Over the past few days the terrorist state of Ukraine with full appoval from its US-NATO sponsors have been repeatedly shelling the largest nuclear power plant in Europe – the Zaporozhie nuclear power plant (NPP). If one keeps in mind hoe Zelensky boasted about the creation of a dirty nuclear bomb – which is one of the reasons Russia had to start the special military operation – it is not surprising that Russia was from the first days trying to keep the monkey away from the nuclear grenade. It did not help that what Russian specialists found at Zporozhie NPP was quite alarming – a certain amount of unregistered nuclear waste, which did not exist according to the papers and thus could have been used by Ukraine to create the aforementioned dirty bomb.

The reason I am writing this post is to translate a couple of Telegram articles from the journalist channel Rybar, and as a response to a conversation with Igor on a post on Lada Ray’s channel:

The idea of closing down Zaporozhie NPP has been aired in the comments, and by many other people. The following two posts first outline the problem and the danger presented to the Zaporozhie NPP from the acts of terrorism – the Ukrainian shelling, and then also addresses the question of closing down of the NPP, or, rather, why it should not be done. The original posts are linked below the translations.

Zaporizhia NPP, the “second Chernobyl” and innocent Ukraine

Due to the shelling of Europe’s largest Zaporozhye NPP, panic reigns in the world media: the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (sic!) want to arrange for a nuclear catastrophe and do not allow the Armed Forces of Ukraine to save the world. The fact that the strikes are inflicted by the Ukrainian side does not bother anyone.

The @rybar team decided to conduct an analysis and explain whether a new catastrophe is in store for the world, who is to blame and why what is happening is happening.

🔻 Depressurization of reactors

Fans of the Chernobyl TV series are well aware of reactors, rods, shell damage and other horrors that accompanied the catastrophe of the last century.

▪️ The shelling does not pose a threat to the reactors themselves.

The outer shell of the reactor is one and a half meters of steel and concrete. To destroy it, it is necessary to use tactical nuclear weapons. And the reactor cover withstands a 20-ton impact at a speed of 200 km/h.

▪️ But now the APU is hitting the power lines. If the reactors are disconnected from consumers, an emergency stop will occur — the NPP will not be able to generate electricity.

Stopping the reactor is a matter of 10 seconds. But then it needs to be cooled down for another two or three years: to pump water through it so that it does not overheat, since the secondary decay of nuclear fuel will occur.

▪️ APU strikes can lead to a permanent shutdown of the reactor.

It is quite simple to disrupt the water supply process after the power line is disabled. It will no longer be possible to cool down the disconnected reactor. There will remain a red-hot metal barrel with air cooling, which it will be impossible to start back.

❗️ There will be no threat of a nuclear catastrophe, but the classic “so that no one will have you” scenario will play out.

🔻 There are several radioactively dangerous objects on the territory of the NPP

▪️ Dry storage of spent nuclear fuel and Isotope storage for radiography.

In case of destruction of these objects, depressurization and ingress of radioactive substances of caesium and strontium into the environment may occur. This will cause an increase in the radiation background at the NPP site within a radius of 50-100 meters from radioactive objects. Staying in this area for a long time will be dangerous.

▪️ Will the station work? Yes. But it will become difficult to maintain, it will be impossible to stay there without radiation protection.

Nuclear power plant will become difficult to guard, since dry storage facilities are located near the perimeter. It will be necessary to isolate the infected soil somehow, this will require special equipment.

▪️ The collection of rainwater runoff is organized at the dry storage site, but there is still a possibility of radioactive elements entering the Dnieper through drainage waters.

As a result, water contamination may occur. It will become impossible to use the water intakes downstream, including in Kherson and Nikolaev (but it all depends on the concentration).

❗️ We are not talking about a nuclear, but about a local environmental disaster, which will significantly complicate the use of the NPP.

🔻 The question arises: then what is all this for?

▪️ Do they understand the possible consequences in Ukraine and the West?

Yes.

Due to the constant shelling, the employees of the NPP and residents of Energodar are fleeing the city. Zaporozhye NPP is turning into an exclusion zone — not because of a nuclear disaster, but the actions of the “caring” UAF.

