The Plan to Destroy Russia. Conceived and Started in 1948. Concluded in 1993? Or Not…

After the hot war phase on Russia(USSR) between 22nd of April 1941 and the 9th of May 1945, executed through Germans, but lavishly funded by US (for example grandfather of the Bush presidential clan), USA did not view 1945 as a year of defeat. Along with preparation for a carpet nuking of the key cities in USSR, USA also devised a plan to politically change and destroy USSR/Russia from within. In the document below, Russia and USSR are referred interchangeably.

The document, presented in full below my analysis, is copied from this resource, which also provides the raw scanned pages of the text.

It demonstrates well the strategy of “divide and conquer” that that US were going to employ, as well as their understanding that the only way to destroy Russia, is from within – something that the “liberal” 5th column is doing in Russia of today. Remember that USSR, is never the stated final objective in the document below – Russia is. On the other hand, they do not understand many aspects of the Russian World, illustrated well by this fallacious statement “Before the revolution of 1918, Russian nationalism was solely Russian.”, as Russian Empire of pre 1917 was also a multi-national and multi-confessional state.

Let me extract the key-points of the doctrine first, and then I’ll let you read through the whole text, leaving to you to decide if there is even a gram of good in the outlined intents…

Our basic objectives with respect to Russia are really only two:

a. To reduce The power and influence of Moscow to limits in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international society; and

b. To bring about a basic change in the theory’ and practice of international relations observed by the government in power in Russia. If these two objectives could be achieved, the problem which this country faces in its relations with Russia would be reduced to what might be considered normal dimensions.

Our difficulty with the present Soviet Government lies basically in the fact that its leaders are animated by concepts of the theory and practice of international relations which are not only radically opposed to our own but are clearly inconsistent with any peaceful and mutually profitable development of relations between that government and other members of the international community, individually and collectively.

Prominent among these concepts are the following:

(a) That the peaceful coexistence and mutual collaboration of sovereign and independent governments, regarding and respecting each other as equals, is an illusion and an impossibility;

(h) That conflict is the basis of international life wherever, as is the case between the Soviet Union and capitalist countries, one country does not recognize the supremacy of the other;

(c) That regimes which do not acknowledge Moscow’s authority and ideological supremacy are wicked and harmful to human progress and that there is a duty on the part of right-thinking people everywhere to work for the overthrow or weakening of such regimes, by any and all methods which prove tactically desirable;

(d) That there can be, in the long run, no advancement of the interests of both the communist and non-communist world by mutual collaboration, these interests being basically conflicting and contradictory;

and

(e) That spontaneous association between individuals in the communist-dominated world and individuals outside that world is evil and cannot contribute to human progress.

Plainly, it is not enough that these concepts should cease to dominate Soviet, or Russian, theory and practice in international relations. It is also necessary that they should be replaced by something approximating their converses.

These would be:

(a) That it is possible for sovereign and equal countries to exist peaceably side by side and to collaborate with each other without any thought or attempt at domination of one by the other;

(b) That conflict is not necessarily the basis of international life and that it may be accepted that peoples can have common purposes without being in entire ideological agreement and without being subordinated to a single authority;

(c) That people in other countries do have a legitimate right to pursue national aims at variance with Communist ideology, and that it is the duty of right-thinking people to practice tolerance for the ideas of others, to observe scrupulous non-interference in the internal affairs of others on the basis of reciprocity, and to use only decent and honorable methods in international dealings;

(d) That international collaboration can, and should, advance the interests of both parties even though the ideological inspiration of thc two parties is not identical; and

(e) That the association of individuals across international borders is desirable and should be encouraged as a process contributing to general human progress.

Note: the above were not just concepts, they were practised by USSR, and are now professed and practised by the Russian Federation. So the Empire of Chaos, already in 1948 set about to exploit any rifts, widening them into chasms

It may he stated, accordingly, that our first aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to encourage and promote by means short of war the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present satellite area and the emergence of the respective eastern European countries as independent factors on the international scene,

We should encourage by every means at our disposal tile development in the Soviet Union of institutions of federalism which would permit a revival of the national life of the Baltic peoples.

We may say, therefore, that our second aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is, by informational activity and by every other means at our disposal, to explode the myth by which people remote from Russian military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the Soviet Union for what it is and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward it.

Then comes the undermining from within, in the chapter of “THE ALTERATION OF RUSSIAN CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS” – in other words making a not-Russia out of Russia

We must say, therefore, that our third aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to create situations which will compel the Soviet Governntent to recognise the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving, at least outwardly, as though it were the converse of those concepts that were true.

This is of course primarily a question of keeping the Soviet Union politically, militarily, psychologically weak in comparison with the international forces outside of its control and of maintaining a high degree of insistence among the non-communist countries on the observance by Russia of the ordinary international decencies.

That phase was started in 1980s with the coming of Gorbachev.

They had the plans for war, of course. And whereas Russian military doctrine is to defend its territory, the American one is written like this:

The first of our war aims must naturally be she destruction of Russian military influence and domination in areas contiguous to, but outside of, the borders of any Russian state.

However that may be, we must leave nothing to chance; and it should naturally be considered that one of our major war aims with respect to Russia would be to destroy thoroughly the structure of relationships by which the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens, or groups of citizens, in countries not under communist control.

In other words, being cowardly to go head on, attack the weaker parts, and then divide and conquer. It is interesting to observe that throughout the 90s, in the accursed Yeltsin era, USA were already implementing the war-time part of the 1948 plan towards Russia:

we may definitely conclude that we could not consider our military operations successful if they left a communist regime in control of enough of the present military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable them to wage war on comparable terms with any neighboring state or with any rival authority which might be set up on traditional Russian territory.

It is impossible to forecast what the nature of such terms [of surrender of Russia] should be. The smaller the territory left at the disposal of such a regime, the easier the task of imposing terms satisfactory to our interests. Taking the worst case, which would be that of the retention of Soviet power over all, or nearly all, of present Soviet territory, we would have to demand:

(a) Direct military terms (surrender of equipment, evacuation of key areas, etc.) designed to assure military helplessness for a long time in advance;

(b) Terms designed to produce a considerable economic dependence on the outside world;

(c) Terms designed to give necessary freedom, or federal status, to national minorities (we would at least have to insist on the complete liberation of the Baltic States and on the granting of some type of federal status to the Ukraine which would make it possible for a Ukrainian local authority to have a large measure of autonomy); and

(d) Terms designed to disrupt the iron curtain and to assure a liberal flow of outside ideas and a considerable establishment of personal contact between persons within the zone of Soviet power and persons outside it.

Funny how Project Ukraine is playing out now. USA got more than what they bargained for in 1948.

Furthermore, here is what Yeltsin implemented in Russia after the November 1993 coup d’etat, almost to the letter of the 1948 document:

First of all, it should be said that regardless of the ideological basis of any such non-communist authority and regardless of the extent to which it might be prepared to do lip service to the ideals of democracy and liberalism, we would do well to see that in one way or another the basic purposes were assured which flow from the demands listed above. In other words, we should set up automatic safeguards to assure that even a regime which is non-communist and nominally friendly to us:

(a) Does not have strong military power;

(b) Is economically dependent to a considerable extent on the outside world;

(c) Does not exercise too much authority over the major national minorities; and

(d) Imposes nothing resembling the iron curtain over contacts with the outside world.

In the case of such a regime, professing hostility to the communists and friendship toward us, we should doubtless wish to take care i.o impose these conditions in a manner which would not be offensive or humiiiating. But we would have to see to it that in one way or another they were imposed, if our interests and the interests of world peace were to be protected.

In the 90’s and the beginning of 00’s (on inertia) military destroyed (check); economical dependence on pertodollar (check); provocation of conflicts and civil wars on ethnic grounds (check); total inability to withstand outside informational influence (check). Funnily, once Russia started to come back to it’s ow in 2007 (Putin’s München Speech), the West slammed an iron curtain on Russia from their own side, blocking almost all of information coming from Russia to the west.

We are therefore safe in saying that it should be our aim in the event of war with the Soviet Union, to see to it that when the war was over no regime on Russian territory is permitted:

(a) To retain military force on a scale which could be threatening to any neighboring stale;

(b) To enjoy a measure of economic autarchy which would permit the erection of the economic basis of such armed power without the assistance of the western world;

(c) To deny autonomy and self-government to the main national minorities; or

(d) To retain anything resembling the present iron curtain. If these conditions are assured, we can adjust ourselves to any political situation which may ensue from the war. We will then be safe, whether a Soviet government retains the bulk of Russian territory or whether it retains only a small part of such territory or whether it disappears altogether. And we will be safe even though the original democratic enthusiasm of a new regime is short-lived and tends to be replaced gradually by the a-social concepts of international affairs to which the present Soviet generation has been educated.

The above should be adequate as an expression of our war aims in the event that political processes in Russia take their own course under the stresses of war and that we are not obliged to assume major responsibility for the political future of the country. But there are further questions to be answered for the event that Soviet authority should disintegrate so rapidly and so radically as to leave the country in chaos, making it encumbent upon us as the victors to make political choices and to take decisions which would be apt to shape the political future of the country. For this eventuality there are three main questions which must be faced.

That disintegration cost more Russian lives in the Wild 90’s than what was lost during the whole of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945!

Also, note how the Ukrainian project is spun. In 1917 Lenin built Ukraine, at the expense of Russia, in 1945 Stalin added to it at the expense of Poland, Romania, Hungary, in 1954 Khrishev expanded it at the expense of Russia again, yet the US “masterminds” are persuing the aim that the “nationalistic organizations” [Read Galicina SS, Bandera follower] are most vocal abroad about. It was in 1948 that the disaster of today with Ukro-Nazis 3-year long shelling of Donbass and the total destruction of the USSR-inherited Ukrainian economy that we are observing now.

First of all, would it be our desire, in such a case, that the present territories of the Soviet Union remain united under a single regime or that they be partitioned? And if they are to remain united, at least to a large extent, then what degree of federalism should be observed in a future Russian government? What about the major minority groups, in particular the Ukraine?

We have already taken note of the problem of the Baltic states. The Baltic states should not be compelled to remain under any communist authority in the aftermath of another war. Should the territory adjacent To the Baltic slates be controlled by a Russian authority other than a communist authority, we should be guided by the wishes of the Baltic peoples and by the degree of moderation which that Russian authority is inclined to exhibit with respect to them.

In the case of the Ukraine, we have a different problem. The Ukrainians are the most advanced of the peoples who have been under Russian rule in modern times. They have generally resented Russian domination; and their nationalistic organizations have been active and vocal abroad. It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that they should be freed, at last, from Russian rule and permitted to set themselves up as an independent slate.

And when the collapse was the accomplished fact, first Yeltsin got installed as a president (cemented during the 1993 coup d’etat), and then they tried to install Khodorkovskij…

In the event of a disintegration of Soviet power, we are certain to be faced with demands for .support on the part of the various competing political elements among the present Russian opposition groups. It will be almost impossible for us to avoid doing things which would have the effect of favoring one or another of these groups over its rivals. But a great deal will depend on ourselves, and on our concept of what we are trying to accomplish.

We have already seen that among the existing and potential opposition groups there is none which we will wish to sponsor entirely and for whose actions, if it were to obtain power in Russia, we would wish to take responsibility.

On the other hand, we must expect that vigorous efforts will be made by various groups to induce us to take measures in Russian internal affairs which will constitute a genuine commitment on our part and make it possible for political groups in Russia to continue to demand our support. In the light of these facts, it is plain then we must make a determined effort to avoid taking responsibility for deciding who would rule Russia in the wake of a disintegration of the Soviet regime.

In 1948 they even planned for “decommunisation” – a term that was popular in Ukraine anno 2014, when physical violence, banning and disappearances became the norm. They did indeed give “plenty of arms and help” to the “non-communist authority” of Ukro-Nazis and Banderites. In the Baltic countries that manifested as apartheid…

We would be wiser, therefore, in the case of territories freed from communist control, to restrict ourselves to seeing to it that individual ex-communists do not have the opportunity to reorganize as armed groups with pretenses to political power and that the local non-communist authority is given plenty of arms and help in any measures which they may desire to take with respect to them.

We may say, therefore, that we would not make it our aim to carry out with our own forces, on territory liberated from the communist authorities, aпy large-scale program of de-communication, and that In general we would leave this problem to whatever local authority might supplant Soviet rule.

And now the whole documents, one of a planned infestation and murder of a country…


Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds.,
Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy,
1945-1950


U.S. OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIA

TOPSECRET

August 18, 1948

[Source; Records of the National Security Council on deposit in the Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives, Washington. D.C.]

NSC 20/1 originated in response to a request from Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal for a "comprehensive statement of national policy’" with regard to the Soviet Union, on the grounds that until such a statement was prepared, "no logical decisions can be reached as to the proportion of our resources which should be devoted to military purposes. . . ..” (*1) Drafted by the Policy Planning Staff, this document represented the most complete exposition up to that time of the objectives the policy of containment was supposed to accomplish.

(*1). Forrestal to Sidney W. Souers, July 10, 1948, quoted in NSC 20, “Appraisal of the
Degree and Character of Mllilary Preparedness Required by the World Situiilion,” July 12,
1948, Foreign Relations of the United Stales: 1948, I (part 2) 589-592.

The document established two basic goals for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union: (1) reduction of the power and influence of the U.S.S.R. to the point that they would no longer threaten international stability; and (2) accomplishment of a fundamental change in the theory and practice of international relations as applied by the Soviet govemment. Unlike NSC 7 (Document 20), NSC 20/1 stressed the distinction between the Soviet Union and the international communist movement, and, in line with the reasoning in PPS 35 (Document 21), held out the possibility of driving a wedge between the two of them as a means of implementing U.S. policy objectives.

NSC 20/1 emphasized the desirability of achieving containment’s desired results by means short of war, although it recognized the possibility that war might come, whether by inadvertence or design. The final portion of the document dealt with the question of what U.S. policy should be in that eventuality. It is noteworthy for its stress on the neutralization, rather than the elimination, of Soviet power, and for its implied rejection of the World War II doctrine of unconditional surrender.

I. Introduction

It is plain that Russia, both as a force in its own right and as a center for the world communist movement, has become for the time being the outstanding problem of U.S. foreign policy, and that there is deep dissatisfaction and concern in this country over the aims and methods of the Soviet leaders. The policies of this Government are therefore determined in considerable measure by our desire to modify Soviet policies and to alter the international situation to which they have already led.

However, there has yet been no clear formulation of basic U.S. objectives with respect to Russia. And it is particularly important, in view of the preoccupation of this Government with Russian affairs, that .such objectives be formulated and accepted for working purposes by all branches of our Government dealing with the problems of Russia and communism. Otherwise, there is a possibility of serious dissipation of the national effort on a problem of outstanding international importance.

II. Background Considerations

There are two concepts of the relationship of national objectives to the factors of war and peace.

The first holds that national objectives be constant and should not be affected by changes in the country’s situation as between war and peace; that they should be pursued constantly by means short of war or by war-like means, as the case may be. This concept was best expressed by Clausewitz, who wrote that, "War is a continuation of policy, intermingled with other means."

The opposite concept is that which sees national objectives in peace and national objectives in war as essentially unrelated. According to this concept, the existence of a state of war creates its own specific political objectives, which generally supersede the normal peacetime objectives. This is the concept which has generally prevailed in this country. Basically, it was the concept which prevailed in the last war, where the winning of the war itself, as a military operation, was made the supreme objective of U.S. policy, other considerations being subordinated to it.

In the case of American objectives with respect to Russia, it is clear that neither of these concepts can prevall entirely.

In the first place, this Government has been forced, for purposes of the political war now in progress, to consider more definite and militant objectives toward Russia even now, in time of peace, than it ever was called upon to formulate with respect either to Germany or Japan in advance of the actual hostilities with those countries.

Secondly, the experience of the past war has taught us the desirability of gearing our war effort to a clear and realistic concept of the long-term political objectives which we wish to achieve. This would be particularly important in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. We could hardly expect to conclude such a war with the same military and political finality as was the case in the recent war against Germany and Japan, Unless, therefore, it were
clear to everyone that our objectives did not lie in military victory for its own sake, it might be hard for the U.S. public to recognize what would in reality be a favorable issue of the conflict. The public might expect much more in the way of military finality than would be necessary, or even desirable, from the standpoint of the actual achievement of our objectives. If people were to get the idea that our objectives were unconditional surrender, total occupation and military government, on the patterns of Germany and Japan, they would naturally feel that anything short of these achievements was no real victory at all, and might fail to appreciate a really genuine and constructive settlement,

Finally, we must recognize that Soviet objectives themselves are almost constant. They are very little affected by changes from war to peace. For example, Soviet territorial aims with respect to eastern Europe, as they became apparent during the war, bore a strong similarity to the program which the Soviet Government was endeavoring to realize by measures short of war in 1939 and 1940, and in fact to certain of the strategic-political concepts which underlay Czarist policy before World War I, To meet a policy of such constancy, so stubbornly pursued through both war and peace, it is necessary that we oppose it with purposes no less constant and enduring- Broadly speaking, this lies in the nature of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the outside world, which is one of permanent antagonism and conflict, taking place sometimes within a framework of formal peace and at other times within the legal framework of war. On the other hand, it is clear that a democracy cannot effect, as the totalitarian state sometimes does, a complete identification of its peacetime and wartime objectives. Its aversion to war as a method of foreign policy is so strong that it will inevitably be inclined to modify its objectives in peacetime, in the hope that they may be achieved without resort to arms. When this hope and this restraint are removed by the outbreak of war, as a result of the provocation of others, the irritation of democratic opinion generally demands either the formulation of further objectives, often of a punitive nature, which it would not have supported in time of peace, or the immediate realization of aims which it might otherwise have been prepared to pursue patiently, by gradual pressures, over the course of decades. It would therefore be unrealistic to suppose that the U.S. Government could hope to proceed in time of war on the basis of exactly the same set of objectives, or at least with the same time-table for realization of objectives, which it would have in time of peace.

At the same time, it must be recognized that the smaller the gap between
peacetime and wartime purposes, the greater the likelihood that a successful military effort will be politically successful as well. If objectives are really sound from the standpoint of national interest, they are worth consciously formulating and pursuing in war as in peace. Objectives which cumc into being as a consequence of wartime emotionalism are not apt to reflect a balanced concept of long-term national interest. For this reason, every effort should be made in government planning now, in advance of any outbreak of hostilities, to define our present peacetime objectives and our hypothetical wartime objectives with relation to Russia, and to reduce as far as possible the gap between them.

III. Basic Objectives

Our basic objectives with respect to Russia are really only two:

a. To reduce The power and influence of Moscow to limits in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international society; and

b. To bring about a basic change in the theory’ and practice of international relations observed by the government in power in Russia. If these two objectives could be achieved, the problem which this country faces in its relations with Russia would be reduced to what might be considered normal dimensions.

Before discussing the manner in which these objectives could be pursued in peace and in war, respectively, let us first examine them in somewhat greater detail.

1 . THE GEOGRAPHIC REDUCTION OF RUSSIAN POWER AND INFLUENCE

There are two spheres in which the power and the influence of Moscow have been projected beyond the borders of the Soviet Union in ways detrimental to the peace and stability of international society.

The first of these spheres is what may be defined as the satellite area:
namely, the area in which decisive political influence is exercised by the Kremlin. It should be noted that in this area, which is, as a whole, geographically contiguous to the Soviet Union, the presence, or proximity, of Soviet armed power has been a decisive factor in the establishment and maintenance of Soviet hegemony.

The second of these spheres embraces the relation between, on the one hand, the power center which controls the Soviet Union and, on the other,
groups or parties in countries abroad, beyond the limits of the satellite area, which look to Russia for their political inspiration and give to it, consciously or otherwise, their basic loyalty.

In both of these spheres the projection of Russian power beyond its legitimate limits must be broken up if the achievement of the first of the objectives listed above is to be effectively served. The countries in the satellite area must be given the opportunity to free themselves fundamentally from Russia domination and from undue Russian ideological inspiration. And the myth which causes millions of people in countries far from the Soviet borders to look to Moscow as the outstanding source of hope for human betterment must be thoroughly exploded and its workings destroyed.

It should be noted that in both cases the objective can conceivably be achieved for Ihe most part without raising issues in which the prestige of the Soviet state, as such, need necessarily be decisively engaged.

In the second of the two spheres, a complete retraction of undue Russian power should be possible without necessarily engaging the more vital interests of the Russian state; for in this sphere Moscow’s power is exerted through carefully concealed channels, the existence of which Moscow itself denies. Therefore, a withering away of the structure of power which was formerly known as the Third International, and which has survived the disuse of that name, need involve no formal humiliation of the government in Moscow and no formal concessions on the part of the Soviet State.

The same is largely true of the first of these two spheres, but not entirely, In the satellite area, to be sure, Moscow likewise denies the formal fact of Soviet domination and attempts to conceal its mechanics. As has now been demonstrated in the Tito incidents, a breakdown of Moscow control is not necessarily regarded as an event affecting the respective states as such. In this instance, it is treated as a party affair by both sides; and particular care is taken everywhere to emphasize that no question of state prestige is involved. The same could presumably happen everywhere else throughout the satellite area without involving the formal dignity of the Soviet State.

We are confronted, however, with a more difficult problem in the actual extensions of the borders of the Soviet Union which have taken place since 1939. These extensions cannot in all cases be said to have been seriously detrimental to international peace and stability; and in certain instances it can probably be considered, from the standpoint of our objectives, that they can be entirely accepted for the sake of the maintenance of peace, In other cases, notably that of the Baltic countries, the question is more difficult. We cannot really profess indifference to the further fate of the Baltic, peoples.

This has been reflected in our recognition policy to date with respect to those countries. And we could hardly consider that international peace and stability will really have ceased to be threatened as long as Europe is faced with the fact that it has been possible for Moscow to crush these three small countries which have been guilty of no real provocation and which have given evidence of their ability to handle their own affairs in a progressive manner, without detriment to the interests of their neighbors. It should therefore logically be considered a part of U.S. objectives to see these countries restored to something at least approaching a decent state of freedom and independence.

It is clear, however, that their complete independence would involve an actual cession of territory by the Soviet Government. It would therefore raise an issue directly involving the dignity and the vital interests of the Soviet State as such. It is idle to imagine that this could be brought about by means short of war. If, therefore, we are to consider that the basic objective outlined above is one which would be valid for peace as well as for war, then we must logically state that under conditions of peace our objective would be merely to induce Moscow to permit the return to the respective Baltic countries of all of their nationals who have been forcibly removed therefrom and the establishment in those countries of autonomous regimes generally consistent with the cultural needs and national aspirations of the peoples in question. In the event of war, we might, if necessary, wish to go further. But the answer to this question would depend on the nature of the Russian regime which would be dominant in that area in the wake of another war; and we need not attempt to decide it in advance.

In saying, consequently, that we should reduce the power and influence of The Kremlin to limits in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international society, we are entitled to consider that this is an objective which can be logically pursued not only in the event of a war but also in time of peace and by peaceful means, and that in the latter case it need not necessarily raise issues of prestige for the Soviet Government which would automatically make war inevitable.

2. THE CHANGE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNAT10NAI-RELATIONS AS OBSERVED IN MOSCOW

Our difficulty with the present Soviet Government lies basically in the fact that its leaders are animated by concepts of the theory and practice of international relations which are not only radically opposed to our own but are clearly inconsistent with any peaceful and mutually profitable development
of relations between that government and other members of the international community, individually and collectively.

Prominent among these concepts are the following:

(a) That the peaceful coexistence and mutual collaboration of sovereign and independent governments, regarding and respecting each other as equals, is an illusion and an impossibility;

(h) That conflict is the basis of international life wherever, as is the case between the Soviet Union and capitalist countries, one country does not recognize the supremacy of the other;

(c) That regimes which do not acknowledge Moscow’s authority and ideological supremacy are wicked and harmful to human progress and that there is a duty on the part of right-thinking people everywhere to work for the overthrow or weakening of such regimes, by any and all methods which prove tactically desirable;

(d) That there can be, in the long run, no advancement of the interests of both the communist and non-communist world by mutual collaboration, these interests being basically conflicting and contradictory;

and

(e) That spontaneous association between individuals in the communist-dominated world and individuals outside that world is evil and cannot contribute to human progress.

Plainly, it is not enough that these concepts should cease to dominate Soviet, or Russian, theory and practice in international relations. It is also necessary that they should be replaced by something approximating their converses.

These would be:

(a) That it is possible for sovereign and equal countries to exist peaceably side by side and to collaborate with each other without any thought or attempt at domination of one by the other;

(b) That conflict is not necessarily the basis of international life and that it may be accepted that peoples can have common purposes without being in entire ideological agreement and without being subordinated to a single authority;

(c) That people in other countries do have a legitimate right to pursue national aims at variance with Communist ideology, and that it is the duty of right-thinking people to practice tolerance for the ideas of others, to observe scrupulous non-interference in the internal affairs of others on the basis of reciprocity, and to use only decent and honorable methods in international dealings;

(d) That international collaboration can, and should, advance the interests of both parties even though the ideological inspiration of thc two parties is not identical; and

(e) That the association of individuals across international borders is desirable and should be encouraged as a process contributing to general human progress.

Now the question at once arises as to whether the acceptance of such concepts in Moscow is an objective which we can seriously pursue and hope to achieve without resort to war and to the overthrow of the Soviet Government. We must face the fact that the Soviet Government, as we know it today, is, and will continue to be a constant threat to the peace of this nation and of the world.

It is quite clear that the present leaders of the Soviet Union can themselves never be brought to view concepts such as those indicated above as intrinsically sound and desirable. It is equally clear that for such concepts to become dominant throughout the Russian communist movement wou!d mean, in present circumstances, an intellectual revolution within that movement which would amount to a metamorphosis of its political personality and a denial of its basic claim to existence as a separate and vital force among the ideological currents of the world at large. Concepts such as these could become dominant in the Russian communist movement only if, through a long process of change and erosion, that movement had outlived in name the impulses which had originally given it birth and vitality and had acquired a completely different significance in the world than that which it possesses today.

It might be concluded, then (and the Moscow theologians would be quick to put this interpretation on it), that to say that we were seeking the adoption of these concepts in Moscow would be equivalent to saying that it was our objective to overthrow Soviet power. Proceeding from that point, it could be argued that this is in turn an objective unrealizable by means short of war, and that we are therefore admitting that our objective with respect to the Soviet Union is eventual war and the violent overthrow of Soviet power. ,

It would be a dangerous error to accept this line of thought.

In the first place, there is no time limit for the achievement of our objectives under conditions of peace. We are faced here with no rigid periodicity of war and peace which would enable us to conclude that we must achieve our peacetime objectives by a given date "or else". The objectives of national policy in times of peace should never be regarded in static terms. In so far as they arc basic objectives, and worthy ones, they are not apt to be ones capable of complete and finite achievement, like specific military objectives in war. The peacetime objectives of national policy should be thought of rather as lines of direction than as physical goals.

In the second place, we are entireiy within our own rights, and need feel no sense of guilt, in working for the destruction of concepts inconsistent with world peace and stability and for their replacement by ones of tolerance and international collaboration. It is not our business to calculate the internal developments to which the adoption of such concepts might lead in another country, nor need we feel that we have any responsibility for those developments. If the Soviet leaders find the growing prevalence of a more enlightened concept of international relations to be inconsistent with the maintenance of their internal power in Russia, that is their responsibility, not ours. That is a matter for their own consciences, and for the conscience of the peoples of the Soviet Union. We are not only within our moral rights but within our moral duty in working for the adoption everywhere of decent and hopeful concepts of international life. In doing so, we are entitled to let the chips tali where they may in terms of internal development.

We do not know for certain that the successful pursuit by us of the objectives in question would lead to the disintegration of Soviet power; for we do not know the time factor here involved. It is entirely possible that under the stress of lime and circumstance certain of the original concepts of the communist movement might be gradually modified in Russia as were certain of the original concepts of the American revolution in our own country.

We are entitled, therefore, to consider, and to state publicly, that it is our objective to bring to The Russian people and government, by every means at our disposal, a more enlightened concept of international relations, and that in so doing we are not taking any position, as a government, with respect to internal conditions in Russia.

In the case of war, there could clearly be no question of this nature. Once a state of war had arisen between this country and the Soviet Union, this Government would be at liberty to pursue the achievement of its basic objectives by whatever means it might choose and by whatever terms it might wish to impose upon a Russian authority or Russian authorities in the event of a successful issue of military operations. Whether these terms would embrace the overthrow of Soviet power would he only a question of expediency, which will be discussed below.

This second of the two basic objectives is therefore also one likewise susceptible of pursuit in lime of peace as in time of war. This objective, like the first, may accordingly be accepted as an underlying one, from which the formulation of our policy, in peace as in war, may proceed.

IV. The Pursuit of Our Basic. Objectives in Time of Peace

In discussing the interpretation which would be given to these basic objectives in time of peace or in time of war respectively, we arc confronted with a problem of terminology. If we continue to speak of the particular orientation lines of our policy in peace or in war as ”objectives", we may find ourselves falling into a semantic confusion. Solely for the purposes of clarity, therefore, we will make an arbitrary distinction. We will speak of objectives only in the sense of the basic objectives outlined above, which are common both to war and peace. When we refer to our guiding purposes as applied specifically in our wartime or peactime policy, respectively, we will speak of "aims" rather than of "objectives".

What then would be the aims of U.S. national policy with respect to Russia in time of peace?

These should flow logically from the two main objectives discussed above,

1. THE RETRACTION OF RUSS1AN POWER AND INFLUENCE

Let us first consider the retraction of undue Russian power and influence. We have .seen that. this divided into the problem of the satellite area and the problem of communist activities and Soviet propaganda activities in countries farther afield.

With respect to the satellite area, the aim of U.S. policy in time of" peace is to place the greatest possible strain on the structure of relationships by which Soviet domination of this area is maintained and gradually, with the aid of the natural and legitimate forces of Europe, to maneuver the Russians out of their position of primacy and to enable the respective governments to regain their independence of action. There are many ways in which this aim can be, and is being, pursued. The most striking step in this direction was the original proposal for the ERP, as stated in Secretary Marshall’s Harvard speech on June 5, S947. By forcing the Russians either to permit the satellite countries to enter into a relationship of economic collaboration with the west of Europe which would inevitably have strengthened east-west bonds and weakened The exclusive orientation of these countries toward Russia or to force them to remain outside this structure of collaboration at heavy economic sacrifice to themselves, we placed a severe strain on the relations between Moscow and the satellite countries and undoubtedly made more awkward and difficult maintenance by Moscow of its exclusive authority in the satellite capitals. Everything, in fad, which operates to tear off the veil with
which Moscow likes to screen its power, and which forces the Russians to reveal the crude and ugly outlines of their hold over the governments of the satellite countries, serves to discredit the satellite governments with their own peoples and to heighten the discontent of those peoples and their desire for free association with other nations.

The disaffection of Tito, to which the strain caused by the ERP problem undoubtedly contributed in some measure, has clearly demonstrated that it is possible for stresses in the Soviet-satellite relations to lead to a real weakening and disruption of the Russian domination,

It should therefore be our aim to continue to do all in our power to increase these stresses and at the same time to make it possible for the satel-lile governments gradually to extricate themselves from Russian control and to find, if they so wish, acceptable forms of collaboration with the governments of the west. This can be done by skillful use of our economic power, by direct or indirect informational activity, by placing the greatest possible strain on the maintenance of the iron curtain, and by building up the hope and vigor of western Europe to a point where it comes to exercise the maximum attraction to the peoples of the east, and by other means too numerous to mention.

We cannot say, of course, that the Russians will sit by and permit the satellites to extricate themselves from Russian control in this way. We cannot be sure that at some point in this process the Russians will not choose to resort to violence of some sort; i.e., to forms of military re-occupation or possibly even to a major war, to prevent such a process from being carried to completion.

It is not our desire that they should do this; and we, for our part, should do everything possible to keep the situation flexible and to make possible a liberation of the satellite countries in ways which do not create any unanswerable challenge to Soviet prestige. But even with the greatest of circumspection we cannot be sure that they will not choose to resort to arms. We cannot hope to influence their policy automatically or to produce any guaranteed results.

The fact that we embark on a policy which can lead to these results does not mean that we are setting our course toward war; and we should be extremely careful to make this plain on all occasions and to refute accusations of this character. The fact of the matter is that, granted the relationship of antagonism which is still basic to the entire relationships between the Soviet Government and non-communist countries at this time, war is an ever-present possibility and no course which this Government might adopt would appre-
ciably diminish this danger. The converse of the policy set forth above, namely to accept Soviet domination of the satellite countries and to do nothing to oppose it, would not diminish in any way the danger of war. On the contrary, it can be argued with considerable logic that the long-term danger of war will inevitably be greater if Europe remains split along the present lines than it will be if Russian power i.s peacefully withdrawn in good time and a normal balance restored to the European community.

It may he stated, accordingly, that our first aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to encourage and promote by means short of war the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present satellite area and the emergence of the respective eastern European countries as independent factors on the international scene,

However, as we have seen above, our examination of this problem is not complete unless we have taken into consideration the question of areas now behind the Soviet border. Do we wish, or do we not, to make it our objective to achieve by means short of war any modification of the borders of the Soviet Union? We have already seen in Chapter III the answer to this question.

We should encourage by every means at our disposal tile development in the Soviet Union of institutions of federalism which would permit a revival of the national life of the Baltic peoples.

It may be asked: Why do we restrict this aim to the Baltic peoples? Why do we not include the other national minority groups of the Soviet Union? The answer is that the Baltic peoples happen to be the only peoples whose traditional territory and population are now entirely included in the Soviet Union and who have shown themselves capable of coping successfully with the responsibilities of statehood. Moreover, we still formally deny the legitimacy of their violent inclusion in the Soviet Union, and they therefore have a special status in our eyes.

Next we have the problem of the disruption of the myth by which the people in Moscow maintain their undue influence and actual disciplinary authority over millions of people in countries beyond the satellite area. First a word about the nature of this problem.

Before the revolution of 1918, Russian nationalism was solely Russian. Except for a few eccentric European intellectuals of the 19th Century, who even then professed to a mystical faith in Russia’s power to solve the ills of civilization (*2) Russian nationalism had no appeal to people outside Russia. On the contrary, the relatively mild despotism of the 19th Century Russian
rulers was perhaps better known and more universally deplored in the western countries than has since been the case with the far greater cruelties of the Soviet regime.

(*2) Karl Marx was not one of these people. He was not, as he himself put it, “one of those
who believed that the old Europe could be revived by Russian blood,” [Note in source text]

After the revolution, the Bolshevik leaders succeeded, through clever and systematic propaganda, in establishing throughout large sections of the world public certain concepts highly favorable to their Own purposes, including the following: that the October Revolution was a popular revolution;
that the Soviet regime was the first real worker’s government; that Soviet power was in some way connected with ideals of liberalism, freedom and economic security; and that it offered a promising alternative to the national regimes under which other peoples lived. A connection was thus established in the minds of many people between Russian communism and the general uneasiness arising in the outside world from the effects of urbanization and industrialization, or from colonial unrest.

In this way Moscow’s doctrine became to some extent a domestic problem for every nation in the world. In Soviet power, western statesmen arc now facing something more than just another problem of foreign affairs. They are facing also an internal enemy in their own countries—an enemy committed to the undermining and eventual destruction of their respective national societies.

To destroy this myth of international communism is a dual task. It takes two parties to create an inter-action such as that which exists between the Kremlin, on the one hand, and the discontented intellectuals in other countries (for it is the intellectuals rather than the "workers" who make up the hard core of communism outside the USSR), on the other. It is not enough to tackle this problem by aiming to silence the propagator. It is even more important to arm the listener against this sort of attack. There is some reason why Moscow propaganda is listened to so avidly, and why this myth takes hold so readily, among many people far from the boundaries of Russia. If it were not Moscow these people listened to, it would be something else, equally extreme and equally erroneous, though possibly less dangerous. Thus the task of destroying the myth on which international communism rests is not just an undertaking relating to the leaders of the Soviet Union. It is also something relating to the non-Soviet world, and above all to the particular society of which each of us forms a part. To the extent to which we can dispel the confusion and misunderstandings on which these doctrines thrive—to the extent that we can remove the sources of bitterness which drive people to irrational and Utopian ideas of this sort—we will succeed in breaking down the ideological influence of Moscow in foreign countries. On the other hand- we must recognize that only a portion of international
communism outside Russia is the result of environmental influence and subject to correction accordingly. Another portion represents something in the nature of a natural mutation of species. It derives from a congenital fifth-columnism with which a certain small percentage of people in every community appear to be affected, and which distinguishes itself by a negative attitude toward the native society and a readiness to follow any outside force which opposes it. This element will always be present in any society for unscrupulous outsiders to work on; and the only protection against its dangerous misuse will be the absence of the will on the part of great-power regimes to exploit this unhappy margin of human nature.

