and mother before that?
Well, they’d reply, they were not yest Slavs. But that’s their opinion.
That’s how you called it and that naming fossilised.
In reality those people and their ancestors lived there for thousands of years.
The history of the appearence of the Russian people is dark and mysterious.
The acknowledged chronicle texts tell about the events, starting from the 9th century.
But tell nothing of what happened before that.
Let us again open the “Tale of the Times” and read:
The German philosopher Hegel described the Russian people among all the Slav peoples as “non-historic”.
The Russian philosopher Chaadaev postulated that Russia has no history,
that Russia belongs to a non-organised, non-historic type of cultural phenomena.
However, here is how the poet Osip Maldenstam would reply to them in the 20th century:
“Such a highly-organised, such an organic language is not just a doorway the the history, but the history herself.”
Even Pushkin wrote that “The Tale of Igor’s Army” lists so many languages that were in use then,
[Jurij Yahontov: Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences]
but so as to write such an ingenious work, one had to know all those languages, which is unrealistic.
This means that it most probably was written in a common Slavic language.
It also appears that at the time when Rurik was invited (to rule The Novgorod Republic), they spoke a common Slavic language –
everyone understood each other.
It appears that before Oleg, that is before the Rurik dynasty, there were some kinds of Slavic states.
[Andreij Burovskij: Professor, Doctor of Historical Science]
At least 3 or 4 are mentioned.
Some think that on the Central Dnepr there was a so-called Russian Khaganat,
that is some state was created with the help of Khazars.
And even without it, at least 3 are mentioned and are recognisable.
The Arabic sources of the 7th-8th centuries speak of Artania, Kujavia and Slavia.
The location of Artania is still being looked for.
But most definitely, Kujavia is Kiev, Kievan Rus,
while Slavia is most probably the surroundings of the Ilmenskj Slovens –
that is the surroundings of the modern Great Novgorod.
Russian language, Russian culture, the Russian way of life, the Russian state, the great Russian contribution to the world civilisation.
Could all this have sprung out of a void?
If yes, then Russia is resembling a building without the first floors, a building suspended in thin air.
The further we descend into the haze of time, the more puzzles and strange coincidences start to appear.
It is customary to think that Slavs were the ancestors of the Russians.
The first detailed and historically correct information about them is dated by the middle of the first century.
However, by that time, the Slavs are already the most numerous nation in Europe. How can this be?
Where were they hiding before that from the eye of the inquisitive neighbours?
Sarmats lived on these territories before the Slavs.
And before them – Scythians.
Both mysteriously vanished from the Eurasian steppes.
On the same land, one and the same play with abrupt appearing and mysterious disappearing
was played out with three different peoples.
Historians have long ago noticed this historical paradox.
“A nation cannot vanish like fog and move about like checkers.”
Egor Klassen, a Russian scientist, tried to convince his colleges and the reading audience.
When they say that Sarmatians destroyed Scythians. Whom did they destroy? Slaughtered millions of people? I don’t believe that.
Hundreds of thousands? Little probable.
The elites, the most symbolic people were eliminated.
While the mass of those, who were called Scythians, became a part of Sarmatians.
This wasn’t so much a vanishing mystery, as a mystery of their abandoning of a large territory.
Two reasons are usually pointed out: ecological changes, and the second is
[Vladimir Malyshev: Fellow of Science of Archaeology at the Russian Academy]
the inflow of the Sarmatians, which, according to the old sources, resulted in Sarmatians massacring the whole population of Scythians.
However, as is known, there were no genocides in that epoch.
The practise of genocide is a much later phenomenon.
Total extermination did not happen.
Most probably people simply left and abandoned that territory.
The history knows many case when nations and their names live different lives.
In the ancient times, a name of a nation was often short-lived.
It could be connected to the geographic location, and would change as the nation moved to another place.
An accurate nickname, given by the neighbours, would reflect the characteristics and the trade of a people.
But time would change a people, and the nickname would become outdated.
Could the same have happened to the Scythians?
Could have they lost this name, which was given to them by the Greek, and attain a different name?
Could have the descendants of Scythians be hiding under the name of Slavs?
Most of the Russian, and later, Soviet historians responded negatively to this question.
Lomonosov, however, was convinced that this is exactly what happened.
“Among the ancient ancestors of the present Russian people,
Scythians comprise not the least part.”, wrote the great Russian scientist.
Historian Tatishev argued that the worth Scyth is a deformed by the Greek Russian word Skit,
as the root in the modern Russian “skitalec” – “wanderer”.
The romantic idea of the kinship of Russians and Scythians
had literally enthralled our society at the beginning of the 20th century.
Alexander Block exclaimed: “Yes, Scythians are us!”
This poetic image is probably
[Ekaterina Devlet: Professor, Doctor of History]
both a world-view and a poetic attempt
to find in the distant history, though not that distant as history goes,
an understanding for the events that went on in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century.
The famous Russian historian and archaeologist Ivan Zabelin founded the theory of Scythians as the forebears of the Slavs.
He pointed out the identity between the Scythian tribes and the Slavs.
The same earth tilling in the Middle Dnepr, the same trade with Greece,
the same sea raids on the shores of the Little Asia.
Zabelin turned to the language spoken by the Scythians.
To the language, that has only a few geographic and tribal names left from it.
Zabelin stated that Borisfen is a mutated by the Greek name of Berezina.
That’s how Dnepr was called in the old times.
Istr – Danube. Parata – prud (pond). He viewed them as undoubtedly Slavic names.
His opponents countered that that is nothing but guesswork.
There was, however, one Scythian word, which was Slavic without a shadow of a doubt.
Herodotus called them for “Scythians”, but at the same time we mentioned their own name for themselves – Skoloty.
The root of the word is “kolo”.
Dahl’s dictionary, in addition to the meanings “radius, wheel”, also defines it as “wheeled wagon, cart”.
Based on this, one can decipher the word “skoloty” as “people of a certain area”,
or it can be interpreted differently: “people on the carts”.
Either way, “skoloty” is a undoubtedly a Slavic – even Russian – word.
Zabelin’s arguments became forgotten with time.
They became pushed out by other theories.
Slowly the opinion that the language of the Black Sea Scythians,
was belonging to the Iranian group of the Indo-European language family too hold.
After the Scything kingdom disintegrated,
at the end of the III – beginning of the IV century, and the Scythians moved almost entirely into Crimea and lower Dbepr,
[Vladimir Malashev: Science fellow of Archaeology of the Russian Academy]
where they lived until the middle of the III century, while the Slavic cultures begin to form only at about this time,
while mostly in the V century, then the distance between the classic Scythia,
the Black Sea Scythia at its height, and the early Slavic cultures is about 1000 years.
Which continuity can one speak of?
The same thing is with the language.
Even though Scythian as one of the Iranian languages,
and Russian language belong to the Indo-European languages, but they are of different groups.
All Slavic tribes consisted of three tribal unions.
[Jurij Yahontov: Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences]
This is coming from historic documents.
Those were: Ross, Scyth and Sarmat.
Thus all these tribes were Slavic tribes.
The question of the language belonging of Scythians is very important.
As anthropologists confirmed that one and the same population lived for over 5000 years
on the Eastern-European plains, this is a very central question.
Scythians. It is hard to find in the depths of ages another such people that would hold so many secrets.
Where did they come from? How and where to did they disappear? Which language did they speak?
Did they have a state, and how was it organised?
Disputes will be going on for a long time still.
A golden vessel was found in Kuljab burial mound (Kurgan),
[Kirill Firsov: Head antiquarian of archaeology of the State historical Museum]
depicting one of the myths of the origins of Scythians,
and it depicts Scythians in their typical clothing.
History’s Father, Herodotus describes several myths of the Scythian origins.
One of them is depicted on this vessel from Kulabe and tells that Hercules is the forefather of the Scythians.
During his travels over the Northern Black Sea, he got sons from the half-woman half-snake – Echidna
When he left those places, he left his sons a bow with a bowstring.
He took off the bowstring and said – tat who will be able to set it back, will continue the Scythian kin.
The first son started to set the bowstring, and it backfired at his tooth.
That vessel shows how Scythians sit abound an inspect his tooth.
The second sone tried his luch, and the bowstring hit him in the foot. He’s depicted bandaging his foot.
And only the thirds son managed to string the bow.
And he it shows that he became the forbearer of the Scythians. That’s one of the legends.
Historian Phukidit tells that not only the European kingdoms could not match Scythians on the field of battle,
but even Asia has no people, who could stand against Scythians in a one-on-one battle,
as long as all Scythians stand united.
But they don’t hold their own compared to other peoples, when it comes to common sense and understanding of the everyday life.
Scythian military deeds are well-known. Persian king Darij I, who by 500BC conquered
the whole of the Near Asia, could not conquer them.
Philip of Macedonia, having beaten the Scythian vanguard in Frakia (France) in 339BC,
did not dare to push forward into the Scythian heartlands,
where only death and no loot would be awaiting the Macedonians.
And in 331BC, at the walls of Ulvia, Scythians beat the army of Zaperion, a governor of Frakia.
Possessing an immense military power, they had no interest in destroying such same settlements, in which they themselves lived –
[Vera Kovalevskaja: Doctor of History]
half-earth houses without any luxury items.
Therefore their aspirations were directed towards Near East, where they destroyed
richly decorated houses, and more importantly, they always conquered and destroyed treasuries and temples.
Battle bow is a Scythian object of pride.
It was crafted from hard tree sorts, tendrils and horn plates.
It had an incredible range.
One can read on a stone stella, discovered in the Greek colony of Olvia, that some Onaxogor
performed a record-breaking shot from a Scythian bow – the arrow covered a distance of 520 meters.
Here there was a find of is an iron helmet from the 4th century.
[Leonid Jablonskij: Doctor of History]
This is the compulsory short sword, called Akinak, which is fastened to the baldric.
A baldric buckle, which was situated at the crossing of the shoulder and waist belts.
This is a quiver with arrows.
Not even a quiver, but a so-called saadak – a travel bag, which incorporates a quiver.
In addition it could hold the bow, it had pockets for various knick-knacks that a warrior may need:
such as a knife and a sharpening stone could be fitted there.
According to specialists, Scythian armament was on par with that of a medeival knight.
For long range: bow with arrows, and a sling.
For middle range: throwing spears and darts.
For short range: sword, axe, dagger.
Protective gear: armour, helmet, leg-covers, shields.
Swords were made from high-alloying steel – they already possessed the skill of making such hardened steel.
Scythians are nomads. Slavs are farmers. Thus Scythians cannot be the predecessors of the Slavs.
This is the essence of the theory of the opponents of Scythian-Slavic kinship.
Indeed, both the ancient Greek and the modern authors call Scythians for nomads.
But is this such a flawless definition?
Herodotus mentions strange Scythians – ploughmen and farmers.
Such battles ranged in scientific circles because of that!
Who are they. They were often called for Slavs.
Ploughing Scythians? Who are they – people living behind Scythians in the forest-steppe land?
They are poorly-known, an Iranian-language people.
Two tribal unions are known from Nestor’s chronicles: Uglichi and Tiberian – they spoke Iranian languages.
Possibly their ancestors were those Scythian-ploughmen.
Places that have compact Scythian settlements, townships,
probably had some kind of a settled life.
There were workshops, etc.
But the nomad Scythians did not do that.
Another thing that Herodotus pointed out, was that among the Scythian gods,
the most celebrated were Geistia – the goddess of the home hearth, and Geia – the patron of agriculture.
There were also Scythian metallurgists.
They produced iron from ore, transformed it into steel, using various techniques of forging, hardening, carburizing, welding.
The people of Eurasia learnt about the new metal from Scythians.
They copied from the Scythians the craft of iron processing.
We are probably seeing a uniquely-organised civilisation.
Each of the tribes were doing its own craft, but together they were bound by unseen strong bonds,
they comprised a united Scythian World.
Excuse me, what about the Siberian Scythians?
Many heard of the Siberian Scythians, of the Central- and Middle-Asia Scythians.
It was a belt of Scythian states – or proto-states, counties – that stretched from Danube to the Central Asia.
Who heard of the Scythians of the Huan He river delta? They existed too.
For the longest time, the scientists studying the ancient world set a demarcation line between “civilisation” and “barbarians”.
Greeks and Romans were placed on one side of it.
Scythians and other “unlearned bloodthirsty people” on the other.
But here is what’s curious: in everything that the Greeks were telling about the Scythians,
one can clearly feel fear, amazement, and an undoubted respect.
Herodotus considered Scythians to be the inventors of the nomad lifestyle, and praised it as the most convenient.
The eldest Greek poet Hesiod wrote about Scythians in the 8th century BC.
He postulated that the best known ancient hero of Greece, Heracles,
was presented with his bow by a Scythian named Tevtar, who also taught Heracles how to shoot from the bow.
Legends of Scythians can be found in the eldest myths.
They attribute the inventions of agriculture and copper melting are attributed to the Scythians.
Greek myths speak of a Scythian Anaharsis.
The Greek name him as the foremost sages of the world.
Iphor(?) attributes him with the invention of such useful things as a double-sided anchor, bellows, and the pottery ring.
Another Scythian, Taksaris, was elevated to the demi-god hero status by the Areopag of Athens, for stopping a plague epidemic in Athens.
A sacrificial alter was placed in his honour, and a decree
that a white horse should be sacrificed in his honour annually.
Herodotus ends his description of the Scythians with the following words:
“We know of no other such intellectually distinguished peoples, but the Scythian people.”
“The Scythian people were the wisest of all living on the other side of Pont.”
So who are Scythians after all?
Enemies of civilisation and destroyers of cultures?
Or a progressive people, who enriched the humanity with inventions and innovations?
Scythian civilisation probably had a half-nomad level of development.
That did not let them to transition into a higher civilisation form:
With a permanent territory, with stability in food production, with emergence of a clerical and warrior cast.
Maybe that already emerged in a form of chieftain.
If we are to take the quality of their works – for example, the legendary Scythian gold – it is very high.
We see clearly that they had high level of craftsmanship.
We now know next to nothing of Scythian tales, legends, their written history.
But if we were to uncover that oral dimension, it would have been very interesting –
after all, it’s not a coincidence that Greeks held Scythians in high regard.
Nomadic Scythians were first and foremost stockbreeders, used animal produce, rode in carts.
They moved from place to place, and thus their objects were distributed so far and wide.
The military objects were also similar in this wide area because they were moving about fast and were fast spreading those new inventions.
And the most efficient types of armour were spread first.
Okinak proved to be efficient and thus it became widespread.
This bridle was the most modern for that time, and thus it quickly became widespread.
And this animalistic (ornamental) style was liked by all that thus became widespread.
Let us again open the “Tale of Times”
And in peace they lived: Poljane, Drevljane (Woodlanders), Severjane (Northerners), Rodimichi, Vjatichi and Horvaty (Croats).
Doleby lived on the high plains, where Volenjany (Free ones) live,
while Ulichi and Tivercy lived along Dnestr and Danube.
There were many of them and they lived along Dnestr until the very Sea,
and their cities stand until this day, and the Greek called them The Great Scythia.
And here, the same, under year 907:
Oleg want against the Greek, leaving Igor in Kiev, and taking with him many Varjags, and Slovens (Slavs),
and Chudi, and Krivichi, and Merju, and Drevljane, and Rodimiche, and Poljane, and Severjane, and Vjatichi, and Horvaty, and Duleby,
and Tivercy, known as Tolmachi, and they were all called by the Greek for The Great Scythia.
The compiler of the first Byzantine Encyclopaedia Anna Komnina does indeed call the Rus people of the 11th century as Scythians.
And Konstantin Bagrjanorodnyj calls Russians for Tauric-Scythians.
The Byzantine writers – Patriarch Fotij, Georgij Amartol and other – who wrote about the Russian attacks on Czar-city,
never call them by the name of Slavs.
When defining the people, who besieged Czar-city, they call them “Ross, the people of the Scythian origin”.
At the same time geographer Ravenskij, when listing the European countries, calls Scythia for the homeland of the Slavs.
Confirming this, in the Lev Diakon’s history, Russians are called Scythians 63 times.
Mazurinsk Chronicles (1678-1682) say “the newcomers, Scythians, who cometh to be called Slavs”.
Nikon’s Chronicles say openly: “Slovenic language as spoken on Danube has come from Scythians.”
What more proof is needed that Scythians are Slavs?!
Thus Scythian language is the Slav language, the common Slav language.
A vase, found in the mound Kuljaba, near Kerch, holds several scenes depicting of the everyday life of the Scythians.
If we compare these images with the Russian lithographic prints (Lubok),
we will be struck not only by a commonality in styles, but also an amazing outward similarity of the faces and characters.
Greek chroniclers, who knew Scythians wrote that they were handsome, well-built people.
Scythians, depicted in the Scythian mounds are of European look.
Depiction of the Scythians on these vessels were of a genealogical mythology, and not of a mundane character of say, pulling a tooth.
But in general, they were very much looking like a typical Russian man, bearded and with unruly hair,
and with a definitely European face.
There were no Asian depictions at all.
Studying in detail the everyday life of Scythians and Slavs, we come across striking similarities at every turn.
Both Scythians and ancient Slavs worshipped the forces of Nature.
Their principal deity was a great female goddess, called Tabitia. She was the goddess of fire and of the living things.
Later with the Slavs she became goddess Zhiva (Zhizn’ – life).
Neither Scythians not Slavs built temples. Both made sacrifices to their gods, and held the god of war in high regard.
They didn’t need priests, but they honoured soothsayers, healers, sages, sorcerers.
There were no atheists in the ancient times.
Scythians worshipped the long sword.
With the combative lifestyle, that was understandable.
Scythians held both short and long swords in their okinaki.
A long sword was 1 to 1,10 meters.
That could be such a splendid meter-long sword with a beautiful golden hilt.
Such a sword would be glittering in the sun at a mound top.
Burial rituals of the Scythians and Slav-Rus people are strikingly similar.
Scythians would strangle one of the Czar’s wives and would bury her with the Czar.
The same fate was in store for the czar’s servants – winer, stableman, and others.
Ancient Slavs did exactly the same.
Scythians built an earth mound above the Czar’s grave, and a year later they would hold commemoration on top of it,
and a new sacrifice would be made – 50 horsemen.
The ancient Slavs also held a commemorative service for their departed on a burial mound.
Both Scythians and ancient Slavs would honour their horses that were killed in battle.
The custom to put a sword beside a newborn son and to sit him on a horse when he reaches 3 years were also in common.
Archaeologists state a complete identity between the first Slav burials and the Scythian burials.
A complete identity. Everything is in common, including construction of the mounds.
Maybe some changes came later with the adoption of Christianity, when bodies were not cremated, but buried.
But the first burials were identical.
Each burial, however many we uncover, adds some new knowledge,
as each burial contains new finds, yet unknown to us.
For example: we for the first time discovered a wicker box, filled to the brim with big black beetles.
We are yet to determine the species of these beetles.
In addition we found for the first time gold-plated steel needles for application of tattoos,
as well as stone palettes for mixing of the pigments.
The tattoos themselves are not preserved, but they had such tradition, and the tattoos were made in colour.
Archaeologists will probably never say with 100% certainty what such a burial means,
but is we are to talk about the Scythian burials, then their splendour, the selection of the accompanying inventory, as we say,
a huge number of various military items,
a typical for many mounds accompanying burials of horses and people,
the timespan, over which the mound complexes, such as Arzhan-2, were formed,
all this speaks of a great might, of a special status, and of a colossal potential possessed by the nobility of that time.
Are we Scythians or not?
Ancient writers hint at our kinship.
Linguistics mixes up things and doubts.
Anthropology answers in the affirmative.
The striking sameness in the appearance, character, temperament,
continuity of the material culture adds votes for this theory.
However, the 21st century gave scientists a completely new set of tools to study ancient history.
These are mathematical studies of the history, and statistical modelling of the large-scale historical process,
and of course – modern genetics.
A new scientific branch appeared – DNA genealogy,
which can give a precise, mathematically proven answer to a question of who we are and where do we come from.
Its main premise is that the male Y-chromosome is transferred only from father to son, and women do not affect it.
In other words, unlike the genes that shuffle with every generation thanks to an almost equal input from mother and father,
the Y-chromosome is transferred between generations almost unchanged.
The “almost” comes from the fact that mutations occur in it at a specific average rate.
According to scientists, DNA-genealogy allows to identify in each person a marker of his ancient lineage.
This marker is called SNP and defines the haplogroup to which a person belongs.
If there are 10 mutations between us, that’s one thing, if there is only 1 – another case, and if 1000 mutations, yet something else.
Thus we can compare any group of people and calculate when their common ancestor lived.
[Anatolij Kljosov: Professor, Doctor of Chemistry]
Let’s say that Rjurik was the common ancestor of his descendant group.
Then we can calculate when he lived.
We can find an answer to the question when lived the common ancestor of all Russians.
For how many thousand years ago he lived.
Or when lived the common ancestor of Russians and Poles.
Or of Russians and Spaniards, etc.
Those who possess haplogroup R1a1 constitute now 70% of all the male population of Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia.
While in the ancient Russian settlements that number is up to 80%.
R1a1 is the biological marker of the Russian ethnos.
This collection of nucleotides is that Russianness from the genetics perspective.
Scientists, who conducted the research say that the Russian people in the genetically contemorary form,
appeared in the European part of the modern Russia about 4500 years ago.
The boy with the mutation R1a1 became the forefather of all the contemporary men,
who have this haplogroup in their DNA.
They are all his biological descendants or, as they said before, of the same bloodline.
And among them their are the kin that comprises one people – Russian.
As for Scythians-Sarmatians, when they started digging and analysed the DNA, it turned out,
cutting to the chase, that Aryans, Scythians, Slavs are one and the same people.
This is a thunderous news! This is not present in the literature yet – only a few articles having been written so far.
They are all R1a.
Aryans are R1a, as they came to India, we know it from their DNA.
Scythians are those, who stayed on this whole vast stretch from Danube to Mongolia,
and to Altai – they wandered across this huge band,
they are too R1a, at least that what we could study.
Slavs too R1a. In any case this is the same genealogical line.
Maybe some time will pass and the specialists in DNA genealogy will give a conclusive answer
about the kinship of the Scythians, Slavs and the modern Russians.
And it may well turn out that the people of the stone age, who left traces on this Earth 50,000 years ago,
are indeed our distant ancestors.
At may turn out that we are of the same bloodline with Aryans, and with Scythians and Sarmatians, in general being the oldest people of Earth.
But a different outcome is possible.
Maybe science will advance and prove fallacy of trying to find ancestors in the Y-chromosome.
The the ancestry field will remain unfilled in the peoples biography.
Each people contributed to the history of the world civilisation. Each people has something to be proud of.
We are all different, but our difference makes the world multicoloured and bright.
And however insurmountable the inter-national conflicts may seem today, however sharp the contradictions are,
a time will neceserally come, when people will realise that they comprise a united community of peoples.
People of Earth. Humanity, which has one common past, and one common future.


As a postscript: The R1a1 haplogroup is also something that your truly belongs to. At the time when Icelandic DecodeMe project was operational, I ordered decoding of my own DNA profile, and the R1a1 belonging was an expected outcome, that got verified.

Below is the information that DecodeMe project presented, but as you now know, the percentage for the R1a1 haplogroup in the Greater Russia is 70%, and not 40-50%% as Wikipedia would want one to believe.

Celebrating 3 years of Crimea’s reunification

Three years ago, on the 16th of March 2014 Crimeans unanimously voted to return home. Below are two maps with the results of that pivotal referendum:

ADDED! Lada Ray has showcased several more videos of the celebration and the 2014 flashbacks at Futurist Trendacst: Russia Celebrates Three Years of Reunification with #Crimea. #Putin 2014 Flashbacks

ADDED! Independent British journalist Graham Philips published at his blog The Truth Speaker a series of videos that he filmed in Crimea prior and during the referendum: Crimea: March 16th, 2014 – As It Really Was. Highly recommended!

ADDED! Fireworks in Moscow on the 18th!

Photos from today’s celebrations in Crimea


Percentages of the turnout per region. Total electorate: 1.543.815 people.


Percentages show the number who voted for the reunification with Russia. Background colour is the turnout from the total electorate. Orange (Lenin region) did not have the opportunity to participate in the referendum.

Following the coup d’etat in Kiev and preceding the referendum, people were already on the streets, as can be seen from the image below from the 23rd of February from Sevastopol. People were forming militia to stand up to the nazi thugs, who were heading towards Crimea. Luckily, the worst case scenario was avoided, though several Crimeans – who were in Kiev protesting against the coup d’etat – were accosted on their way back to the peninsular and killed.

