The article about the newly-declassified document appeared in RIA Navosti (freedom-of-speeched in the West) on April 7, 2024. It is re-printed on the site of the press office of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SRV). Here we present the machine-translated images of the three pages of the documents, while the originals can be found at the Presidential Library. Click on the images to enlarge.

The SVR has published new declassified documents on the Nazis’ ties with the West in 1945

Draft memorandum of the head of the NKGB of the USSR, V. N. Merkulov to I. V. Stalin

The Presidential Library has published on its website declassified archival documents of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service regarding the plans of the leaders of Nazi Germany in the spring of 1945 to establish contacts in neutral Ireland and Sweden with representatives of the United States and Great Britain in order to jointly oppose the Soviet Union.

Monday marks the 80th anniversary of the day when Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, in his correspondence, pointed out to the US President Franklin Roosevelt the inadmissibility of separate negotiations between the West and Germany behind the back of the USSR. According to historians, it was in a letter dated April 7, 1945, that the Soviet leadership praised the work of Soviet intelligence.

“As for my informants, I assure you that they are very honest and modest people who perform their duties carefully and have no intention of offending anyone. We have repeatedly tested these people in action,” Stalin wrote to Roosevelt.

One of the main tasks of Soviet foreign intelligence during the Great Patriotic War was to extract information about the behind-the-scenes contacts of the leadership of Nazi Germany with the West regarding their possible truce.

The work on uncovering and disrupting such separate negotiations in the spring of 1945 in Switzerland formed the basis of the novel by Julian Semenov and the script of the most popular Russian film about intelligence “Seventeen Moments of Spring”. The main character of “Seventeen Moments…” Stirlitz, aka Colonel Isaev, did not actually exist, but in reality there were Soviet foreign intelligence stations in different countries that obtained information with the help of their agents about the attempt of Hitler’s bosses to negotiate with the Anglo-Americans and thereby cause a split in relations between the allied powers.

Attempts by the Nazis to establish unofficial contacts with representatives of Washington and London were made long before the spring of 1945, and intelligence tracked them. Several attempts of such contacts are known. In recent years, the contents of a number of declassified archival documents of the SVR on this topic have become known. According to these materials, the Nazis made their last attempt to negotiate with the West at the very end of April 1945, a few days before the fall of Berlin.

A photocopy of the draft memorandum of the People’s Commissar of State Security of the USSR Vsevolod Merkulov to Stalin has now been released. The document, dated March 1945, cited “intelligence information received in Washington about German attempts to establish contact with representatives of Britain and the United States”.

As Merkulov noted, in February 1945, “U.S. Undersecretary of State Grew secretly informed the British Ambassador to Washington, Lord Halifax, that the Americans had intercepted a telegram from German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop addressed to the German envoy in Dublin, which was obviously a copy of a circular sent to German diplomatic representatives in neutral countries.”

In this telegram, Ribbentrop instructed the envoy in Dublin to “contact the most prominent British and American representatives and point out to them that Germany, as a result of the Red Army offensive, is on the verge of defeat, and once again emphasise that the only hope for Great Britain and the United States to prevent the Bolshevisation of Europe is cooperation with the National Socialist Party of Germany.” The text of this telegram by Ribbentrop was previously given in the collection “Essays on the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence”, published under the auspices of the SVR.

As Merkulov wrote, “Grew stated that it would be desirable to inform the Soviet government on this issue in order to avoid possible misunderstandings.” The American diplomat also asked Halifax to find out the British government’s point of view on this issue.

“The British government replied to Halifax that the British had intercepted not only this telegram, but also another one following it… in which the German envoy in Dublin is asked not to take any action on the first telegram until further instructions are received,” wrote the head of the NKGB of the USSR.

At the same time, as Merkulov reported, in response to the US offer to inform the USSR about the actions of the Nazi leadership, Halifax reported that this issue was being considered by the British military cabinet.

“Just for the information of the British Embassy in Washington, the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the British government would probably find it inappropriate to inform the Soviet government about this Ribbentrop telegram, since the instructions contained in it were cancelled, as well as for fear of deciphering the source of this information. The final decision of the British government on this issue is not yet known,” Merkulov said.

London had no idea that their unwillingness to share information about the Nazis’ plans with Moscow was pointless. The fact is that thanks to the work of the legendary Cambridge Five, a group of Soviet foreign intelligence agents, the USSR knew the contents of German documents intercepted by the British.

A photocopy of another draft of Merkulov’s memo to Stalin, prepared in March 1945, on the attempts of German representatives in Sweden to establish contact with the USSR’s allies, has also been published.

“The German Consul General in Stockholm, Pfleiderer, in a confidential conversation with a source, said that in late February or early March, the German envoy in Stockholm received instructions from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs to begin ‘political negotiations’ with the allies that would lead to peace,” Merkulov wrote.

Pfleiderer, as reported by the People’s Commissar, announced attempts by German diplomats to establish contact with the allies in order to find out on what terms peace could be concluded.

“He (Pfleiderer — Editor’s note) stated at the same time that the initiative for negotiations came from Hitler, Himmler and Ribbentrop. In his opinion, this indicates that even the Nazi leadership is now convinced of the hopelessness of further resistance. However, the Nazi leaders still hope that negotiations will be conducted with them “in order to put an end to further bloodshed and destruction,” the head of the NKGB noted.