Fortunately, the Kremlin has thus far done more than we ourselves could ever have done to dispel the very myth by which it operates. The Yugoslav incident is perhaps the most striking case in point; but the history of the Communist International is replete with other instances of the difficulty non-Russian individuals and groups have encountered in trying to be the followers of Moscow doctrines. The Kremlin leaders are so inconsiderate, so relentless, so over-bearing and so cynical in the discipline they impose on their followers that few can stand their authority for very long.

The Leninist-Stalinist system is founded, basically, on the power which a desperate, conspiratorial minority can always wield, at least temporarily, over a passive and unorganized majority of human beings- For this reason, the Kremlin leaders have had little concern, in the past, about the tendency of their movement to leave in its train a steady backwash of disillusioned former followers. Their aim was not to have communism become a mass movement but rather to work through a small group of faultlessly disciplined and entirely expendable followers. They were always content to let those peoples go who could not stomach Their particular brand of discipline.

For a long time, this worked reasonably well. New recruits were easy to obtain; and the Party lived by a steady process of natural selection-out, which left within its ranks only the most fanatically devoted, the most unimaginative, and the most obtusely unscrupulous natures.

The Yugoslav case has now raised a great question mark as to how well this system will work in the future, Heretofore, heresy could safely be handled by police repression within The limits of Soviet power or by a tested process of excommunication and character-assassination outside those limits. Tito has demonstrated that in the case of the satellite leaders, neither of these methods is necessarily effective. Excommunication of communist leaders who are beyond the effective range of Soviet power and who themselves have territory, police power, military power, and disciplined fol-
lowers, can split the whole communist movement, as nothing else was ever able to do, and cause the most grievous damage to the myth of Stalin’s omniscience and omnipotence.

Conditions are therefore favorable to a concentrated effort on our part designed to take advantage of Soviet mistakes and of the rifts that have appeared, and to promote the steady deterioration of the structure of moral influence by which the authority of the Kremlin has been carried to peoples far beyond the reach of Soviet police power.

We may say, therefore, that our second aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is, by informational activity and by every other means at our disposal, to explode the myth by which people remote from Russian military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the Soviet Union for what it is and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward it.

2. THE ALTERATION OF RUSSIAN CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

We come now to the interpretation, in terms of peacetime policy, of our second major objective: namely, to bring about an alteration of the concepts of international relations prevalent in Moscow governing circles.

As has been seen above, There is no reasonable prospect that we will ever be able to alter the basic political psychology of the men now in power in the Soviet Union. The malevolent character of their outlook on the outside world, their repudiation of the possibility of permanent peaceful collaboration, their belief in the inevitability of the eventual destruction of the one world by the other: these things must remain, if only tor the simple reason that the Soviet leaders are convinced that their own system will not stand comparison with the civilization of the west and that it will never be secure until the example of a prosperous and powerful western civilization has been physically obliterated and its memory discredited. This is not to mention the fact that these men are committed to the theory of inevitable conflict between the two worlds by the strongest of all commitments: namely, the fact that they have inflicted the punishment of death or of great suffering and hardship on millions of people in the name of this theory.

On the other hand, the Soviet leaders are prepared to recognize situations, if not arguments. If, therefore, situations can be created in which it is clearly noi. to the advantage of their power to emphasize the elements of conflict in their relations with the outside world, then their actions, and even the tenor of their propaganda to their own people, can be modified. This was made
evident in the recent war when the circumstances of their military association with the western powers had the effect just described. In this instance, the modification of their policies was of relatively short duration; for with the end of hostilities they thought they saw an opportunity for gaining important objectives of their own regardless of the feelings and views of the western powers. This meant that the situation which had caused them to modify their policies no longer appeared to them to exist.

If, however, analogous situations could again be created in the future and the Soviet leaders compelled to recognize their reality, and if these situations could be maintained for a longer time, i.e., for a period long enough to encompass a respectable portion of the organic process of growth and change in Soviet political life, then they might have a permanent modifying effect on the outlook and habits of Soviet power. Even the relatively brief and perfunctory lip service done during the recent war to the possibility of collaboration among the major allies left a deep mark on the consciousness of the Russian public, and one which has undoubtedly caused serious difficulties to the regime, since the end of the war, in its attempt to revert to the old policies of hostility and subversion toward the western world. Yet all this occurred in a period in which there was absolutely no turnover of any importance in the Soviet leadership and no normal evolution of internal political life in the Soviet Union- Had it been necessary for the Soviet Government to observe these policies of circumspection and moderation toward the west for so long a period that the present leaders would have had to yield to other ones and that there would have been some normal evolution of Soviet political life in the face of these necessities, then it is possible that some real modification in Soviet outlook and behavior might eventually have been achieved.

It flows from this discussion that whereas we will not be able to alter the basic political psychology of the present Soviet leaders, there is a possibility that if we can create situations which, if long enough maintained, may cause them to soft-pedal their dangerous and improper attitude toward the west and to observe a relative degree of moderation and caution in their dealings with western countries. In this case, we could really say that we had begun to make progress toward a gradual alteration of the dangerous concepts which now underlie Soviet behavior.

Again, as in the case of the retraction of Soviet power, and, in fact, as in the case of any sound program of resistance to Soviet attempts at the destruction of western civilization, we must recognize that the Soviet leaders may see the writing on the wall and may prefer to resort to violence rather
than to permit these things to occur. It must be reiterated: that is the risk which we run not just in this, but in any sound policy toward the Soviet Union. It is inherent in the present nature of the Soviet Government; and nothing we may do can alter or remove it, This is not a problem new to the foreign relations of the United Stales. In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton stated:

"Let us recollect that peace or war will not always be left to our option;
that however moderate or unambitious we may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the ambition, of others."

In setting out, therefore, to alter the concepts by which the Soviet Government now operates in world affairs, we must again concede that the question of whether this aim can be achieved by peaceful means cannot he answered entirely by ourselves. But this does not excuse us from making the attempt.

We must say, therefore, that our third aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to create situations which will compel the Soviet Governntent to recognise the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving, at least outwardly, as though it were the converse of those concepts that were true.

This is of course primarily a question of keeping the Soviet Union politically, militarily, psychologically weak in comparison with the international forces outside of its control and of maintaining a high degree of insistence among the non-communist countries on the observance by Russia of the ordinary international decencies.

3. SPECIFIC AIMS

The aims listed above are all general in nature. To attempt to make them specific would lead us into an endless maze of attempts at verbal classification and would probably be more confusing than clarifying. For this reason, no attempt will be made here to spell out the possible forms of specific application of these aims. Many of these forms will easily suggest themselves to any who give thought to the interpretation of these, general aims in terms of practical policy and action. It will be seen for example, that a major factor in the achievement of all of these aims without exception, would be the degree to which we might succeed in penetrating or disrupting the iron curtain.

However, the question of specific interpretation may be considerably clarified by a brief indication of the negative side of the picture: in other words, by pointing out what our aims are not.

First of all, it is not our primary aim in time of peace to set the stage for a war regarded as inevitable. We do not regard war as inevitable. We do not repudiate the possibility that our overall objectives with respect to Russia may be successfully pursued without resort to war, We have to recognize the possibility of war, as something flowing logically and at all times from the present attitude of The Soviet leaders; and we have to prepare realistically for that eventuality.

But it would be wrong to consider that our policy rested on an assumption of an inevitability of war and was confined to preparations for an armed conflict. Thal is not the case. Our task at present, in the absence of a state of war automatically brought about by the actions of others, is to find means of pursuing our objectives successfully without resort to war ourselves. It includes preparations for a possible war, but we regard these as only subsidiary and precautionary rather than as the primary element of policy. We are still hoping and striving to achieve our objectives within the framework of peace. Should we at any time come to the conclusion (which is not excluded) that this is really impossible and that the relations between communist and non-communist worlds cannot proceed without eventual armed conflict, then The whole basis of this paper would be changed and our peacetime aims. as set forth herein, would have to be basically altered.

Secondly, it is not our peacetime aim to overthrow the Soviet Government. Admittedly, we are aiming at the creation of circumstances and situations which would be difficult for the present Soviet leaders to stomach, and which they would not like. It is possible that they might not be able, in the face of these circumstances and situations, to retain their power in Russia. But it must be reiterated: that is their business, not ours. This paper implies no judgment as to whether it is possible for the Soviet Government to behave with relative decency and moderation in external affairs and yet to retain its internal power in Russia. Should the situations to which our peacetime aims are directed actually come into being and should they prove intolerable to the maintenance, of internal Soviet power and cause the Soviet Government to leave the scene, we would view this development without regret; but we would not assume responsibility for having sought it or brought it about.

V. The Pursuit of our Basic Objectives in Time of War

This chapter treats of our aims with respect to Russia in the event that a state of war should arise between the United States and the USSR. It pro-
poses to set forth what we would seek as a favorable issue of our military operations.

1. THE IMPOSSIBILITIES

Before entering into a discussion of what we should aim to achieve in a war with Russia, let us first be clear in our own minds about those things which we could not hope to achieve.

In the first place we must assume that it will not be profitable or practically feasible for us To occupy and take under our military administration the entire territory of the Soviet Union. This course is inhibited by the size of that territory, by the number of its inhabitants, by the differences of language and custom which separate its inhabitants from ourselves, and by the improbability that we would find any adequate apparatus of local authority through which we could work.

Secondly, and in consequence of this first admission, we must recognize that it is not likely that the Soviet leaders would surrender unconditionally to us. It is possible that Soviet power might disintegrate during the stress of an unsuccessful war, as did that of the tsar’s regime during World War I. But even this is not likely. And if it did not so disintegrate, we could not be sure that we could eliminate it by any means short of an extravagant military effort designed to bring all of Russia under our control. We have before us in our experience with the Nazis an example of the stubbornness and tenacity with which a thoroughly ruthless and dictatorial regime can maintain its internal power even over a territory constantly shrinking as a consequence of military operations. The Soviet leaders would be capable of concluding a compromise peace, if pressed, and even one highly unfavorable to their own interests. But it is not likely that they would do anything, such as to surrender unconditionally, which would place themselves under The complete power of a hostile authority. Rather than do that, they would probably retire to the most remote village of Siberia and eventually perish, as Hitler did, under the guns of the enemy.

There is a strong possibility that if we were to take the utmost care, within limits of military feasibility, not to antagonize the Soviet people by military policies which would inflict inordinate hardship and cruelties upon them, there would be an extensive disintegration of Soviet power during the course of a war which progressed favorably from our standpoint, We would certainly he entirely Justified in promoting such a disintegration with every means at our disposal. This does not mean, however, that we could be sure of achieving the complete overthrow of the Soviet regime, in the sense of
the removal of its power overall the present territory of the Soviet Union.

Regardless of whether or not Soviet power endures on any of the present Soviet territory we cannot be sure of finding among the Russian people any other group of political leaders who would he entirely "democratic" as we understand that term.

While Russia has had her moments of liberalism, the concepts of democracy arc not familiar to the great mass of the Russian people, and particularly not to those who are temperamentally inclined to the profession of government. At the present rime, there are a number of interesting and powerful Russian political groupings, among the Russian exiles, all of which do lip service to principles of liberalism, to one degree or another, and any of which would probably he preferable to the Soviet Government, from our standpoint, as the rulers of Russia. But just how liberal these groupings would be, if they once had power, or what would be their ability to maintain their authority among the Russian people without resort to methods of police terror and repression, no one knows. The actions of people in power are often controlled far more by the circumstances in which they arc obliged to exercise that power than by the ideas and principles which animated them when they were in the opposition. In turning over the powers of government to any Russian group, it would never be possible for us to be certain that those powers would be exercised in a manner which our own people would approve. We would therefore always be taking a chance, in making such a choice, and incurring a responsibility which we could not be sure of meeting creditably.

Finally, we cannot hope really to impose our concepts of democracy within a short space of time upon any group of Russian leaders. In the long run, the political psychology of any regime which is even reasonably responsive to the will of the people must be that of the people themselves- But it has been vividly demonstrated through our experience in Germany and Japan that the psychology and outlook of a great people cannot be altered in a short space of time at the mere dictate or precept of a foreign power, even in the wake of total defeat and submission. Such alteration can flow only from the organic political experience of the people in question. The best that can be done by one country to bring about this sort of alteration in another is to change the environmental influences to which the people in question are subjected, leaving it to them to react to those influences in their own way.

All of the above indicates that we could not expect, in the aftermath of successful military operations in Russia, to create there an authority entirely submissive to our will or entirely expressive of our political ideals. We must
reckon with the strong probability that we would have to continue to deal, in one degree or another, with Russian authorities of whom we will not entirely approve, who will have purposes different from ours, and whose views and desiderata we wiil be obliged to take into consideration whether we like them or not. In other words, we could not hope to achieve any total assertion of our will on Russian territory, as we have endeavored to do in Germany and in Japan. We must recognize that whatever settlement we finally achieve must be a political settlement, politically negotiated.

So much for the impossibilities. Now what would be our possible and desirable aims in the event of a war with Russia? These, like the aims of peace, should flow logically from the basic objectives set forth in Chapter III.

2. THE RETRACTION OF SOCIET POWER

The first of our war aims must naturally be she destruction of Russian military influence and domination in areas contiguous to, but outside of, the borders of any Russian state.

Plainly, a successful prosecution of the war on our part would automatically achieve this effect throughout most, if not all, of the satellitc area. A succession of military defeats to the Soviet forces would probably so undermine the authority of the communist regimes in the eastern European countries that most of them would be overthrown. Pockets might remain, in the form of political Tito-ism, i.e., residual communist regimes of a purely national and local character. These we could probably afford to by-pass. Without the might and authority of Russia behind them, they would be sure either to disappear with lime or to evolve into normal national regimes with no more and no less of chauvinism and extremism than is customary to strong national governments in that area. We would of course insist on the cancellation of any formal traces of abnormal Russian power in that area, such as treaties of alliance, etc.

Beyond this. however, we have again the problem of the extent lo which we. would wish Soviet borders modified as a result of a successful military action in our part. We must face frankly the fact that we cannot answer this question at this time. The answer depends almost everywhere on the type of regime which would be left, in the wake of military operations, in the particular area in question. Should this regime be one which held out at least reasonably favorable prospects of observing the principles of liberalism in internal affairs and moderation in foreign policy, it might be possible to leave under its authority most, if not all, of the Territories gained by the So-
viet Union in the recent war. If, as is more probable, little dependence could be placed on the liberalism and moderation of a post-hostilities Russian authority, it might be necessary to alter these borders quite extensively. This must simply be chalked up as one of the questions which will have to be left open until the development of military and political events in Russia reveals to us the full nature of the post-war framework in which we will have to act.

We then have the question of the Soviet myth and of the ideological authority which the Soviet Government now exerts over people beyond The present satellite area. In the first instance, this will of course depend on the question of whether or not the present All-Union Communist Party continues to exert authority over any portion of the present Soviet territory, in the aftermath of another war. We have already seen that we cannot rule out this possibility. Should communist authority disappear, this question is automatically solved. It must be assumed, however, that in any event an unsuccessful issue of the war itself, from the Soviet standpoint, would probably deal a decisive blow to this form of the projection of Soviet power and influence.

However that may be, we must leave nothing to chance; and it should naturally be considered that one of our major war aims with respect to Russia would be to destroy thoroughly the structure of relationships by which the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens, or groups of citizens, in countries not under communist control.

3. THE ALTERATION OF THE RUSSIAN CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Our next problem is again that of the concepts by which Russian policy would be governed in the aftermath of a war. How would we assure ourselves that Russian policy would henceforth be conducted along lines as close as possible to those which we have recognized above as desirable? This is the heart of the problem of our war aims with respect to Russia; and it cannot be given too serious attention.

In the first instance this is a problem of the future of Soviet power; that is, of the power of the communist party in the Soviet Union. This is an extremely intricate question. There is no simple answer to it. We have seen that while we would welcome, and even strive for, the complete disintegration and disappearance of Soviet power, we could not be sure of achieving this entirely. We could therefore view this as a maximum, but not a minimum, aim.

Assuming, then, that there might be a portion of Soviet territory on which we would find it expedient to tolerate the continued existence of Soviet power, upon the conclusion of military operations, what should be our relationship to it? Would we consent to deal with it at all? If so, what sort of terms would we be willing to make?

First of all, we may accept it as a foregone conclusion that we would not be prepared to conclude a full-fledged peace settlement and/or resume regular diplomatic relations with any regime in Russia dominated by any of the present Soviet leaders or persons sharing their cast of Thought. We have had too bitter an experience, during the past fifteen years, with the effort to act as though normal relations were possible with such a regime; and if we should now be forced to resort to war to protect ourselves from the consequences of their policies and actions, our public would hardly be in a mood to forgive the Soviet leaders for having brought things to this pass, or to resume the attempt at normal collaboration.

On the other hand, if a communist regime were to remain on any portion of Soviet territory, upon the conclusion of military operations, we could not afford to ignore it entirely. It could not fail to be, within the limits of its own possibilities, a potential menace to the peace and stability of Russia itself and of the world. The least we could do would be to see to it that its possibilities for mischief were so limited that it could not do serious dam’ age, and that we ourselves, or forces friendly to us, would retain all the necessary controls.

For this, two things would probably be necessary. The first would be the actual physical limitation of the power of such a residual Soviet regime to make war or to threaten and intimidate other nations or other Russian regimes. Should military operations lead to any drastic curtailment of the territory over which the communists held sway, particularly such a curtailment as would deprive them of key factors in the present military-industrial structure of the Soviet Union, this physical limitation would automatically flow from that. Should the territory under their control not be substantially diminished, the same result could be obtained by extensive destruction of important industrial and economic targets from the air. Possibly, both of these means might be required. However that may be, we may definitely conclude that we could not consider our military operations successful if they left a communist regime in control of enough of the present military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable them to wage war on comparable terms with any neighboring state or with any rival authority which might be set up on traditional Russian territory.

The second thing required, if Soviet authority is to endure at all in the traditional Russian territories, will probably be some sort of terms defining at least its military relationship to ourselves and to the authorities surrounding it. In other words, it may be necessary for us to make some sort of deal with a regime of this sort. This may sound distasteful to us now, but it is quite possible that we would find our interests better protected by such a deal than by the all-out military effort which would be necessary to stamp out Soviet power entirely.

It is safe to say that such terms would have to be harsh ones and distinctly humiliating to the communist regime in question. They might well be something along the lines of the Bresl-Litovsk settlement of 1918(*3) which deserves careful study in this connection. The fact that the Germans made this settlement did not mean that they had really accepted the permanency of the Soviet regime. They regarded the settlement as one which rendered the Soviet regime momentarily harmless to them and in a poor position to face the problems of survival. The Russians realized that this was the German purpose. They agreed to the settlement only with the greatest of reluctance, and with every intention of violating it at every opportunity. But the German superiority of force was real; and the German calculations realistic. Had Germany not suffered defeat in the west soon after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk agreement, it is not likely that the Soviet Government would have been able to put up any serious opposition to the accomplishment of German purposes with respect to Russia. It is in this sense that it might be necessary for this Government to deal with the Soviet regime in the latter phases of an armed conflict.

(*3). Treaty of Brest-Lilovsk, signed March 3, 1918, ended hostilities between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers on the basis of provisions that included the independence of the Ukraine, Georgia. Finland, the transfer to the Central Powers of Poland, the Baltic States, and portions of Byelorussia, and the cession of Kars, Ardahan. and Batum to Turkey. As part of the armistice agreement between Germany and the Western Powers on November II. 1918, Germany was forced to repudiate this treaty. [Ed. note]

It is impossible to forecast what the nature of such terms should be. The smaller the territory left at the disposal of such a regime, the easier ihe task of imposing terms satisfactory to our interests. Taking the worst case, which would be that of the retention of Soviet power over all, or nearly all, of present Soviet territory, we would have to demand:

(a) Direct military terms (surrender of equipment, evacuation of key areas, etc.) designed to assure military helplessness for a long time in advance;

(b) Terms designed to produce a considerable economic dependence on the outside world;

(c) Terms designed to give necessary freedom, or federal status, to national minorities (we would at least have to insist on the complete liberation of the Baltic States and on the granting of some type of federal status to the Ukraine which would make it possible for a Ukrainian local authority to have a large measure of autonomy); and

(d) Terms designed to disrupt the iron curtain and to assure a liberal flow of outside ideas and a considerable establishment of personal contact between persons within the zone of Soviet power and persons outside it.

So much for our aims with respect to any residual Soviet authority. There remains the question of what our aims would be with respect to any non-communist authority which might be set up on a portion or all of Russian territory as a consequence of the events of war.

First of all, it should be said that regardless of the ideological basis of any such non-communist authority and regardless of the extent to which it might be prepared to do lip service to the ideals of democracy and liberalism, we would do well to see that in one way or another the basic purposes were assured which flow from the demands listed above. In other words, we should set up automatic safeguards to assure that even a regime which is non-communist and nominally friendly to us:

(a) Does not have strong military power;

(b) Is economically dependent to a considerable extent on the outside world;

(c) Does not exercise too much authority over the major national minorities; and

(d) Imposes nothing resembling the iron curtain over contacts with the outside world.

In the case of such a regime, professing hostility to the communists and friendship toward us, we should doubtless wish to take care i.o impose these conditions in a manner which would not be offensive or humiiiating. But we would have to see to it that in one way or another they were imposed, if our interests and the interests of world peace were to be protected.

We are therefore safe in saying that it should be our aim in the event of war with the Soviet Union, to see to it that when the war was over no regime on Russian territory is permitted:

(a) To retain military force on a scale which could be threatening to any neighboring stale;

(b) To enjoy a measure of economic autarchy which would permit the erection of the economic basis of such armed power without the assistance of the western world;

(c) To deny autonomy and self-government to the main national minorities; or

(d) To retain anything resembling the present iron curtain. If these conditions are assured, we can adjust ourselves to any political situation which may ensue from the war. We will then be safe, whether a Soviet government retains the bulk of Russian territory or whether it retains only a small part of such territory or whether it disappears altogether. And we will be safe even though the original democratic enthusiasm of a new regime is short-lived and tends to be replaced gradually by the a-social concepts of international affairs to which the present Soviet generation has been educated.

The above should be adequate as an expression of our war aims in the event that political processes in Russia take their own course under the stresses of war and that we are not obliged to assume major responsibility for the political future of the country. But there are further questions to be answered for the event that Soviet authority should disintegrate so rapidly and so radically as to leave the country in chaos, making it encumbent upon us as the victors to make political choices and to take decisions which would be apt to shape the political future of the country. For this eventuality there are three main questions which must be faced.

4. PARTITION VS. NATIONAL UNITY

First of all, would it be our desire, in such a case, that the present territories of the Soviet Union remain united under a single regime or that they be partitioned? And if they are to remain united, at least to a large extent, then what degree of federalism should be observed in a future Russian government? What about the major minority groups, in particular the Ukraine?

We have already taken note of the problem of the Baltic states. The Baltic states should not be compelled to remain under any communist authority in the aftermath of another war. Should the territory adjacent To the Baltic slates be controlled by a Russian authority other than a communist authority, we should be guided by the wishes of the Baltic peoples and by the degree of moderation which that Russian authority is inclined to exhibit with respect to them.

In the case of the Ukraine, we have a different problem. The Ukrainians are the most advanced of the peoples who have been under Russian rule in modern times. They have generally resented Russian domination; and their nationalistic organizations have been active and vocal abroad. It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that they should be freed, at last, from Russian rule and permitted to set themselves up as an independent slate.

We would do well to beware of this conclusion. Us very simplicity condemns it in terms of eastern European realities.

It is True that the Ukrainians have been unhappy under Russian rule and that something should be done to protect their position in future. But there are certain basic fads which must not be lost sight of. While the Ukrainians have been an important and specific element in the Russian empire, they have shown no signs of being a ‘"nation" capable of bearing successfully the responsibilities of independence in the face of great Russian opposition. The Ukraine is not a clearly defined ethnical or geographic concept. In general, the Ukrainian population made up of originally in large measure out of refugees from Russian or Polish despotism shades off imperceptibly into the Russian or Polish nationalities. There is no clear dividing line between Russia and the Ukraine, and it would be impossible to establish one. The cities in Ukrainian territory have been predominantly Russian and Jewish. The real basis of "Ukrainianism" is the feeling of "difference" produced by a specific peasant dialect and by minor differences of custom and folklore throughout the country districts. The political agitation on the surface is largely the work of a few romantic intellectuals, who have little concept of the responsibilities of government.

The economy of the Ukraine is inextricably intertwined with that of Russia as a whole. There has never been any economic separation since the territory was conquered from the nomadic Tatars and developed for purposes of a sedentary population. To attempt to carve it out of the Russian economy and to set it up as something separate would be as artificial and as destructive as an attempt to separate the Corn Belt, including the Great Lakes industrial area, from the economy of the United States.

Furthermore, the people who speak the Ukrainian dialect have been split, like those who speak the White Russian dialect, by a division which in eastern Europe has always been the real mark of nationality: namely, religion- If any real border can be drawn in the Ulcraine, it should logically be the border between the areas which traditionally give religious allegiance to the Eastern Church and those which give it to the Church of Rome.

Finally, we cannot he indifferent to the feelings of the Great Russians themselves. They were the strongest national element in the Russian Empire, as they now are in the Soviet Union. They will continue to be the strongest national element in that general area, under any status. Any long-term U.S. policy must be based on their acceptance and their cooperation. The Ukrainian territory is as much a part of their national heritage as the Middle West is of ours, and they are conscious of that fact. A solution which attempts to separate the Ukraine entirely from the rest of Russia is
bound TO incur their resentment and opposition, and can be maintained, in the last analysis, only by force- There is a reasonable chance that the Great Russians could be induced to tolerate the renewed independence of the Baltic states. They tolerated the freedom of those territories from Russian rule for long periods in the past; and they recognize, subconsciously if not other’ wise, that the respective peoples are capable of independence. With respect to the Ukrainians, things arc different. They are loo close to the Russians to be able to set themselves up successfully as something wholly different, For better or for worse, they will have to work out their destiny in some sort of special relationship to the Great Russian people.

It seems clear that this relationship can be at best a federal one, under which the Ukraine would enjoy a considerable measure of political and cultural autonomy but would not be economically or militarily independent. Such a relationship would be entirely just to the requirements of the Great Russians themselves, it would seem, therefore, to be along these lines that U.S. objectives with respect to the Ukraine should be framed.

It should be noted that this question has far more than just a distant future significance. Ukrainian and Great Russian elements among the Russian emigre-opposition groups are already competing vigorously for U.S. support. The manner in which we receive their competing claims may have an important influence on the development and success of the movement for political freedom among the Russians, It is essential, therefore, that we make our decision now and adhere to it consistently. And that decision should be neither a pro-Russian one nor a pro-Ukrainian one, but one which recognizes the historical geographic and economic realities involved and seeks for the Ukrainians a decent and acceptable place in the family of the traditional Russian Empire, of which they form an inextricable part.

It should be added that while, as stated above, we would not deliberately encourage Ukrainian separatism, nevertheless if an independent regime were to come into being on the territory of the Ukraine through no doing of ours, we should not oppose it outright. To do so would be to undertake an undesirable responsibility for internal Russian developments. Such a regime would be bound to be challenged eventually from the Russian side. If it were to maintain itself successfully, mat would be proof that the above analysis was wrong and that the Ukraine docs have the capacity for, and the moral right to, independent status. Our policy in the first instance should be to maintain an outward neutrality, as long as our own interests—military or otherwise—were not immediateiy affected. And only if it became clear that an undesirable deadlock was developing, we would encourage a composing
of the differences along the lines of a reasonable federalism. The same would apply to any other efforts at the achievement of an independent status on the part of other Russian minorities. It is not likely that any of the other minorities could successfully maintain real independence for any length of time. However, should they attempt it (and it is quite possible that the Caucasian minorities would do this), our attitude should be the same as in the case of the Ukraine. We should be careful not to place ourselves in a position of open opposition to such attempts, which would cause us to lose permanently the sympathy of the minority in question. On the other hand, we should not commit ourselves to their support to a line of action which in the long run could probably be maintained only with our military assistance.

5. THE CHOICE OF A NEW RULING GROUP

In the event of a disintegration of Soviet power, we are certain to be faced with demands for .support on the part of the various competing political elements among the present Russian opposition groups. It will be almost impossible for us to avoid doing things which would have the effect of favoring one or another of these groups over its rivals. But a great deal will depend on ourselves, and on our concept of what we are trying to accomplish.

We have already seen that among the existing and potential opposition groups there is none which we will wish to sponsor entirely and for whose actions, if it were to obtain power in Russia, we would wish to take responsibility.

On the other hand, we must expect that vigorous efforts will be made by various groups to induce us to take measures in Russian internal affairs which will constitute a genuine commitment on our part and make it possible for political groups in Russia to continue to demand our support. In the light of these facts, it is plain then we must make a. determined effort to avoid taking responsibility for deciding who would rule Russia in the wake of a disintegration of the Soviet regime. Our best course would be to permit all the exiled elements to return to Russia as rapidly as possible and to see to it, in so far as this depends on us, that they are all given roughly equal opportunity to establish their bids for power. Our basic position must be that in the final analysis the Russian people will have to make their own choices, and that we do not intend to influence those choices. We should therefore avoid having proteges, and should try to see to it that all of the competing groups receive facilities for putting their case to the Russian people through the media of public information. It is probable that there will be violence between these groups. Even in this instance, we should not interfere unless our military interests are affected or unless there should be an attempt on the part of one group to establish its authority by large-scale and savage repression along totalitarian lines, affecting not just the opposing political leaders but the mass of the population itself.

6. THE PROBLEM OF "DE-COMMUNIZATION"

In any territory which is freed of Soviet rule, we will be faced with the problem of the human remnants of the Soviet apparatus of power.

It is probable that in the event of an orderly withdrawal of Soviet forces from present Soviet territory, the local communist party apparatus would go underground, as it did in the areas taken by the Germans during the recent war. It would then probably reemerge in part in the form of partisan bands and guerrilla forces. To this extent, the problem of dealing with it would be a relatively simple one; for we would need only to give the necessary arms and military support to whatever non-communist Russian authority might control the area and permit that authority to deal with the communist bands through the traditionally thorough procedures of Russian civil war.

A more difficult problem would be presented by minor communist party members or officials who might be uncovered and apprehended, or who might throw themselves on the mercy of our forces or of whatever Russian authority existed in the territory.

Here, again, we should refrain from taking upon ourselves the responsibility of disposing of these people or of giving direct orders to the local authorities as to how to do so. We would have a right to insist that they be disarmed and that they not come into leading positions in government unless they had given clear evidence of a genuine change of heart. Bul basically this must remain a problem for whatever Russian authority may take the place of the communist regime. We may be sure that such an authority will be more capable than we ourselves would be to judge the danger which ex-communists would present to the security of the new regime, and to dispose of them in such ways as to prevent their being harmful in the future. Our main concern should be to see that no communist regime, as such, is re-established in areas which we have once liberated and which we have decided should remain liberated from communist control. Beyond that, we should be careful not to become entangled in the problem of "de-communization."

The basic reason for this is that the political processes of Russia are strange and inscrutable. They contain nothing that is simple, and nothing that can be taken for granted. Rarely, if ever, are the colors straight black or
white. The present communist apparatus of power probably embraces a large proportion of those persons who are fitted by training and inclination to take part in the processes of government, Any new regime will probably have to utilize the services of many of these people in order to be able to govern at all. Furthermore, we are incapable of assessing in each individual case the motives which have brought individuals in Russia into association with the communist movement. We are also incapable of assessing the degree to which such association will appear discreditable or criminal to other Russians, in retrospect. It would be dangerous for us to proceed on the basis of any fixed assumptions in such matters. We must always remember that to be the subject of persecution at the hands of a foreign government inevitably makes local martyrs out of persons who might otherwise only have been the objects of ridicule.

We would be wiser, therefore, in the case of territories freed from communist control, to restrict ourselves to seeing to it that individual ex-communists do not have the opportunity to reorganize as armed groups with pretenses to political power and that the local non-communist authority is given plenty of arms and help in any measures which they may desire to take with respect to them.

We may say, therefore, that we would not make it our aim to carry out with our own forces, on territory liberated from the communist authorities, aпy large-scale program of de-communication, and that In general we would leave this problem to whatever local authority might supplant Soviet rule.

The Upside-down World of the Western Main Stream Media (MSM)


MSM – only the truthful information

I’ve been meaning to post the above caricature for quite some time, but as it is usual with many of my posts, it’s been sitting in draft until I felt it “matured” enough. Now, I saw a convergence of two seemingly insignificant events, that made it feel like a good time to post this image.

It is not a secret that anything published in the Western main-stream media about Russia (as well as China, or Syria, or any other state that the Western elites feel is in need of some “democratic bombings”), is presented through a certain prism, where either partial truths or outright lies are given to the audience to form an image of an enemy.

This can be seen in the materials, published both…

… in Peace …

Seemingly such an innocent thing, a report by one of the many Russian TV channels on a vegetable shortage in Europe… But look how it got blown out of proportions both by the 5th column inside and the agents of influence outside of Russia.

Here I am going to demonstrate how the above caricature applies to the everyday reporting. Take a look at the following article in one of the main Norwegian newspapers, Aftenposten: Russlands største TV-kanal hevder det er rasjonering på grønnsaker i butikkene i Norge (Russia’s biggest TV channel claims that there is rationing on the vegetables in Norway). Remember this headline. Interestingly, it is perceived by the population as “Russia is claiming…” – that’s how some people I know recited the story to me.

The article above cites a Russian TV channel – TV1. It translates some snippets of the material, but not all of them, making it sound as if the Russian channel is postulating that it is explicitly in Norway that we ration broccoli and experience vegetable shortage. To Aftenposten’s credit, they provide the link to the channel’s news-item, but who is going to go there and verify it anyway, it being in Russian?

Aftenposten provides the following picture:

With the sub-text of that’s how Russian TV channel presents the state of affairs in Norway, Denmark and Britain. Looks dramatic, right? Russians must be out of their minds, right?

That’s what they want you to think. And they don’t even stop there. In the second half of the article, Aftenposten presents it as “Kremlin’s propaganda” for “Putin’s Russia”, etc, etc.

Let’s go to the source…

http://www.1tv.ru/news/2017/02/04/319211-evropeyskie_pokupateli_stolknulis_s_defitsitom_ovoschey_v_supermarketah

It’s a 35-second long filler news snippet, and I’ll give the full translation here:

“Three salads into one hands. European buyers have come to face a shortage of vegetable in the supermarkets. It is unusually empty in the shops of Britain, Norway, Denmark. What’s left in stores is being rationed, for example, selling a few salads and broccolis per person. And the prices are very high – squashes and aubergines saw a price hike of almost 4 times over the last month. The reason for this is a harvest failure due to very cold winter in Italy and Spain – the main suppliers of vegetables during this time of the year. First the agricultural areas where flooded by rain, and then came frost. Experts say, that if the weather does not become better, Europe can also experience shortage of the citrus fruits.”

That’s it. But wait…

This is a still frame from the report, and what does it say? “Photo from the site of www.dailymail.co.uk”. That attribution was “conveniently” omitted in the image, published in the Norwegian Aftenposten.

A quick search leads us to this article:

Supermarkets RATION salads and veg after storms in Spain devastate crops with shortages due to last until APRIL (and a box of 12 iceberg lettuces is even being offered on Gumtree for £50)

So! It wasn’t the “crazy Russians spinning a lie”, but rather a short translation of an article from the British Daily Mail. But that won’t sound as sensationalist, would it?

And going back to the outrage, demonstrated by Aftenposten, I did a quick search in the Norwegian news items, and here is what came up:

Grønnsaksmangel etter uvær i Sør-Europa: – Situasjonen er svært krevende (Vegetable shortage after bad weather in Southern Europe – The situation is very demanding). And in it they say that the supply of vegetables to Northern Europe is halved, compared to the same time last year. They even quote PR chief of one of the largest Norwegian supermarket chains COOP, Harald Kristiansen, as saying that it concerns mostly broccoli and iceberg salad, but also, to a lesser degree paprika, tomatoes, cauliflower… I personally noticed a shortage of eco-salads and eco-tomatos, which I usually buy, and which I have not seen in the shops for about a month, without giving it a second thought – there were enough of the local greenhouse non-eco alternatives on the shelves.

So, the news item on TV1 was also truthful, when they included Norway! I’ll leave it to the reader to research the Danish newsfront.

Towards the end of the article, Aftenposten actually refers to the British tabloids, but presents it as if Russian media “twists the British publication”. From my translation above, where does it twist anything?

And finally they say that they took contact with TV1 fro comment about the “source foundation for the material”, but got no answer. But the source was specified in the material all along!

Funnily, not only The Daily Mail published these news:
BBC: European vegetables: ‘Perfect storm’ raises prices
The Telegraph: What is causing the 2017 vegetable shortage and what does it mean for consumers?
The Sun: IT’S THE A-BROC-ALYPSE! ‘Perfect storm’ of bad weather wipes out vegetables in Europe – and it’s set to send the price of lettuce, broccoli and peppers soaring in UK supermarkets

What I find interesting in all of this, is how it got quickly tied to “Russia”, “Russia’s biggest TV channel”, and the subsequent demonstration and ridicule on the net, tie in to “Kremlin propaganda”, and the usual ad hominem attack – “Putin’s Russia”. In other words, Western MSM business as usual.

First of all, TV1 is a fully-private channel, with some of its owners spending more time in London, than in Moscow. As there is no censorship on the Russian mediascape, each channel, or media outlet publishes whatever they want – isn’t it what the West wanted all along?

Secondly, how this got twisted in the Russian “5th column environment”:
“Radio Svoboda” – the very same that has a stated goal of government change in Russia (and played the same role against USSR), published a stream of Tweet ridicules under the title “Hungry Europe”, without bothering to say where the news come from and blaming it all on Russia. A series of other “liberal resources” wailed about Russia spreading fakes, for example here, here and here (the last one is an example of how it gets spread on the social media by people who don’t care about doing a source research). And only one outlet, Meduza.io, tried to come to the bottom of it.

Mission accomplished.

As the Russian saying goes, they “made an elephant out of a fly”. And drew Russia’s name through mud in the process. All, over a 35-second long filler newsreel, which was a re-telling of a British news item. All the while leaving the original source, the complete picture, out of the view. Take a look at the caricature at the beginning of my post once again. Telling isn’t it?

… and in War

Presenting half-truths or big lies is typical of any war-mogering propaganda. I could exemplify with Ukraine and its populace at large, that have become ensnared in this kind of the nets of deception, but we can go even bit further back in history, to the Goebbels/Hitler propaganda in the Nazi Germany, and how the people of Germany were made to believe that they were liberating the Eastern lands…

Fast forward to 2008…

In the sitrep article at The Saker, Sandwiching NATO in Ukraine Scott Humor writes:

As we all know the plans to instigate war between Russia and Ukraine go way back. It’s kinetic stage, however, started in 2008. Immediately after the skirmishes in South Ossetia with Georgian and NATO troops in August 2008, in October the Washington Times publishes an article of Jeffrey Kuhner: “Will Russia-Ukraine be Europe’s next war?”

“Europe faces the risk of another major war. In 1939, Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland triggered the Second World War. Today the possible trip wire is not Poland, but Ukraine. And the aggressor will not be Adolf Hitler, but Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.”

That’s a statement; it’s not an analyses, or expert opinion, its a statement of intent. This statement was made not by anyone in the government of Russia. This statement was made by the “deep state” globalist government. It says that they are about to stage a major war in Europe. Like the previous big war in Europe, this new war will be fought under the fascists and Nazi flags. They also say that they will start this war on the territory of Ukraine, the war will be against Russia, and Russians will become the appointed aggressors and even “the invaders“ of their own homeland.

This is a typical for globalists switch, when the victims are named aggressors, and that the Western powers act in order to “stop an aggression” and even better “to prevent an aggression.”

Just let me reiterate: The West calls Russians, who for centuries (if not millennia) living in the Don river basin (Donbas), the descendants of those Russians, who in 1813 liberated Europe from Napoelonic forces, and restored the kingdom of the Netherlands, the Russians who fended off the German invasion of the Don river basin in 1941-43, they call these Russians for “invaders” on their own land! The same justification, that also Hitler used to start his war!

The West went even further to reinforce the parallel.

In 1941 German soldiers were photographing against the backdrop of the Russian fortress of Ivangorod in Narva:

And on February 10th 2017, the Americans decided to repeat the feat. Wonder if the consequences will be the same…

So, with the help of MSM, a Westerner is prepped with a picture of an enemy: a crazy Russian, who must be “liberated” from his own values, political structure, country, life. That’s how wars were usually started by the West, and it always historically fell on Russia’s peoples shoulders to end those wars and bring back balance and peace to our one common continent: Eurasia.

To wrap it up…

Always check the source, even in the face of a simple newsitem, and especially if it want to play on your emotions. Earlier I translated a fragment of a Russian documentary, The Nets of Deception – False Reality, and it would be a good moment to revisit it again.

Seek alternative sources of information. There are a few English-language sources, which will give you either a second opinion, or a direct and unadulterated version directly from the source, here to name a few:

Croudfunded media outlet Russia Insider
Lada Ray’s Futurist Trendcast
The Saker
RT
Global Research
Paul Craig Roberts
TASS
Sputnik News

When Rouble Was Golden – Russia that we lost in the ashes of WWI and the coup d’etats of 1914-1917

In the years before Russia got drawn into WWI, it was displaying fabulous growth, both socially and economically. WWI, also known as the “War of 4 cousins” – as all heads of the warring states were blood relatives – was a disaster for Russia, and weakened it sufficiently to facilitate the second – internal – disaster of 1917, which all but destroyed it.

One of the contemporary writers said that “Pity that we have Nikolai the Second, and not the second Nikolai”, referring to the strong in the will Nikolai I. Nikolai II, while being praised by the Western (British) powers, delivered Russia on a platter, and then was dumped by the Brits to be executed by the followers of their agent – Lenin. There was only one other Russian ruler, who was praised as highly by the West – Yeltsin, who caused destruction of Russia almost to the point of no return in the “Wild 90s”.

In November 1914 the Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold wrote: “Our main goal in this war lies in the long-term weakening of Russia.” Oh, how well they succeeded!

What did Russia lose? Marking the coming 100th anniversary of the two coup d’etats of 1917, Russian weekly “Argumenty and Fakty” publishes in 2016 a series of articles – “When Rouble was Golden” – showing some key points of Russian life before WWI. Here I want to present the translation of the series.

1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2Please note that translating a documentary film or an article takes a lot of time and emotional effort. I am doing it on a voluntary basis, but if someone feels like supporting my work, a Bitcoin donation to the following address is appreciated: 1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2




Publication of 03.02.2016, regarding the foundations of the Russian economics.


Harvest. Urals, 1907

What was the country, that lost forever? What was the foundation of its economy, when oil was not the main article of Russian exports nor the main source of state revenues? Argumenty i Fakty got at its disposal a unique booklet, first published in 1958 in New York City in 8 thousand copies. Edited by B. Brazol, it compiled statistics showing that over the last 15-20 years before the First World War, Russia made giant steps forward both in the economy, and in the development of the social and educational systems.

“AiF” starts a series of articles in which we will talk about how our country developed in the early twentieth century. In this edition we will focus on the golden rouble and gold reserves, revenues and expenditures of the state budget, taxes and savings.

A strong currency

During the reign of Emperor Nicholai II, by the law of 1896 Russia introduced the gold currency standard. That is, the issuance from each rouble was tied to the amount of gold reserves of the country. In case of emergency, the state Bank was granted the right to issue 300 million paper roubles not backed by gold, but it never used this right. The rouble was equal to 0,7 grammes of pure gold. As for the paper money (banknotes) and gold coins — they were equal in value. The content of the precious metal in the golden rouble surpassed the gold content of the coins of other countries. The rouble as the currency enjoyed a steady demand both inside the country and in the world.

In that period the financial system of all developed countries were also based on the gold standard — the amount of money had to match the size of the gold reserves of a country. Today the exchange rate is determined by its correlation with the dollar, while gold is a regular market commodity.

Positive budget

Russia of that time built its policy not only on a balanced budget, but also on the principle of substantial accumulation of gold reserves. Despite this and without any increase in the tax burden, the state income steadily grew from 1,410 billion in 1897, whereas the government spending remained more or less on the same level. Over the last ten years before the First World War, the excess of government revenue over expenditure amounted to 2.4 billion roubles. This amount is all the more impressive if one remembers that during the reign of Nicholai II, railway tariffs were lowered, redemption payments for land ceded to serfs from their former landlords in 1861 were abolished, as well as some taxes were cancelled.

Infographics: Budget of the Russian Empire by year

Legend: Blue sack – income; gold coins – expenditures; in the circle – income over expenditure surplus; in 1912: * in squares – converted to 2016-roubles.
млн – million; млрд – billion; трлн – trillion

Low taxes

Total sum of taxes per capita in Russia was more than twice lower than in Austria, France and Germany, while compared with England it was four times lower.

Infographics: Total sum of taxes per capita in roubles

Legend: in the circle – roubles; white square* – converted into 2016 roubles (20700p).

The welfare of the citizens

In 1914, the State Savings Bank had deposits for 2,236 billion roubles. From 1904 accumulation of the Russians on savings accounts was steadily increasing — with the exception of 1905, which coincided with the Russian-Japanese war and the revolution.

Infographics: Saving deposits by the population

Legend: млн – million; млрд – billion; трлн – trillion
White square* – converted into 2016 roubles
1 golden rouble was equal to 0.774235 gramme of pure gold, ad at today’s (2016) Central Bank rate would have cost about 2282 roubles.

Bread and Tariffs

The Treasury of the Russian Empire is the dream of any Finance Ministry: minimum os social spending, — said Sergei Bespalov, historian, senior researcher of the Ranepa.

— Russia in the XIX-XX centuries was more fortunate than in the beginning of the XXI century — it’s the Ministry of Finance was successively headed by several talented administrators. First N. Bunge, then I. Vyshnegradsky, and finally, S. Witte. They were engaged in the replenishment of gold reserves, while Vyshnegradsky began preparation of the currency reform, which was conducted by Witte. The reform not only made the rouble convertible, what’s more important, it was valued internally. In addition, Witte cleverly borrowed from foreign banks at low interest rates. Re-borrowing, he managed to reduce payments on previous debts.

Vyshnegradsky is credited with the phrase: “we’ll eat less, but will export”, which refers to the export of bread. he could have well said it, because the export of grain for the Russian Empire was the most important source of income for the Treasury — almost like oil today. And the volume of grain exports had to be maintained at a high level. Exporters of bread were mostly not the peasants, but the large landlords farm — the agricultural firms of today.

The flourishing economy of Russia in the early XX century was carefully prepared. A major achievement of the Ministry of Finance, besides the gold rouble, can and should be considered the Customs Tariff of 1891 which was developed by Dmitri Mendeleev. There is a legend that it was the Customs Tariff, and not the periodic system of chemical elements, that he considered to be his main achievement. Mendeleev was a close ally to Sergei Witte. Customs Tariff helped to protect the market from cheap imports and to develop domestic industry. At the same time, high tariffs led to a rise in import prices, resulting in the Tariff having many opponents.

A major source of revenue waere taxes. It is believed that they were lower than in other countries. However, the standard of living in Russia in the early XX century was also lower. With this in mind, it turns out that the tax burden was comparable to other countries — there no difference “in magnitudes”. In addition to taxes, the Treasury was receiving “redemption payments” — the peasants up to 1905 paid for the purchase of the land from the landlords during the abolition of serfdom.

Government spendings were by a degree smaller — there were almost no social expenditures, pensions were paid to a narrow group of the population. But when they were paid… The whole of his numerous family, including the future leader of the proletariat, lived for many years on the pension, received after death of the Director of public schools in Simbirsk province, Ilya Ulyanov (Lenin’s father).




Publication of 15.02.2016, regarding the development of the industry.


The view from Dorogomilovo to partnership calico factory of Albert Hubner in Moscow.

In this edition we will focus on the development of industry and entrepreneurship, the construction of railways and the already establishing social legislation.

Industrial growth

In the period between 1890 and 1913, the productivity of Russian industry by grew four times. Its revenues not only nearly equalled to the income from agriculture — the produce covered almost 4/5 of the domestic demand for manufactured products.


Upper left corner: value, produced by the Russian factories in billions of roubles
Upper right corner: Construction of agricultural machinery in million of roubles.
Table with comparison of production between 1895 and 1914, top to bottom, in [млн – million / тыс. – thousand] of tonnes: coal, oil, gold, copper, magnesium, cast iron, iron/steel, salt, sugar.

Protection of workers

Industrial development caused a rapid increase in the number of factory workers. It should be noted that the laws relating to the protection of labour, were first published in Russia in the XVIII century, during the reign of Empress Catherine II. In the reign of Nicholai II were issued the laws to ensure the safety of workers in the mining industry, on the railways and in factories, constituting particular danger to life and health, such as gunpowder factories.

Child labour under 12 years of age was prohibited, minors and women were not allowed to work in night shift. Fines were not to exceed one third of the salary. In 1912 there was adopted the law on insurance payments due to illness, for child birth and accidents. Workers unions were recognized by law, strikes were allowed.

Development of entrepreneurship

During the 4 years before the First World War, the number of newly founded joint stock companies increased more than 2-fold, and the capital invested in them — by almost 4 times.

The number of new stock companies and their capital in million of roubles:

The construction of railways

Railway length in thousand of kilometres, 1917 and 2016.

The Great Siberian Railway was the longest in the world.

58,2 thousand km of railways were built in 1880-1917 (1600km per year in average).

In 1916, that is in the midst of the war, Russia built more than 2 thousand km of railways, which connected the Arctic ocean (port Romanovsk, now Murmansk) with the centre of Russia.

On the eve of the war, more than 4/5th of the payments on external and domestic debt were secured by revenues that the state received from the operation of railways.

Russian railway for passengers was the cheapest and most comfortable in the world. Train rides through the Siberian railway.

The price of the growth

Russia in the early XX century made a sharp spurt in industrial development, but became – as is in our time – directly or indirectly owned by foreigners, says Vasily Simchera, former Director of the Institute of State Statistics Committee, the author of the work “Development of Economy of Russia over 100 years.”

Cast iron, steel, gold

— In the early twentieth century, Russia played a prominent role in the extractive industries, production of iron, steel, gold, furs, building materials, military equipment, machine building. According to the total volume of technical and economic development, the country was on the 5th place in the world (after the USA, Germany, UK and France). The volume of national property (60,3 billion gold rubles, while the United States had 397,4 billion in terms of gold roubles) also at the 5th place (in the domestic Russian market, the gold rouble was equal to paper rouble, while on the foreign market it cost 1.85 U.S. dollar to 1 rouble, though the paper rouble was not convertible. — Ed.). At the same time, judging by the production of iron, steel, metal, copper, gold, platinum, locomotives, wagons, grain, sugar and other 27 key indicators, Russia is among the top three countries in the world. Today (2016) it is not included even in the top ten.

Industrial production grew due to the measures of the tsarist government — the domestic manufacturers were provided with incentives, loans and allowances. Metallurgical factories were generously paid for railroad tracks by the Treasury. For the first 13 years of the XX century the volume of production in the country almost doubled, while foreign trade rose by 2,5 times. On the advice of Witte and Mendeleev, Nicholai II imposed significant restrictions on the export of crude oil in 1896 – to secure the development of domestic refining and engineering. Major industrial regions were formed: Central, Urals, St. Petersburg, Volga. Only during the years of Russia’s participation in World War I (1914-1917), the indicators of industrial production decreased, although individual industries (military equipment, food, import) on the contrary showed rapid development.

And whose is the money?

The flip side of acceleration was the increase of Russia’s dependence on foreign (mainly French, Belgian and British) capital. Witte and Stolypin strutted, but not all was good — the economy lacked money. The construction of railways — Caucasian, Chinese — underwent on foreign loans. Even the money of the Russian Industrialists were borrowed. Foreigners were especially eager to invest in the primary sector. Thus, the Donbass and Baku oilfields in fact belonged to the British. In general the foreigners owned at least 70% of its assets in commodities in the heavy and, to a lesser extent, in light industries. This dependency was the reason for the involvement of Russia into a world war it did not need, and the ensuing collapse of the Empire.




Publication of the 17.02.2016, second part regarding the economic foundations of Russia.

Recently, the United States acknowledged that this year (2016) Russia will be able to come out on top in the world in grain export. In the beginning of XX century our country has also fed the world with its bread.

Bread with butter

Agrarian reform of the early XX century wasleft unfinished, but its interim results gave birth to another 40 million Russians, believes Alexander Bessolitsyn, Professor at the Department of Economics, Ranepa:

– 1891-1892 was the last hungry years in the Russian Empire (later the famine only happened after 1917: in 1921-1922 in the Volga region, and in 1932-1933 as a result of collectivization). Harvests increased, also grew the export of grain from Russia. The government stimulated it through the banks – for example, the Russian-Asian, which invested the mostly borrowed from the Western bankers money into the export, built elevators, including offshore in the Azov and Black seas, tankers. There arose grain exchanges, bread was sold to the dealers both by the landlords and the peasants.

The Russian food exports of the beginning of the XX century is called by some experts “a hungry export”, while others say that the excess was exported. Both assessments are unfair. In 1913 the population of the Russian Empire had reached 166 million: in 15 years it grew by 40 million people – mostly rural residents. Per capita consumption of bread in this time was only a little below the norm of 500kg per year, and amounted to 459kg. But such a gap may not lead to starvation. Rapid population growth confirms that the life of the peasants was relatively stable.

Egypt, Turkey and other countries in the Middle East and the Northern Mediterranean were those countries that purchased Russian grain the most. Although it is believed that Russia fed Europe, our grain was mainly shipped to the colonies. It was the cheapest (a pound of rye in 1913 cost 91 kopecks) and was considered low quality – too diverse and clogged. Europeans looked upon it with disdain. Germany bought Russian rye for processing and then sold the flour back to us.

Eggs and butter were more valued – two of the main Russian export product of the period. We started to produce butter only in the 80-ies of the XIX century, but already in the beginning of XX century it was considered the best in the world. Belgium, France, Germany and the UK were eager to buy it.

Agriculture was considered by the Head of the Government, Sergei Witte, as a source of funds for industrialization. Later on the Bolsheviks treated it in the same way. Still, the Imperial government saw agriculture not only a cash cow. Witte announced a program of replacement of grain export by flour: Russia, being one of the leaders in the export of grain, controlled only 3% of the world flour market.

But landlords and peasants, together with the foreign bankers, did not support the idea – it was easier to ship out the grain, while the foreigners did not want to let Russia to a more lucrative market. This problem is not resolved till this day.

Agrarian reform, called after Stolypin (from translator: the fact that there were made 11 assassination attempts over 5 years on the Interior Minister Petr Stolypin speaks volumes! He was ultimately murdered on the 14th of September 1911 in Kiev.), was also developed in the period of the Witte government. It remained unfinished. But the interim results were impressive. The main rise of agricultural cooperation, resettlement of peasants to Siberia and its development.

The government stimulated the development of the village, but the Russian agricultural sector, even in this period of rapid development, all the time suffered from lack of money. Just as the rest of the Russian economy of the early XX century.

Crops

In 1913 the harvest of the main cereals in Russia was one-third higher than in Argentina, Canada and the USA combined. Our country was the main bread supplier for the Western Europe.

In the 20 years preceding the First World War, the harvest of bread almost doubled.


Infographics block by block:
Upper left: Average grain productivity of a “tenth” (1,09 hectare), in hundredweigt; Area of planting of sugar beets, in thousand of hectares.
Upper right: Yearly harvest of the cereals, in million tonnes. Note! In 2015 Russian Federation harvested 104.3 million tonnes grain – not much more than in 1913. In 2012 the harvest was even lower than in the pre-revolutionary Russia, when mainly horses were used in agriculture – 70.9 million tonnes.
Middle: Harvest of cotton, in thousand of tonnes. In 1913 cotton harvest fully covered the needs of the Russian textile industry.
Bottom: Harvest of flax, in thousand of tonnes. Comparing France, Autro-Hungary and Russia. Russia produces 80% of the world flax harvest before WWI.

Stolypin’s agrarian reform (started in 1906)

The peasant was allowed to leave the community and become individual and hereditary owner of the land. In 1913 already 2 million families have received plots. By the beginning of the First World War, 13% of communal land passed into individual ownership.


Infographics: Peasants owned in million of hectares.

The State Farming Bank was buying out landlord estates and giving them to the peasants on favourable lending (up to 90% of the land cost) low-interest terms (4.5%). As a result, in 1917 the peasants owned up to 90% of arable land in the European part of Russia and 100% in the Asian part.

Peasants were moved from European part of Russia, where there was not enough land, in Siberia. Migrants were exempt from taxes, given land (15 hectares for the head of the family, plus 45 hectares for the whole of the family), provided with an allowance (200 RUB) and transported with the whole economy at state expense. In Siberia the settlers were supplied with agricultural machinery.

One hundred years passed, and now in 2016, the Russians are again given free land in the Far East, but only 1(!) hectares per person. Feel the difference…


Infographics: Animal husbandry.
Cattle, in million heads. Note! In 2014 there was only 19,2 million heads of cattle in Russian Federation!
Horses, in million heads.
Export of eggs: 1908 2.59 billion for 54.8 million roubles, and in 1909 2.84 billion for 62.2 million roubles. Russia stood for 50% of world production of eggs.




Publication of 24.02.2016, regarding the state of education.


Nikolai Bgdanov-Belskij. “Schoolgirls”. 1901.

Russia has enough universities, but it “is in need of opening of higher schools, and even more so, in secondary technical and agricultural schools.” This phrase belongs to Emperor Nicholai II. 100 years passed, and our country again lacks engineers and farmers.

In early 1913, the total budget of national education in Russia reached colossal figures by those time – 0.5 billion roubles in gold (1,14 trillion 2016-roubles).

In 2016, the Russian Federation Federal budget spendings on education amounted to 578 billion roubles.


Infographics: Budget of the Ministry of Education above; and the number of literate conscripts below.

Elementary school

Zemskaya (rural) schools of the Ministry of National Education (MNE)

Free education.
Duration: 3-4 years
Subjects: basic – the Law of God, reading, writing, arithmetic. In schools with two classes – also history, geography, natural sciences, Church singing and drawing.


Infographics: 1914: 123.7 thousand schools, giving education to 30% of all children between 8 and 11.

Parochial schools

Duration: 3-4 years
Subjects: basic – the Law of God, Church singing, reading, writing, arithmetic. In schools with two classes – also history.

City schools

Duration: 4 years
Subjects: the Law of God, reading, writing, arithmetic, geometry, sketching, drawing, history, geography, natural history, physics, gymnastics.

High schools

Classical gymnasium
* Men’s
Duration: 8 years
Subjects: the Law of God, Russian and Church Slavonic languages, ancient and foreign languages, philosophy, mathematics, physics, history, geography, science, art, jurisprudence.

* Women’s
Duration: 7 years
Subjects: The same as above, but with a simplified program, plus crafts and pedagogy.

* Real school (with natural-mathematical bias)

Duration: 7 years
Subjects: the Law of God, Russian and foreign languages, geography, history, mathematics, physics, natural history, drawing, sketching, calligraphy, jurisprudence.

In 2014-2015 there were 950 high schools in the Russian Federation. Authorities are trying to reduce their number, closing inefficient ones.


Infographics: Number of High schools on 1913-1914. Total: 63.
The list from top to bottom:
Engineering-industrial: 15
Universities: 10
Military/Navy: 8
Church: 6
Agricultural: 6
Jurisprudence: 4
Pedagogical: 4
Veterinarian: 4
Eastern Studies: 3
Medical: 2
Art: 1

The lessons of the century

The reform of public education in Russia of the beginning of XX century remained unfinished, but the pre-revolutionary system made possible the scientific and technological breakthroughs of the Soviet era, says historian and teacher Yevgenij Spitsyn.

Hordes of illiterates

– The development of the education system in the Russian Empire was consistent and continued on the basis of the democratic principles of classlessness and universality, established in 1803. However, the law on universal primary education did not come into force – on June 6, 1912 it was ultimately dismissed by the Council of State.

It is generally believed (including in the Soviet historical science) that the main contribution to the increase in the number of educated people in Russia was made by “Zemstvo” (country schools), but it is not so. The parochial schools, which constantly created be the statesman in the reign of Alexander III, the chief Procurator of the Holy Synod K. Pobedonostsev, helped more in the education. It is customary to call parochial schools for the “hotbeds of obscurantism”. Pity. The children learned not only to read, but the main skill – the ability to learn, helping them further in the gymnasium or real school. Furthermore the population of Russia has grown very rapidly in this period, so a new “hordes” of illiterate people came to replace the educated ones, thus the number of schools had to increase rapidly and by much.

When mathematicians knew Latin

Russia lagged behind. By 1914, on 1000 people of the population, students accounted for: in Russia – 59, Austria – 143, UK – 152 in Germany – 175, USA – 213, France – 148, in Japan – 146. However, the primary school attendance of children of 8-11 years by 1914 constituted 30.1% in the whole Empire, including in the cities – 46.6%, and in rural areas – 28.3% (see: Russia in 1913. Statistical and documentary Handbook. SPb, 1995). And according to some sources, in the central provinces and in the big cities the education of children of school age was universal.

The Empire’s scholl helped to educate scientists, engineers and designers, who then, in Soviet times, made many discoveries and inventions. The gymnasium included study of Greek and Latin, gave a strong mathematical training. Mathematician could read in Latin, and a philology scholar possessed the knowledge on the natural Sciences. The classical school provided the opportunity to give a really higher education people with a broad outlook, who posessed three ancient as wells as 2-3 modern languages, were familiar with the scientific picture of the world.

Higher education evolved as intensely as secondary and primary – by 1914, there were 63 state-owned, public, private and departmental educational institutions of the higher school, where there studied 123532 students (of those, 71379 in public universities). Self-financed and state-financed students were approximately equal in numbers.

The aim of the pre-revolutionary education was not the economics, but the development of the harmonious human personality. But, as happens in such cases, the rapid economic development of the country became a “by-product” of the creation of schools, colleges and universities.

The Future of the Russian World

I have on previous occasions translated articles by the excellent analyst Rostislav Ishchenko. This particular article, “The Future of the Russian World” appeared on Kont on the 28th of September. It gives a good definition of what the Russian World is.


Flag commemorating a years since the Crimean Spring

Two and a half years ago, when Crimea has just returned to Russia, I once had the opportunity to participate in a conference in Yalta, devoted to the prospects of the Russian world. Then, I was surprised by the limited approach to the issue by the majority of the participants in the discussion.

Some thought that the Russian world is Russia within its existing borders. Particularly insistent on this definition were the Crimeans, who came just barely into those boundaries fall. Some identified the Russian world as the territory of the former USSR. Those inclined towards the monarchy were replacing the Soviet Union with the Russian Empire. At the same time, most of them agreed with the fact that Alaska, is definitely a part of the Russian world, while Poland is not Russian, as for Finland, opinions diverged. Finally, yet another group believed that the Russian world extends to the Western borders of the states that once were members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

As you can see, no matter how far we are willing to push the boundaries of the Russian world, members of this or that group all agree on the fact that the Russian world is only part of the known world, and is relatively small in comparison with the non-Russian world. No one was able to answer my question, in what exactly way Yakuts or Kamchatkan are so different from French or Germans, that Kamchatkan are without reservations allowed in the Russian world, while the French and Germans are not allowed at all? Although a part of the Germans (in GDR) were in the boundaries of WTO and, probably, too could qualify for inclusion into the Russian world.

This restrictive approach has another vulnerability. All the supporters of the Russian world (in whatever borders they were squeezed) state, that in order for the Russian world to exist, it must give the global world some idea, show it the direction of development.

But how can we “give an idea” of the Russian world to those, whom we a priori refuse to include into it?

For comparison, when we defined the modern world as Pax Americana, we understand that we are talking about a global world, not about the world within the borders of the United States, not about the world of the Anglo-Saxons and not about the world of the North Atlantic. Border ideas coincide with the boundaries of the planet, and if mankind lived outside the Earth, the idea of a Pax Americana would have expanded with it out of the planetary limits.

And this is not about Anglo-Saxon expansionism and not about the Russian peacefulness. In Russia there is also a sufficient number of supporters of solving complex international problems with military force. The most interesting thing is that even the Russian expansionists, who see their ideal in the tri-colour over the White House and a dozens of aircraft carrier battle groups sailing the seas and oceans of the planet under the St. Andrew’s flag, still however, just like their peace-loving opponents, separated the “true” Russian world, from the rest of the world. They consider 3/4 of the Earth’s land as something alien, something that is necessary to be defeated by the military force, that can be remotely controlled, but that is not subject to integration.


The meeting of defence Ministers of States participating in the Warsaw Pact. 1968

Characteristically, both of these ideas are in direct contradiction with the Russian history and the practice of building of the Russian State, be it in the form of the Kingdom, or the Empire, or a Union. If the kings, emperors and General secretaries thought about the boundaries of the Russian/Soviet world, the state would not have gone beyond the borders of the time of Ivan III. And even within those borders there lived a lot of foreigners.

While the United States created a melting pot in which all (even the British) have disappeared without a trace, becoming a new nation of Americans, Russia has always built the hostel, in which all that joined, lived comfortably lived, and where national identity did not preclude a general Russian-ness.

And that was understood by our enemies. While rushing into our land us with arms, they are well versed in national diversity, and have always sought to use any differences, to play people off against each other. But while identifying us from the outside, they have always talked about the whole mass of the peoples, as Russians.

Actually, this is the idea of the Russian World, which is opposed to the idea of Pax Americana. American world – a world of the averages. In its ideal expression, all nations and races should melt, mix and give at the output a common race. The two sexes are merged into a common “third gender”. Super-tolerance should ideally go so far as to artificially limit the abilities of intellectuals, because it is unfair to idiots, and prevents the allocation of the arithmetic average in the field of intelligence.

For its part, the Russian World, offers unity, which does not encroach on the variety. As in a family where everyone is different (all with a different degree of consanguinity), but all are united by common goals and interests.

That is why the United States is opposed to Russia, which, since the formulation of the ideals of the Pax Americana in the mid-twentieth century, was an example of an alternative world order. And it is a successful and sustainable alternative.

Russian World arose with its main features by the beginning of the XVI century, when the United States did not even exist as a project. Not having lost any nation, without coming across with anything even remotely resembling genocide of Indians, the Russian World lived on for half a millennium, while constantly expanding.

Our opposition with the US is not ideological, not economic or financial (this is only the external form ,in which the opposition manifests). We have a confrontation of the systems – not so much in world views, as in world perceptions.


The participants of the festive events dedicated to the anniversary of the “Crimean spring”

We live on the same planet but in different worlds. These worlds can push each other, but cannot mix.

All the while, the Russian World can coexist with the American, but the American cannot coexist with the Russian. This inability is determined at the level of basic values. For the Russian World there is nothing extraordinary in the recognition of the right to existence of another, alternative world. From the point of view of the United States, American world is the only correct, the only possible ideal form of human existence. Everything else should be eliminated.

From here we reach some simple conclusions:

First, Russia cannot artificially limit the scope of the Russian world, because the decision on entry into the Russian World is reached by every nation of their own accord. Russia can neither allow, nor prohibit, nor order. This would be contrary to the basic principles of the Russian World.

Second, because Pax Americana claims to exclusivity and uniqueness, it will always carry the threat of Russian World. The American idea does not provide for its existence. And because an aggressive attempt to eliminate the danger of the America World is contrary to the basic values of the Russian World, involving coexistence and not aggression, then its expansion is only possible by protecting those who enter the Russian world, escaping from American values.

Actually it is exactly this policy that Russia is now conducting in Syria. And Russian attempts not to stifle the opposition, but to make the parties in the civil war to agree, rely exactly on the basic values of the Russian World, involving not the destruction of the different, but coexistence with them.

Thirdly, being the alternative to American global idea, the Russian world is in itself a global idea, the ideal form of organization of the planetary common house of the peoples. It is clear that with the centre of this world, which is Russia, will lie the responsibility for maintaining order in this world, like the responsibility for the maintenance of order in Pax Americana lies with the United States.

And here it is extremely important not to succumb to the temptation of simple and fast decisions, and not to go the way of the US, which rescinded the role of the global judge, who is subject to the same rules as in the whole community, in favour of the Sheriff from the Wild West, whose Colt is the absolute law.

If the Russian global justice becomes the same as modern American, then Russian world will turn into American, and the peoples of the world are not interested in shedding blood and sweat for a change of sign at the jail from one to another.

Putin’s biggest failure (Re-blog with commentary)

I’ve written before that For Russia the 90’s Were Worse Than WWII, both when it came to loss of sovereignty, loss of human life and loss of industrial potential.

The Saker, an astute analyst, published not long ago an article Putin’s biggest failure, in which he describes the dynamics and the forces that were active in the 90s and, which are still partially present in the Russian political life. The Saker describes the continued presence of this 5th column as one of the Putin’s failures.

I do not entirely agree with the formulation. Rather, I view this as an event yet to happen. Observing Putins moves, one can come to a conclusion that he, like a doctor, is guided by the principal of “don’t do harm”. If an intervention into the political system brings more harm than good, then he’ll wait for a more favourable time. In this case, the threat is unsettling a delicate political balance in Russia, which it just re-acquired after the Wild 90s.

The beginning of the article below, highlighting is mine.


Whatever happens in the future, Putin has already secured his place in history as one of the greatest Russian leaders ever. Not only did he succeed in literally resurrecting Russia as a country, but in a little over a decade he brought her back as a world power capable of successfully challenging the AngloZionist Empire. The Russian people have clearly recognized this feat and, according to numerous polls, they are giving him an amazing 90% support rate. And yet, there is one crucial problem which Putin has failed to tackle: the real reason behind the apparent inability of the Kremlin to meaningfully reform the Russian economy.

As I have described it in the past many times, when Putin came to power in 1999-2000 he inherited a system completely designed and controlled by the USA. During the Eltsin years, Russian ministers had much less power than western ‘advisers’ who turned Russia into a US colony. In fact, during the 1990s, Russia was at least as controlled by the USA as Europe and the Ukraine are today. And the results were truly catastrophic: Russia was plundered from her natural wealth, billions of dollars were stolen and hidden in western offshore accounts, the Russian industry was destroyed, a unprecedented wave of violence, corruption and poverty drowned the entire country in misery and the Russian Federation almost broke up into many small statelets. It was, by any measure, an absolute nightmare, a horror comparable to a major war. Russia was about to explode and something had to be done.

Two remaining centers of power, the oligarchs and the ex-KGB, were forced to seek a solution to this crisis and they came up with the idea of sharing power: the former would be represented by Dmitrii Medvedev and the latter by Vladimir Putin. Both sides believed that they would keep the other side in check and that this combination of big money and big muscle would yield a sufficient degree of stability.

I call the group behind Medvedev the “Atlantic Integrationists” and the people behind Putin the “Eurasian Sovereignists”. The former wants Russia to be accepted by the West as an equal partner and fully integration Russia into the AngloZionist Empire, while the latter want to fully “sovereignize” Russia and then create a multi-polar international system with the help of China and the other BRICS countries.

What the Atlantic Integrationists did not expect is that Putin would slowly but surely begin to squeeze them out of power: first he cracked down on the most notorious oligarchs such as Berezovskii and Khodorkovskii, then he began cracking down on the local oligarchs, gubernatorial mafias, ethnic mobsters, corrupt industry officials, etc. Putin restored the “vertical [axis]of power” and crushed the Wahabi insurgents in Chechnia. Putin even carefully set up the circumstances needed to get rid of some of the worst ministers such as Serdiukov and Kudrin. But what Putin has so far failed to do is to

  • Reform the Russian political system
  • Replace the 5th columnists in and around the Kremlin
  • Reform the Russian economy

The current Russian Constitution and system of government is a pure product of the US ‘advisors’ which, after the bloody crackdown against the opposition in 1993, allowed Boris Eltsin to run the country until 1999. It is paradoxical that the West now speaks of a despotic presidency about Putin when all he did is inherit a western-designed political system. The problem for Putin today is that it makes no sense to replace some of the worst people in power as long as the system remains unchanged. But the main obstacle to a reform of the political system is the resistance of the pro-Western 5th columnists in and around the Kremlin. They also the ones who are still forcing a set of “Washington consensus” kind of policies upon Russia even though it is obvious that the consequences for Russia are extremely bad, even disastrous. There is no doubt that Putin understands that, but he has been unable, at least so far, to break out of this dynamic.