▪️ The price of this is simple: in case of emergency shutdowns of the generators of the NPP and damage to the 750 kV transmission line, the consequences can affect the whole of Ukraine.

Transients in networks can lead to a decrease in the stability of the entire power system and the occurrence of overloads in existing lines. The whole of Ukraine should expect problems with electricity.

At a meeting of the UN Security Council, the situation around the NPP is already being used to pump up the topic of the introduction of a demilitarized zone in this region. It is not difficult to guess what this will lead to.

And at the same time, public opinion in the West is turning towards poor, unhappy Ukraine, whose authorities are so eager to save the world from “Russia, the harbinger of a nuclear catastrophe.”

And the second post, regarding the shut-down of the NPP:

About the possible conservation of the Zaporozhye NPP

After our analysis of the situation with the Zaporozhye NPP the subscribers asked a logical question through the feed-back bot: why can’t the NPP be mothballed, and power lines under construction from the Crimea be used to supply electricity?

They are already hinting in the civil-military administration of the Zaporozhye region that the NPP may be mothballed. We will not touch upon the professional qualities of those who voice such thoughts: this is done clearly with a lack of understanding of the specifics of the functioning of the NPP and what threats it brings. And it is at least highly unprofessional to talk about such things.

We very much hope that the issue will be resolved by military means, because otherwise huge territories will be de-energized.

Winter is ahead: electricity consumption will grow. There is such a thing as a “winter maximum” — the electrical modes of the power system are calculated with that in mind.

By conserving the NPP, we are removing a powerful source of generation from the power system, which simply cannot be replaced with anything.

▪️ Regional power stations consume either gas, or coal, or fuel oil — there are big problems with all this in Ukraine.
▪️ Hydroelectric power plants depend very much on the amount of water in the reservoirs.
▪️ Due to the fighting, the entire repair program in the power system is most likely disrupted.

It’s good if someone recalculated the modes and made corrections to the operation of the protective automation, but you can’t be completely sure about that.

It will not be possible to transfer power in full from the Crimea: the republic is an energy—deficient region that receives part of the power from the Krasnodar Region via cables under the strait. There are several thermal power plants there, but their capacity does not come close to the Zaporozhye NPP. There may be enough for Kherson, but for the rest of the left—bank Ukraine – definitely not.

So the conservation of the station will predictably entail big problems with the future power supply of the liberated territories.

❗️ This will lead to the loss of large generating capacity, honed to provide basic generation of the entire industrial south of Ukraine.

While the industrial enterprises are stopped, it will not be so critical, but problems will arise as they are re-started.

▪️ The liberated territories will have to be powered from the Crimea, there will not be enough electricity .
▪️ Kakhovskaya Hydropower plant with a nominal generation capacity of 334.8MW is 3 times less than one power unit of the NPP.
▪️ For Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk, there will most likely be a shortage of electricity, the cost of electricity will increase.
▪️ Purely energy problems will arise: the power system will switch to a different state, short-circuit currents will decrease, all relay protections will need to be recalculated, additional dangerous overflows will occur on 330, 500 and 750 kV lines, but they will be slightly mitigated by the idle industry.

❗️ In addition, it will take at least 12 years to maintain operation at the mothballed NPP. It will be necessary to ensure a full-fledged work schedule for all personnel, all workshops.

It is much more expensive to maintain a frozen station than a functioning one.

And if the Zaporozhye NPP is mothballed, it is safe to say that the AFU will win a powerful victory in the local area of warfare.

In conclusion, the West’s solution to stopping the terrorists from shelling a nuclear power plant, is to give control of the plant to the terrorists. As Rybar mentioned above, the only real solution is for Russia to make it so that the plant becomes out reach of the terrorists shelling it.

On Alina Lipps’ channel she writes that one of the Ukrainian shells hit 10 metres from the storage of the nuclear waste!

The load on the NPP is now minimal and the authorities are, indeed pondering a shut-down:

Here are the original Rybar posts in Russian that i translated at the beginning of my post: