Despite the majority of the Soviet citizens speaking out in favour of the preservation of the Soviet Union, their will was completely disregarded. In this article, which was published by “Argumenty i Fakty” on June 20,2022, Gennady Burbulis is giving his justification for the process. We shall make a note of when he is referencing a Western-sponsored myth about the USSR as part of his justification. Make sure you have read first the article The referendum on the independence of Ukraine on December 1, 1991: how Kravchuk deceived Sevastopol and Crimea, which uncovers the motivations for Kravchuk’s actions, which may seem as coming out of the blue in Burbulis’ story.
“Political Chernobyl has blown up.” How Burbulis justified the collapse of the USSR
– by Vitaly Tseplyaev
President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin and Secretary of State under the President of the Russian Federation Gennady Burbulis
Gennady Burbulis, one of the closest associates of the first President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin, died on June 19 (2022) at the age of 77. In December 1991, he held the position of Secretary of State of Russia, which was specially created for him, and played a crucial role in signing the Belovezha Agreements, which ended the existence of the Soviet Union. In a recent interview with AiF, Burbulis explained why he considered the collapse of the USSR to be an “optimistic tragedy” and did not regret what he had done.
— In December 1991, the Soviet Union practically did not exist. Moreover, a new Union Treaty had been prepared, and its signing was scheduled for December 9th. We chose this date specifically in order to wait for the results of the presidential elections in Kazakhstan and the referendum in Ukraine, which took place on December 1.
On Gorbachev’s initiative, on September 5, Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed to the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR to dissolve itself and create transitional governing bodies of the Union. And such a decision was made. There was no mention of the USSR in the text of the Treaty on the creation of the Union of Sovereign States (note the “Union” in the formula here! See: On March 17th 1991, the referendum on the preservation of the USSR was held) as a confederate democratic voluntary association, which was finally agreed upon in Novo-Ogaryovo on November 28-29.
Even before August, Gorbachev defended the erroneous formula of the 9+1 treaty, where 9 are republics and 1 is the Kremlin, the Union center. But by December, everything had changed. By that time, not a single organ of the union government was functioning normally. The country was on the verge of the most dangerous anarchy, and Gorbachev himself knew this best of all. Therefore, our decision (to sign an agreement on the establishment of the CIS in Belovezhskaya Pushcha on December 8. — Ed.) was vital and necessary. We had no choice.
“We spent the whole day trying to convince Kravchuk”
Vitaly Tseplyaev, aif.ru: — Why didn’t you wait for December 9th? Did you want to disrupt the signing of a new union treaty?
Gennady Burbulis: — Leonid Kravchuk said from the very first minute of our meeting in Belovezhskaya Pushcha that the mandate of the Ukrainian people, which he received in the elections and in the referendum, forbids him to discuss any options for a new Union Treaty: Ukraine declared itself a sovereign independent state. Such a categorical position came as a surprise to us. For a whole day we tried to convince Kravchuk that the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus cannot just leave for nowhere. It was unthinkable at the time. And after difficult conversations, reflections, and the realisation that a unique empire filled with nuclear weapons was disintegrating, in my opinion, it was Kravchuk who proposed this compromise form: the Commonwealth of Independent States. Here one can glean more than just a good analogy with the British Commonwealth.
Fortunately, there were already bilateral cooperation agreements between the three parties to the agreement — the RSFSR, Ukraine and Belarus. There was some groundwork, an experience of mutual understanding. And so this formula was born. The commonwealth means friendship of peoples. But at the same time — independent, independent — which is what everyone wanted then.
By the way, Nazarbayev was supposed to fly to Belovezhskaya Pushcha. But he didn’t make it. He stopped in Moscow and visited Gorbachev. And they started chatting. Nazarbayev sent us messages saying that he was refuelling, and he was leaving soon… But he never arrived. When it became clear that it was impossible to convince Kravchuk to return to the Novoogarevsky process, but something had to be done, it became clear that Nazarbayev had done the right thing by not arriving. He created impeccable legitimacy for our trilateral decision, because it was Russia, Ukraine and Belarus that were the founders of the Soviet Union in December 1922. And this is a fundamental historical legal circumstance: only those who have created a new state can dissolve it.
Gennady Burbulis at a memorial rally dedicated to the 24th anniversary of the events of August 1991 in Moscow.
— But what about the Constitution of the USSR — didn’t you violate it by condemning the Union to dissolution?