So who are these 5th columnists?

I have selected nine of the names most often mentioned by Russian analysts. These are (in no particular order):

Former First Deputy Prime Minister Anatolii Chubais, First Deputy Governor of the Russian Central Bank Ksenia Iudaeva, Deputy Prime Minister Arkadii Dvorkovich, First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, Governor of the Russian Central Bank Elvira Nabiullina, former Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin, Minister of Economic Development, Alexei Uliukaev, Minister of Finance Anton Siluanov and Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev.


Please read the complete article and comments to it at The Saker.

As a post-scriptum, a remark to the fragment from the above article that “Russian Federation almost broke up into many small statelets”. Nikolai Starikov in his videoblog #68 at 44:23 demonstrates a collection of “Ural Francs” – money that were printed in 1991 in anticipation of the break-up of the Russian Federation into such statelets:

Crimea Celebrates the 2nd Anniversary of Reunification

On the 18th of March 2016 Crimea and Sevastopol celebrated the second anniversary of the joyous event of their reunification with Russia, after a 60-year long separation.

Lada Ray published a very much needed recap of the events that lead to the reunification in:

#Sevastopol #Krim #Rossia: 2nd Anniversary of Crimea’s Reunification with Russia

Following the February Ukraine coup, on March 16th, 2014, Crimeans voted overwhelmingly to secede from Ukraine and reunite with Russia. 95% to 97% voted for reunification, depending on the area. Simultaneously, a referendum whether to accept Crimea and Sevastopol as two new subjects of the Russian Federation took place in Russia. 95% of Russians said ‘yes.’

On March 18-19, Crimea and Sevastopol joined the Russian Federation as two newest subjects. The transition went smoothly and peacefully, not a single shot was fired and only two casualties were registered on both sides, shot by a provocateur Ukrainian sniper sent there to attempt inciting violence (by the old CIA playbook).

At the time, 16,000 Russian troops were stationed in Crimea, based on the Black Sea Fleet Sevastopol base lease agreement with Ukraine. Simultaneously, 20,000 Ukrainian troops were stationed on the peninsula as well. Out of these 20,000, about 18,000 Ukraine troops pledged allegiance to Russia, while only 2,000 chose to leave back to Ukraine. They were allowed to leave peacefully and with dignity.

The article also contains video from the celebrations in Crimea and from the Beautiful (Red) Square. Here I want to present one very significant song, the anthem of Sevastopol.

The Legendary Sevastopol

Music: Vano Muradeli
Text: Petr Gragov
Written: 1954
Ratified as the official anthem of Sevastopol on 29.07.1994

Russian text of the song and some history can be read in this Wikipedia article.

Fly winged wind.
Over seas, over land,
Tell the whole world,
About my beloved city.

Tell to the whole world,
How on the Crimean shores,
Our grandfathers fought,
And glorified in battle.

[Chorus:]
Legendary Sevastopol,
Impregnable to enemies.
Sevastopol, Sevastopol –
The pride of Russian sailors!

Here we went to the rightful and holy battles,
For our Motherland,
And your previous glory,
Have we multiplied.

Having shrugged of black sailor overcoats,
The Black Sea sailors, during the days of War,
Went against tanks with only handgrenades,
Your sons went to their deaths,

[Chorus]

If across the sea
enemies should come to us with swords,
We’ll meet the unwelcome guests
with annihilating fire

The whole of our dear country knows,
That the battleships do not sleep
And are guarding surely
The shores of the homeland

[Chorus]

Some trivia: During the most vicious period of Ukranisation of Crimea in 2006, Ukrainians tried to re-write the text, replacing “Russian sailors” with “Ukrainian sailors”, “Sevastopol” with “white-stone fortress”, and “Cossacks” were added. The reaction of the citizens was strongly negative, to say the least.

You can hear a rendition of it, where a girl spontaneously performed it at an election locale on the 16th of March 2014:

Boris Yeltsin: Demon or Hero?

On the 1st of February Boris Yeltsin, the first President of the Russian Federation, would have been 85. Commemorating the date, Argumenty i Fakty published a two-polar article about Yeltsin. Two views on what he did to Russia, one negative and one positive. The whole article Boris Yeltsin: Demon or Hero can be read in Russian at the site of AiF.

Here I am only going to translate one view, which reflects the real negative impact of Yeltsin on Russia. I cannot bring myself to translating the positive view by Vladimir Ryzhkov, who was the vice-speaker of the Parliament in 1997-1999 – in the years after the 1993 Yeltsin’s coup d’etat. Ryzhkov’s words are sugar-coated paintings of black as white. IF anyone wants to read them, go to the Russian article above and use Google translate…


Aleksander Prokhanov, writer:

– For me, Yeltsin is an absolute evil, while the recently opened “Yeltsin Center” in Ekaterinburg is a temple where all the haters of Russia can now congregate and worship their idol.

When Hitler was preparing his attack on the Soviet Union, he had “Plan Ost” – to dismember the USSR, to destroy its defence industry, the whole of the Soviet ideology and culture, to reduce the number of Russian and, finally, to introduce external management of all parts of the dismembered country. Hitler’s plan was not allowed to come to fruition because in 1945 Stalin’s T-34 danced a quadrille on the Reich Chancellery bunker.

But in 1991 Yeltsin carried this plan out almost to the point. He made 3 coup d’etats. The first one in August 1991, when he took away all the powers from Gorbachev while he sat in Foros. The second – in December of the same year, when Yeltsin dissolved the Soviet Union by signing the Belovezhsk agreement. And the third coup – in 1993, when Yeltsin, in violation of the Constitution, disbanded the parliament, and then shot at it from the tanks, torching a terrible fire in the centre of Moscow. (Translator note: for more details about the 1993 coup d’etat see my post The ”Wild 90s” in Russia, as reflected in people’s memory)

In 1994, Yeltsin launched a fratricidal war in Chechnya. He compromised the integrity of what was still remaining of Russia – back then Tatar, Bashkir, Ural republics almost became independent… (Translator note: Nikolaj Starikov in one of his video journals demonstrated samples of “Ural Roubles” – a currency that war already printed and was supposed to be introduced in that fragmented bit of Russia.) Yeltsin created the monstrous class of oligarchs who to this day view the country as their prey, and are transferring the loot abroad. At the same time he created in Russia is alien to her way of consumption, saturation, hedonism and egoism – despite the fact that our people had always been a part of a community, cooperative, society… Yeltsin sought to re-encode the Russian people and Russian psycho. Hollywood came here in full power and started imposing Western values.

Finally, as was intended in the “Plan Ost”, our country came under external management. The Yeltsin-Kozyrev Russia did not have its own foreign policy – it was built on the national interests of the US; CIA officers were sitting in our economic centres, managing privatization and allocation of resources.


End of the translation.

The Belovezhsk agreement, which dissolved the USSR was voluntaristic and unconstitutional. Article 3 of USSR’s Constitution was dedicated to the procedures, which needed to be observed if a republic wanted to exit the union. Referendums were supposed to be conducted.

This Yeltsin’s act alone had terrible, tragic consequences: Russian people became the most fragmented nationality in the world, still living as non-citizens in oppression in such “European value” countries as Estonia and Latvia. Millions of people ended up being “abroad” from one day to the other. Hundreds of thousands of families were split up. Millions died in the ensuing war, hunger and economic collapse, which was also in the Hitler’s “Plan Ost”, manifested by Yeltsin.

At best, Yeltsin was a naïve fool, used by Western powers in their Big Game of destroying Russia. At worst, he was a ruthless criminal.

Who and How Transferred Crimea into Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1952-1954

Below is my translation of a very informative article by Mikhail Smirnov, published in Svobodnaja Mysl’ (Free Thought).

1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2Please note that translating a documentary film or an article takes a lot of time and emotional effort. I am doing it on a voluntary basis, but if someone feels like supporting my work, a Bitcoin donation to the following address is appreciated: 1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2

It is worth noting, that when the author points out the Russian roots in Crimea, he is most probably referring to the Scythians, who are just the same people as Rus, but going under a different name. See my summery of the documentary Yes, Scythians Are Us.

When reading the text below, note one historic peculiarity of USSR of that time. While 14 republics were almost always denoted by their national name – e.g Ukrainian SSR (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) – there was one exception. In USSR no one spoke of Russia, to the extent that the existence of Russia as a republic was largely forgotten. Instead the acronym RSFSR was always in use (decoded as Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic).

At the end of this post, after the main article, I present my translation of the closing speech by K.E Voroshilov from the stenography of the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from the 19th of February 1954, which is an important historical evidence, setting the stage for the transfer and for the peninsular and the expectation connected to the act.


It was not Khrushchev, who made the decision on the transfer of Crimea, but his rabid anti-Stalinism and voluntarism became the propelling power behind this whole undertaking. There were no objective reasons for this decision.

In the history of the presence of the Crimea within modern Ukraine, which, as it is now widely known, began with the official transfer of the Crimean region of the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 and is associated with the name N.S.Khrushchev, you can set apart the pre-history, that is the actually history of decision-making on behalf of the Crimea, from hatching of the idea to the party-bureaucratic mechanism for its implementation.

As it is well-known, at the time of its transfer into the Ukrainian SSR in 1954, Crimea had the status of the region within the RSFSR. From 1921 to 1945 it was a multi-national autonomy within the Russian Federation – the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (KrASSR) with the official languages ​​of Russian and Tatar, and in places of compact settlement – also German and Hebrew. After the well-known dramatic events during the War, the administrative status of Crimea was downgraded: Crimean Autonomy was eliminated by converting it into the Crimean region, officially – due to changes in the ethnic composition of the population of Crimea. Crimean Autonomy was restored in 1991 as part of the Ukrainian SSR, and in 1992 it was renamed into the Republic of Crimea.

In the public mind there is a long-established stereotype, which firmly connects the transfer of the Crimean region of the RSFSR into the Ukrainian SSR with the name of N.S. Khrushchev. By and large it is justified, but, after all, a few comments clarifying and enriching the picture of the event will be reasonably useful.

According to the memoirs of the contemporaries of the events, the idea of ​​the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine began to ripen in Khrushchev’s mind ever since the time, when he in 1944-1947 headed the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, and at the same time was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR. The year was 1944, the war was still going on. The boss off the USSR, I.V. Stalin, demanded that Khrushchev sent from the Ukrainian SSR to the neighbouring republic 100 thousand people – they were supposed to help with the rebuilding of the Russian Federation. But the position of Ukraine itself was not less, but even more severe, as during the Great Patriotic War almost the whole of its territory saw devastating military operations, and almost all of it has been exposed to enemy occupation. Nikita Khrushchev was furious. “Ukraine itself is destroyed, and more is taken from us” – he raged. (Head of the Soviet trade unions, Lavrentij Pogrebnoy, was a witness to Khrushchev’s indignation in 1944. A few years later, he told one of the Soviet writers about the events.)

Khrushchev could not directly oppose Stalin’s orders. So perhaps even then, or a little later, he hatched the idea that a decent compensation for this extra effort (and even, maybe for Starvation [translator’s note: Gologomor, for the real history surrounding it, I’d recommend reading the article The Real Truth About USSR: Golodomor and Collectivization in Ukraine]), could become a significant territorial gain of Ukraine within the USSR: of course, at the expense of the beneficiary of the “Ukrainian brotherly” assistance – the Russian Federation, which was to boot the most rich territory-wise. Even a cursory glance at the map of the Soviet Union was enough to see the most likely scenario for this: geographically isolated from the rest of the territory of the RSFSR, but located in the vicinity of the Ukrainian SSR and adjacent to it, is the Crimean peninsula. And being by nature a voluntarist, he vowed that he will get Crimea, whatever it takes.

But Khrushchev began the direct implementation of his idea later, in the first half of the 50s, or more precisely – starting from 1952, when the signs of limitations in functional capacity of Stalin became more and more obvious for the party leadership. (Stalin announced that he was going to retire at the October Central Committee plenum of 1952, which was held after the completion of the XIX Congress of the CPSU. But already starting from February 1951, three Politburo members (G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria, N.A. Bulganin) were given the right to sign various documents on behalf of Stalin, as, according to Molotov, due to the decrease in performance he did not sign many government documents for a prolonged period of time.) The real opportunity opened up only in connection with the death of Stalin. But it is possible that another significant cause for activation of Khrushchev on this subject at that time was also the activity of a supporter of Stalin’s policy in regard to the Crimea, which brought to the fore the ideas that went counter to Khrushchev’s.

According to unconfirmed records, in October 1952, the first secretary of the Crimean regional party (in 1949-1954) P.I. Titov, while being a delegate of the XIX Party Congress, addressed personally to Stalin with a written offer to rename the Crimean region into Tauridia. In his opinion, it would be entirely consistent with the history of the region, starting from the XVIII century. In particular, as one of the arguments, Titov appealed to the forgotten Soviet Republic of Tauridia. He believed that for the Crimean region of the RSFSR “it’s high time to restore its Russian, Rus name”.

Titov’s proposal was not priorly discussed in the Crimean Regional Party Committee and was not approved by them. But we know that the second person in the region – D.S. Polanski (in 1952-1954 the chairman of the executive committee of the Crimean Regional Council) – objected to this initiative. On the other hand he supported the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR. Twenty years later, the nomenclature Party member G.V. Myasnikov, while at that time the second secretary of the Moscow city committee of the Komsomol remembered Polyansky thus: “I remember how he went up the hill. He met Khrushchev and Titov in the Crimea. An idea of ​​the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was brought up. Titov rejected the idea right away, while Polyansky said it was “brilliant”. The next day they gathered the plenum of the Crimean Regional Committee, Titov was driven out, while Poljansky became the first secretary of the regional committee.”

But it is more likely that this “cleansing out” of Titov took place more gradually, after the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of USSR, N.S. Khrushchev visited the Crimea in October 1953. Khrushchev’s son-in-law, Adjoubei Alex, who accompanied him on his trip around the country, recalled that when Khrushchev came to the Crimea at that time, he was shocked by how disastrous was the situation in the region and how great was the discontent by this among the local residents. At the same time, however, Khrushchev remained true to himself, and when he saw at the local airport some aircraft, he immediately ordered to fly it over to Kiev. And then, a few hours later, he already talked, over a supper, with the local party leaders about the transfer of Crimea and resettlement of Ukrainians into Crimea. Most likely, it was at this moment that an open dispute ensued between him and Titov. According to Titov’s deputy, L.G. Mezentsev, the head of the Crimea was called in to Moscow in mid-January of 1954 to inform him of preparation of a decision on the transfer of the region. He protested, for which on the 16th of January he was replaced with a Ukrainian Dmitry Polyansky. Thus, based on the totality of the memories of witnesses, it can be argued that P.I. Titov strongly objected to Khrushchev regarding the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, and he had constant clashes with the Secretary of the Central Committee on this issue, which resulted in this imperious and prudent owner of the Crimean region being finally deposed to the rank of Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the RSFSR. In general, according to the researchers, Khrushchev initiated a rather limited number of people into his intentions with respect to Crimea. Among them – the first secretary (since June 1953) of the Communist Party of Ukraine A.I. Kirichenko, who, at the time, was also a candidate member of the Praesidium of the Central Committee of CPSU and was in good standing with Khrushchev.

But Stalin, who was by that time ill, delayed an official response to Titov. According to the memoirs of some of Titov’s colleagues, in the spring of 1953 and later he, nevertheless, referred to a brief personal answer from Stalin, which was sent personally to him in late January 1953, saying that his proposal was “interesting and perhaps correct. This question can be discussed and resolved.” In the middle of November of 1953 Titov told about this opinion of Stalin to Khrushchev and Polyansky, when the principal decision on the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine had in fact already been made.

An indirect confirmation of the fact that Stalin was quite seriously considering Titov’s proposals, can be the process of renaming of the Crimean Tatar names into Russian ones, which began from the mid-1940s and which was initiated by Stalin himself after the deportation of the Tatar population from there. There are many sources describing this. For example, a comprehensive project on renaming in Crimea was dated with the 25th of September 1948, when the Crimean Regional Committee passed the decree “On renaming of settlements, streets, certain types of work, and other Tatar designations”. However, it was not planned to rename Crimea itself. But even before that, in the 1944-1946, 11 out of 26 Crimean regional centres were renamed (for example, the Ak-Mechetsky region into Chernomorskij, Larindorfsky into Pervomaisky) as well as 327 villages. In the period from 1948 to 1953, it was planned to rename some towns. The documents recorded in particular that Djankoi was going to become either Uzlovo, Severnyj or Verhnekrymsk, Saki turning into Ozernoje, and they wanted to call Bakhchisaray – “Pushkin”. Kerch was supposed to be given the name of “Korchev”, known from the old-Russian chronicles. In general, during 1947-1953 new – Russian – names were given to 1062 settlements and nearly 1300 natural object, mostly replacing Tatar ones. It is obvious that in the context of this process, also Titov’s proposal to change the name of the Crimea looked quite logical. However, the renaming slowed down when the turn of the cities came. And after Stalin’s death, the plan to rename the Crimean cities was abandoned altogether.

Thus, we can see that the project of the inclusion of Crimea into Ukraine was preceded by a project of strengthening of Russian presence in Crimea, and in 1952-1953, as a logical completion of the latter, there was also a project, which remained on the level of an idea, of re-renaming the Crimean region into Tauridian.

(An aside from the translator: Crimean Tatars are more likely Mongolians, the descendants of the Golden Horde of the Mongolian Khan Baty, who raided and occupied the peninsular in the 14th century. The name given to the peninsular by them was “Kyrim”, meaning “trench”. Before the Mongol occupation the peninsular had the Greek name of “Tauridia”. What the endemic population, Scythians, called their land back then is lost.)