So when reunification happened, the relief and joy were palpable. Crimeans were and are happy to be back home. And for all Russians, despite the demonstration and sanctions that followed, that was the most important, the brightest event of this century so far.



Crimea is Russia

And for all the neigh-sayers, I have it from a reliable source that Russian Crimeans are willing to fight if someone tries to deprive them of this victory. It won’t be the first time. Here is a photo from my photo album, which I took in 2010, while Crimea was still under Ukraine. Ask yourself, would the people who were so meticulously taking care of their history, of they heroism against the German nazi occupation, take kindly to a nazi regime that took over Ukraine, a regime, that banned and criminalised all the symbols of the 1945 victory?


Steam Engine of the legendary armoured train “Zheleznjakov”, which took part in the heroic defence of Sevastopol in 1941-1942. Inscription on the side of the engine: “Death to Fascism”.

Will Russia have to fend off NATO invasion too..?

The image below speaks volumes, without words. It speaks of Russia’s history past, and of the precarious future. The Russian Bear sitting on his land of old, looking with suspicion at the ever growing tentacles of the US/NATO, already consuming neighbouring lands in blood – Yugoslavia, former Ukraine – Malorossia and Novorossia, Middle-East. And besides The Bear is a compost heap of history, where one can see the the tentacles of the past that dared to choke Russia and got pruned. Will Russia again be forced to end another war that someone starts in the hopes of eliminating Russia, freedom, history, from the face of the world?

For those, not so well-versed in history, here is what the dates in the compost heap of history signify. I added a few more – on average Russia got invaded once every 50 years, and this time is not different, though the method of warfare changed.

  • 1242 – The Germanic Teutonic invasion and the Ice Battle on the Ladoga lake.
  • 1612 – Polish invasion into Russia and occupation of Moscow. Beaten by the people’s militia of Minin and Pozharskij, the memorial to whom you will find on the Beautiful Square in Moscow.
  • 1709 – Karl XII of Sweden said that “Russia is a dwarf, whom I shall put on its knees” and attacked. After that Sweden lost its status of a superpower.
  • 1759 – (not on the image). Freidrich I moved against Russia with the words “I shall conquer the backward Russia” and in 1759 Russian army entered Berlin.
  • 1812 – Napoleon is famous for his saying that “Russia is a giant on clay feet”. This giant made the Napoleonic army turn in 1812 after the battle of Borodino and a tactical surrender of Moscow, and in 1814 Russian army was marching down the streets of Paris. By the way, Russian Don Cossacks also had to restore some of Europe, for which they were promptly forgotten.
  • 1854-1855 – (not on the image) French, Brits and Turks attacked Crimea, and Russia held the defence of Sevastopol. Russia won that war, which in reality lasted between 1853 and 1856, and was the first really world war. Brits presented the history otherwise, claiming victory in the “Crimean War”, which was really only one of many battles. But if they won, how come Crimea remained Russian?
  • 1914-1918 – First World War, or the “War of 4 Cousins”, Russia had nothing to win in that war and got mixed in it responding to a provocation (much the same as what the West hoped to achieve in Ukraine, yet it didn’t work this time). Though Russia was on the winning side, the country got destroyed in the process. Still Russia managed to hold its own against the subsequent foreign intervention and even chased the Poles (who tried to repeat their failure of 1612) from Moscow suburbs to Warsar.
  • 1941-1945 – Hitler proclaimed that he’d conquer USSR by the end of 1941. In 1945 Russian troops entered Berlin (again, as in 1759 – they never learn).
  • 2014 NATO – Obama famously said a few years back that “Russia is only a regional power, and US will destroy its economy”. When will the pruning begin, and have the streets of Washington been prepared for the welcoming of the liberating army..?

As I wrote earlier, Russia Means Peace, Russia loves peace, but knowing it’s own history of defence, it is always prepared to end wars.

For those suffering from historic amnesia, here is a song of revelations from Artjom Grishanov – Russian Soldier Saved the World (with English subtitles of the news items showcasing history rewriting, and of the lyrics):

In his article Washington’s Benevolent Mask Is Disintegrating Paul Craig Roberts writes:

By orchestrating Russophobia in the West, Washington has put all of humanity at risk. The Russians have watched Washington’s false accusations against Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya, Yeman, Pakistan, Iran and against Russia herself—“invasion of Ukraine.” False accusations have in the 21st century always been Washington’s set-up of the target country for invasion or bombing.

These provocations issued daily by the idiot Western press, the idiot Western governments, and the idiot commentators have prepared the groundwork for a misunderstanding that can result in thermo-nuclear war and the end of life on earth.

When you read the New York Times, the Washington Post, or listen to CNN, NPR, or MSNBC or the British, Canadian, German, French, and Australian media, you are being indoctrinated with war with Russia (and China) and, thus, you are being prepared for your funeral.

Hopefully it will not come to this, for Russia will do its utmost to preserve this good Earth.

And as an after word, the picture below is well-known by now (with the correction, that Kazahstan never had a NATO base, though some of the neighbouring republics did have advisors):

Remembering the Slain Children of Donbass – #101LIFE

In my previous post I pointed my readers to a documentary about commander Givi. He was a soldier – just like hundreds of other Russian soldiers of Donbass – giving his life defending the land of his father from a Ukro-nazi invasion.

The other tragic side of this war, are all the lives of the people of Donbass lost to the Ukro-nazi artillery shellings, the lives of civilians – women and children, elderly…

I encourage everyone to go to 101 Life – referring to 101 child killed so far, to learn about the victims of the war, and to sign a petition for the Western powers to stop the madness.

Spread the word!

Below are several outstanding songs by Artem Grishanov…

When the enemy is at the gates… At 4:30 onwards, you can see what those brave souls are defending, can you say that that girl, reading a poem with tears in her eyes is the “terrorist” that Poroshenko tries to show the people of Donbass to be?

Here are the “toys” that Poroshenko sends to the children of Donbass – Grad shells and mines… And the children, asking for peace #ИгрушкиДляПорошенко


This is how it started…

Another song, which shows that tragedy of the anger–riddled, brainwashed children of Ukraine. While in Donbass the people wish for peace, for everyone, in Ukraine they talk war. Also, not that while in Ukraine the Ukro-Nazis mistreat the Novorossian flag, in Donbass Zaharchenko carefully folds the Ukrainian flag of a defeated battalion.

Donbass in the Line of Fire: Givi

Mihail Sergeevich Tolstyh – better known under the call sign of Givi – was one of the commanders of the Donetsk People’s Republican army, and he was the second commander, after Motorola, to have been murdered by Kiev in a terrorist attack.

So far, the West was in an almost total information black-out, when news from the civil war in Ukraine and the general disastrous state of affairs in that former country were concerned. A few European journalists woudl try to give a picture of the events, but their message would largely remain unheard. The best sources of information so far were Lada Ray’s Futurist Trendcast, The Saker, reports from the ground by the freelance croud-funded journalist Graham Philips, who was there since the day of the referendum of 2014, which Kiev suppressed with artillery. Of the larger news agencies I can mention RT, croud-funded Russia Insider, and some reports on EuroNews.

NewsFront and Inessa S published newly an English translated documentary about Givi, those soldiers he was responsible and their motivation to defend their land.

Graham Philips has published his own tribute to Givi:

One of the YouTube commenters nails it:

Nate Sinadinovic
Reminder for Western viewers that just might have drank the Cool Aid of MSM Here is information detailed by somebody whom has taken a interest and information is realistic. Givi wasnt just some bum off the street, Givi served in the Ukraine army for 2-3 years and rose to the rank of Sargent and commander he finished his service and then returned to life as a civilian. When the Coup d’etat happened in Kiev in 2014 Givi was the one of the 1st to take up Arms when the New Regime announced the ATO operation in the East which Kiev said ‘Would take 72 hours’ 25,000 hours later and that ATO operation is still going on.
What Givi did is exactly what I would have done.

Real Democracy at Work: Serbian Parliamentarians Booed Mogherini During Speech to Serbian Parliament

Lada once again brings good news of awakening:

Lada’s thoughts on the end of NWO: ‘Serbia and Russia! No EU!’ Mogherini booed in Serbian Parliament

You can’t hear a word she is saying, and that’s how I like her. I wonder how this Rothschild-installed globalist hypocrite felt, for once getting a long-deserved taste of her own medicine.

Just another small confirmation of The Great Earth Shift at work, the breakdown of the old NWO system and the budding of the new. It is also another confirmation of the rebalancing work Russia The Great Balancer is doing, as we speak, on our planet.

The great changes happening now are just the beginning! More to follow!

This is the real voice of the people in Serbian Parliament – how Serbs really feel about EU, which is being shoved down their throats in spite of their resistance. Incidentally, the neighboring Montenegro and Macedonia are in the same situation. There is a veritable anti-NATO and anti-EU revolution happening in Montenegro, mass protests have been ongoing since last year. At one point, 10% of the population has been out on streets protesting. Yet no one notices it and the sold-out government continues dragging the country into NATO. Bulgaria is also being forced to stay in NATO and EU, despite people’s sympathies to Russia and aversion to NATO/EU Russophobia.

The people of Serbia are demonstrating how real democracy works, as it should. I wonder why the ‘world’s No.1 defender of democracy’ EU doesn’t like it?

Read on at Lada Ray’s Futurist Trendcast

After what EU and NATO did to Yugoslavia at large and Serbia in particular, booing is just too soft a protest. Radovan Karadzic is still the political prisoner of EU for saying that Serbs are Southern Russians. Yugoslavia was bombed to pieces with radioactive munitions, leaving the land contaminated and the people with cancer. And then Yugoslavia was partitioned and Serbs driven from their historic heartland – Kosovo, which is now occupied by the NATO installed entities. And all this was done, while Russia itself was on the verge of collapse and destruction during the Wild 90’s of the desolation of Yeltsin.

And after that the NATO/EU was expecting a friendly welcoming? What duplicity!

The Magic of the Children’s Films from the Soviet Union

One characteristic of the Soviet films that I hold dear, is that they are humane, moral (often without being moralising), centre on the characters, rather than action and events. The films for grown-ups, be it a war-time film or a film about a mundane everyday life, would always have several layers of meaning – good film makers knew how to convey what they wanted to say to the audience without raising the alarms of censorship. All that resulted in films that would have depth, satire, criticism, thoughtfulness in them.

But here I want to write about children films. The films that formed our, my, world view, that taught us about fairness, compassion, friendship, the pitfalls of negative relations. They were a joy to watch, and they left a trace in your heart, a moral compass that no religion can give you, as morality was based on your own desire to do good, rather than fearing a punishment from the holder of the scriptures if you do wrong.

One such outstanding film is “Visitor from the Future”, released in 1985 and filmed at the Central Studio of Children and Youth Films named after M. Gorky in Moscow. And the bright star of that film is its title song, “The Beautiful Faraway”. In 1985 nothing was outwardly speaking of the time of troubles that lay ahead, in just short 7 years, the Wild 90’s and the Desolation of Yeltsin. But in retrospect, this song turned out to be prophetic, and at the same time it was a testament, an oath of how to conduct oneself in the difficult times ahead, how to stay strong. The song does not promise paradise lands, but rather trials and only asks to not be treated too cruelly along the way to the unknown future, walking the untrodden path towards the future of 2084.

Staring into the eyes of the girl who looks at me from the screen, I see a reflection of me, of my childhood, and the promise that I made to myself in my early youth – to never forget my childhood and the values that I learnt back then, no matter what life throws at me. And I know that many of my generation were influenced by this film in the same way, something that allowed us to stay strong in the chaos that came shortly after.

Listen to it (the English translation is below), as sung in its original form. The video presents cuts of main character of the film, played by Natasha Guseva, an actress, who, when she grew up, continued to live by the moral code of the film through the Wild 90’s and till this day…

Слышу голос из прекрасного далёка,
Голос утренний в серебряной росе,
Слышу голос, и манящая дорога
Кружит голову, как в детстве карусель.

Прекрасное далёко, не будь ко мне жестоко,
Не будь ко мне жестоко, жестоко не будь.
От чистого истока в прекрасное далёко,
В прекрасное далёко я начинаю путь.

Слышу голос из прекрасного далёка,
Он зовёт меня не в райские края,
Слышу голос, голос спрашивает строго —
А сегодня что для завтра сделал я.

Прекрасное далёко, не будь ко мне жестоко,
Не будь ко мне жестоко, жестоко не будь.
От чистого истока в прекрасное далёко,
В прекрасное далёко я начинаю путь.

Я клянусь, что стану чище и добрее,
И в беде не брошу друга никогда,
Слышу голос, и спешу на зов скорее
По дороге, на которой нет следа.

Прекрасное далёко, не будь ко мне жестоко,
Не будь ко мне жестоко, жестоко не будь.
От чистого истока в прекрасное далёко,
В прекрасное далёко я начинаю путь.

Прекрасное далёко, не будь ко мне жестоко,
Не будь ко мне жестоко, жестоко не будь.
От чистого истока в прекрасное далёко,
В прекрасное далёко я начинаю путь.

I hear the voice from the beautiful faraway,
A morning voice in a silvery dew,
I hear the voice, and the tempting road
Spins my head, as a carousel of my childhood.

Beautiful faraway, don’t be cruel to me,
Don’t be cruel to me, don’t be.
From the clear beginnings into the beautiful faraway,
Into the beautiful faraway I start my journey.

I hear the voice from the beautiful faraway,
It calls me not to the paradise lands,
I hear the voice, and the voice is asking sternly –
What have I done today for the sake of tomorrow.

Beautiful faraway, don’t be cruel to me,
Don’t be cruel to me, don’t be.
From the clear beginnings into the beautiful faraway,
Into the beautiful faraway I start my journey.

I swear that I’ll become purer and kinder,
And will never abandon a friend in need,
I hear the voice, and hasten to the call
Along the untrodden road with no trail.

Beautiful faraway, don’t be cruel to me,
Don’t be cruel to me, don’t be.
From the clear beginnings into the beautiful faraway,
Into the beautiful faraway I start my journey.

Beautiful faraway, don’t be cruel to me,
Don’t be cruel to me, don’t be.
From the clear beginnings into the beautiful faraway,
Into the beautiful faraway I start my journey.

Here are all 5 episodes with English subtitles of this marvellous and thoughtful, funny and sad film:

Episode 1:

Episode 2:

Episode 3:

Episode 4:

Episode 5:


Reading viewer’s comments on YouTube to this and the other films that I reference below, one will find a wide range of testimonials, both from those, who, like me, were born in the USSR and grew up together with these films, and those born at the end of the century, expressing regret of not having been able to witness what it was like to be a kid in the USSR.

There were literally dozens more of such pivotal children’s films that formed the moral and the world view of my generation, that taught us to see right from wrong. Here are a few other films from different years and studios.

“The Adventures of Electronic” is from 1979, filmed at Odessa Film Studio (present-day Ukraine, where the studio is all but in shatters, tragically just like the rest of the country, and where this film, along with the other Soviet heritage is forbidden by law). It has a theme song that too became symbolic for my generation: “Winged Swings”

В юном месяце апреле
В старом парке тает снег,
И весёлые качели
Начинают свой разбег.

Позабыто всё на свете,
Сердце замерло в груди,
Только небо, только ветер,
Только радость впереди.
Только небо, только ветер,
Только радость впереди.

Взмывая выше ели,
Не ведая преград,
Крылатые качели
Летят, летят, летят.
Крылатые качели
Летят, летят, летят.

Детство кончится когда-то,
Ведь оно не навсегда,
Станут взрослыми ребята,
Разлетятся кто куда.

А пока мы только дети,
Нам расти ещё расти,
Только небо, только ветер,
Только радость впереди.
Только небо, только ветер,
Только радость впереди.

Взмывая выше ели,
Не ведая преград,
Крылатые качели
Летят, летят, летят.
Крылатые качели
Летят, летят, летят.

Шар земной быстрей кружится
От весенней кутерьмы,
И поют над нами птицы,
И поём, как птицы, мы.
Позабыто всё на свете,
Сердце замерло в груди,
Только небо, только ветер,
Только радость впереди.
Только небо, только ветер,
Только радость впереди.

Взмывая выше ели,
Не ведая преград,
Крылатые качели
Летят, летят, летят.
Крылатые качели
Летят, летят, летят.

In the young month of April
The snow is melting in the old park,
And the merry swings
Are staring their take-off

Everything in the world is forgotten,
The heart has stopped in the chest,
Only the sky, only the wind,
Only happiness is ahead.
Only the sky, only the wind,
Only happiness is ahead.

Soaring above the fir-tree,
Not knowing any limits,
The winged swings
Are flying, flying, flying.
The winged swings
Are flying, flying, flying.

Childhood will end at one point,
After all, it’s not forever,
The kids will grow up,
And will fly off in all directions.

But now we are just children,
We are yet to grow and grow
Only the sky, only the wind,
Only happiness is ahead.
Only the sky, only the wind,
Only happiness is ahead.

Soaring above the fir-tree,
Not knowing any limits,
The winged swings
Are flying, flying, flying.
The winged swings
Are flying, flying, flying.

The Earth is spinning ever faster
From the spring commotion,
And the birds are singing above us,
And like birds we wing.
Everything in the world is forgotten,
The heart has stopped in the chest,
Only the sky, only the wind,
Only happiness is ahead.
Only the sky, only the wind,
Only happiness is ahead.

Soaring above the fir-tree,
Not knowing any limits,
The winged swings
Are flying, flying, flying.
The winged swings
Are flying, flying, flying.

Those who did not grow up in the USSR, will, probably not know what kind of swing this song is about. It’s a standing kind, which can be made to soar high up, and even make loops if one dared. I found a video of the now, sadly, defunct and abandoned small version of such swings:


Exploration of Space tingled the imagination of the kids of my age, and the two films from 1973 and 1974 – “Moscow-Cassiopea” and “Moscow-Cassiopea – Teens in the Universe” were special to us with that regard. I remember many hours of discussions with my coevals at a Pioneer camp about how such travels could be made possible, what kind of technology would be needed… And it seems to be able to capture the imagination of the contemporary Western viewers too, to which one comment bears witness: “This is one of the best sci-fi films I have seen! I like this better than Star Wars and Star Trek. This is just amazing! So philosophical, fresh, unique, artistic, creative, special, and original!” Philosophical is what can be said about most Soviet films – films were not just an entertainment, they had to make a viewer think.

This film has a philosophical and quiet song to it, that we all loved: “The Night Has Passed”. It is one such song that I start crying, when I listen to it, and when I sing along. And that song carries that promise of which I wrote above: to never forget, so as to be accepted by the stars…

Ночь прошла, будто прошла боль,
Спит земля, пусть отдохнет, пусть.
У Земли, как и у нас с тобой,
Там впереди, долгий, как жизнь, путь.

Я возьму этот большой мир,
Каждый день, каждый его час,
Если что-то я забуду,
Вряд ли звезды примут нас.
Если что-то я забуду,
Вряд ли звезды примут нас.

Я возьму память земных верст,
Буду плыть в спелом, густом льне.
Там вдали, там, возле синих звезд,
Солнце Земли, будет светить мне.

Я возьму этот большой мир,
Каждый день, каждый его час,
Если что-то я забуду,
Вряд ли звезды примут нас.
Если что-то я забуду,
Вряд ли звезды примут нас.

Я возьму щебет земных птиц,
Я возьму добрых ручьев плеск,
Я возьму свет грозовых зарниц,
Шепот ветров, зимний густой лес…

Night has passed, as if the pain passed,
The Earth is asleep, let is rest, let it.
The Earth, just like we,
There ahead, has a lifetime long road.

I shall take this big world,
Every day, every its hour,
If I forget something,
The stars are unlikely to accepts us.
If I forget something,
The stars are unlikely to accepts us.

I shall take the memory of the earthly miles,
I shall sail in the ripe, thick flax.
There far away, there, near the blue stars,
the Sun of the Earth shall lit my path.

I shall take this big world,
Every day, every its hour,
If I forget something,
The stars are unlikely to accepts us.
If I forget something,
The stars are unlikely to accepts us.

I shall take the chirping of the earthly birds,
I shall take the splashing of the kind creeks,
I shall take the light of the thunderstorms,
The whispering of the winds, the thick winter forests…

The last passage in italics is not in the film version of the song.

Here are both films with English subtitles:


Having started this post with “Visitor from the Future”, I will round off with another film, screened to Kir Bulychov’s book, where Natasha Guseva also plays the lead role. She only ever played in these two films, refusing other offers later on, and leaving her image associated with the beloved character of Alice.

Film “Purple Ball” appeared in 1987, filmed at the Yalta (Crimea) filial of the Central Studio of Children and Youth Films named after M. Gorky. The time of trouble was neigh, and the uncertainties were mounting. And that, along with the hope for the future, is reflected in this space adventure, and its title song, “If Only We Could Take One Look”:

Чего только нету, чего только нет
На этом на белом на свете,
Нам выпал счастливый, но трудный билет –
Мы века двадцатого дети.

Небесная высь, океанское дно
Раскроют секреты однажды,
Нам жить интересно и весело, но…
Но всё-таки хочется, хочется страшно.

Хоть глазочком заглянуть бы,
Заглянуть в грядущий век,
И узнать бы, что за судьбы,
И узнать бы, что за судьбы
Ждут тебя, ждут тебя, человек?

Чего только нету, чего только нет
На этом на белом на свете,
Повсюду минувшего времени след,
А мы за сегодня в ответе.

С тобою нам дом возвести суждено,
В дне завтрашнем вспомнят вчерашний,
Нам жить интересно и весело, но…
Но всё-таки хочется, хочется страшно.

Хоть глазочком заглянуть бы,
Заглянуть в грядущий век,
И узнать бы, что за судьбы,
И узнать бы, что за судьбы
Ждут тебя, ждут тебя, человек?

Хоть глазочком заглянуть бы,
Заглянуть в грядущий век,
И узнать бы, что за судьбы,
И узнать бы, что за судьбы
Ждут тебя, ждут тебя, человек?

So many things, so many things
There are in this wide world,
We drew a lucky, yet difficult lot –
We are the children of the 20th century.

The height of the skies, and the depth of the seas
Will once reveal their secrets,
It’s interesting and joyful for us to live, but…
It’s terribly, terribly tempting.

If only we could take one look,
Take a look into the coming century,
To learn what kind of fates,
To learn what kind of fates,
Are awaiting you, are awaiting you, man?

So many things, so many things
There are in this wide world,
Everywhere are the traces of the times past,
While we are responsible for today.

Together we are fated to build a common home,
In tomorrow’s day, yesterday will be remembered,
It’s interesting and joyful for us to live, but…
It’s terribly, terribly tempting.

If only we could take one look,
Take a look into the coming century,
To learn what kind of fates,
To learn what kind of fates,
Are awaiting you, are awaiting you, man?

If only we could take one look,
Take a look into the coming century,
To learn what kind of fates,
To learn what kind of fates,
Are awaiting you, are awaiting you, man?

We’ve taken a peek into the 21st century… And what we saw is horrifying, terrible, devastating… For the purple ball – the time bomb containing the virus of hostility – was not neutralised in our timeline. Not yet? Can we go back? Please?

Here is the complete film The Purple Ball with English subtitles:


Here are more English-subtitled Soviet must-see children’s classics. Mosfilm and Lenfilm studios are uploading many of the Soviet-era films into public domain, making them the part of the world heritage of humanity.

Some of the Mosfilm films cannot be embedded, so I add them as links to YouTube.

1947, Cinderella (colourised), Lenfilm

1976, Rusalochka. Cooperation product of Gorky Film Studio, Moscow and “Za igralni filmi”, Sophia. This Soviet rendition from 1976 of the Little Mermaid by H.C. Andersen is one of the closest to the original book. Haunting and deep and tragic. When shown in the cinemas in USSR, it was rated for 16+ audience.

1939, The Beautiful Vasilisa. SojuzDetFilm.

1939, The Golden Key (Buratino), Mosfilm. The sound in this film is from 1959.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MuurQgbg6Vc

1956, Ilja Muromec. Mosfilm. The film is known for the largest in the history of cinematography number of extras: 106000 soldiers and 11000 horses.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hooaKxdXbfM

1982, The Donkey’s Hide. Lenfilm. A deeply touching fairytale.

1952, Sadko. Mosfilm.

1976, Stepan’s Reminder. Lenfilm

1966, Aladdin’s Lamp. Gorky Film

1944, Kaschei the Deathless (without subtitles). This children’s folk Russian fairy tale was filmed at the time of the Great Patriotic War, and the parallels with the invading hordes were striking.

1972, Ruslan and Ludmila, Mosfilm. 2 parts

1946, The Stone Flower, Mosfilm
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k6QNtZRtsjM

1961, Scarlet Sails, Mosfilm
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5YzwW4hxrx4

The Simple Miracle, Mosfilm, 2 parts:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gZiKrWSzNBo
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mzpJq23cuKc

1968, The Snow Maiden, Lenfilm

1966, Snow Queen, Lenfilm. The real, gritty fairytale, not the sugary Disney “Frozen”.

1968, The Old Old Tale, Lenfilm


As I won’t be able to showcase all the wonderful Soviet films, I want to round off on this joyful piece. 1975 saw the excellent film “Buratino” (“Pinnochio”), filmed at Belarusfilm studio. Here is its memorable, joyful closing song:

RVISION’s YouTube channel holds a lot Russian and Soviet films with English subtitles.


Russian texts of the Soviet film songs can be found at http://pesnifilm.ru/.

The Plan to Destroy Russia. Conceived and Started in 1948. Concluded in 1993? Or Not…

After the hot war phase on Russia(USSR) between 22nd of April 1941 and the 9th of May 1945, executed through Germans, but lavishly funded by US (for example grandfather of the Bush presidential clan), USA did not view 1945 as a year of defeat. Along with preparation for a carpet nuking of the key cities in USSR, USA also devised a plan to politically change and destroy USSR/Russia from within. In the document below, Russia and USSR are referred interchangeably.

The document, presented in full below my analysis, is copied from this resource, which also provides the raw scanned pages of the text.

It demonstrates well the strategy of “divide and conquer” that that US were going to employ, as well as their understanding that the only way to destroy Russia, is from within – something that the “liberal” 5th column is doing in Russia of today. Remember that USSR, is never the stated final objective in the document below – Russia is. On the other hand, they do not understand many aspects of the Russian World, illustrated well by this fallacious statement “Before the revolution of 1918, Russian nationalism was solely Russian.”, as Russian Empire of pre 1917 was also a multi-national and multi-confessional state.

Let me extract the key-points of the doctrine first, and then I’ll let you read through the whole text, leaving to you to decide if there is even a gram of good in the outlined intents…

Our basic objectives with respect to Russia are really only two:

a. To reduce The power and influence of Moscow to limits in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international society; and

b. To bring about a basic change in the theory’ and practice of international relations observed by the government in power in Russia. If these two objectives could be achieved, the problem which this country faces in its relations with Russia would be reduced to what might be considered normal dimensions.

Our difficulty with the present Soviet Government lies basically in the fact that its leaders are animated by concepts of the theory and practice of international relations which are not only radically opposed to our own but are clearly inconsistent with any peaceful and mutually profitable development of relations between that government and other members of the international community, individually and collectively.

Prominent among these concepts are the following:

(a) That the peaceful coexistence and mutual collaboration of sovereign and independent governments, regarding and respecting each other as equals, is an illusion and an impossibility;

(h) That conflict is the basis of international life wherever, as is the case between the Soviet Union and capitalist countries, one country does not recognize the supremacy of the other;

(c) That regimes which do not acknowledge Moscow’s authority and ideological supremacy are wicked and harmful to human progress and that there is a duty on the part of right-thinking people everywhere to work for the overthrow or weakening of such regimes, by any and all methods which prove tactically desirable;

(d) That there can be, in the long run, no advancement of the interests of both the communist and non-communist world by mutual collaboration, these interests being basically conflicting and contradictory;

and

(e) That spontaneous association between individuals in the communist-dominated world and individuals outside that world is evil and cannot contribute to human progress.

Plainly, it is not enough that these concepts should cease to dominate Soviet, or Russian, theory and practice in international relations. It is also necessary that they should be replaced by something approximating their converses.

These would be:

(a) That it is possible for sovereign and equal countries to exist peaceably side by side and to collaborate with each other without any thought or attempt at domination of one by the other;

(b) That conflict is not necessarily the basis of international life and that it may be accepted that peoples can have common purposes without being in entire ideological agreement and without being subordinated to a single authority;

(c) That people in other countries do have a legitimate right to pursue national aims at variance with Communist ideology, and that it is the duty of right-thinking people to practice tolerance for the ideas of others, to observe scrupulous non-interference in the internal affairs of others on the basis of reciprocity, and to use only decent and honorable methods in international dealings;

(d) That international collaboration can, and should, advance the interests of both parties even though the ideological inspiration of thc two parties is not identical; and

(e) That the association of individuals across international borders is desirable and should be encouraged as a process contributing to general human progress.

Note: the above were not just concepts, they were practised by USSR, and are now professed and practised by the Russian Federation. So the Empire of Chaos, already in 1948 set about to exploit any rifts, widening them into chasms

It may he stated, accordingly, that our first aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to encourage and promote by means short of war the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present satellite area and the emergence of the respective eastern European countries as independent factors on the international scene,

We should encourage by every means at our disposal tile development in the Soviet Union of institutions of federalism which would permit a revival of the national life of the Baltic peoples.

We may say, therefore, that our second aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is, by informational activity and by every other means at our disposal, to explode the myth by which people remote from Russian military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the Soviet Union for what it is and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward it.

Then comes the undermining from within, in the chapter of “THE ALTERATION OF RUSSIAN CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS” – in other words making a not-Russia out of Russia

We must say, therefore, that our third aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to create situations which will compel the Soviet Governntent to recognise the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving, at least outwardly, as though it were the converse of those concepts that were true.

This is of course primarily a question of keeping the Soviet Union politically, militarily, psychologically weak in comparison with the international forces outside of its control and of maintaining a high degree of insistence among the non-communist countries on the observance by Russia of the ordinary international decencies.

That phase was started in 1980s with the coming of Gorbachev.

They had the plans for war, of course. And whereas Russian military doctrine is to defend its territory, the American one is written like this:

The first of our war aims must naturally be she destruction of Russian military influence and domination in areas contiguous to, but outside of, the borders of any Russian state.

However that may be, we must leave nothing to chance; and it should naturally be considered that one of our major war aims with respect to Russia would be to destroy thoroughly the structure of relationships by which the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens, or groups of citizens, in countries not under communist control.

In other words, being cowardly to go head on, attack the weaker parts, and then divide and conquer. It is interesting to observe that throughout the 90s, in the accursed Yeltsin era, USA were already implementing the war-time part of the 1948 plan towards Russia:

we may definitely conclude that we could not consider our military operations successful if they left a communist regime in control of enough of the present military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable them to wage war on comparable terms with any neighboring state or with any rival authority which might be set up on traditional Russian territory.

It is impossible to forecast what the nature of such terms [of surrender of Russia] should be. The smaller the territory left at the disposal of such a regime, the easier the task of imposing terms satisfactory to our interests. Taking the worst case, which would be that of the retention of Soviet power over all, or nearly all, of present Soviet territory, we would have to demand:

(a) Direct military terms (surrender of equipment, evacuation of key areas, etc.) designed to assure military helplessness for a long time in advance;

(b) Terms designed to produce a considerable economic dependence on the outside world;

(c) Terms designed to give necessary freedom, or federal status, to national minorities (we would at least have to insist on the complete liberation of the Baltic States and on the granting of some type of federal status to the Ukraine which would make it possible for a Ukrainian local authority to have a large measure of autonomy); and

(d) Terms designed to disrupt the iron curtain and to assure a liberal flow of outside ideas and a considerable establishment of personal contact between persons within the zone of Soviet power and persons outside it.

Funny how Project Ukraine is playing out now. USA got more than what they bargained for in 1948.

Furthermore, here is what Yeltsin implemented in Russia after the November 1993 coup d’etat, almost to the letter of the 1948 document:

First of all, it should be said that regardless of the ideological basis of any such non-communist authority and regardless of the extent to which it might be prepared to do lip service to the ideals of democracy and liberalism, we would do well to see that in one way or another the basic purposes were assured which flow from the demands listed above. In other words, we should set up automatic safeguards to assure that even a regime which is non-communist and nominally friendly to us:

(a) Does not have strong military power;

(b) Is economically dependent to a considerable extent on the outside world;

(c) Does not exercise too much authority over the major national minorities; and

(d) Imposes nothing resembling the iron curtain over contacts with the outside world.

In the case of such a regime, professing hostility to the communists and friendship toward us, we should doubtless wish to take care i.o impose these conditions in a manner which would not be offensive or humiiiating. But we would have to see to it that in one way or another they were imposed, if our interests and the interests of world peace were to be protected.

In the 90’s and the beginning of 00’s (on inertia) military destroyed (check); economical dependence on pertodollar (check); provocation of conflicts and civil wars on ethnic grounds (check); total inability to withstand outside informational influence (check). Funnily, once Russia started to come back to it’s ow in 2007 (Putin’s München Speech), the West slammed an iron curtain on Russia from their own side, blocking almost all of information coming from Russia to the west.

We are therefore safe in saying that it should be our aim in the event of war with the Soviet Union, to see to it that when the war was over no regime on Russian territory is permitted:

(a) To retain military force on a scale which could be threatening to any neighboring stale;

(b) To enjoy a measure of economic autarchy which would permit the erection of the economic basis of such armed power without the assistance of the western world;

(c) To deny autonomy and self-government to the main national minorities; or

(d) To retain anything resembling the present iron curtain. If these conditions are assured, we can adjust ourselves to any political situation which may ensue from the war. We will then be safe, whether a Soviet government retains the bulk of Russian territory or whether it retains only a small part of such territory or whether it disappears altogether. And we will be safe even though the original democratic enthusiasm of a new regime is short-lived and tends to be replaced gradually by the a-social concepts of international affairs to which the present Soviet generation has been educated.

The above should be adequate as an expression of our war aims in the event that political processes in Russia take their own course under the stresses of war and that we are not obliged to assume major responsibility for the political future of the country. But there are further questions to be answered for the event that Soviet authority should disintegrate so rapidly and so radically as to leave the country in chaos, making it encumbent upon us as the victors to make political choices and to take decisions which would be apt to shape the political future of the country. For this eventuality there are three main questions which must be faced.

That disintegration cost more Russian lives in the Wild 90’s than what was lost during the whole of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945!

Also, note how the Ukrainian project is spun. In 1917 Lenin built Ukraine, at the expense of Russia, in 1945 Stalin added to it at the expense of Poland, Romania, Hungary, in 1954 Khrishev expanded it at the expense of Russia again, yet the US “masterminds” are persuing the aim that the “nationalistic organizations” [Read Galicina SS, Bandera follower] are most vocal abroad about. It was in 1948 that the disaster of today with Ukro-Nazis 3-year long shelling of Donbass and the total destruction of the USSR-inherited Ukrainian economy that we are observing now.

First of all, would it be our desire, in such a case, that the present territories of the Soviet Union remain united under a single regime or that they be partitioned? And if they are to remain united, at least to a large extent, then what degree of federalism should be observed in a future Russian government? What about the major minority groups, in particular the Ukraine?

We have already taken note of the problem of the Baltic states. The Baltic states should not be compelled to remain under any communist authority in the aftermath of another war. Should the territory adjacent To the Baltic slates be controlled by a Russian authority other than a communist authority, we should be guided by the wishes of the Baltic peoples and by the degree of moderation which that Russian authority is inclined to exhibit with respect to them.

In the case of the Ukraine, we have a different problem. The Ukrainians are the most advanced of the peoples who have been under Russian rule in modern times. They have generally resented Russian domination; and their nationalistic organizations have been active and vocal abroad. It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that they should be freed, at last, from Russian rule and permitted to set themselves up as an independent slate.

And when the collapse was the accomplished fact, first Yeltsin got installed as a president (cemented during the 1993 coup d’etat), and then they tried to install Khodorkovskij…

In the event of a disintegration of Soviet power, we are certain to be faced with demands for .support on the part of the various competing political elements among the present Russian opposition groups. It will be almost impossible for us to avoid doing things which would have the effect of favoring one or another of these groups over its rivals. But a great deal will depend on ourselves, and on our concept of what we are trying to accomplish.

We have already seen that among the existing and potential opposition groups there is none which we will wish to sponsor entirely and for whose actions, if it were to obtain power in Russia, we would wish to take responsibility.

On the other hand, we must expect that vigorous efforts will be made by various groups to induce us to take measures in Russian internal affairs which will constitute a genuine commitment on our part and make it possible for political groups in Russia to continue to demand our support. In the light of these facts, it is plain then we must make a determined effort to avoid taking responsibility for deciding who would rule Russia in the wake of a disintegration of the Soviet regime.

In 1948 they even planned for “decommunisation” – a term that was popular in Ukraine anno 2014, when physical violence, banning and disappearances became the norm. They did indeed give “plenty of arms and help” to the “non-communist authority” of Ukro-Nazis and Banderites. In the Baltic countries that manifested as apartheid…

We would be wiser, therefore, in the case of territories freed from communist control, to restrict ourselves to seeing to it that individual ex-communists do not have the opportunity to reorganize as armed groups with pretenses to political power and that the local non-communist authority is given plenty of arms and help in any measures which they may desire to take with respect to them.

We may say, therefore, that we would not make it our aim to carry out with our own forces, on territory liberated from the communist authorities, aпy large-scale program of de-communication, and that In general we would leave this problem to whatever local authority might supplant Soviet rule.

And now the whole documents, one of a planned infestation and murder of a country…


Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds.,
Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy,
1945-1950


U.S. OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIA

TOPSECRET

August 18, 1948

[Source; Records of the National Security Council on deposit in the Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives, Washington. D.C.]

NSC 20/1 originated in response to a request from Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal for a "comprehensive statement of national policy’" with regard to the Soviet Union, on the grounds that until such a statement was prepared, "no logical decisions can be reached as to the proportion of our resources which should be devoted to military purposes. . . ..” (*1) Drafted by the Policy Planning Staff, this document represented the most complete exposition up to that time of the objectives the policy of containment was supposed to accomplish.

(*1). Forrestal to Sidney W. Souers, July 10, 1948, quoted in NSC 20, “Appraisal of the
Degree and Character of Mllilary Preparedness Required by the World Situiilion,” July 12,
1948, Foreign Relations of the United Stales: 1948, I (part 2) 589-592.

The document established two basic goals for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union: (1) reduction of the power and influence of the U.S.S.R. to the point that they would no longer threaten international stability; and (2) accomplishment of a fundamental change in the theory and practice of international relations as applied by the Soviet govemment. Unlike NSC 7 (Document 20), NSC 20/1 stressed the distinction between the Soviet Union and the international communist movement, and, in line with the reasoning in PPS 35 (Document 21), held out the possibility of driving a wedge between the two of them as a means of implementing U.S. policy objectives.

NSC 20/1 emphasized the desirability of achieving containment’s desired results by means short of war, although it recognized the possibility that war might come, whether by inadvertence or design. The final portion of the document dealt with the question of what U.S. policy should be in that eventuality. It is noteworthy for its stress on the neutralization, rather than the elimination, of Soviet power, and for its implied rejection of the World War II doctrine of unconditional surrender.

I. Introduction

It is plain that Russia, both as a force in its own right and as a center for the world communist movement, has become for the time being the outstanding problem of U.S. foreign policy, and that there is deep dissatisfaction and concern in this country over the aims and methods of the Soviet leaders. The policies of this Government are therefore determined in considerable measure by our desire to modify Soviet policies and to alter the international situation to which they have already led.

However, there has yet been no clear formulation of basic U.S. objectives with respect to Russia. And it is particularly important, in view of the preoccupation of this Government with Russian affairs, that .such objectives be formulated and accepted for working purposes by all branches of our Government dealing with the problems of Russia and communism. Otherwise, there is a possibility of serious dissipation of the national effort on a problem of outstanding international importance.

II. Background Considerations

There are two concepts of the relationship of national objectives to the factors of war and peace.

The first holds that national objectives be constant and should not be affected by changes in the country’s situation as between war and peace; that they should be pursued constantly by means short of war or by war-like means, as the case may be. This concept was best expressed by Clausewitz, who wrote that, "War is a continuation of policy, intermingled with other means."

The opposite concept is that which sees national objectives in peace and national objectives in war as essentially unrelated. According to this concept, the existence of a state of war creates its own specific political objectives, which generally supersede the normal peacetime objectives. This is the concept which has generally prevailed in this country. Basically, it was the concept which prevailed in the last war, where the winning of the war itself, as a military operation, was made the supreme objective of U.S. policy, other considerations being subordinated to it.

In the case of American objectives with respect to Russia, it is clear that neither of these concepts can prevall entirely.

In the first place, this Government has been forced, for purposes of the political war now in progress, to consider more definite and militant objectives toward Russia even now, in time of peace, than it ever was called upon to formulate with respect either to Germany or Japan in advance of the actual hostilities with those countries.

Secondly, the experience of the past war has taught us the desirability of gearing our war effort to a clear and realistic concept of the long-term political objectives which we wish to achieve. This would be particularly important in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. We could hardly expect to conclude such a war with the same military and political finality as was the case in the recent war against Germany and Japan, Unless, therefore, it were
clear to everyone that our objectives did not lie in military victory for its own sake, it might be hard for the U.S. public to recognize what would in reality be a favorable issue of the conflict. The public might expect much more in the way of military finality than would be necessary, or even desirable, from the standpoint of the actual achievement of our objectives. If people were to get the idea that our objectives were unconditional surrender, total occupation and military government, on the patterns of Germany and Japan, they would naturally feel that anything short of these achievements was no real victory at all, and might fail to appreciate a really genuine and constructive settlement,

Finally, we must recognize that Soviet objectives themselves are almost constant. They are very little affected by changes from war to peace. For example, Soviet territorial aims with respect to eastern Europe, as they became apparent during the war, bore a strong similarity to the program which the Soviet Government was endeavoring to realize by measures short of war in 1939 and 1940, and in fact to certain of the strategic-political concepts which underlay Czarist policy before World War I, To meet a policy of such constancy, so stubbornly pursued through both war and peace, it is necessary that we oppose it with purposes no less constant and enduring- Broadly speaking, this lies in the nature of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the outside world, which is one of permanent antagonism and conflict, taking place sometimes within a framework of formal peace and at other times within the legal framework of war. On the other hand, it is clear that a democracy cannot effect, as the totalitarian state sometimes does, a complete identification of its peacetime and wartime objectives. Its aversion to war as a method of foreign policy is so strong that it will inevitably be inclined to modify its objectives in peacetime, in the hope that they may be achieved without resort to arms. When this hope and this restraint are removed by the outbreak of war, as a result of the provocation of others, the irritation of democratic opinion generally demands either the formulation of further objectives, often of a punitive nature, which it would not have supported in time of peace, or the immediate realization of aims which it might otherwise have been prepared to pursue patiently, by gradual pressures, over the course of decades. It would therefore be unrealistic to suppose that the U.S. Government could hope to proceed in time of war on the basis of exactly the same set of objectives, or at least with the same time-table for realization of objectives, which it would have in time of peace.

At the same time, it must be recognized that the smaller the gap between
peacetime and wartime purposes, the greater the likelihood that a successful military effort will be politically successful as well. If objectives are really sound from the standpoint of national interest, they are worth consciously formulating and pursuing in war as in peace. Objectives which cumc into being as a consequence of wartime emotionalism are not apt to reflect a balanced concept of long-term national interest. For this reason, every effort should be made in government planning now, in advance of any outbreak of hostilities, to define our present peacetime objectives and our hypothetical wartime objectives with relation to Russia, and to reduce as far as possible the gap between them.

III. Basic Objectives

Our basic objectives with respect to Russia are really only two:

a. To reduce The power and influence of Moscow to limits in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international society; and

b. To bring about a basic change in the theory’ and practice of international relations observed by the government in power in Russia. If these two objectives could be achieved, the problem which this country faces in its relations with Russia would be reduced to what might be considered normal dimensions.

Before discussing the manner in which these objectives could be pursued in peace and in war, respectively, let us first examine them in somewhat greater detail.

1 . THE GEOGRAPHIC REDUCTION OF RUSSIAN POWER AND INFLUENCE

There are two spheres in which the power and the influence of Moscow have been projected beyond the borders of the Soviet Union in ways detrimental to the peace and stability of international society.

The first of these spheres is what may be defined as the satellite area:
namely, the area in which decisive political influence is exercised by the Kremlin. It should be noted that in this area, which is, as a whole, geographically contiguous to the Soviet Union, the presence, or proximity, of Soviet armed power has been a decisive factor in the establishment and maintenance of Soviet hegemony.

The second of these spheres embraces the relation between, on the one hand, the power center which controls the Soviet Union and, on the other,
groups or parties in countries abroad, beyond the limits of the satellite area, which look to Russia for their political inspiration and give to it, consciously or otherwise, their basic loyalty.

In both of these spheres the projection of Russian power beyond its legitimate limits must be broken up if the achievement of the first of the objectives listed above is to be effectively served. The countries in the satellite area must be given the opportunity to free themselves fundamentally from Russia domination and from undue Russian ideological inspiration. And the myth which causes millions of people in countries far from the Soviet borders to look to Moscow as the outstanding source of hope for human betterment must be thoroughly exploded and its workings destroyed.

It should be noted that in both cases the objective can conceivably be achieved for Ihe most part without raising issues in which the prestige of the Soviet state, as such, need necessarily be decisively engaged.

In the second of the two spheres, a complete retraction of undue Russian power should be possible without necessarily engaging the more vital interests of the Russian state; for in this sphere Moscow’s power is exerted through carefully concealed channels, the existence of which Moscow itself denies. Therefore, a withering away of the structure of power which was formerly known as the Third International, and which has survived the disuse of that name, need involve no formal humiliation of the government in Moscow and no formal concessions on the part of the Soviet State.

The same is largely true of the first of these two spheres, but not entirely, In the satellite area, to be sure, Moscow likewise denies the formal fact of Soviet domination and attempts to conceal its mechanics. As has now been demonstrated in the Tito incidents, a breakdown of Moscow control is not necessarily regarded as an event affecting the respective states as such. In this instance, it is treated as a party affair by both sides; and particular care is taken everywhere to emphasize that no question of state prestige is involved. The same could presumably happen everywhere else throughout the satellite area without involving the formal dignity of the Soviet State.

We are confronted, however, with a more difficult problem in the actual extensions of the borders of the Soviet Union which have taken place since 1939. These extensions cannot in all cases be said to have been seriously detrimental to international peace and stability; and in certain instances it can probably be considered, from the standpoint of our objectives, that they can be entirely accepted for the sake of the maintenance of peace, In other cases, notably that of the Baltic countries, the question is more difficult. We cannot really profess indifference to the further fate of the Baltic, peoples.

This has been reflected in our recognition policy to date with respect to those countries. And we could hardly consider that international peace and stability will really have ceased to be threatened as long as Europe is faced with the fact that it has been possible for Moscow to crush these three small countries which have been guilty of no real provocation and which have given evidence of their ability to handle their own affairs in a progressive manner, without detriment to the interests of their neighbors. It should therefore logically be considered a part of U.S. objectives to see these countries restored to something at least approaching a decent state of freedom and independence.

It is clear, however, that their complete independence would involve an actual cession of territory by the Soviet Government. It would therefore raise an issue directly involving the dignity and the vital interests of the Soviet State as such. It is idle to imagine that this could be brought about by means short of war. If, therefore, we are to consider that the basic objective outlined above is one which would be valid for peace as well as for war, then we must logically state that under conditions of peace our objective would be merely to induce Moscow to permit the return to the respective Baltic countries of all of their nationals who have been forcibly removed therefrom and the establishment in those countries of autonomous regimes generally consistent with the cultural needs and national aspirations of the peoples in question. In the event of war, we might, if necessary, wish to go further. But the answer to this question would depend on the nature of the Russian regime which would be dominant in that area in the wake of another war; and we need not attempt to decide it in advance.

In saying, consequently, that we should reduce the power and influence of The Kremlin to limits in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international society, we are entitled to consider that this is an objective which can be logically pursued not only in the event of a war but also in time of peace and by peaceful means, and that in the latter case it need not necessarily raise issues of prestige for the Soviet Government which would automatically make war inevitable.

2. THE CHANGE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNAT10NAI-RELATIONS AS OBSERVED IN MOSCOW

Our difficulty with the present Soviet Government lies basically in the fact that its leaders are animated by concepts of the theory and practice of international relations which are not only radically opposed to our own but are clearly inconsistent with any peaceful and mutually profitable development
of relations between that government and other members of the international community, individually and collectively.