— No. The Constitution of the USSR stipulated the right to secede from the USSR at any time from any republic (note: however, the exact mechanism for secession were not detailed in the constitutuion). In addition, the Constitution has already been rewritten several times during perestroika. And several republics had already left the Union by that time — the Baltics, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova.
We are often accused of arbitrarily destroying the Union. Nothing of the sort. A responsible, forced decision was made that fully preserves the logic of the most complex historical work on the transformation of the Soviet totalitarian system into a new structure (note: and that was done by ignoring the will of the people!). Besides, this decision was flawlessly legitimate. Within a few hours, the Belovezhskaya Agreements were ratified by the highest legislative bodies of the three republics (note: the version ratified by Ukraine had different wording, see: The referendum on the independence of Ukraine on December 1, 1991: how Kravchuk deceived Sevastopol and Crimea). These agreements fully complied with the norms of international law and were registered by the United Nations. On December 12, at the initiative of Nazarbayev, 8 other republics of the former USSR gathered and decided to join the CIS. And on December 21, in Alma Ata, such a decision was signed without making a single amendment to the text of the Belovezhskaya Accord.
— What about the referendum on March 17, 1991? After all, almost all the people said “yes” to the preservation of the renewed Union.
— Firstly, 6 republics did not participate in the March 17 referendum: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova. Ukraine and Belarus used their own modification of the issue, emphasising the preservation of the sovereignty and independence of their countries while maintaining the renewed Union. Russia has fully complied with all obligations arising from the results of this referendum. We actively participated in the preparation of the new Union Treaty. We were not going to ignore the will of the people. But the decision to create the CIS turned out to be the last opportunity to give a constructive response to the results of the referendum.
“The Yugoslav scenario was prevented”
— What did Russia gain by becoming independent?
— It should be borne in mind that the Soviet economic management system was completely bankrupt in 1991 (note: or, rather, it was made appear bankrupt through premeditated scarcity, when the goods were held back the the warehouses, not reaching the stores). And Yeltsin had a task: how to feed people, how to prepare for the heating season. Few people know that the Russian government could actually manage only 7% of the economy on the territory of the Russian Federation. Everything else was under the jurisdiction of the union government, which in fact could no longer manage anything. On June 15, 1991, Soviet Premier Pavlov demanded emergency powers, stating that the reserves of vital resources were depleted, that the financial base was depleted and the country could not pay its loans, and that there was a collapse in economic and business activity. After the events of August of that year, we were forced to take full responsibility for the survival of Russian citizens.
As Boris Nikolaevich’s (Yeltsin’s) only deputy, I had the right to sign documents, and every night they brought me documents for the seizure of the last stocks of flour, diesel fuel, and specialised metal grades… We dealt with the issues of survival in the face of the threat of famine and the complete collapse of economic life in the country. We proposed a reform program, which was supported by the 5th Congress of People’s Deputies on October 29, 1991. He empowered Yeltsin as head of government and authorised urgent reforms. Without them, we were heading for real trouble…
With the dissolution of the USSR, we stopped wasting energy on endless coordination of decisions with union structures. And who was there to coordinate with? In fact, there was no government: Prime Minister Pavlov was arrested, and so were key ministers… In August 1991, the political Chernobyl of the Soviet Empire exploded. And we had to deal with the consequences of this disaster. It was not a struggle for power, not the displacement of one elite by another, but the vital need to solve pressing problems. To do what you can’t not do.
— In all honesty, wasn’t it a pity to lose the big country in which you were born?
— I have always perceived the death of the USSR as a personal tragedy. It was impossible to imagine that Gennady Burbulis, the grandson of Lithuanian immigrants, together with the president, on behalf of 150 million Russians, was signing a document that changed world history. For a normal person, the loss of a homeland is always a disaster. And no one can ever be elated and happy about it… But if you consider that my homeland, the USSR, was an unprecedented totalitarian state that repressed its own people, tried to make people happy through violence, enslavement of millions of peasants and exploitation of slave labour of millions of GULAG prisoners (note: here Burbulis echoes the Western myth, see: The history of repressions devoid of emotion. Viktor Zemskov’s arguments and facts), then you understand that the collapse of such a state was nevertheless an optimistic tragedy. It was a correct, logical and morally justified event.
The Belovezhskaya Agreements are often called the civilised divorce of the Soviet republics. I would say otherwise: it was a civilised way out of the historical impasse. At that time, we managed to prevent a bloody civil war over the redistribution of the Soviet inheritance as it happened in the Yugoslav model.