Prominent among these concepts are the following:

(a) That the peaceful coexistence and mutual collaboration of sovereign and independent governments, regarding and respecting each other as equals, is an illusion and an impossibility;

(h) That conflict is the basis of international life wherever, as is the case between the Soviet Union and capitalist countries, one country does not recognize the supremacy of the other;

(c) That regimes which do not acknowledge Moscow’s authority and ideological supremacy are wicked and harmful to human progress and that there is a duty on the part of right-thinking people everywhere to work for the overthrow or weakening of such regimes, by any and all methods which prove tactically desirable;

(d) That there can be, in the long run, no advancement of the interests of both the communist and non-communist world by mutual collaboration, these interests being basically conflicting and contradictory;

and

(e) That spontaneous association between individuals in the communist-dominated world and individuals outside that world is evil and cannot contribute to human progress.

Plainly, it is not enough that these concepts should cease to dominate Soviet, or Russian, theory and practice in international relations. It is also necessary that they should be replaced by something approximating their converses.

These would be:

(a) That it is possible for sovereign and equal countries to exist peaceably side by side and to collaborate with each other without any thought or attempt at domination of one by the other;

(b) That conflict is not necessarily the basis of international life and that it may be accepted that peoples can have common purposes without being in entire ideological agreement and without being subordinated to a single authority;

(c) That people in other countries do have a legitimate right to pursue national aims at variance with Communist ideology, and that it is the duty of right-thinking people to practice tolerance for the ideas of others, to observe scrupulous non-interference in the internal affairs of others on the basis of reciprocity, and to use only decent and honorable methods in international dealings;

(d) That international collaboration can, and should, advance the interests of both parties even though the ideological inspiration of thc two parties is not identical; and

(e) That the association of individuals across international borders is desirable and should be encouraged as a process contributing to general human progress.

Now the question at once arises as to whether the acceptance of such concepts in Moscow is an objective which we can seriously pursue and hope to achieve without resort to war and to the overthrow of the Soviet Government. We must face the fact that the Soviet Government, as we know it today, is, and will continue to be a constant threat to the peace of this nation and of the world.

It is quite clear that the present leaders of the Soviet Union can themselves never be brought to view concepts such as those indicated above as intrinsically sound and desirable. It is equally clear that for such concepts to become dominant throughout the Russian communist movement wou!d mean, in present circumstances, an intellectual revolution within that movement which would amount to a metamorphosis of its political personality and a denial of its basic claim to existence as a separate and vital force among the ideological currents of the world at large. Concepts such as these could become dominant in the Russian communist movement only if, through a long process of change and erosion, that movement had outlived in name the impulses which had originally given it birth and vitality and had acquired a completely different significance in the world than that which it possesses today.

It might be concluded, then (and the Moscow theologians would be quick to put this interpretation on it), that to say that we were seeking the adoption of these concepts in Moscow would be equivalent to saying that it was our objective to overthrow Soviet power. Proceeding from that point, it could be argued that this is in turn an objective unrealizable by means short of war, and that we are therefore admitting that our objective with respect to the Soviet Union is eventual war and the violent overthrow of Soviet power. ,

It would be a dangerous error to accept this line of thought.

In the first place, there is no time limit for the achievement of our objectives under conditions of peace. We are faced here with no rigid periodicity of war and peace which would enable us to conclude that we must achieve our peacetime objectives by a given date "or else". The objectives of national policy in times of peace should never be regarded in static terms. In so far as they arc basic objectives, and worthy ones, they are not apt to be ones capable of complete and finite achievement, like specific military objectives in war. The peacetime objectives of national policy should be thought of rather as lines of direction than as physical goals.

In the second place, we are entireiy within our own rights, and need feel no sense of guilt, in working for the destruction of concepts inconsistent with world peace and stability and for their replacement by ones of tolerance and international collaboration. It is not our business to calculate the internal developments to which the adoption of such concepts might lead in another country, nor need we feel that we have any responsibility for those developments. If the Soviet leaders find the growing prevalence of a more enlightened concept of international relations to be inconsistent with the maintenance of their internal power in Russia, that is their responsibility, not ours. That is a matter for their own consciences, and for the conscience of the peoples of the Soviet Union. We are not only within our moral rights but within our moral duty in working for the adoption everywhere of decent and hopeful concepts of international life. In doing so, we are entitled to let the chips tali where they may in terms of internal development.

We do not know for certain that the successful pursuit by us of the objectives in question would lead to the disintegration of Soviet power; for we do not know the time factor here involved. It is entirely possible that under the stress of lime and circumstance certain of the original concepts of the communist movement might be gradually modified in Russia as were certain of the original concepts of the American revolution in our own country.

We are entitled, therefore, to consider, and to state publicly, that it is our objective to bring to The Russian people and government, by every means at our disposal, a more enlightened concept of international relations, and that in so doing we are not taking any position, as a government, with respect to internal conditions in Russia.

In the case of war, there could clearly be no question of this nature. Once a state of war had arisen between this country and the Soviet Union, this Government would be at liberty to pursue the achievement of its basic objectives by whatever means it might choose and by whatever terms it might wish to impose upon a Russian authority or Russian authorities in the event of a successful issue of military operations. Whether these terms would embrace the overthrow of Soviet power would he only a question of expediency, which will be discussed below.

This second of the two basic objectives is therefore also one likewise susceptible of pursuit in lime of peace as in time of war. This objective, like the first, may accordingly be accepted as an underlying one, from which the formulation of our policy, in peace as in war, may proceed.

IV. The Pursuit of Our Basic. Objectives in Time of Peace

In discussing the interpretation which would be given to these basic objectives in time of peace or in time of war respectively, we arc confronted with a problem of terminology. If we continue to speak of the particular orientation lines of our policy in peace or in war as ”objectives", we may find ourselves falling into a semantic confusion. Solely for the purposes of clarity, therefore, we will make an arbitrary distinction. We will speak of objectives only in the sense of the basic objectives outlined above, which are common both to war and peace. When we refer to our guiding purposes as applied specifically in our wartime or peactime policy, respectively, we will speak of "aims" rather than of "objectives".

What then would be the aims of U.S. national policy with respect to Russia in time of peace?

These should flow logically from the two main objectives discussed above,

1. THE RETRACTION OF RUSS1AN POWER AND INFLUENCE

Let us first consider the retraction of undue Russian power and influence. We have .seen that. this divided into the problem of the satellite area and the problem of communist activities and Soviet propaganda activities in countries farther afield.

With respect to the satellite area, the aim of U.S. policy in time of" peace is to place the greatest possible strain on the structure of relationships by which Soviet domination of this area is maintained and gradually, with the aid of the natural and legitimate forces of Europe, to maneuver the Russians out of their position of primacy and to enable the respective governments to regain their independence of action. There are many ways in which this aim can be, and is being, pursued. The most striking step in this direction was the original proposal for the ERP, as stated in Secretary Marshall’s Harvard speech on June 5, S947. By forcing the Russians either to permit the satellite countries to enter into a relationship of economic collaboration with the west of Europe which would inevitably have strengthened east-west bonds and weakened The exclusive orientation of these countries toward Russia or to force them to remain outside this structure of collaboration at heavy economic sacrifice to themselves, we placed a severe strain on the relations between Moscow and the satellite countries and undoubtedly made more awkward and difficult maintenance by Moscow of its exclusive authority in the satellite capitals. Everything, in fad, which operates to tear off the veil with
which Moscow likes to screen its power, and which forces the Russians to reveal the crude and ugly outlines of their hold over the governments of the satellite countries, serves to discredit the satellite governments with their own peoples and to heighten the discontent of those peoples and their desire for free association with other nations.

The disaffection of Tito, to which the strain caused by the ERP problem undoubtedly contributed in some measure, has clearly demonstrated that it is possible for stresses in the Soviet-satellite relations to lead to a real weakening and disruption of the Russian domination,

It should therefore be our aim to continue to do all in our power to increase these stresses and at the same time to make it possible for the satel-lile governments gradually to extricate themselves from Russian control and to find, if they so wish, acceptable forms of collaboration with the governments of the west. This can be done by skillful use of our economic power, by direct or indirect informational activity, by placing the greatest possible strain on the maintenance of the iron curtain, and by building up the hope and vigor of western Europe to a point where it comes to exercise the maximum attraction to the peoples of the east, and by other means too numerous to mention.

We cannot say, of course, that the Russians will sit by and permit the satellites to extricate themselves from Russian control in this way. We cannot be sure that at some point in this process the Russians will not choose to resort to violence of some sort; i.e., to forms of military re-occupation or possibly even to a major war, to prevent such a process from being carried to completion.

It is not our desire that they should do this; and we, for our part, should do everything possible to keep the situation flexible and to make possible a liberation of the satellite countries in ways which do not create any unanswerable challenge to Soviet prestige. But even with the greatest of circumspection we cannot be sure that they will not choose to resort to arms. We cannot hope to influence their policy automatically or to produce any guaranteed results.

The fact that we embark on a policy which can lead to these results does not mean that we are setting our course toward war; and we should be extremely careful to make this plain on all occasions and to refute accusations of this character. The fact of the matter is that, granted the relationship of antagonism which is still basic to the entire relationships between the Soviet Government and non-communist countries at this time, war is an ever-present possibility and no course which this Government might adopt would appre-
ciably diminish this danger. The converse of the policy set forth above, namely to accept Soviet domination of the satellite countries and to do nothing to oppose it, would not diminish in any way the danger of war. On the contrary, it can be argued with considerable logic that the long-term danger of war will inevitably be greater if Europe remains split along the present lines than it will be if Russian power i.s peacefully withdrawn in good time and a normal balance restored to the European community.

It may he stated, accordingly, that our first aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to encourage and promote by means short of war the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present satellite area and the emergence of the respective eastern European countries as independent factors on the international scene,

However, as we have seen above, our examination of this problem is not complete unless we have taken into consideration the question of areas now behind the Soviet border. Do we wish, or do we not, to make it our objective to achieve by means short of war any modification of the borders of the Soviet Union? We have already seen in Chapter III the answer to this question.

We should encourage by every means at our disposal tile development in the Soviet Union of institutions of federalism which would permit a revival of the national life of the Baltic peoples.

It may be asked: Why do we restrict this aim to the Baltic peoples? Why do we not include the other national minority groups of the Soviet Union? The answer is that the Baltic peoples happen to be the only peoples whose traditional territory and population are now entirely included in the Soviet Union and who have shown themselves capable of coping successfully with the responsibilities of statehood. Moreover, we still formally deny the legitimacy of their violent inclusion in the Soviet Union, and they therefore have a special status in our eyes.

Next we have the problem of the disruption of the myth by which the people in Moscow maintain their undue influence and actual disciplinary authority over millions of people in countries beyond the satellite area. First a word about the nature of this problem.

Before the revolution of 1918, Russian nationalism was solely Russian. Except for a few eccentric European intellectuals of the 19th Century, who even then professed to a mystical faith in Russia’s power to solve the ills of civilization (*2) Russian nationalism had no appeal to people outside Russia. On the contrary, the relatively mild despotism of the 19th Century Russian
rulers was perhaps better known and more universally deplored in the western countries than has since been the case with the far greater cruelties of the Soviet regime.

(*2) Karl Marx was not one of these people. He was not, as he himself put it, “one of those
who believed that the old Europe could be revived by Russian blood,” [Note in source text]

After the revolution, the Bolshevik leaders succeeded, through clever and systematic propaganda, in establishing throughout large sections of the world public certain concepts highly favorable to their Own purposes, including the following: that the October Revolution was a popular revolution;
that the Soviet regime was the first real worker’s government; that Soviet power was in some way connected with ideals of liberalism, freedom and economic security; and that it offered a promising alternative to the national regimes under which other peoples lived. A connection was thus established in the minds of many people between Russian communism and the general uneasiness arising in the outside world from the effects of urbanization and industrialization, or from colonial unrest.

In this way Moscow’s doctrine became to some extent a domestic problem for every nation in the world. In Soviet power, western statesmen arc now facing something more than just another problem of foreign affairs. They are facing also an internal enemy in their own countries—an enemy committed to the undermining and eventual destruction of their respective national societies.

To destroy this myth of international communism is a dual task. It takes two parties to create an inter-action such as that which exists between the Kremlin, on the one hand, and the discontented intellectuals in other countries (for it is the intellectuals rather than the "workers" who make up the hard core of communism outside the USSR), on the other. It is not enough to tackle this problem by aiming to silence the propagator. It is even more important to arm the listener against this sort of attack. There is some reason why Moscow propaganda is listened to so avidly, and why this myth takes hold so readily, among many people far from the boundaries of Russia. If it were not Moscow these people listened to, it would be something else, equally extreme and equally erroneous, though possibly less dangerous. Thus the task of destroying the myth on which international communism rests is not just an undertaking relating to the leaders of the Soviet Union. It is also something relating to the non-Soviet world, and above all to the particular society of which each of us forms a part. To the extent to which we can dispel the confusion and misunderstandings on which these doctrines thrive—to the extent that we can remove the sources of bitterness which drive people to irrational and Utopian ideas of this sort—we will succeed in breaking down the ideological influence of Moscow in foreign countries. On the other hand- we must recognize that only a portion of international
communism outside Russia is the result of environmental influence and subject to correction accordingly. Another portion represents something in the nature of a natural mutation of species. It derives from a congenital fifth-columnism with which a certain small percentage of people in every community appear to be affected, and which distinguishes itself by a negative attitude toward the native society and a readiness to follow any outside force which opposes it. This element will always be present in any society for unscrupulous outsiders to work on; and the only protection against its dangerous misuse will be the absence of the will on the part of great-power regimes to exploit this unhappy margin of human nature.

Fortunately, the Kremlin has thus far done more than we ourselves could ever have done to dispel the very myth by which it operates. The Yugoslav incident is perhaps the most striking case in point; but the history of the Communist International is replete with other instances of the difficulty non-Russian individuals and groups have encountered in trying to be the followers of Moscow doctrines. The Kremlin leaders are so inconsiderate, so relentless, so over-bearing and so cynical in the discipline they impose on their followers that few can stand their authority for very long.

The Leninist-Stalinist system is founded, basically, on the power which a desperate, conspiratorial minority can always wield, at least temporarily, over a passive and unorganized majority of human beings- For this reason, the Kremlin leaders have had little concern, in the past, about the tendency of their movement to leave in its train a steady backwash of disillusioned former followers. Their aim was not to have communism become a mass movement but rather to work through a small group of faultlessly disciplined and entirely expendable followers. They were always content to let those peoples go who could not stomach Their particular brand of discipline.

For a long time, this worked reasonably well. New recruits were easy to obtain; and the Party lived by a steady process of natural selection-out, which left within its ranks only the most fanatically devoted, the most unimaginative, and the most obtusely unscrupulous natures.

The Yugoslav case has now raised a great question mark as to how well this system will work in the future, Heretofore, heresy could safely be handled by police repression within The limits of Soviet power or by a tested process of excommunication and character-assassination outside those limits. Tito has demonstrated that in the case of the satellite leaders, neither of these methods is necessarily effective. Excommunication of communist leaders who are beyond the effective range of Soviet power and who themselves have territory, police power, military power, and disciplined fol-
lowers, can split the whole communist movement, as nothing else was ever able to do, and cause the most grievous damage to the myth of Stalin’s omniscience and omnipotence.

Conditions are therefore favorable to a concentrated effort on our part designed to take advantage of Soviet mistakes and of the rifts that have appeared, and to promote the steady deterioration of the structure of moral influence by which the authority of the Kremlin has been carried to peoples far beyond the reach of Soviet police power.

We may say, therefore, that our second aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is, by informational activity and by every other means at our disposal, to explode the myth by which people remote from Russian military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the Soviet Union for what it is and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward it.

2. THE ALTERATION OF RUSSIAN CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

We come now to the interpretation, in terms of peacetime policy, of our second major objective: namely, to bring about an alteration of the concepts of international relations prevalent in Moscow governing circles.

As has been seen above, There is no reasonable prospect that we will ever be able to alter the basic political psychology of the men now in power in the Soviet Union. The malevolent character of their outlook on the outside world, their repudiation of the possibility of permanent peaceful collaboration, their belief in the inevitability of the eventual destruction of the one world by the other: these things must remain, if only tor the simple reason that the Soviet leaders are convinced that their own system will not stand comparison with the civilization of the west and that it will never be secure until the example of a prosperous and powerful western civilization has been physically obliterated and its memory discredited. This is not to mention the fact that these men are committed to the theory of inevitable conflict between the two worlds by the strongest of all commitments: namely, the fact that they have inflicted the punishment of death or of great suffering and hardship on millions of people in the name of this theory.

On the other hand, the Soviet leaders are prepared to recognize situations, if not arguments. If, therefore, situations can be created in which it is clearly noi. to the advantage of their power to emphasize the elements of conflict in their relations with the outside world, then their actions, and even the tenor of their propaganda to their own people, can be modified. This was made
evident in the recent war when the circumstances of their military association with the western powers had the effect just described. In this instance, the modification of their policies was of relatively short duration; for with the end of hostilities they thought they saw an opportunity for gaining important objectives of their own regardless of the feelings and views of the western powers. This meant that the situation which had caused them to modify their policies no longer appeared to them to exist.

If, however, analogous situations could again be created in the future and the Soviet leaders compelled to recognize their reality, and if these situations could be maintained for a longer time, i.e., for a period long enough to encompass a respectable portion of the organic process of growth and change in Soviet political life, then they might have a permanent modifying effect on the outlook and habits of Soviet power. Even the relatively brief and perfunctory lip service done during the recent war to the possibility of collaboration among the major allies left a deep mark on the consciousness of the Russian public, and one which has undoubtedly caused serious difficulties to the regime, since the end of the war, in its attempt to revert to the old policies of hostility and subversion toward the western world. Yet all this occurred in a period in which there was absolutely no turnover of any importance in the Soviet leadership and no normal evolution of internal political life in the Soviet Union- Had it been necessary for the Soviet Government to observe these policies of circumspection and moderation toward the west for so long a period that the present leaders would have had to yield to other ones and that there would have been some normal evolution of Soviet political life in the face of these necessities, then it is possible that some real modification in Soviet outlook and behavior might eventually have been achieved.

It flows from this discussion that whereas we will not be able to alter the basic political psychology of the present Soviet leaders, there is a possibility that if we can create situations which, if long enough maintained, may cause them to soft-pedal their dangerous and improper attitude toward the west and to observe a relative degree of moderation and caution in their dealings with western countries. In this case, we could really say that we had begun to make progress toward a gradual alteration of the dangerous concepts which now underlie Soviet behavior.

Again, as in the case of the retraction of Soviet power, and, in fact, as in the case of any sound program of resistance to Soviet attempts at the destruction of western civilization, we must recognize that the Soviet leaders may see the writing on the wall and may prefer to resort to violence rather
than to permit these things to occur. It must be reiterated: that is the risk which we run not just in this, but in any sound policy toward the Soviet Union. It is inherent in the present nature of the Soviet Government; and nothing we may do can alter or remove it, This is not a problem new to the foreign relations of the United Stales. In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton stated:

"Let us recollect that peace or war will not always be left to our option;
that however moderate or unambitious we may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the ambition, of others."

In setting out, therefore, to alter the concepts by which the Soviet Government now operates in world affairs, we must again concede that the question of whether this aim can be achieved by peaceful means cannot he answered entirely by ourselves. But this does not excuse us from making the attempt.

We must say, therefore, that our third aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to create situations which will compel the Soviet Governntent to recognise the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving, at least outwardly, as though it were the converse of those concepts that were true.

This is of course primarily a question of keeping the Soviet Union politically, militarily, psychologically weak in comparison with the international forces outside of its control and of maintaining a high degree of insistence among the non-communist countries on the observance by Russia of the ordinary international decencies.

3. SPECIFIC AIMS

The aims listed above are all general in nature. To attempt to make them specific would lead us into an endless maze of attempts at verbal classification and would probably be more confusing than clarifying. For this reason, no attempt will be made here to spell out the possible forms of specific application of these aims. Many of these forms will easily suggest themselves to any who give thought to the interpretation of these, general aims in terms of practical policy and action. It will be seen for example, that a major factor in the achievement of all of these aims without exception, would be the degree to which we might succeed in penetrating or disrupting the iron curtain.

However, the question of specific interpretation may be considerably clarified by a brief indication of the negative side of the picture: in other words, by pointing out what our aims are not.

First of all, it is not our primary aim in time of peace to set the stage for a war regarded as inevitable. We do not regard war as inevitable. We do not repudiate the possibility that our overall objectives with respect to Russia may be successfully pursued without resort to war, We have to recognize the possibility of war, as something flowing logically and at all times from the present attitude of The Soviet leaders; and we have to prepare realistically for that eventuality.

But it would be wrong to consider that our policy rested on an assumption of an inevitability of war and was confined to preparations for an armed conflict. Thal is not the case. Our task at present, in the absence of a state of war automatically brought about by the actions of others, is to find means of pursuing our objectives successfully without resort to war ourselves. It includes preparations for a possible war, but we regard these as only subsidiary and precautionary rather than as the primary element of policy. We are still hoping and striving to achieve our objectives within the framework of peace. Should we at any time come to the conclusion (which is not excluded) that this is really impossible and that the relations between communist and non-communist worlds cannot proceed without eventual armed conflict, then The whole basis of this paper would be changed and our peacetime aims. as set forth herein, would have to be basically altered.

Secondly, it is not our peacetime aim to overthrow the Soviet Government. Admittedly, we are aiming at the creation of circumstances and situations which would be difficult for the present Soviet leaders to stomach, and which they would not like. It is possible that they might not be able, in the face of these circumstances and situations, to retain their power in Russia. But it must be reiterated: that is their business, not ours. This paper implies no judgment as to whether it is possible for the Soviet Government to behave with relative decency and moderation in external affairs and yet to retain its internal power in Russia. Should the situations to which our peacetime aims are directed actually come into being and should they prove intolerable to the maintenance, of internal Soviet power and cause the Soviet Government to leave the scene, we would view this development without regret; but we would not assume responsibility for having sought it or brought it about.

V. The Pursuit of our Basic Objectives in Time of War

This chapter treats of our aims with respect to Russia in the event that a state of war should arise between the United States and the USSR. It pro-
poses to set forth what we would seek as a favorable issue of our military operations.

1. THE IMPOSSIBILITIES

Before entering into a discussion of what we should aim to achieve in a war with Russia, let us first be clear in our own minds about those things which we could not hope to achieve.

In the first place we must assume that it will not be profitable or practically feasible for us To occupy and take under our military administration the entire territory of the Soviet Union. This course is inhibited by the size of that territory, by the number of its inhabitants, by the differences of language and custom which separate its inhabitants from ourselves, and by the improbability that we would find any adequate apparatus of local authority through which we could work.

Secondly, and in consequence of this first admission, we must recognize that it is not likely that the Soviet leaders would surrender unconditionally to us. It is possible that Soviet power might disintegrate during the stress of an unsuccessful war, as did that of the tsar’s regime during World War I. But even this is not likely. And if it did not so disintegrate, we could not be sure that we could eliminate it by any means short of an extravagant military effort designed to bring all of Russia under our control. We have before us in our experience with the Nazis an example of the stubbornness and tenacity with which a thoroughly ruthless and dictatorial regime can maintain its internal power even over a territory constantly shrinking as a consequence of military operations. The Soviet leaders would be capable of concluding a compromise peace, if pressed, and even one highly unfavorable to their own interests. But it is not likely that they would do anything, such as to surrender unconditionally, which would place themselves under The complete power of a hostile authority. Rather than do that, they would probably retire to the most remote village of Siberia and eventually perish, as Hitler did, under the guns of the enemy.

There is a strong possibility that if we were to take the utmost care, within limits of military feasibility, not to antagonize the Soviet people by military policies which would inflict inordinate hardship and cruelties upon them, there would be an extensive disintegration of Soviet power during the course of a war which progressed favorably from our standpoint, We would certainly he entirely Justified in promoting such a disintegration with every means at our disposal. This does not mean, however, that we could be sure of achieving the complete overthrow of the Soviet regime, in the sense of
the removal of its power overall the present territory of the Soviet Union.

Regardless of whether or not Soviet power endures on any of the present Soviet territory we cannot be sure of finding among the Russian people any other group of political leaders who would he entirely "democratic" as we understand that term.

While Russia has had her moments of liberalism, the concepts of democracy arc not familiar to the great mass of the Russian people, and particularly not to those who are temperamentally inclined to the profession of government. At the present rime, there are a number of interesting and powerful Russian political groupings, among the Russian exiles, all of which do lip service to principles of liberalism, to one degree or another, and any of which would probably he preferable to the Soviet Government, from our standpoint, as the rulers of Russia. But just how liberal these groupings would be, if they once had power, or what would be their ability to maintain their authority among the Russian people without resort to methods of police terror and repression, no one knows. The actions of people in power are often controlled far more by the circumstances in which they arc obliged to exercise that power than by the ideas and principles which animated them when they were in the opposition. In turning over the powers of government to any Russian group, it would never be possible for us to be certain that those powers would be exercised in a manner which our own people would approve. We would therefore always be taking a chance, in making such a choice, and incurring a responsibility which we could not be sure of meeting creditably.

Finally, we cannot hope really to impose our concepts of democracy within a short space of time upon any group of Russian leaders. In the long run, the political psychology of any regime which is even reasonably responsive to the will of the people must be that of the people themselves- But it has been vividly demonstrated through our experience in Germany and Japan that the psychology and outlook of a great people cannot be altered in a short space of time at the mere dictate or precept of a foreign power, even in the wake of total defeat and submission. Such alteration can flow only from the organic political experience of the people in question. The best that can be done by one country to bring about this sort of alteration in another is to change the environmental influences to which the people in question are subjected, leaving it to them to react to those influences in their own way.

All of the above indicates that we could not expect, in the aftermath of successful military operations in Russia, to create there an authority entirely submissive to our will or entirely expressive of our political ideals. We must
reckon with the strong probability that we would have to continue to deal, in one degree or another, with Russian authorities of whom we will not entirely approve, who will have purposes different from ours, and whose views and desiderata we wiil be obliged to take into consideration whether we like them or not. In other words, we could not hope to achieve any total assertion of our will on Russian territory, as we have endeavored to do in Germany and in Japan. We must recognize that whatever settlement we finally achieve must be a political settlement, politically negotiated.

So much for the impossibilities. Now what would be our possible and desirable aims in the event of a war with Russia? These, like the aims of peace, should flow logically from the basic objectives set forth in Chapter III.

2. THE RETRACTION OF SOCIET POWER

The first of our war aims must naturally be she destruction of Russian military influence and domination in areas contiguous to, but outside of, the borders of any Russian state.

Plainly, a successful prosecution of the war on our part would automatically achieve this effect throughout most, if not all, of the satellitc area. A succession of military defeats to the Soviet forces would probably so undermine the authority of the communist regimes in the eastern European countries that most of them would be overthrown. Pockets might remain, in the form of political Tito-ism, i.e., residual communist regimes of a purely national and local character. These we could probably afford to by-pass. Without the might and authority of Russia behind them, they would be sure either to disappear with lime or to evolve into normal national regimes with no more and no less of chauvinism and extremism than is customary to strong national governments in that area. We would of course insist on the cancellation of any formal traces of abnormal Russian power in that area, such as treaties of alliance, etc.

Beyond this. however, we have again the problem of the extent lo which we. would wish Soviet borders modified as a result of a successful military action in our part. We must face frankly the fact that we cannot answer this question at this time. The answer depends almost everywhere on the type of regime which would be left, in the wake of military operations, in the particular area in question. Should this regime be one which held out at least reasonably favorable prospects of observing the principles of liberalism in internal affairs and moderation in foreign policy, it might be possible to leave under its authority most, if not all, of the Territories gained by the So-
viet Union in the recent war. If, as is more probable, little dependence could be placed on the liberalism and moderation of a post-hostilities Russian authority, it might be necessary to alter these borders quite extensively. This must simply be chalked up as one of the questions which will have to be left open until the development of military and political events in Russia reveals to us the full nature of the post-war framework in which we will have to act.

We then have the question of the Soviet myth and of the ideological authority which the Soviet Government now exerts over people beyond The present satellite area. In the first instance, this will of course depend on the question of whether or not the present All-Union Communist Party continues to exert authority over any portion of the present Soviet territory, in the aftermath of another war. We have already seen that we cannot rule out this possibility. Should communist authority disappear, this question is automatically solved. It must be assumed, however, that in any event an unsuccessful issue of the war itself, from the Soviet standpoint, would probably deal a decisive blow to this form of the projection of Soviet power and influence.

However that may be, we must leave nothing to chance; and it should naturally be considered that one of our major war aims with respect to Russia would be to destroy thoroughly the structure of relationships by which the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens, or groups of citizens, in countries not under communist control.

3. THE ALTERATION OF THE RUSSIAN CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Our next problem is again that of the concepts by which Russian policy would be governed in the aftermath of a war. How would we assure ourselves that Russian policy would henceforth be conducted along lines as close as possible to those which we have recognized above as desirable? This is the heart of the problem of our war aims with respect to Russia; and it cannot be given too serious attention.

In the first instance this is a problem of the future of Soviet power; that is, of the power of the communist party in the Soviet Union. This is an extremely intricate question. There is no simple answer to it. We have seen that while we would welcome, and even strive for, the complete disintegration and disappearance of Soviet power, we could not be sure of achieving this entirely. We could therefore view this as a maximum, but not a minimum, aim.

Assuming, then, that there might be a portion of Soviet territory on which we would find it expedient to tolerate the continued existence of Soviet power, upon the conclusion of military operations, what should be our relationship to it? Would we consent to deal with it at all? If so, what sort of terms would we be willing to make?

First of all, we may accept it as a foregone conclusion that we would not be prepared to conclude a full-fledged peace settlement and/or resume regular diplomatic relations with any regime in Russia dominated by any of the present Soviet leaders or persons sharing their cast of Thought. We have had too bitter an experience, during the past fifteen years, with the effort to act as though normal relations were possible with such a regime; and if we should now be forced to resort to war to protect ourselves from the consequences of their policies and actions, our public would hardly be in a mood to forgive the Soviet leaders for having brought things to this pass, or to resume the attempt at normal collaboration.

On the other hand, if a communist regime were to remain on any portion of Soviet territory, upon the conclusion of military operations, we could not afford to ignore it entirely. It could not fail to be, within the limits of its own possibilities, a potential menace to the peace and stability of Russia itself and of the world. The least we could do would be to see to it that its possibilities for mischief were so limited that it could not do serious dam’ age, and that we ourselves, or forces friendly to us, would retain all the necessary controls.

For this, two things would probably be necessary. The first would be the actual physical limitation of the power of such a residual Soviet regime to make war or to threaten and intimidate other nations or other Russian regimes. Should military operations lead to any drastic curtailment of the territory over which the communists held sway, particularly such a curtailment as would deprive them of key factors in the present military-industrial structure of the Soviet Union, this physical limitation would automatically flow from that. Should the territory under their control not be substantially diminished, the same result could be obtained by extensive destruction of important industrial and economic targets from the air. Possibly, both of these means might be required. However that may be, we may definitely conclude that we could not consider our military operations successful if they left a communist regime in control of enough of the present military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable them to wage war on comparable terms with any neighboring state or with any rival authority which might be set up on traditional Russian territory.

The second thing required, if Soviet authority is to endure at all in the traditional Russian territories, will probably be some sort of terms defining at least its military relationship to ourselves and to the authorities surrounding it. In other words, it may be necessary for us to make some sort of deal with a regime of this sort. This may sound distasteful to us now, but it is quite possible that we would find our interests better protected by such a deal than by the all-out military effort which would be necessary to stamp out Soviet power entirely.

It is safe to say that such terms would have to be harsh ones and distinctly humiliating to the communist regime in question. They might well be something along the lines of the Bresl-Litovsk settlement of 1918(*3) which deserves careful study in this connection. The fact that the Germans made this settlement did not mean that they had really accepted the permanency of the Soviet regime. They regarded the settlement as one which rendered the Soviet regime momentarily harmless to them and in a poor position to face the problems of survival. The Russians realized that this was the German purpose. They agreed to the settlement only with the greatest of reluctance, and with every intention of violating it at every opportunity. But the German superiority of force was real; and the German calculations realistic. Had Germany not suffered defeat in the west soon after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk agreement, it is not likely that the Soviet Government would have been able to put up any serious opposition to the accomplishment of German purposes with respect to Russia. It is in this sense that it might be necessary for this Government to deal with the Soviet regime in the latter phases of an armed conflict.

(*3). Treaty of Brest-Lilovsk, signed March 3, 1918, ended hostilities between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers on the basis of provisions that included the independence of the Ukraine, Georgia. Finland, the transfer to the Central Powers of Poland, the Baltic States, and portions of Byelorussia, and the cession of Kars, Ardahan. and Batum to Turkey. As part of the armistice agreement between Germany and the Western Powers on November II. 1918, Germany was forced to repudiate this treaty. [Ed. note]

It is impossible to forecast what the nature of such terms should be. The smaller the territory left at the disposal of such a regime, the easier ihe task of imposing terms satisfactory to our interests. Taking the worst case, which would be that of the retention of Soviet power over all, or nearly all, of present Soviet territory, we would have to demand:

(a) Direct military terms (surrender of equipment, evacuation of key areas, etc.) designed to assure military helplessness for a long time in advance;

(b) Terms designed to produce a considerable economic dependence on the outside world;

(c) Terms designed to give necessary freedom, or federal status, to national minorities (we would at least have to insist on the complete liberation of the Baltic States and on the granting of some type of federal status to the Ukraine which would make it possible for a Ukrainian local authority to have a large measure of autonomy); and

(d) Terms designed to disrupt the iron curtain and to assure a liberal flow of outside ideas and a considerable establishment of personal contact between persons within the zone of Soviet power and persons outside it.

So much for our aims with respect to any residual Soviet authority. There remains the question of what our aims would be with respect to any non-communist authority which might be set up on a portion or all of Russian territory as a consequence of the events of war.

First of all, it should be said that regardless of the ideological basis of any such non-communist authority and regardless of the extent to which it might be prepared to do lip service to the ideals of democracy and liberalism, we would do well to see that in one way or another the basic purposes were assured which flow from the demands listed above. In other words, we should set up automatic safeguards to assure that even a regime which is non-communist and nominally friendly to us:

(a) Does not have strong military power;

(b) Is economically dependent to a considerable extent on the outside world;

(c) Does not exercise too much authority over the major national minorities; and

(d) Imposes nothing resembling the iron curtain over contacts with the outside world.

In the case of such a regime, professing hostility to the communists and friendship toward us, we should doubtless wish to take care i.o impose these conditions in a manner which would not be offensive or humiiiating. But we would have to see to it that in one way or another they were imposed, if our interests and the interests of world peace were to be protected.

We are therefore safe in saying that it should be our aim in the event of war with the Soviet Union, to see to it that when the war was over no regime on Russian territory is permitted:

(a) To retain military force on a scale which could be threatening to any neighboring stale;

(b) To enjoy a measure of economic autarchy which would permit the erection of the economic basis of such armed power without the assistance of the western world;

(c) To deny autonomy and self-government to the main national minorities; or

(d) To retain anything resembling the present iron curtain. If these conditions are assured, we can adjust ourselves to any political situation which may ensue from the war. We will then be safe, whether a Soviet government retains the bulk of Russian territory or whether it retains only a small part of such territory or whether it disappears altogether. And we will be safe even though the original democratic enthusiasm of a new regime is short-lived and tends to be replaced gradually by the a-social concepts of international affairs to which the present Soviet generation has been educated.

The above should be adequate as an expression of our war aims in the event that political processes in Russia take their own course under the stresses of war and that we are not obliged to assume major responsibility for the political future of the country. But there are further questions to be answered for the event that Soviet authority should disintegrate so rapidly and so radically as to leave the country in chaos, making it encumbent upon us as the victors to make political choices and to take decisions which would be apt to shape the political future of the country. For this eventuality there are three main questions which must be faced.

4. PARTITION VS. NATIONAL UNITY

First of all, would it be our desire, in such a case, that the present territories of the Soviet Union remain united under a single regime or that they be partitioned? And if they are to remain united, at least to a large extent, then what degree of federalism should be observed in a future Russian government? What about the major minority groups, in particular the Ukraine?

We have already taken note of the problem of the Baltic states. The Baltic states should not be compelled to remain under any communist authority in the aftermath of another war. Should the territory adjacent To the Baltic slates be controlled by a Russian authority other than a communist authority, we should be guided by the wishes of the Baltic peoples and by the degree of moderation which that Russian authority is inclined to exhibit with respect to them.

In the case of the Ukraine, we have a different problem. The Ukrainians are the most advanced of the peoples who have been under Russian rule in modern times. They have generally resented Russian domination; and their nationalistic organizations have been active and vocal abroad. It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that they should be freed, at last, from Russian rule and permitted to set themselves up as an independent slate.

We would do well to beware of this conclusion. Us very simplicity condemns it in terms of eastern European realities.

It is True that the Ukrainians have been unhappy under Russian rule and that something should be done to protect their position in future. But there are certain basic fads which must not be lost sight of. While the Ukrainians have been an important and specific element in the Russian empire, they have shown no signs of being a ‘"nation" capable of bearing successfully the responsibilities of independence in the face of great Russian opposition. The Ukraine is not a clearly defined ethnical or geographic concept. In general, the Ukrainian population made up of originally in large measure out of refugees from Russian or Polish despotism shades off imperceptibly into the Russian or Polish nationalities. There is no clear dividing line between Russia and the Ukraine, and it would be impossible to establish one. The cities in Ukrainian territory have been predominantly Russian and Jewish. The real basis of "Ukrainianism" is the feeling of "difference" produced by a specific peasant dialect and by minor differences of custom and folklore throughout the country districts. The political agitation on the surface is largely the work of a few romantic intellectuals, who have little concept of the responsibilities of government.

The economy of the Ukraine is inextricably intertwined with that of Russia as a whole. There has never been any economic separation since the territory was conquered from the nomadic Tatars and developed for purposes of a sedentary population. To attempt to carve it out of the Russian economy and to set it up as something separate would be as artificial and as destructive as an attempt to separate the Corn Belt, including the Great Lakes industrial area, from the economy of the United States.

Furthermore, the people who speak the Ukrainian dialect have been split, like those who speak the White Russian dialect, by a division which in eastern Europe has always been the real mark of nationality: namely, religion- If any real border can be drawn in the Ulcraine, it should logically be the border between the areas which traditionally give religious allegiance to the Eastern Church and those which give it to the Church of Rome.

Finally, we cannot he indifferent to the feelings of the Great Russians themselves. They were the strongest national element in the Russian Empire, as they now are in the Soviet Union. They will continue to be the strongest national element in that general area, under any status. Any long-term U.S. policy must be based on their acceptance and their cooperation. The Ukrainian territory is as much a part of their national heritage as the Middle West is of ours, and they are conscious of that fact. A solution which attempts to separate the Ukraine entirely from the rest of Russia is
bound TO incur their resentment and opposition, and can be maintained, in the last analysis, only by force- There is a reasonable chance that the Great Russians could be induced to tolerate the renewed independence of the Baltic states. They tolerated the freedom of those territories from Russian rule for long periods in the past; and they recognize, subconsciously if not other’ wise, that the respective peoples are capable of independence. With respect to the Ukrainians, things arc different. They are loo close to the Russians to be able to set themselves up successfully as something wholly different, For better or for worse, they will have to work out their destiny in some sort of special relationship to the Great Russian people.

It seems clear that this relationship can be at best a federal one, under which the Ukraine would enjoy a considerable measure of political and cultural autonomy but would not be economically or militarily independent. Such a relationship would be entirely just to the requirements of the Great Russians themselves, it would seem, therefore, to be along these lines that U.S. objectives with respect to the Ukraine should be framed.

It should be noted that this question has far more than just a distant future significance. Ukrainian and Great Russian elements among the Russian emigre-opposition groups are already competing vigorously for U.S. support. The manner in which we receive their competing claims may have an important influence on the development and success of the movement for political freedom among the Russians, It is essential, therefore, that we make our decision now and adhere to it consistently. And that decision should be neither a pro-Russian one nor a pro-Ukrainian one, but one which recognizes the historical geographic and economic realities involved and seeks for the Ukrainians a decent and acceptable place in the family of the traditional Russian Empire, of which they form an inextricable part.

It should be added that while, as stated above, we would not deliberately encourage Ukrainian separatism, nevertheless if an independent regime were to come into being on the territory of the Ukraine through no doing of ours, we should not oppose it outright. To do so would be to undertake an undesirable responsibility for internal Russian developments. Such a regime would be bound to be challenged eventually from the Russian side. If it were to maintain itself successfully, mat would be proof that the above analysis was wrong and that the Ukraine docs have the capacity for, and the moral right to, independent status. Our policy in the first instance should be to maintain an outward neutrality, as long as our own interests—military or otherwise—were not immediateiy affected. And only if it became clear that an undesirable deadlock was developing, we would encourage a composing
of the differences along the lines of a reasonable federalism. The same would apply to any other efforts at the achievement of an independent status on the part of other Russian minorities. It is not likely that any of the other minorities could successfully maintain real independence for any length of time. However, should they attempt it (and it is quite possible that the Caucasian minorities would do this), our attitude should be the same as in the case of the Ukraine. We should be careful not to place ourselves in a position of open opposition to such attempts, which would cause us to lose permanently the sympathy of the minority in question. On the other hand, we should not commit ourselves to their support to a line of action which in the long run could probably be maintained only with our military assistance.

5. THE CHOICE OF A NEW RULING GROUP

In the event of a disintegration of Soviet power, we are certain to be faced with demands for .support on the part of the various competing political elements among the present Russian opposition groups. It will be almost impossible for us to avoid doing things which would have the effect of favoring one or another of these groups over its rivals. But a great deal will depend on ourselves, and on our concept of what we are trying to accomplish.

We have already seen that among the existing and potential opposition groups there is none which we will wish to sponsor entirely and for whose actions, if it were to obtain power in Russia, we would wish to take responsibility.

On the other hand, we must expect that vigorous efforts will be made by various groups to induce us to take measures in Russian internal affairs which will constitute a genuine commitment on our part and make it possible for political groups in Russia to continue to demand our support. In the light of these facts, it is plain then we must make a. determined effort to avoid taking responsibility for deciding who would rule Russia in the wake of a disintegration of the Soviet regime. Our best course would be to permit all the exiled elements to return to Russia as rapidly as possible and to see to it, in so far as this depends on us, that they are all given roughly equal opportunity to establish their bids for power. Our basic position must be that in the final analysis the Russian people will have to make their own choices, and that we do not intend to influence those choices. We should therefore avoid having proteges, and should try to see to it that all of the competing groups receive facilities for putting their case to the Russian people through the media of public information. It is probable that there will be violence between these groups. Even in this instance, we should not interfere unless our military interests are affected or unless there should be an attempt on the part of one group to establish its authority by large-scale and savage repression along totalitarian lines, affecting not just the opposing political leaders but the mass of the population itself.

6. THE PROBLEM OF "DE-COMMUNIZATION"

In any territory which is freed of Soviet rule, we will be faced with the problem of the human remnants of the Soviet apparatus of power.

It is probable that in the event of an orderly withdrawal of Soviet forces from present Soviet territory, the local communist party apparatus would go underground, as it did in the areas taken by the Germans during the recent war. It would then probably reemerge in part in the form of partisan bands and guerrilla forces. To this extent, the problem of dealing with it would be a relatively simple one; for we would need only to give the necessary arms and military support to whatever non-communist Russian authority might control the area and permit that authority to deal with the communist bands through the traditionally thorough procedures of Russian civil war.

A more difficult problem would be presented by minor communist party members or officials who might be uncovered and apprehended, or who might throw themselves on the mercy of our forces or of whatever Russian authority existed in the territory.

Here, again, we should refrain from taking upon ourselves the responsibility of disposing of these people or of giving direct orders to the local authorities as to how to do so. We would have a right to insist that they be disarmed and that they not come into leading positions in government unless they had given clear evidence of a genuine change of heart. Bul basically this must remain a problem for whatever Russian authority may take the place of the communist regime. We may be sure that such an authority will be more capable than we ourselves would be to judge the danger which ex-communists would present to the security of the new regime, and to dispose of them in such ways as to prevent their being harmful in the future. Our main concern should be to see that no communist regime, as such, is re-established in areas which we have once liberated and which we have decided should remain liberated from communist control. Beyond that, we should be careful not to become entangled in the problem of "de-communization."

The basic reason for this is that the political processes of Russia are strange and inscrutable. They contain nothing that is simple, and nothing that can be taken for granted. Rarely, if ever, are the colors straight black or
white. The present communist apparatus of power probably embraces a large proportion of those persons who are fitted by training and inclination to take part in the processes of government, Any new regime will probably have to utilize the services of many of these people in order to be able to govern at all. Furthermore, we are incapable of assessing in each individual case the motives which have brought individuals in Russia into association with the communist movement. We are also incapable of assessing the degree to which such association will appear discreditable or criminal to other Russians, in retrospect. It would be dangerous for us to proceed on the basis of any fixed assumptions in such matters. We must always remember that to be the subject of persecution at the hands of a foreign government inevitably makes local martyrs out of persons who might otherwise only have been the objects of ridicule.

We would be wiser, therefore, in the case of territories freed from communist control, to restrict ourselves to seeing to it that individual ex-communists do not have the opportunity to reorganize as armed groups with pretenses to political power and that the local non-communist authority is given plenty of arms and help in any measures which they may desire to take with respect to them.

We may say, therefore, that we would not make it our aim to carry out with our own forces, on territory liberated from the communist authorities, aпy large-scale program of de-communication, and that In general we would leave this problem to whatever local authority might supplant Soviet rule.

In Memory of Vitaly Churkin

There is a Russian saying – one person alone is not a warrior in a field.

Vitaly Chrukin, the Russian Federation’s ambassador to the UN, was proving that saying wrong.

Direct, forceful, honest, real, witty – he spoke at the UN not only on behalf of Russia, but also on behalf of the nations looking for equality and justice.

He was a true warrior standing alone in a hostile field, and holding his ground.

And he passed away on his post, suddenly, unexpectedly, only a day before his 65th birthday.

He will be deeply missed. Both by his family, Russia, and the world that lost a great defender.

Russian ambassador to UN Vitaly Churkin dies day before turning 65

He gave an interview, his last interview, to the RT journalist Alexey Yaroshevsk only 2 weeks ago. The journalist remembers him as being in perfect health, joking, being open, letting the journalist take his time, and answering all the questions that got thrown at him – he answered over 20 questions, whereas only 6 were agreed upon before the interview…

Interviewed Churkin just 2 weeks ago. He looked in good health and was very energetic during the interview. Shocked https://t.co/SAcWVZ1wEJ
— Alexey Yaroshevsky (@Yaro_RT) February 20, 2017

And let us hope that he passed away from natural causes. Because if he hasn’t, the future of the possible perpetrators would look utterly bleak. As many commenters on the internet, both Russian and foreign, noted – there has been far too many deaths of the Russian foreign diplomats and public figures as of late…

The Upside-down World of the Western Main Stream Media (MSM)


MSM – only the truthful information

I’ve been meaning to post the above caricature for quite some time, but as it is usual with many of my posts, it’s been sitting in draft until I felt it “matured” enough. Now, I saw a convergence of two seemingly insignificant events, that made it feel like a good time to post this image.

It is not a secret that anything published in the Western main-stream media about Russia (as well as China, or Syria, or any other state that the Western elites feel is in need of some “democratic bombings”), is presented through a certain prism, where either partial truths or outright lies are given to the audience to form an image of an enemy.

This can be seen in the materials, published both…

… in Peace …

Seemingly such an innocent thing, a report by one of the many Russian TV channels on a vegetable shortage in Europe… But look how it got blown out of proportions both by the 5th column inside and the agents of influence outside of Russia.

Here I am going to demonstrate how the above caricature applies to the everyday reporting. Take a look at the following article in one of the main Norwegian newspapers, Aftenposten: Russlands største TV-kanal hevder det er rasjonering på grønnsaker i butikkene i Norge (Russia’s biggest TV channel claims that there is rationing on the vegetables in Norway). Remember this headline. Interestingly, it is perceived by the population as “Russia is claiming…” – that’s how some people I know recited the story to me.

The article above cites a Russian TV channel – TV1. It translates some snippets of the material, but not all of them, making it sound as if the Russian channel is postulating that it is explicitly in Norway that we ration broccoli and experience vegetable shortage. To Aftenposten’s credit, they provide the link to the channel’s news-item, but who is going to go there and verify it anyway, it being in Russian?

Aftenposten provides the following picture:

With the sub-text of that’s how Russian TV channel presents the state of affairs in Norway, Denmark and Britain. Looks dramatic, right? Russians must be out of their minds, right?

That’s what they want you to think. And they don’t even stop there. In the second half of the article, Aftenposten presents it as “Kremlin’s propaganda” for “Putin’s Russia”, etc, etc.

Let’s go to the source…

http://www.1tv.ru/news/2017/02/04/319211-evropeyskie_pokupateli_stolknulis_s_defitsitom_ovoschey_v_supermarketah

It’s a 35-second long filler news snippet, and I’ll give the full translation here:

“Three salads into one hands. European buyers have come to face a shortage of vegetable in the supermarkets. It is unusually empty in the shops of Britain, Norway, Denmark. What’s left in stores is being rationed, for example, selling a few salads and broccolis per person. And the prices are very high – squashes and aubergines saw a price hike of almost 4 times over the last month. The reason for this is a harvest failure due to very cold winter in Italy and Spain – the main suppliers of vegetables during this time of the year. First the agricultural areas where flooded by rain, and then came frost. Experts say, that if the weather does not become better, Europe can also experience shortage of the citrus fruits.”

That’s it. But wait…

This is a still frame from the report, and what does it say? “Photo from the site of www.dailymail.co.uk”. That attribution was “conveniently” omitted in the image, published in the Norwegian Aftenposten.

A quick search leads us to this article:

Supermarkets RATION salads and veg after storms in Spain devastate crops with shortages due to last until APRIL (and a box of 12 iceberg lettuces is even being offered on Gumtree for £50)

So! It wasn’t the “crazy Russians spinning a lie”, but rather a short translation of an article from the British Daily Mail. But that won’t sound as sensationalist, would it?

And going back to the outrage, demonstrated by Aftenposten, I did a quick search in the Norwegian news items, and here is what came up:

Grønnsaksmangel etter uvær i Sør-Europa: – Situasjonen er svært krevende (Vegetable shortage after bad weather in Southern Europe – The situation is very demanding). And in it they say that the supply of vegetables to Northern Europe is halved, compared to the same time last year. They even quote PR chief of one of the largest Norwegian supermarket chains COOP, Harald Kristiansen, as saying that it concerns mostly broccoli and iceberg salad, but also, to a lesser degree paprika, tomatoes, cauliflower… I personally noticed a shortage of eco-salads and eco-tomatos, which I usually buy, and which I have not seen in the shops for about a month, without giving it a second thought – there were enough of the local greenhouse non-eco alternatives on the shelves.

So, the news item on TV1 was also truthful, when they included Norway! I’ll leave it to the reader to research the Danish newsfront.

Towards the end of the article, Aftenposten actually refers to the British tabloids, but presents it as if Russian media “twists the British publication”. From my translation above, where does it twist anything?

And finally they say that they took contact with TV1 fro comment about the “source foundation for the material”, but got no answer. But the source was specified in the material all along!

Funnily, not only The Daily Mail published these news:
BBC: European vegetables: ‘Perfect storm’ raises prices
The Telegraph: What is causing the 2017 vegetable shortage and what does it mean for consumers?
The Sun: IT’S THE A-BROC-ALYPSE! ‘Perfect storm’ of bad weather wipes out vegetables in Europe – and it’s set to send the price of lettuce, broccoli and peppers soaring in UK supermarkets

What I find interesting in all of this, is how it got quickly tied to “Russia”, “Russia’s biggest TV channel”, and the subsequent demonstration and ridicule on the net, tie in to “Kremlin propaganda”, and the usual ad hominem attack – “Putin’s Russia”. In other words, Western MSM business as usual.

First of all, TV1 is a fully-private channel, with some of its owners spending more time in London, than in Moscow. As there is no censorship on the Russian mediascape, each channel, or media outlet publishes whatever they want – isn’t it what the West wanted all along?

Secondly, how this got twisted in the Russian “5th column environment”:
“Radio Svoboda” – the very same that has a stated goal of government change in Russia (and played the same role against USSR), published a stream of Tweet ridicules under the title “Hungry Europe”, without bothering to say where the news come from and blaming it all on Russia. A series of other “liberal resources” wailed about Russia spreading fakes, for example here, here and here (the last one is an example of how it gets spread on the social media by people who don’t care about doing a source research). And only one outlet, Meduza.io, tried to come to the bottom of it.

Mission accomplished.

As the Russian saying goes, they “made an elephant out of a fly”. And drew Russia’s name through mud in the process. All, over a 35-second long filler newsreel, which was a re-telling of a British news item. All the while leaving the original source, the complete picture, out of the view. Take a look at the caricature at the beginning of my post once again. Telling isn’t it?

… and in War

Presenting half-truths or big lies is typical of any war-mogering propaganda. I could exemplify with Ukraine and its populace at large, that have become ensnared in this kind of the nets of deception, but we can go even bit further back in history, to the Goebbels/Hitler propaganda in the Nazi Germany, and how the people of Germany were made to believe that they were liberating the Eastern lands…

Fast forward to 2008…

In the sitrep article at The Saker, Sandwiching NATO in Ukraine Scott Humor writes:

As we all know the plans to instigate war between Russia and Ukraine go way back. It’s kinetic stage, however, started in 2008. Immediately after the skirmishes in South Ossetia with Georgian and NATO troops in August 2008, in October the Washington Times publishes an article of Jeffrey Kuhner: “Will Russia-Ukraine be Europe’s next war?”

“Europe faces the risk of another major war. In 1939, Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland triggered the Second World War. Today the possible trip wire is not Poland, but Ukraine. And the aggressor will not be Adolf Hitler, but Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.”

That’s a statement; it’s not an analyses, or expert opinion, its a statement of intent. This statement was made not by anyone in the government of Russia. This statement was made by the “deep state” globalist government. It says that they are about to stage a major war in Europe. Like the previous big war in Europe, this new war will be fought under the fascists and Nazi flags. They also say that they will start this war on the territory of Ukraine, the war will be against Russia, and Russians will become the appointed aggressors and even “the invaders“ of their own homeland.

This is a typical for globalists switch, when the victims are named aggressors, and that the Western powers act in order to “stop an aggression” and even better “to prevent an aggression.”

Just let me reiterate: The West calls Russians, who for centuries (if not millennia) living in the Don river basin (Donbas), the descendants of those Russians, who in 1813 liberated Europe from Napoelonic forces, and restored the kingdom of the Netherlands, the Russians who fended off the German invasion of the Don river basin in 1941-43, they call these Russians for “invaders” on their own land! The same justification, that also Hitler used to start his war!

The West went even further to reinforce the parallel.

In 1941 German soldiers were photographing against the backdrop of the Russian fortress of Ivangorod in Narva:

And on February 10th 2017, the Americans decided to repeat the feat. Wonder if the consequences will be the same…

So, with the help of MSM, a Westerner is prepped with a picture of an enemy: a crazy Russian, who must be “liberated” from his own values, political structure, country, life. That’s how wars were usually started by the West, and it always historically fell on Russia’s peoples shoulders to end those wars and bring back balance and peace to our one common continent: Eurasia.

To wrap it up…

Always check the source, even in the face of a simple newsitem, and especially if it want to play on your emotions. Earlier I translated a fragment of a Russian documentary, The Nets of Deception – False Reality, and it would be a good moment to revisit it again.

Seek alternative sources of information. There are a few English-language sources, which will give you either a second opinion, or a direct and unadulterated version directly from the source, here to name a few:

Croudfunded media outlet Russia Insider
Lada Ray’s Futurist Trendcast
The Saker
RT
Global Research
Paul Craig Roberts
TASS
Sputnik News

When Rouble Was Golden – Russia that we lost in the ashes of WWI and the coup d’etats of 1914-1917

On the 6th of March (21st of February by the old style) 1917, the colour “bread” revolution was started, which heralded a great disaster, spanning a century…

In the years before Russia got drawn into WWI, it was displaying fabulous growth, both socially and economically. WWI, also known as the “War of 4 cousins” – as all heads of the warring states were blood relatives – was a disaster for Russia, and weakened it sufficiently to facilitate the second – internal – disaster of 1917, which all but destroyed it.

One of the contemporary writers said that “Pity that we have Nikolai the Second, and not the second Nikolai”, referring to the strong in the will Nikolai I. Nikolai II, while being praised by the Western (British) powers, delivered Russia on a platter, and then was dumped by the Brits to be executed by the followers of their agent – Lenin. There was only one other Russian ruler, who was praised as highly by the West – Yeltsin, who caused destruction of Russia almost to the point of no return in the “Wild 90s”.

In November 1914 the Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold wrote: “Our main goal in this war lies in the long-term weakening of Russia.” Oh, how well they succeeded!

What did Russia lose? Marking the coming 100th anniversary of the two coup d’etats of 1917, Russian weekly “Argumenty and Fakty” publishes in 2016 a series of articles – “When Rouble was Golden” – showing some key points of Russian life before WWI. Here I want to present the translation of the series.

1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2Please note that translating a documentary film or an article takes a lot of time and emotional effort. I am doing it on a voluntary basis, but if someone feels like supporting my work, a Bitcoin donation to the following address is appreciated: 1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2




Publication of 03.02.2016, regarding the foundations of the Russian economics.


Harvest. Urals, 1907

What was the country, that lost forever? What was the foundation of its economy, when oil was not the main article of Russian exports nor the main source of state revenues? Argumenty i Fakty got at its disposal a unique booklet, first published in 1958 in New York City in 8 thousand copies. Edited by B. Brazol, it compiled statistics showing that over the last 15-20 years before the First World War, Russia made giant steps forward both in the economy, and in the development of the social and educational systems.

“AiF” starts a series of articles in which we will talk about how our country developed in the early twentieth century. In this edition we will focus on the golden rouble and gold reserves, revenues and expenditures of the state budget, taxes and savings.

A strong currency

During the reign of Emperor Nicholai II, by the law of 1896 Russia introduced the gold currency standard. That is, the issuance from each rouble was tied to the amount of gold reserves of the country. In case of emergency, the state Bank was granted the right to issue 300 million paper roubles not backed by gold, but it never used this right. The rouble was equal to 0,7 grammes of pure gold. As for the paper money (banknotes) and gold coins — they were equal in value. The content of the precious metal in the golden rouble surpassed the gold content of the coins of other countries. The rouble as the currency enjoyed a steady demand both inside the country and in the world.

In that period the financial system of all developed countries were also based on the gold standard — the amount of money had to match the size of the gold reserves of a country. Today the exchange rate is determined by its correlation with the dollar, while gold is a regular market commodity.

Positive budget

Russia of that time built its policy not only on a balanced budget, but also on the principle of substantial accumulation of gold reserves. Despite this and without any increase in the tax burden, the state income steadily grew from 1,410 billion in 1897, whereas the government spending remained more or less on the same level. Over the last ten years before the First World War, the excess of government revenue over expenditure amounted to 2.4 billion roubles. This amount is all the more impressive if one remembers that during the reign of Nicholai II, railway tariffs were lowered, redemption payments for land ceded to serfs from their former landlords in 1861 were abolished, as well as some taxes were cancelled.

Infographics: Budget of the Russian Empire by year

Legend: Blue sack – income; gold coins – expenditures; in the circle – income over expenditure surplus; in 1912: * in squares – converted to 2016-roubles.
млн – million; млрд – billion; трлн – trillion

Low taxes

Total sum of taxes per capita in Russia was more than twice lower than in Austria, France and Germany, while compared with England it was four times lower.

Infographics: Total sum of taxes per capita in roubles

Legend: in the circle – roubles; white square* – converted into 2016 roubles (20700p).

The welfare of the citizens

In 1914, the State Savings Bank had deposits for 2,236 billion roubles. From 1904 accumulation of the Russians on savings accounts was steadily increasing — with the exception of 1905, which coincided with the Russian-Japanese war and the revolution.

Infographics: Saving deposits by the population

Legend: млн – million; млрд – billion; трлн – trillion
White square* – converted into 2016 roubles
1 golden rouble was equal to 0.774235 gramme of pure gold, ad at today’s (2016) Central Bank rate would have cost about 2282 roubles.

Bread and Tariffs

The Treasury of the Russian Empire is the dream of any Finance Ministry: minimum os social spending, — said Sergei Bespalov, historian, senior researcher of the Ranepa.

— Russia in the XIX-XX centuries was more fortunate than in the beginning of the XXI century — it’s the Ministry of Finance was successively headed by several talented administrators. First N. Bunge, then I. Vyshnegradsky, and finally, S. Witte. They were engaged in the replenishment of gold reserves, while Vyshnegradsky began preparation of the currency reform, which was conducted by Witte. The reform not only made the rouble convertible, what’s more important, it was valued internally. In addition, Witte cleverly borrowed from foreign banks at low interest rates. Re-borrowing, he managed to reduce payments on previous debts.

Vyshnegradsky is credited with the phrase: “we’ll eat less, but will export”, which refers to the export of bread. he could have well said it, because the export of grain for the Russian Empire was the most important source of income for the Treasury — almost like oil today. And the volume of grain exports had to be maintained at a high level. Exporters of bread were mostly not the peasants, but the large landlords farm — the agricultural firms of today.

The flourishing economy of Russia in the early XX century was carefully prepared. A major achievement of the Ministry of Finance, besides the gold rouble, can and should be considered the Customs Tariff of 1891 which was developed by Dmitri Mendeleev. There is a legend that it was the Customs Tariff, and not the periodic system of chemical elements, that he considered to be his main achievement. Mendeleev was a close ally to Sergei Witte. Customs Tariff helped to protect the market from cheap imports and to develop domestic industry. At the same time, high tariffs led to a rise in import prices, resulting in the Tariff having many opponents.

A major source of revenue waere taxes. It is believed that they were lower than in other countries. However, the standard of living in Russia in the early XX century was also lower. With this in mind, it turns out that the tax burden was comparable to other countries — there no difference “in magnitudes”. In addition to taxes, the Treasury was receiving “redemption payments” — the peasants up to 1905 paid for the purchase of the land from the landlords during the abolition of serfdom.

Government spendings were by a degree smaller — there were almost no social expenditures, pensions were paid to a narrow group of the population. But when they were paid… The whole of his numerous family, including the future leader of the proletariat, lived for many years on the pension, received after death of the Director of public schools in Simbirsk province, Ilya Ulyanov (Lenin’s father).




Publication of 15.02.2016, regarding the development of the industry.


The view from Dorogomilovo to partnership calico factory of Albert Hubner in Moscow.

In this edition we will focus on the development of industry and entrepreneurship, the construction of railways and the already establishing social legislation.

Industrial growth

In the period between 1890 and 1913, the productivity of Russian industry by grew four times. Its revenues not only nearly equalled to the income from agriculture — the produce covered almost 4/5 of the domestic demand for manufactured products.


Upper left corner: value, produced by the Russian factories in billions of roubles
Upper right corner: Construction of agricultural machinery in million of roubles.
Table with comparison of production between 1895 and 1914, top to bottom, in [млн – million / тыс. – thousand] of tonnes: coal, oil, gold, copper, magnesium, cast iron, iron/steel, salt, sugar.

Protection of workers

Industrial development caused a rapid increase in the number of factory workers. It should be noted that the laws relating to the protection of labour, were first published in Russia in the XVIII century, during the reign of Empress Catherine II. In the reign of Nicholai II were issued the laws to ensure the safety of workers in the mining industry, on the railways and in factories, constituting particular danger to life and health, such as gunpowder factories.

Child labour under 12 years of age was prohibited, minors and women were not allowed to work in night shift. Fines were not to exceed one third of the salary. In 1912 there was adopted the law on insurance payments due to illness, for child birth and accidents. Workers unions were recognized by law, strikes were allowed.

Development of entrepreneurship

During the 4 years before the First World War, the number of newly founded joint stock companies increased more than 2-fold, and the capital invested in them — by almost 4 times.

The number of new stock companies and their capital in million of roubles:

The construction of railways

Railway length in thousand of kilometres, 1917 and 2016.

The Great Siberian Railway was the longest in the world.

58,2 thousand km of railways were built in 1880-1917 (1600km per year in average).

In 1916, that is in the midst of the war, Russia built more than 2 thousand km of railways, which connected the Arctic ocean (port Romanovsk, now Murmansk) with the centre of Russia.

On the eve of the war, more than 4/5th of the payments on external and domestic debt were secured by revenues that the state received from the operation of railways.

Russian railway for passengers was the cheapest and most comfortable in the world. Train rides through the Siberian railway.

The price of the growth

Russia in the early XX century made a sharp spurt in industrial development, but became – as is in our time – directly or indirectly owned by foreigners, says Vasily Simchera, former Director of the Institute of State Statistics Committee, the author of the work “Development of Economy of Russia over 100 years.”

Cast iron, steel, gold

— In the early twentieth century, Russia played a prominent role in the extractive industries, production of iron, steel, gold, furs, building materials, military equipment, machine building. According to the total volume of technical and economic development, the country was on the 5th place in the world (after the USA, Germany, UK and France). The volume of national property (60,3 billion gold rubles, while the United States had 397,4 billion in terms of gold roubles) also at the 5th place (in the domestic Russian market, the gold rouble was equal to paper rouble, while on the foreign market it cost 1.85 U.S. dollar to 1 rouble, though the paper rouble was not convertible. — Ed.). At the same time, judging by the production of iron, steel, metal, copper, gold, platinum, locomotives, wagons, grain, sugar and other 27 key indicators, Russia is among the top three countries in the world. Today (2016) it is not included even in the top ten.

Industrial production grew due to the measures of the tsarist government — the domestic manufacturers were provided with incentives, loans and allowances. Metallurgical factories were generously paid for railroad tracks by the Treasury. For the first 13 years of the XX century the volume of production in the country almost doubled, while foreign trade rose by 2,5 times. On the advice of Witte and Mendeleev, Nicholai II imposed significant restrictions on the export of crude oil in 1896 – to secure the development of domestic refining and engineering. Major industrial regions were formed: Central, Urals, St. Petersburg, Volga. Only during the years of Russia’s participation in World War I (1914-1917), the indicators of industrial production decreased, although individual industries (military equipment, food, import) on the contrary showed rapid development.

And whose is the money?

The flip side of acceleration was the increase of Russia’s dependence on foreign (mainly French, Belgian and British) capital. Witte and Stolypin strutted, but not all was good — the economy lacked money. The construction of railways — Caucasian, Chinese — underwent on foreign loans. Even the money of the Russian Industrialists were borrowed. Foreigners were especially eager to invest in the primary sector. Thus, the Donbass and Baku oilfields in fact belonged to the British. In general the foreigners owned at least 70% of its assets in commodities in the heavy and, to a lesser extent, in light industries. This dependency was the reason for the involvement of Russia into a world war it did not need, and the ensuing collapse of the Empire.




Publication of the 17.02.2016, second part regarding the economic foundations of Russia.

Recently, the United States acknowledged that this year (2016) Russia will be able to come out on top in the world in grain export. In the beginning of XX century our country has also fed the world with its bread.

Bread with butter

Agrarian reform of the early XX century wasleft unfinished, but its interim results gave birth to another 40 million Russians, believes Alexander Bessolitsyn, Professor at the Department of Economics, Ranepa:

– 1891-1892 was the last hungry years in the Russian Empire (later the famine only happened after 1917: in 1921-1922 in the Volga region, and in 1932-1933 as a result of collectivization). Harvests increased, also grew the export of grain from Russia. The government stimulated it through the banks – for example, the Russian-Asian, which invested the mostly borrowed from the Western bankers money into the export, built elevators, including offshore in the Azov and Black seas, tankers. There arose grain exchanges, bread was sold to the dealers both by the landlords and the peasants.

The Russian food exports of the beginning of the XX century is called by some experts “a hungry export”, while others say that the excess was exported. Both assessments are unfair. In 1913 the population of the Russian Empire had reached 166 million: in 15 years it grew by 40 million people – mostly rural residents. Per capita consumption of bread in this time was only a little below the norm of 500kg per year, and amounted to 459kg. But such a gap may not lead to starvation. Rapid population growth confirms that the life of the peasants was relatively stable.

Egypt, Turkey and other countries in the Middle East and the Northern Mediterranean were those countries that purchased Russian grain the most. Although it is believed that Russia fed Europe, our grain was mainly shipped to the colonies. It was the cheapest (a pound of rye in 1913 cost 91 kopecks) and was considered low quality – too diverse and clogged. Europeans looked upon it with disdain. Germany bought Russian rye for processing and then sold the flour back to us.

Eggs and butter were more valued – two of the main Russian export product of the period. We started to produce butter only in the 80-ies of the XIX century, but already in the beginning of XX century it was considered the best in the world. Belgium, France, Germany and the UK were eager to buy it.

Agriculture was considered by the Head of the Government, Sergei Witte, as a source of funds for industrialization. Later on the Bolsheviks treated it in the same way. Still, the Imperial government saw agriculture not only a cash cow. Witte announced a program of replacement of grain export by flour: Russia, being one of the leaders in the export of grain, controlled only 3% of the world flour market.

But landlords and peasants, together with the foreign bankers, did not support the idea – it was easier to ship out the grain, while the foreigners did not want to let Russia to a more lucrative market. This problem is not resolved till this day.

Agrarian reform, called after Stolypin (from translator: the fact that there were made 11 assassination attempts over 5 years on the Interior Minister Petr Stolypin speaks volumes! He was ultimately murdered on the 14th of September 1911 in Kiev.), was also developed in the period of the Witte government. It remained unfinished. But the interim results were impressive. The main rise of agricultural cooperation, resettlement of peasants to Siberia and its development.

The government stimulated the development of the village, but the Russian agricultural sector, even in this period of rapid development, all the time suffered from lack of money. Just as the rest of the Russian economy of the early XX century.

Crops

In 1913 the harvest of the main cereals in Russia was one-third higher than in Argentina, Canada and the USA combined. Our country was the main bread supplier for the Western Europe.

In the 20 years preceding the First World War, the harvest of bread almost doubled.


Infographics block by block:
Upper left: Average grain productivity of a “tenth” (1,09 hectare), in hundredweigt; Area of planting of sugar beets, in thousand of hectares.
Upper right: Yearly harvest of the cereals, in million tonnes. Note! In 2015 Russian Federation harvested 104.3 million tonnes grain – not much more than in 1913. In 2012 the harvest was even lower than in the pre-revolutionary Russia, when mainly horses were used in agriculture – 70.9 million tonnes.
Middle: Harvest of cotton, in thousand of tonnes. In 1913 cotton harvest fully covered the needs of the Russian textile industry.
Bottom: Harvest of flax, in thousand of tonnes. Comparing France, Autro-Hungary and Russia. Russia produces 80% of the world flax harvest before WWI.

Stolypin’s agrarian reform (started in 1906)

The peasant was allowed to leave the community and become individual and hereditary owner of the land. In 1913 already 2 million families have received plots. By the beginning of the First World War, 13% of communal land passed into individual ownership.


Infographics: Peasants owned in million of hectares.

The State Farming Bank was buying out landlord estates and giving them to the peasants on favourable lending (up to 90% of the land cost) low-interest terms (4.5%). As a result, in 1917 the peasants owned up to 90% of arable land in the European part of Russia and 100% in the Asian part.

Peasants were moved from European part of Russia, where there was not enough land, in Siberia. Migrants were exempt from taxes, given land (15 hectares for the head of the family, plus 45 hectares for the whole of the family), provided with an allowance (200 RUB) and transported with the whole economy at state expense. In Siberia the settlers were supplied with agricultural machinery.

One hundred years passed, and now in 2016, the Russians are again given free land in the Far East, but only 1(!) hectares per person. Feel the difference…


Infographics: Animal husbandry.
Cattle, in million heads. Note! In 2014 there was only 19,2 million heads of cattle in Russian Federation!
Horses, in million heads.
Export of eggs: 1908 2.59 billion for 54.8 million roubles, and in 1909 2.84 billion for 62.2 million roubles. Russia stood for 50% of world production of eggs.




Publication of 24.02.2016, regarding the state of education.


Nikolai Bgdanov-Belskij. “Schoolgirls”. 1901.

Russia has enough universities, but it “is in need of opening of higher schools, and even more so, in secondary technical and agricultural schools.” This phrase belongs to Emperor Nicholai II. 100 years passed, and our country again lacks engineers and farmers.

In early 1913, the total budget of national education in Russia reached colossal figures by those time – 0.5 billion roubles in gold (1,14 trillion 2016-roubles).

In 2016, the Russian Federation Federal budget spendings on education amounted to 578 billion roubles.


Infographics: Budget of the Ministry of Education above; and the number of literate conscripts below.

Elementary school

Zemskaya (rural) schools of the Ministry of National Education (MNE)

Free education.
Duration: 3-4 years
Subjects: basic – the Law of God, reading, writing, arithmetic. In schools with two classes – also history, geography, natural sciences, Church singing and drawing.


Infographics: 1914: 123.7 thousand schools, giving education to 30% of all children between 8 and 11.

Parochial schools

Duration: 3-4 years
Subjects: basic – the Law of God, Church singing, reading, writing, arithmetic. In schools with two classes – also history.

City schools

Duration: 4 years
Subjects: the Law of God, reading, writing, arithmetic, geometry, sketching, drawing, history, geography, natural history, physics, gymnastics.

High schools

Classical gymnasium
* Men’s
Duration: 8 years
Subjects: the Law of God, Russian and Church Slavonic languages, ancient and foreign languages, philosophy, mathematics, physics, history, geography, science, art, jurisprudence.

* Women’s
Duration: 7 years
Subjects: The same as above, but with a simplified program, plus crafts and pedagogy.

* Real school (with natural-mathematical bias)

Duration: 7 years
Subjects: the Law of God, Russian and foreign languages, geography, history, mathematics, physics, natural history, drawing, sketching, calligraphy, jurisprudence.

In 2014-2015 there were 950 high schools in the Russian Federation. Authorities are trying to reduce their number, closing inefficient ones.


Infographics: Number of High schools on 1913-1914. Total: 63.
The list from top to bottom:
Engineering-industrial: 15
Universities: 10
Military/Navy: 8
Church: 6
Agricultural: 6
Jurisprudence: 4
Pedagogical: 4
Veterinarian: 4
Eastern Studies: 3
Medical: 2
Art: 1

The lessons of the century

The reform of public education in Russia of the beginning of XX century remained unfinished, but the pre-revolutionary system made possible the scientific and technological breakthroughs of the Soviet era, says historian and teacher Yevgenij Spitsyn.

Hordes of illiterates

– The development of the education system in the Russian Empire was consistent and continued on the basis of the democratic principles of classlessness and universality, established in 1803. However, the law on universal primary education did not come into force – on June 6, 1912 it was ultimately dismissed by the Council of State.

It is generally believed (including in the Soviet historical science) that the main contribution to the increase in the number of educated people in Russia was made by “Zemstvo” (country schools), but it is not so. The parochial schools, which constantly created be the statesman in the reign of Alexander III, the chief Procurator of the Holy Synod K. Pobedonostsev, helped more in the education. It is customary to call parochial schools for the “hotbeds of obscurantism”. Pity. The children learned not only to read, but the main skill – the ability to learn, helping them further in the gymnasium or real school. Furthermore the population of Russia has grown very rapidly in this period, so a new “hordes” of illiterate people came to replace the educated ones, thus the number of schools had to increase rapidly and by much.

When mathematicians knew Latin

Russia lagged behind. By 1914, on 1000 people of the population, students accounted for: in Russia – 59, Austria – 143, UK – 152 in Germany – 175, USA – 213, France – 148, in Japan – 146. However, the primary school attendance of children of 8-11 years by 1914 constituted 30.1% in the whole Empire, including in the cities – 46.6%, and in rural areas – 28.3% (see: Russia in 1913. Statistical and documentary Handbook. SPb, 1995). And according to some sources, in the central provinces and in the big cities the education of children of school age was universal.

The Empire’s scholl helped to educate scientists, engineers and designers, who then, in Soviet times, made many discoveries and inventions. The gymnasium included study of Greek and Latin, gave a strong mathematical training. Mathematician could read in Latin, and a philology scholar possessed the knowledge on the natural Sciences. The classical school provided the opportunity to give a really higher education people with a broad outlook, who posessed three ancient as wells as 2-3 modern languages, were familiar with the scientific picture of the world.

Higher education evolved as intensely as secondary and primary – by 1914, there were 63 state-owned, public, private and departmental educational institutions of the higher school, where there studied 123532 students (of those, 71379 in public universities). Self-financed and state-financed students were approximately equal in numbers.

The aim of the pre-revolutionary education was not the economics, but the development of the harmonious human personality. But, as happens in such cases, the rapid economic development of the country became a “by-product” of the creation of schools, colleges and universities.

Lugansk – The Last Cry For Help

This is a lightning translation of the following post on Kont: https://cont.ws/@klimova/521800

Here are the news of the petition signing at Vesti.Ru

While we are watching the developments in Syria, the Ukraine has seen a lot of changes of which I would like to tell.

It turns out that more than 153.000 residents of the Lugansk People’s Republic, signed a petition, where they appeal to the leaders of Russia, USA and Germany, Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump and Angela Merkel with the request to prevent the aggravation of the situation in Donbass.

I will remind that earlier the presidents of the people’s councils of the Lugansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic, Vladimir Degtyarenko and Denis Pushilin, addressed the presidents of Russia and the USA, as well as the Chancellor of Germany, with a request to “stop Poroshenko” so as to end fighting in Donbass and the blockade of the region. Head of The Lugansk People’s Republic, Igor Carpenter, stated that LPR and DPR will in the near future start collecting signatures under this appeal.

And here is the result. To be honest, I’m incredibly curious as to how Europe will react to this “cry for help” from Lugansk? After all, everything spearheads to Poroshenko being dumped. Judge for yourself, a couple of days ago Merkel admitted that the Ukrainian crisis has lasted too long and actions need to be taken. Other prominent political actors of the EU have started to notice that Kiev did not follow the obligations, assigned to them by the Minsk agreements.

We shall see what the consequences of such changes will be, but already today it is possible to speak with confidence about drastic changes in such matters as the war in Ukraine.

“Russians Are Coming!”: Restoration of the Dutch Kingdom. Year 1813.

This is my translation of the article by Alexander Mashkin about the events that have sadly become either forgotten or outright erased from the pages of history…

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Since the end of XVIII century the country now known as the Kingdom of Netherlands, was in a state of economic decline and political chaos. The reason for that was that under the influence of the events in North America, part of the Dutch populace, which for some reason called themselves for “patriots”, with maniacal stubbornness pushed the then stadhouder of the Seven United Provinces, Willem (Wilhelm) V, Prince of Orange-Nassau (1748-1806), to the recognition of Republic of G. Washington – the breakaway part of the possessions of the British Empire. When it happened, and, indignant at such perfidy, London declared war on Holland, the aforementioned “brave” fled in a panic, leaving their government on the own to suffer the most severe consequences of this ill-considered foreign policy steps. Not having been satisfied with “the progress”, the local “fighters for the freedom of the people”, declaring the need for “protecting municipal rights in several cities”, started an outright armed revolt in 1785. After the suppression of which by the Prussian Royal troops, which came to the aid of the legitimate government, those “patriots”, cursing the winners for their supposedly “living in our house with outright robbery”, and stadhouder in particular, for the cruelty (“everyone had to wear in public the orange cockade”), 40000 people withdrew to neighbouring Brabant.

These internal differences led to the fact that in 1795 the Netherlands were occupied – almost without resistance – by the French revolutionary divisions, which in January of that year forced Willem V to flee to England, and proclaimed the so-called “Batavian Republic”, led by their protege, “the great pensionarium” Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck. Despite the fact that the invaders called the “state” in honour of the Germanic tribe of Batavs, which lived South of the Rhine since the times of the Roman colonization of the region and is traditionally considered the ancestor of all Netherlanders, it lasted only until 1806. After that it was included by the invaders into the “Kingdom of Holland”, subordinated to the sibling of Napoleon the First, Louis Bonaparte, while after 1810, because of his quarrel with his “sovereign” relative, it turned into an integral part of the newly created pan-European Empire with its centre in Paris.

More than fifteen years of suffering of the locals under the thumb of foreign strangers and their native adherents, turned into “a byword”. Well known is also the fact that these things ended with the landing of the heir of the exiled at the time stadhouder Willem V – Willem VI of Orange – on the Dutch shore, near Scheveningen on the 30th of November 1813, meeting him there as a national hero, and the immediate proclamation of him as the Sovereign Prince of the United Netherlands. Thus far, however, few know that the uprising of Dutch national identity could well have remained on the level of wishful thinking, if not for the heroic deeds of soldiers, sailors and officers of the Russian Army and Navy. They came on the orders of Emperor Alexander the First, to smash Napoleon and his allies on the territory of Europe itself…

The total number of troops and their tactics

Having destroyed the enemy in the vastness between Moscow and the Beresina river, that is – at home, Russian troops entered the mainland countries. It’s clear that their plan also included the Netherlands, located on the North Sea coast, liberation of which from the Napoleonic yoke began in the late autumn of 1813.

To accomplish this more than important mission the vanguard detachment of three so-called “flying corps” in a total number of 3500 people was formed in the army of Wintzingerode, commanded by the future chief of the political police of the Russian Empire, General Aleksandr Khristoforovich Benkendorf. It consisted of a) the Tula infantry regiment (700 men), b) Jaeger battalion of the Second regiment (400), c) battalion of the Pavlograd hussar regiment (800), d) five Cossack regiments (1,600 people) of the adjutant of Alexander I, the Creator of the network of agents in Paris, Colonel Count Chernyshev, e) the battery of horse-pulled artillery.

Fortunately, archival materials preserved to our days almost the complete picture of the said military units, which, because of its particular value, we allow ourselves to reproduce here almost in full:

“Outside of the brigades: Balabin’s 2nd Cossack regiment of the Don Army (5 hundreds); Commander — Colonel of ataman regiment of the Don Army, Stepan Fedorovich Balabin, the 2nd.
The 1st brigade: Commander of the Cossack Don Army named on behalf of his regiment, Major-General Maxim Grigorievich Vlasov, the 3rd; 3rd Cossack regiment of the Vlasov’s Don Cossack Army (5 hundreds). Commander — Major-General Maxim Grigorievich Vlasov ,the 3rd.
Zhirov’s Cossack regiment of the Don Army (5 hundreds). Commander — Colonel Ivan Ivanovich Zhirov.
The 2nd brigade: Sysoev’s 3rd Cossack regiment of of the Don Cossack Army (5 hundreds). Commander — Major-General Vasily Alekseevich Sysoev the 3rd, not with the regiment due to illness since January 1813.
Dyachkin’s Cossack regiment of the Don Army (5 hundreds). Commander — Major-General Gregory Andreevich Dyachkin, not with the regiment due to illness since January, 1813.
Flying squad (consisting of three regiments of the Separate Cossack brigade) of Colonel Naryshkin. Commander – Colonel of the Life Guards of the hussar regiment, Lev Alexandrovich Naryshkin.
Grekov’s 9th Cossack regiment of the Don Army (5 hundreds). Commander — Colonel Alexey Antonovich Grekov, the 9th.
Barabanschikov’s 2nd Cossack regiment of the Don Army (5 hundreds). Commander — Colonel Fedor Akimovich Barabanshikov, the 2nd.
Lashilin’s 1st Cossack regiment of the Don Army (5 hundreds). Commander — Colonel Joseph Grigorievich Lemelin, the 1st”.

Alexander von Benckendorff
Count Alexander Khristoforovich Benkendorff

While performing the task of strengthening the anti-French resistance in the Netherlands, as well as protecting the adjacent region of Germany against a possible enemy invasion, Benkendorff’s detachment marched on November the 2nd 1813 towards the river IJssel (Assel; Jessel). He ordered his first column to attack the city of Zwolle (called “Zvol” in Russian reports of the time), and the second (Central, where Benkendorff was himself) to move to Bentham and Deventer, while the third was to attempt to master Disbursem. Of course, under each of these settlements “a decisive battle” took place.

Under the Walls of Deventer

Only having begun the march towards the designated settlement located on the banks of IJssel, where in his time Erasmus of Rotterdam was studying, the Cossacks continuously attacked the enemy. Moreover, in addition to the destruction of manpower of the opponent, they were also spreading among the local residents rumours that “people from the East came to give you freedom!”. The Don warriors were also performing active scouting at that time, in which it was found that the garrison of Deventer consists of 3000 French, while the Fortress is well fortified and supplied with provisions and forage, and has a significant numbers of mural artillery.

Realizing that this fortified edifice cannot be conquered on the go, the Russian command took to certain tricks. So, the future hero of the campaign for the liberation of the Netherlands, commander of the Bashkir regiment, major Prince Gagarin – awarded the Order of St. George IV degree for his successful cavalry raids against enemy positions – was ordered, after crossing the river, to simulate from the opposite shore a furious attack on the only bridge leading to the fortress, as if trying to capture it. At the same time Benkendorff with the main forces was to try to take the city from the unfortified side.

…At 3am Russian small forces rushed to occupy the outskirts, opposite to the local river port. But the surprise factor for them was by that time completely lost, an thus the soldiers, losing a few men killed and wounded, quietly retreated into the darkness. Leaving patrol group of Colonel Balabin to watch Deventer…

Battle at Zwolle

Refusing to accept a temporary setback in Deventer as a defeat, and not losing presence of spirit, Russian troops continued to move into the Netherlands, with its two columns taking a course on Zwolle.

It should be noted that by the end of 1812 this settlement represented a poorly fortified outpost, the garrison of which consisted of two or three hundred cavalry units. Knowing this, and seeking to avoid needless casualties among the civilian population, Benkendorff ordered several Cossacks from Colonel Naryshkin’s division to take all measures within their power to lure the enemy outside the walls of the fortress. “This trick, – said one of the participants of those events – was successful: the French, after a sortie, were quite bodily overrun. Our people entered Zwolle, mingling with the enemy, more than half of whom were captured”.

Taking the aforesaid city, the Russians were finally able to report “up” that the river IJssel is “ultimately and irrevocably passed”. In addition, there occurred two important events, the history of which we see as prudent to recall in particular.

It was in the small town of Zwolle that the Russian commander was awaited by the Dutch General, Count Baltazar Bogislav van der Platten (1766 – 1829, translator: “Bogislav” is a Russian name, meaning “Gods-praising”). Having long served in Russia as a military engineer, he at home acquired the post of Governor-General. Van der Platten, according to A. H. Benkendorff, “embraced all of my plans for the Netherlands, told me accurate information about the enemy forces and the sentiments of his people”.

On the other hand, at the same time, also Baron Cornelius Rudolph Theodor Kraayenhof (1758-1840) took contact. After finishing the High school in Hardewijk, possessing a deep knowledge in the field of humanitarian, natural and technical Sciences, being the author of the monumental work “Hydrographic and topographic descriptions of the Netherlands”, this military figure and scientist, being a steadfast supporter of national traditions and monarchist, and one of the main initiators of the enthronement of King of the Netherlands Willem I. After the Russians came to Holland, he served them, as the Russian saying goes, not out of fear but for conscience. We read in one of the contemporary books: “He, like no one else, knew his country. Napoleon promoted him to the rank of Brigadier General (Engineer-General) and appointed as inspector of fortifications in the Netherlands. A person with such a complete knowledge about the Netherlands, a country of canals, locks and dams, in the opinion of Napoleon, was to serve him alone, but Kraayenhof remained loyal to the “Orange” party, who headed the Patriotic forces of the Netherlands by the end of the French occupation. Thanks to General Kraayenhof, Russian squad in the Netherlands did not experience difficulties, acquiring the necessary information about the hydraulic structures, roads and fortresses”.

Corneluis von Krayenhoff
Baron Cornelius Rudolph Theodore Kraayenhof

…”The local residents welcomed the Russian Cossacks as liberators, offering them fruit and drinks; popular uprisings started in the towns closer to Zwolle, resulting in the attacks on the French customs officers and gendarmes. The main forces of Napoleon’s Marshal MacDonald became entangled”…

To Amsterdam!

In preparation for the march on Deventer and Zwolle, General Benkendorff, trying to figure out the general mood of the residents of Amsterdam and to conduct a reconnaissance, sent there one of the Dutch “Orange” colonels from his entourage, who was in Russian service. The operation was successful, and upon return, the messenger reported to the authorities that both the population of the said commercial and industrial centre, and Napoleon’s commandant Baron K. Kraayenhof, were eagerly anticipating the army of the Emperor Alexander I.

So as to use the fortuitous moment to the maximum and force the Dutch to speak out against their oppressors, it was decided to send to the walls of this main city a force of 200 – 250 Cossacks, led by the native Lancastershire (England) cavalry officer, major of the Pavlograd hussar regiment, Marclay. Notably, in the instruction towards this end, he was ordered “to proceed to the destination of the operation without stopping, avoiding encounters with the enemy and not caring about his communication lines or about the retreat”. Having marched at high tempo to the prescribed destination, “this brave and prudent officer was able to conceal his movement from the enemy, avoiding all roads, and entered Amsterdam on the 14th of November. The people, inspired by the view of the Cossacks arrested the remaining in the city French, and raised the banner of independence”. In the meantime, the enemy doubled their vigilance, having managed to retreat to Utrecht (1800 soldiers and officers of the division of General Gabriel Jean Joseph Molitor (1770-1849)) and concentrate its main forces in the reasonably well-fortified fortresses “Muiden and Helwig near Amsterdam, almost at its gates” (900 men with 26 guns).

Realizing that in this situation he has no chance for a head-on attack on Amsterdam, Benkendorf, disobeying the orders of a superior over him General Wintzingerode regarding “not entering Holland due to insufficient troops”, decided to act in a flanking maneuver. Leaving the already familiar to us Colonel Balabin in Zwolle “to watch over Deventer”, he himself, with a small detachment of infantry, moved during the night from 21 to 22 Nov 1813 to Hardewicke (Harderwijk), where he was to continue his raid in the vessels provided by loyal-minded Dutch people. Laying “six miles of awful road” behind, and reaching the designated point that same night, Benkendorf, to his surprise, “found in Harderwijk port only a small number of vessels”. Not wishing, however, to abandon the idea of freeing Amsterdam by themselves, Aleksandr Khristoforovich, sending another part of the soldiers of his already small detachment “as reinforcements to General Zhevakhov”, loaded the other 600 people into available boats. This makeshift flotilla raised their sails at 23.00 on the 22nd of November and, praying to the Lord about the favourable wind, moved over the ice-floe covered Amsterdam Bay of Zuider-ze (Zuger see, the modern IJsselmeer). The fortune clearly favoured the Russians back then, because they quietly slipped under the noses of the located nearby in the Texel French squadron, whose commander was a fanatical napoleonist, a Dutchman by birth, Charles – Henri Verhuell (real name – Wernher) (1764 – 1845). “At sunrise on November 23 [they] saw the bell towers of Amsterdam and at 8 in the morning entered the port”.

The residents met this handful of brave men with indescribable enthusiasm. Residents were everywhere singing a new anthem, which “suddenly” appeared, carrying these these words:

“Holland is free!
The allies advance on Utrecht.
The French fleeing in all directions.
The sea is open,
The trade is reviving!
The strife is over,
Past forgotten
And is forgiven.
Nobility returns to the government.
The government asks the Prince to Arrive at the Palace.
All praise God.
Back are the good old days!”

The local chief, who openly switched to the Russian side, was horrified upon learning that his liberation from the French came by a squad of less than a thousand bayonets, knowing full well that Napoleon would be trying to retake the city under his control. To strengthen their prestige, the winners decided to announce to the public that 6000 Russians entered Amsterdam, and issued an appeal to the people to take up arms, form the National Guard and, in the case of the attempts by the enemy to change the situation in their favour, “for them all to die in the battle for the beloved Fatherland.”

…The Russian divisions that distinguished themselves the most, were soon presented high awards from the Dutch Crown. “Amsterdam and Breda” — such inscription was engraved on the golden chord, awarded to Benkendorf by the first king of the Netherlands. Tula infantry regiment received from Willem I two memorial silver trumpets with the inscription “Amsterdam 24 Novembre 1813” (presented on June the 5th 1815), and the 2nd Jaeger regiment – two memorial Royal silver trumpets “For the entry of the 2nd Jaeger regiment in Amsterdam on 24 November 1813″…

The revival of statehood

Barely freeing Amsterdam, the Russians and their allies among the local conservatives started to create here the main pillars of authority. First of all, the National Guard was formed which on the next day marched in a celebratory parade through the Palace square of the city, filled with people and decorated with flags of the House of Orange. Where a handful of Slavs the winners, “having just descended to the shore, made up the honour guard under the balcony of the Palace”. Boosting their own enthusiasm with the arms from the Arsenal and the support of thousands of citizens-volunteers, who joined their ranks, the guards easily captured the nearby still-occupied by the enemy fortresses of Muiden and Helwig, which garrisons surrendered.

Then also arose the Provisional Government, whose members at 10 a.m. on the 24th November 1813, under the jubilant cries of the crowd and thunderous volleys of the gun salute, read “the Act of restoration of Holland”. Energetic measures for the further armament of the patriots were taken, as well as the restoration of “order in the city; all in a hurry to assist with the defence, and the public mood was more and more filled with zeal and firmness”. On the questions of the Benkendorf about what political system they wished for themselves, and what he was to report on it to the Emperor Alexander, all in one voice replied: “the Monarchy and the return of the Prince of Orange. Only this House could guarantee our independence! It was agreed to immediately to send a Deputy to the Prince, to beg him to return and lead his People”.

Restoration

Willem Frederick VI, Prince of Orange, Count of Nassau-Diez (1771-1820), an active participant in the struggle with Napoleon, was in London when the tumultuous events in his home country unfolded. Having learnt about the Russian liberation of Amsterdam, he landed on the coast of the Netherlands and rushes to the capital. Active participant of those events recalled: “Here it was announced of the arrival of the Prince of Orange; friends of the family hastened to meet him, and Amsterdam was readied to meet their Ruler, chosen by right of birth and by the will of the people. The entire population of this great city went out to meet the Prince and filled the streets and squares. Upon leaving the coach on the 1st of December 1813, the Prince could barely stay on his feet because of the people who crowded around him, I rushed to meet him and held out my hand to help him wade through the crowd and enter the Palace. The Prince appeared on the balcony, and the uproar resumed with a vengeance. He was very touched by this scene, but it was easy to see that it was difficult for him to comprehend the height of his new position and appreciate the moment. The Prince was accompanied by the British Ambassador, sir Clancarty, who told me about the plans of his government regarding Holland; the frank talk completely reassured me about my political ventures. In the evening, the Prince, the Ambassador and I sat together in the carriage and drove off to the theatre. The Prince was received there with noisy enthusiasm; it was evident throughout the powerful mood of the nation which has not lost its sense of freedom. The Dutch, who until now had not the habit of seeing the Prince as their head, now paid tribute to the first citizen of the State; their cries were not cries of the servants, but was a witness of their choice, indicating the most worthy person for the salvation of the State. It was overwhelming and gave the sense of greatness of the unfolding events”.

…”Russian trace” of this topic can be continued up to the present day. So, on February 9, 1816, son of Willem VI, Crown Prince Wilhelm Friedrich Georg Ludwig of Orange, entered into marriage with the Russian Grand Duchess Anna Pavlovna (1795-1865), sister of Emperor Alexander I. Their eldest son, Wilhelm III Alexander Paul Frederick Ludwig (b. 1817), became the third King of the Netherlands.

Anna Pavlovna Romanova
The Queen of the Netherlands and Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Anna Pavlovna Romanova

The future Queen of the Netherlands, Anna Pavlovna, was raised by her August mother – the wife of the Russian Tsar Paul I – Empress Maria Feodorovna and Countess Charlotte Karlovna Lieven. During almost fifty years that She lived in Holland, Queen Anne left a long, good memory for her acts of charity, care of the poor (nursing home and a hospital) and orphans (50 children’s shelters), hospitals and prisons. Her Majesty was buried at the Russian (ambassadorial) Church in the Hague. She is remembered in Holland even now – in 1998 the Dutch erected a statue in her honour, which happened to only a few monarchs and historical figures of the Netherlands”…

Honour guard of the First Person

Given the fact that the Russian Imperial Guard did not participate in the liberation of the Netherlands, the first soldiers carrying the ceremonial service at the Person of Crown Prince Willem VI of Orange (the de facto King of the Netherlands Wilhelm I Friedrich), were the ranks of the detachment of General Benkendorf, who took Amsterdam. It was his Cossacks, who ceremonially marched ahead of the carriage of the future Monarch, when he was leaving his palace with the intent to pay someone anyone an official visit. Russian Marines were guarding the private chambers of the Emperor, were at the doors of the palace when He appeared on public, forming guard lines along the streets of the city, down which He proceeded. Benkendorf’s officers, and often Alexander Hristoforovich himself, were performing functions of avant-guard and were first to meet the Prince at the place of His planned visits.

Portrait of A. H. Benkendorf, in the uniform of the Life Guards half-squadron of Rendermessage
Portrait of A. H. Benkendorf, in the uniform of the Life Guards half-squadron of Rendermessage

The continuation of the struggle: the Cossacks against the Navy

Realizing that it was his fault that his idol – Napoleon Bonaparte – forever lost Amsterdam, the French Admiral Virgual was doing everything to maintain his home base – a fortified Fort Halder.

So as to expel the enemy from this strategic point, the Russian command dispatched the already experienced in the Dutch situations Major Marclay, with his Cossack detachment that distinguished themselves earlier. Successfully manoeuvring along the coast, Marclay soon managed to arrange things so, that the enemy’s naval commander had nowhere left to obtain food for their crews.

Quite aware that his sailors – most of them Dutch by nationality – were prone to disobedience even in conditions of normal material provision, could raise a mutiny in the event of disruption of regular food supplies, Virgual signed surrender to the Russians. Under which terms, in return for permission “to continue to buy their food”, he was obliged not only to vacate the aforementioned Halder and leave there 10 guns, but to never participate in battles with his opponents.

…The aforesaid agreement between Virgual and Marclay was the first case of successful negotiations of the Don Cossacks with the enemy Admiral…

The conquest of Utrecht

The main trick which the Russians used after conquering the Amsterdam, was a success: the French, believing that there is ten times more Russians than it really was, succumbed to the moods paralysing the will to resist.

All this contributed to the actions of General Prince Zhevakhov, who on the morning of the 28th November 1813 came to the walls of Utrecht, near the North gate, and began a regular siege. It was, however, not needed, because an hour later the enemy withdrew from the fortress through its southern part, not relying on the power of their bayonets and the depth of the moat.

The citizens of Utrecht immediately turned the day of their liberation by the Russians from Napoleon’s tyranny into the city holiday. It was called Kozakkendag (that is, “The Day of the Cossacks”), and they continued to celebrate it until the German Imperial troops came there in the summer of 1914.

Anyone who has ever visited the Central Museum of the modern Utrecht, immediately see located there under exhibit #1 painting “The Cossacks, entering Utrecht in 1813.” Being given as a gift by the Dutch to the Emperor Alexander the First, it portrayed the entry of the Russian troops on the the Town Hall square of the city. From under the hooves of winners’ war horses there runs away the Gallic rooster, symbolizing the French, while local residents are greeting their saviours, enthusiastically waving their hands.

Cossacks entering Utrecht in 1813
Peter Van Hoesen. Cossacks entering Utrecht in 1813

The Dutch painter Peter Van Hoesen is the author of this painting, drawn in 1816. Leaving the high art behind and becoming a member of the National Guard in the days of the struggle for freedom of his Motherland, after the Napoleonic wars he again picked up the brush. In addition to portraits and landscapes, he create 10 battle paintings, glorifying the courage of his Slavic brothers-in-arms.

…”In the message dated 18th of December 1824, the Russian Minister of foreign Affairs Karl Nesselrode wrote to the artist that Van Hoesen’s painting was liked by the Czar. Together with the letter of gratitude he was given a diamond ring.

In Soviet times, the picture in the spirit of “the Dutch of the XVII century” was recognized as not having any special artistic value, and was sold back to Holland. It came to Utrecht, where it was given the place of honour: on a raised stand, in a separate room”…

Amersfoort

The Russian offensive on the town was conducted by several divisions. On the one side on the city marched Colonel Naryshkin, who having taken Fort Harderwyk, moved from Zwolle towards Amersfoort, from the other side was advancing the Baltic Baron, Major-General Georgij Fedorovich Stahl (1771 – after 1816), whose Cossack regiment and two squadrons of hussars were to go to Amersfoort between Swettenham and Deventer, and from the third side – both of them were helped by Major-General Prince Spyridon Erastovich Zhevakhov (Dzhavakhishvili) (1768-1815) – his hussar regiment and artillery were ordered “to attack the located there French avant-guards”.

…Unable to withstand the attack of the enemy, Napoleon’s supporters fled in panic. That, in turn, allowed the Russian military commanders to begin implementing the future plans of the high command: Naryshkin and Zhevakhov hurried to the walls of Rotterdam, the first in a forced march, while the second, after the transfer of their former positions to “the Prussian who headed to Utrecht”. Stahl’s dashing Cossacks chased the retreating French first over the rivers of Wijk and Vianen; then, after crossing Lech, placed their posts at Bomel and Gorinchem…

The battle of Gorinchem (Gorkum)

Benkendorf had luck in conquering this “primary storage location”, which was guarded by a garrison numbering up to 8000. Awaiting the approach of the Prussians (who, incidentally, never arrived to the designated area!), the Russians sent two companies and a couple of guns of the 72nd Tula infantry regiment under the command of Major Belemovskij “for the capture of the dam, which was used for crossing from Gorinchem to Hardingfele”. As is clear from the published in Warsaw in 1901 history of this military division (P. 192), “Belemovskij and his soldiers were barely done securing this important crossing, settled on the dam and on the bridge, as the French appeared. Upon seeing the Russian infantry ready to resist, and the burning wicks of the cannons, they did not attack, but retreated in the direction of Brede”. Effective aid to the advancing troops was also given by the Prussian infantry volunteers – a part of the Russian battalion – under command of major Friedrich August Peter von Colombes (1775-1854), arriving from under the Dordrecht. From the other side, also equally active here were the “hastily armed by the efforts of the inhabitants of the Rotterdam boats, firing at Gorinchem and coming close to the fortifications of this fortress”.

The Battle for Breda

Realizing the danger of the situation if this powerful fortress in Brabant continued to remain in the hands of the French, the Russians took the effort to promptly change the situation in their favour. To achieve this goal they used the existing experience of sudden capture of Amsterdam, with the only difference being that the direct implementer of the plan was not Benkendorf, but General G.F Stahl, known to us by Amersfoort.

Obeying the command, Stahl, under cover of distracting manoeuvres of the Captain Peterson of the Count Arakcheev’s Grenadier regiment, with a hundred Cossacks “in the direction of Gog-Svaljuv, Brill and Velvet-Sluis”, crossed the Vaal, and, without stopping anywhere, after the storming of the Antwerp gate, entered Breda on the same-named tract. Capturing 600 enemy soldiers and forcing the rest of the garrison (300 soldiers) to retreat in panic to Antwerp. Thus he mastered one of the strongest strongholds of the country, and completed on this the liberation from the French of the Dutch territory, looking forward to the arrival of the main forces.

But the French were not sleeping. Having recovered from the first surprise, they decided to take revenge. Setting out from Antwerp with 18000 soldiers and excellent artillery, where even the sailors of merchant ships were armed with it, the Napoleonic General Carnot, pushing the Russians away from Vestvesel (Westates?), rushed to Breda. Persistent fighting took place on the outskirts of the fortress, in areas of Turnhout, Geertruidenberg and Tilburg. Finally, we read in the report about those events, written down by Benkendorf, on the night from 7 on 8 December 1813: “the enemy started to bombard the city. On the 9th in the morning, increasing the cannonade, the enemy attempted attacks on Turnhout gate. The attack lasted a long time and stopped only when I made a sortie from the Antwerp gate. Soldiers of the Dutch battalion, hastily composed of young citizens, went into battle with shouts of joy. They showed bravery worthy of admiration. In support to them I detached a hundred of the best soldiers of our infantry. The enemy suffered considerable losses, and the cannonade ceased. In the evening, the cannonade was resumed, but the night was calm. The English could not help the Russians: their ships, which were loaded with horses, were detained by contrary winds at sea. The covered with ice Bomelwert bay was so inaccessible, so the Prussian General Bjulov (Bülow), who very much wished to help me, couldn’t transport his troops. Yet the French had to fear the arrival of the English and the Prussians, and either hurry with the capture of Breda, or leave their positions. On the 10th they captured all the roads except the one that led to the positions occupied by Prince Gagarin. Their avant-guard batteries approached the fortress during the night, and were moving rapidly. Because of this we lost people, and several houses were destroyed. By the end of the day, the enemy fiercely attacked the three gates. Antwerp gates were defended by Knjaz (Prince) Zhevakhov. His footmen hussars competed in the courage with our infantry. Turnhout gate was defended by General Stahl and the Prussians under the command of Colonel Colombes. All were filled with amazing courage; confidence in success was written in their faces. The Russian reserve counter-attacked and pinned the enemy to Buale-Duke gate, where the attack seemed less decisive. The place was quite open, and when evening came, I advanced with three squadrons of hussars, a detachment of Cossacks, and four horse-pulled guns. We furiously rushed on the enemy. The enemy was repulsed by the very first attack, and hastily retreated to a considerable distance. I stopped chasing them, fearing that this too easy a victory was a trap. By the will of fortune a detachment of Cossacks from Prince Gagarin arrived at that moment. With loud cries, the Cossacks rushed to the rear of the French. The French decided that I am acting in coordination with the troops of General Bjulov, and this circumstance forced them to quickly retreat. In the evening, I lit a lot of lights, and set the watchmen so, that it seemed as if a whole army was stationed in the camp. In other places, the attack was repulsed and the enemy suffered considerable losses. By night the shots died down everywhere. All the reports from the outposts said that a lot of noise was heard in the camp of the French. Because of dense morning fog it was impossible to discern enemy positions. At 8 o’clock I lowered the bridge and despite the fog advanced forward patrols. They told me that the besiegers abandoned their positions and withdrew from Breda. The joy of this news was moreover strengthened by the fact that we have started to run out of fodder, and the residents of the city, out of the food supplies.

General Stahl received orders to pursue the enemy along the Antwerp road. He could do it only to Vestvesel, where the French halted and entrenched. Colonel Colombes, with a detachment of Cossacks, went to Turnhout. On the next day, 12th of December — on the birthday of His Majesty the Emperor Alexander the First — we had a thanksgiving service on the walls of Breda.” Holland gained her freedom!

…As was the case with the capital, the exploits of Russians under the aforesaid enemy stronghold was generously rewarded. In particular, on the 15th of November 1815, 25 people of the “lower ranks” of the 2nd Jaeger regiment received the Military Order (“Soldier’s St. George”) for the protection of the fortress of Breda. The 1st horse artillery company received on the 19th of January 1818 a distinguishing mark on their shakos, with the inscription “For distinction, for courage, rendered in the battle with the French troops at the fortress of Breda”…

Deliberate neglect?

The scientific world of modern Europe is working hard to not notice all of what was written above. In the article by P. N. Grünberg “For the Amsterdam and Breda” (The Liberation of Holland according to “Benckendorff’s Notes”) we read: “The only comment to the described by us Grand battle, is that all(!) available in Russia Western studies are silent about the events of November-December 1813 in Holland. A typical example is in “The Low Countries 1780-1940” by Ernst H. Kossmann. Oxford, 1978 (English translation of the first Dutch edition of 1976). This Oxford edition of the best Dutch book on “comparative history” of the Netherlands and Belgium, devotes only one page 103 (first page of Chapter III of the “Great Netherlands”) to the event of the “departure” of the French and the “arrival” of Prince of Orange. Here’s what it says (re-translation from Russian): “A few weeks after the battle of Leipzig, a small number of allied troops crossed the borders of the former Dutch Republic; on November 12th (new style. – A. M.) they took Zwolle, on 15th — Groningen. The French commander gathered his forces in Utrecht and, when on 15th of November, the almost two-thousand man strong garrison left Amsterdam, there immediately started riots against the occupation authorities. The local population along with the few nobles, who declared themselves as its leaders, declared independence under the rule of the Prince of Orange… William of Orange accepted the offer “out of the hands of the people,” as he wrote in the proclamation on the 2nd of December, on the condition that he guarantees people’s freedom in the Constitution. It became clear that the country has established a constitutional monarchy…” As you can see, not a word about the Russians. Almost all of the previous one hundred pages are devoted to the invasion of the French, Batavian Republic, to how the French administration was falling apart, as if by itself, etc.

The beginning of the new state, the current Kingdom of the Netherlands is presented in the same key in the section “The Low Counties” of the latest edition of the famous Encyclopaedia Britannica. (Re-translation form Russian) “While Napoleon’s Empire seemed strong and stable, the Dutchmen served the new monarch, just as they served King Louis, especially since Prince of Orange did not object to such cooperation. The Dutch contingent continued to fight in Napoleon’s campaigns, suffering heavy losses during the invasion of Russia. But as soon as it became clear (after the failure of the Russian and Spanish campaigns) that the Napoleonic Empire was falling, influential Dutchmen began to prepare for the establishment of a new and independent regime. It was considered self-evident that the head of this regime should be the Prince of Orange, son of William V, who died in 1806, and that it was desirable for that regime to be installed by the Dutch people, and not by random foreign winners. The movement for the establishment of the new regime was headed by a great figure Gisbert Karel van Hogendorp, a man of firm principles, who did not recognise any government of the Netherlands after 1795, however considered it necessary to involve Prince of Orange as a constitution-limited monarch” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1978, Macropaedia, vol. 11, p. 152). We must add to this that in reality the Dutch did not have freedom of choice: the British were hurrying to liberate them. The “Orangists” knew that this liberation would not come for free. So their choice was in favour of Russia, and the sudden appearance of Benkendorf’s divisions in the Netherlands was probably the action, secretly agreed upon between the liberators and the liberated. Their unclouded alliance in Amsterdam was probably also the result of a pre-agreed policy. The omission by the authoritative British edition is understandable, because the British “lost” Holland to the Russians both in the military, and in diplomatic rivalry.

…And we cannot even speak about the presence of this matter in the Soviet and especially in the Russian (formed in the modern Russian Federation) historiography! Because even on the pages of the book published in 1964 by the Moscow publishing house “Science” “The Campaign of the Russian army against Napoleon in 1813 and the liberation of Germany” there is not a single complete document about the actions of the Russian troops in the Netherlands. Only in the material of “The Journal of military operations for November — December 1813” that same P.N. Grünberg comments: “about them there are two indirect references. The first passage: “the Swedish Crown Prince continued his conquests in Holland, which already recalled Prince of Orange from England to Amsterdam” (No. 421). The second passage is in No. 423: “the Enemy’s garrison in Breda (Holland) at the approach of two Cossack regiments from the brigade of Major-General Benkendorf, moved out to Anwer, and Breda was taken by the allied troops with the capture there of up to 600 people. Thus on December the 4th, the allied Northern army was holding the line from Breda to Dusseldorf”. Plus the pages 148 – 159, and 390 in the book of D.I. Oleynikov “Benkendorf” (Moscow, Molodaya Gvardiya, series “Life of remarkable people” of 2009. – P.395 ).

“And that’s all that was published about the Dutch campaign of the Russian Imperial army during the last 85 years in the “grateful” Fatherland!”…

So That They Are Remembered!

The Russian General A. H. Benkendorf wrote the following in French in the seventh book, published in Saint Petersburg “Military magazine” for 1817: “The Dutch expedition, which cost us 460 in dead and wounded, was well-received by the general disposition of the Dutch people.” In particular, we read in the biography of Alexander Khristoforovich: “since the end of November 1813, the word “Cossack” acquired an incredible popularity in Holland. From Napoleon’s horror-image, it became a symbol of liberation. The road by which the Cossacks passed the untaken by the Russian fortress of Deventer is still called Kozakkenweg – “the Cossack Road”, and a big old tree near the road – Kozakkenlinde (“Cossack Linden”). Nearby, in the town of Gorssel, there is another “Cossack Road”, and besides, a “Hussar Passage” and a hill “The Cossack Bump”, on which until 1941 had stood the house under the name “Cossack hut”. In our days, somewhere on the road from Arnheim to Rotterdam, cafe-bar “Cossack” successfully operates, and in the province of Gelderland they can treat you to a “Cossack pie”. Cold by European standards winter of 1813/14 was dubbed “Cossack’s winter” in some provinces of the Netherlands. Residents of the Hague sing Russian songs, having founded their Oeralkozakenkoor – “The Urals Cossack Choir”, and in Brabant plays a football team Kozakken Boys (“Cossack Boys”).

…As you can see, in the Netherlands of the beginning of XXI centuries there are still people who know how to preserve the memory of those foreign heroes, who gave their lives for the liberation of their homeland.

Even if they committed their immortal acts almost 200 years ago…

— Alexander Mashkin


An afterword…

The reason for such neglect and erasing of the history is different for the West and for the USSR.

In the West, the early seeds of what later became EU were sawn in the form of creation of the artificial state of Belgium, and later the “Benelux” – Low Lands. For that a different history – of European unity, without Russians – was needed, and was written. Not only was the memories of Russia were erased, but Russia itself was almost successfully erased in the course of the 20th century – in 1917, 1941, 1991.

In USSR, the reason for forgetting was the Czar past and the Cossacks. Cossacks were a traditional pillar of support of Russian monarchy and the Russian state. When that state was destroyed in the 1917, anything that reminded of its past got retouched. It is said that Lenin held an especial dislike to the Cossacks for the reason mentioned above. So it is not strange that in the Soviet historical literature everything that had to do with pre-1917 period got diluted to the point of abstract and terse sketches.

Interestingly, the memories of Cossacks lived on in children’s game of “Cossacks and Robbers”, but even that slowly disappeared, especially after the War, when the children began playing in “Partisans and Fascists”.

And in the modern, post-2000, Russia I do not think that they have come around to restoration of those chapters yet. A lot is still being rebuilt after the desolation of 1991-2000.

Even Google seems have some selective indexing. If one searches for the Cyrillic name of Hardingfele, one gets only 2 hits, regarding some cruises. However, if you go to Russian Yandex, you’ll get a viariety of hits, pertaining to the Benckendorf’s campaign in Holland in 1813.

The Future of the Russian World

I have on previous occasions translated articles by the excellent analyst Rostislav Ishchenko. This particular article, “The Future of the Russian World” appeared on Kont on the 28th of September. It gives a good definition of what the Russian World is.


Flag commemorating a years since the Crimean Spring

Two and a half years ago, when Crimea has just returned to Russia, I once had the opportunity to participate in a conference in Yalta, devoted to the prospects of the Russian world. Then, I was surprised by the limited approach to the issue by the majority of the participants in the discussion.

Some thought that the Russian world is Russia within its existing borders. Particularly insistent on this definition were the Crimeans, who came just barely into those boundaries fall. Some identified the Russian world as the territory of the former USSR. Those inclined towards the monarchy were replacing the Soviet Union with the Russian Empire. At the same time, most of them agreed with the fact that Alaska, is definitely a part of the Russian world, while Poland is not Russian, as for Finland, opinions diverged. Finally, yet another group believed that the Russian world extends to the Western borders of the states that once were members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

As you can see, no matter how far we are willing to push the boundaries of the Russian world, members of this or that group all agree on the fact that the Russian world is only part of the known world, and is relatively small in comparison with the non-Russian world. No one was able to answer my question, in what exactly way Yakuts or Kamchatkan are so different from French or Germans, that Kamchatkan are without reservations allowed in the Russian world, while the French and Germans are not allowed at all? Although a part of the Germans (in GDR) were in the boundaries of WTO and, probably, too could qualify for inclusion into the Russian world.

This restrictive approach has another vulnerability. All the supporters of the Russian world (in whatever borders they were squeezed) state, that in order for the Russian world to exist, it must give the global world some idea, show it the direction of development.

But how can we “give an idea” of the Russian world to those, whom we a priori refuse to include into it?

For comparison, when we defined the modern world as Pax Americana, we understand that we are talking about a global world, not about the world within the borders of the United States, not about the world of the Anglo-Saxons and not about the world of the North Atlantic. Border ideas coincide with the boundaries of the planet, and if mankind lived outside the Earth, the idea of a Pax Americana would have expanded with it out of the planetary limits.

And this is not about Anglo-Saxon expansionism and not about the Russian peacefulness. In Russia there is also a sufficient number of supporters of solving complex international problems with military force. The most interesting thing is that even the Russian expansionists, who see their ideal in the tri-colour over the White House and a dozens of aircraft carrier battle groups sailing the seas and oceans of the planet under the St. Andrew’s flag, still however, just like their peace-loving opponents, separated the “true” Russian world, from the rest of the world. They consider 3/4 of the Earth’s land as something alien, something that is necessary to be defeated by the military force, that can be remotely controlled, but that is not subject to integration.


The meeting of defence Ministers of States participating in the Warsaw Pact. 1968

Characteristically, both of these ideas are in direct contradiction with the Russian history and the practice of building of the Russian State, be it in the form of the Kingdom, or the Empire, or a Union. If the kings, emperors and General secretaries thought about the boundaries of the Russian/Soviet world, the state would not have gone beyond the borders of the time of Ivan III. And even within those borders there lived a lot of foreigners.

While the United States created a melting pot in which all (even the British) have disappeared without a trace, becoming a new nation of Americans, Russia has always built the hostel, in which all that joined, lived comfortably lived, and where national identity did not preclude a general Russian-ness.

And that was understood by our enemies. While rushing into our land us with arms, they are well versed in national diversity, and have always sought to use any differences, to play people off against each other. But while identifying us from the outside, they have always talked about the whole mass of the peoples, as Russians.

Actually, this is the idea of the Russian World, which is opposed to the idea of Pax Americana. American world – a world of the averages. In its ideal expression, all nations and races should melt, mix and give at the output a common race. The two sexes are merged into a common “third gender”. Super-tolerance should ideally go so far as to artificially limit the abilities of intellectuals, because it is unfair to idiots, and prevents the allocation of the arithmetic average in the field of intelligence.

For its part, the Russian World, offers unity, which does not encroach on the variety. As in a family where everyone is different (all with a different degree of consanguinity), but all are united by common goals and interests.

That is why the United States is opposed to Russia, which, since the formulation of the ideals of the Pax Americana in the mid-twentieth century, was an example of an alternative world order. And it is a successful and sustainable alternative.

Russian World arose with its main features by the beginning of the XVI century, when the United States did not even exist as a project. Not having lost any nation, without coming across with anything even remotely resembling genocide of Indians, the Russian World lived on for half a millennium, while constantly expanding.

Our opposition with the US is not ideological, not economic or financial (this is only the external form ,in which the opposition manifests). We have a confrontation of the systems – not so much in world views, as in world perceptions.


The participants of the festive events dedicated to the anniversary of the “Crimean spring”

We live on the same planet but in different worlds. These worlds can push each other, but cannot mix.

All the while, the Russian World can coexist with the American, but the American cannot coexist with the Russian. This inability is determined at the level of basic values. For the Russian World there is nothing extraordinary in the recognition of the right to existence of another, alternative world. From the point of view of the United States, American world is the only correct, the only possible ideal form of human existence. Everything else should be eliminated.

From here we reach some simple conclusions:

First, Russia cannot artificially limit the scope of the Russian world, because the decision on entry into the Russian World is reached by every nation of their own accord. Russia can neither allow, nor prohibit, nor order. This would be contrary to the basic principles of the Russian World.

Second, because Pax Americana claims to exclusivity and uniqueness, it will always carry the threat of Russian World. The American idea does not provide for its existence. And because an aggressive attempt to eliminate the danger of the America World is contrary to the basic values of the Russian World, involving coexistence and not aggression, then its expansion is only possible by protecting those who enter the Russian world, escaping from American values.

Actually it is exactly this policy that Russia is now conducting in Syria. And Russian attempts not to stifle the opposition, but to make the parties in the civil war to agree, rely exactly on the basic values of the Russian World, involving not the destruction of the different, but coexistence with them.

Thirdly, being the alternative to American global idea, the Russian world is in itself a global idea, the ideal form of organization of the planetary common house of the peoples. It is clear that with the centre of this world, which is Russia, will lie the responsibility for maintaining order in this world, like the responsibility for the maintenance of order in Pax Americana lies with the United States.

And here it is extremely important not to succumb to the temptation of simple and fast decisions, and not to go the way of the US, which rescinded the role of the global judge, who is subject to the same rules as in the whole community, in favour of the Sheriff from the Wild West, whose Colt is the absolute law.

If the Russian global justice becomes the same as modern American, then Russian world will turn into American, and the peoples of the world are not interested in shedding blood and sweat for a change of sign at the jail from one to another.