As is known, the Russian presence in Crimea has been recorded since ancient chronicled times. Of particular interest to us – in the light of the events of the XX century that we discuss here – is “Tmutarakan” sub-plot of this presence. The original antique city of Panticapaeum, which in the era of the Khazarian Khaganate (translator note: For a well-researched foray into the history of Khazarian Kaganate, I would recommend reading Lada Ray’s Earth Shift Report 6: UKRAINE – NEW KHAZARIAN KHAGANATE?) of the VIII century got the name of Karsha or Charsha, which in Turkic means “market” or “bazaar”, is mentioned in the old-Russian historical records of the events of the X century under the Slavinised name of Krchev (Korchev) [Кърчевъ]. In the tenth century, Tmutarakan principality – part of the Ancient (Kievan) Rus – takes root on the Crimean and the Caucasian coasts of the Kerch Strait. Korchev was closely associated with the capital of the principality – Tmutarakan, while the Eastern geographers of that time called the Kerch Strait for the Russian River.

And so it was in Kerch that, after a long period of Ottoman history in Crimea, Russia once again establishes on the peninsula, several years before its full incorporation into the Russian Empire. In 1771 Russian troops took Kerch and neighbouring fortress Yeni-Kale. By the Kuchuk-Karnadzhiyskomu peace treaty between the Russian and Ottoman empires, which ended Russian-Turkish war of 1768-1774, this city with its fortress was the first of all the Crimea to become part of the Russian Empire, while, in accordance with that agreement, the Crimean Khanate as a whole then became independence from the Ottoman Empire, with the exception of the influence in the questions of religion. The manifesto of Catherine II was issued on the 8th of April 1783 and decreed the accession of Crimea, Taman and Kuban into the Russian Empire. By the decree of the 2nd of February 1784 Tauridian region (oblast) was established, covering some of the continental land. Later it was transformed into a province (county).

It is quite possible that the role of Kerch, and the Kerch Peninsula as a whole, in the Russian development on Crimea was the foundation for another P.I. Titov’s proposal in November 1953, which he already addressed to Polyansky and Khrushchev, and reiterated in January 1954. It pertained to the inclusion of this region (ie. Eastern Crimea) with the status of the “Kerch region” into the composition of RSFSR. Already then Titov had a well-founded belief that it was inadvisable for RSFSR “to vacate” Crimea, and, thanks to the newly formed region, the strategically important Kerch (Azov-Black Sea) Strait – “Russian River” – would still be a part of RSFSR. Titiov’s “Kerch” was outright rejected by Khrushchev followers, so much so, that the entire water area of ​​the Kerch Strait in the subsequent transfer of the Crimea ended up being assigned to the Ukrainian SSR.

The question of what was the nature of the whole of Crimean autonomy – national or territorial – is also of crucial importance. Lenin’s Sovnarkom initially created both types of autonomies, but over time only the national ones were left. The Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, in this regard, had become a unique autonomous construct, which retained its territorial nature. According to the All-Union census of 1939, Russians comprised 49.6% of the Crimean population, Crimean Tatars – 19.4%, Ukrainians – 13.7%, Jews – 5.8%, Germans – 4.6%. But as the total population during the war declined sharply, and its ethnic composition underwent fundamental changes, Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was transformed into the Crimean region (oblast) on the 30th of June 1945. Unlike most other autonomous regions, where there was the predominance of the indigenous population, the Crimean Autonomous Republic was not Tatar from the very beginning of its establishment. Moreover, 2/3 of the population of the Crimea at the time was Russian, and only one-third consisted of the peoples who had settled here before the Russians and made up the indigenous population of the peninsula. (Translator note: in the bird’s eye historic perspective, Russians are the indigenous population of the peninsula, who were driven from Crimea, but later returned.) At the same time, flirting with Kemalist Turkey, the Soviet leadership traditionally appointed mostly men of Tatar origin to the leading positions in the republic. This created a false impression that the Crimean autonomy was, like all the other, the national one – Crimean Tatar. But as it is known, in accordance with the provisions of the National Defence Commission of 11th of May and the 2nd of June 1944, of all Tatars of all ages (about 180 thousand people) were deported from Crimea to Kazakhstan. (Translator note: the exception was given to mixed-marriage families, where a Tatar woman was married to a Russian.)

All of the above sheds some light on the political context in which Khrushchev’s fateful for the history of the Crimea voluntarist decision was conceived and prepared. But it is equally important to take into account the details of the mechanism of this decision at the state level.

The fact is that N.S. Khrushchev became the first person in the USSR leadership only in 1955. While immediately after the death of Stalin (at the time of the death he held the post of the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers), the head of government and a key figure in the leadership of the USSR was G.M. Malenkov. By the end of Stalin’s life, Malenkov was one of the main contenders for the post of supreme leader of the country, and immediately after his death, inherited the post of the chairman of the Council of Ministers. I.V. Stalin died on the 5th of March 1953, and at that time, in the beginning of the 1950s, this was the main post, while the position of the General Secretary of the CPSU was abolished, since, according to the late Stalinist concept of the governance structure, the Communist Party should no longer play a leading role in governing of the country.

M.S. Voslensky in his famous book “The Nomenclature” writes:

In the days after the death of Stalin in March 1953, it was customary to conclude speeches at the memorial meetings in the following typical ending: “Eternal glory to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Secretary of the CPSU I.V. Stalin! Long live Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee G.M. Malenkov!”

As it becomes clear from these titles, according to a new tradition established by Stalin, the post of the President of the Council of Ministers of USSR was the most important positions in contemporary system of power, and that it was inherited by Malenkov. And although the decision from March the 5th 1953 of the joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers abolished the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of CPSU, and on the the 14th of March 1953 the political opponents of Malenkov managed to deprive him of his post of a Secretary of the CPSU (ie, at the time, one of the many secretaries of the Central Committee), in 1953-55 he was still the Chairman of the USSR, and presiding over the meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee of CPSU (as Politburo of the Central Committee of CPSU was called at the time). And thus, according to the then semi-official representations of the structure of power in the USSR, and, to an even greater extent, due to the political practice established under Stalin’s influence, he was the real leader of the country. It was during the period of his leadership of the country, that the transfer of the Crimean region into the Ukrainian SSR actually took place.

And if you take the viewpoint of those, who do not recognize that the decisions in the USSR were taken collectively, but absolutely want to assign personal responsibility for any decision to one of the “leaders”, then we must blame Malenkov, and not Khrushchev for the transfer of the Crimean region. By the beginning of 1954, when the Crimea was handed over, Khrushchev was not yet a sufficiently influential figure so as to define such major decisions. He was one of the secretaries of the Central Committee, responsible for the work of the entire Secretariat (on September the 7th 1953 he was elected 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU), he was a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, and was a member of a group, warring with the group of Malenkov. The very same Voslensky in his book indicates that Malenkov tried his best to belittle the role of the Central Committee Secretariat, and it was under him that they began to speak of the secretariat as of a purely technical body. Therefore, it is logical to assume that any significant initiatives emanating from Khrushchev, would not get the support of Malenkov.

If, however, we are be absolutely exact, then from a purely formal point of view, the transfer of Crimea was initiated by a collective body – the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, which meetings at that time were chaired by Malenkov. This can be seen from documents published in “Rossiyskaya Gazeta” (Federal Edition #3409 of the 19th of February 2004):

From the protocol N 49 of the Central Committee of the CPSU Presidium meeting on the transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of the RSFSR into the composition of the Ukrainian SSR
25th of January 1954
Presided by: G.M. Malenkov
Present:
Members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, comrades N.S. Khrushchev, K.E. Voroshilov, N.A. Bulganin, L.M. Kaganovich, A.L. Mikoyan, M.Z. Saburov, M.G. Pervukhin.
Candidates for members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, comrades N.M. Shvernik, P.K. Ponomarenko.
CPSU Central Committee secretaries, comrades M.A. Suslov, P.N. Pospelov, N.N. Shatalin.

XL About transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of the RSFSR into the composition of the Ukrainian SSR
1. To approve as amended at the meeting, the attached draft of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of the RSFSR into the composition of the Ukrainian SSR.
2. To deem it appropriate to hold a special session of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR, at which to consider a joint submission to the Bureau of the Supreme Soviets of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR on the transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of the RSFSR into the composition of the Ukrainian SSR.

Secretary of the CPSU Khrushchev
АЛРФ.Ф.З.Оп.10.Д.65Л1,4-б Подлинник (original)

However, having the real distribution of power in the USSR leadership elite in favour of the government agencies – as a testament from Stalin, outwardly the power system in the country continued working in a mode, familiar to the people, that is, in such a way, that the decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU were governing in relation the decisions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which was only a “law publishing” body, which gave the appearance of democracy to decisions, which had actually been taken in the Central Committee. Thus, the Council of Ministers, headed by Malenkov, was sidelined on the decision of the Crimea. This decision was taken by the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, a meeting presided by Malenkov.

Again, from a purely formal point of view, N.S. Khruschev’s responsibility for this decision consisted only in the fact that he, like everyone else, voted “for” and in addition to this, as the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee heading the work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, put his signature, just formally certifying the protocol. In the same way as in the Brezhnev period Giorgadze put his signature after Brezhnev’s signature. But analysis of the alignment of the centres of power in the power system of that time shows that the decision of the Presidium chaired by the economic planner Malenkov could be a bargaining chip (albeit a pretty small one) in the nomenclature and political struggle of his supporters with the group of Khrushchev – the highest at that time party functionary. In any case, with that set up, Malenkov was a guarantor that, as a result of this decision, there would be no major changes in the Crimea’s situation and, above all, in the nature of economic relations of the Crimean region within the control system of the USSR.

From the extract from the protocol N49, cited above, it is clear at the same meeting the draft of the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the transfer of Crimea was approved, which after a multi-stage procedure, would in the end be “rubber-stamped” by the Supreme Council. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR rubber-stamped the decree draft at its meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of February the 19th 1954. Here is the text of the decree:

The stenography of meeting can be consulted here. (Translator note: I will translate the closing speech of Voroshilov, which gives additional context to the political and cultural background, as well as assumed conditions, of the transfer.)

DECREE
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
On the transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of the RSFSR into the composition the Ukrainian SSR

“Given the commonality of the economy, the proximity and close economic and cultural ties between the Crimean region and the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics RESOLVES:

Approve the joint submission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR on the transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic into the composition of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.”

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR K.VOROSHILOV
Secretary of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N.PEGOV
Moscow, The Kremlin, February 19, 1954.

And already on the 26th of April 1954 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR by the Law “On the transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of RSFSR in the composition of the Ukrainian SSR” approved the decree of its Presidium and made the appropriate changes to Articles 22 and 23 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Incidentally, we must note that the issue of transfer of the Crimea went in the agenda of the meeting of the Presidium of the CC CPSU as item XI or XL (it is not very clear from the publication of the document). In any case, this issue was not perceived as being particularly important. It is possible that this attitude has led to a certain constitutional legislative negligence in the design of the entire transfer procedure. The fact is, under Article 18 of the Constitution of USSR, which was in effect by 1954, the territory of a republic could not be altered without its consent. Such consent was given by both Republics in the form of a Ruling of the Presidium of the Supreme Councils of the two Republics. However, Article 33 of the Constitution of the RSFSR, which contained a list of the authorities given to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, there is no authority to change the boundaries of the RSFSR. Not to mention the fact that out of the 27 members of the meeting of the 5th of February 1954, during which the issue was addressed, only 15 were present.

Further considering the nature of the relationship of the then leadership of the USSR to the “Crimean issue”, one should also note the following. For example, in the relevant documents of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet it was claimed both wisely and pompously, “that the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR, taking into account the commonality of their economies, the proximity and close economic and cultural ties, is fully appropriate and is a testament to the boundless trust of the Russian people in the Ukrainian people…” This is how the “Ukrainians” at the helm thought back then. At the same time, the event itself passed completely unnoticed. It was not widely presented by the official propaganda to the Soviet and foreign public as another triumph of the party reason and higher justice. Probably for this reason, the Western press said nothing about this. While in the Soviet publications one can only find a couple of paragraphs about the symbolic meaning of this act in the context of the 300th anniversary of the “reunification” of Ukraine and Russia. However, the celebrations that took place in late May 1954 were generally devoted only to the anniversary. And even in the festive speech of Khrushchev, not a word was said about the Crimea. The absence of any indication to the transfer of Crimea in the Soviet sources of the time leads to some extent to a probable assumption, that the leaders of the Soviet Union intended to create in the perception of the peoples of the Soviet Union the idea, that the presence of the Crimea as part of Ukraine was a self-evident fact, and the decision to transfer the peninsula was represented as something long-overdue and almost as correction of a certain historical misunderstanding. But it is also quite possible that there was a feeling of voluntary overeagerness, and that there was no complete confidence that the decision, taken completely privately and without extensive discussion between the peoples of the two largest of the Soviet republics, would not cause public rejection. (Translator’s note: It did, at the “kitchen talk” level, much of which I heard first-hand, while spending many a summer of my youth in Crimea.)

N.S. Khruschev made a considerable progress towards senior management position of the country only in 1955 as a result of the nomenclature struggle for the removal of Malenkov from power. In 1955, Malenkov was dismissed from the post of Chairman of the USSR, and on the 29th of June 1957 he was removed from the Presidium of the CC CPSU. It is not known when exactly he ceased to be “presiding” at the Presidium meeting, but most likely in the very same 1955.

Since that time, that is, from the time when N.S. Khruschev, as the 1st Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, began to gradually strengthen his position as the sole leader of the Communist Party, we can say that the party organs as a whole began to regain the lead in the country’s leadership. However, until 1958 the high status and independence of the state and economic apparatus inherited from the Stalinist era remained. Chairman of the USSR from 1955 to 1958 was N.A. Bulganin, who previously, just like Malenkov, was one of the Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers of Stalin. It was only in 1958 that Bulganin was dismissed, and his position was also taken by N.S. Khruschev while still holding the post of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The defeat of the group of Bulganin, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov and Shepilov occurred in June 1957 when at first during the meeting of the Presidium (Politburo) of the Central Committee of the CPSU by a majority vote, it was decided to abolish the post of the 1st Secretary of the CPSU and to appoint Khrushchev Minister of Agriculture, and then during an urgently convened plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, as a result of the dramatically unfolding events and with Zhukov’s help, Khrushchev managed to turn the situation to his advantage, and called Bulganin/Malenkov’s group for “anti-party”. Only after 1958 can N.S. Khurshev be held solely responsible for the supreme power decisions in the country. The Crimean region was transferred to Ukraine at the beginning of 1954, while the opinion about the deciding role that Khrushchev played in it, was formed only later with the help of the official propaganda.

Soviet newspapers, like mirrors, reflected the change in the ratio of different branches of power in the USSR. The newspaper “Pravda” of the 21st of December 1955 in its report on the national meeting of the top performers of agriculture in Tashkent, said: “spacious auditorium of the theatre named after Alisher Navoi was filled to capacity. 11 am. Loud and prolonged applause greeted the appearance at the meeting the Chairman of the presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers N. Bulganin and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, N.S. Khrushchev. Places on the podium are occupied by the first secretary of Central Committee of the Communist Party: Uzbekistan – A.I. Niyazov, Kazakhstan – LI Brezhnev, Tajikistan – BG Gafurov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers: Uzbek SSR – N.A. Mukhitdinov, Tajik SSR – T. Uldzhabaev, Turkmen SSR – B. Ovezov, Kirghiz SSR – A. Suerkulov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR Sh.R. Rashidov.” Here, the Chairman of the USSR Council is still mentioned in the first place, while the first secretary of the Communist Party – in the second, as a figure of lesser importance.

But already in 1960, at the height of Khrushchev’s personality cult, there is a dominating and familiar us from the days of Stagnation formula, where the Central Committee of the Communist Party is mentioned in the first place: “The workers of agriculture of the Penza region report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government and personally to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev that, realizing the historical decision of the XXI Congress of the CPSU, collective and state farms, overcoming the difficulties created in the current year due to adverse weather conditions, have grown a good harvest, and completed the plan to sell grain to the state ahead of schedule – on August the 9th – using 20 working days.” (“Pravda” of the 12th of August 1960).

There are some important considerations at the end of this brief historical sketch of this dramatic episode in the history of Russia. In that harsh time P.I. Titov became the forerunner of the modern Communist Party of the Russian Federation in that part of its activity, which is directed today to protect the all-Russian interests. It is a pity that his name have not become a symbol of the 23-year-long modern struggle for liberation of the Russian-speaking people of the Crimea against the Ukrinising occupants. In light of the events of the modern Russian history, that person is worthy of his memory being perpetuated at least by a commemorative plaque in Simferopol, and at least a mention of him in the future textbooks of the history of the Fatherland as a Russian citizen, who was not afraid to go against the voluntarist projects of omnipotent Russian Ukrainophile Khrushchev. The country and the people need to know their heroes, and not only the negative ones.


Below is a translation of the closing speech by K.E Voroshilov from the stenography of the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from the 19th of February 1954. As the commentary note at the top of that site says, “The Communist regime held no referendum or any opinion poll among the Crimeans regarding their transfer into the Ukrainian SSR”. All highlighting in the translation is mine.

Comrades, the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the joint proposal of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR regarding the transfer of the Crimean region from the composition of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic into the composition of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a testament to further strengthening of the unity and indestructible friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples within the great powerful fraternal family of the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This significant act of great national importance once again confirms that the relationship between sovereign allied socialist republics in the USSR is based on genuine equality and a real understanding and respect for mutual interests, aimed at the prosperity of all of the Union republics.

In history, there is no – and can not be – other such relation between States. In the past, especially under capitalism, at the very root of relations between states there was an aspiration for territorial conquest, the pursuit of strong states profiteering at the expense of territories of weaker countries. Only within the conditions, created by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may there be such a fair resolution of all issues between Union Republics, decisions based on economic feasibility and sensibility, full of mutual friendship and fraternal co-operation of their peoples. The transfer of the Crimean region of the RSFSR into the Ukrainian SSR is in the interest of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, and meets the national interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Crimean region, due to its historical development, due to its territorial and economic status, is important for the whole of the Soviet state. And in the distant and recent past enemies have repeatedly tried to take away the Crimean peninsula from Russia, use it to plunder and ruin Russian and Ukrainian lands, establish a base there for attacks on Russia and Ukraine. However the Russian and Ukrainian peoples had more than once, in their common struggle, severely beaten the arrogant invaders and thrown them out of the borders of Ukraine and Crimea. Ukraine and Crimea are closely linked by common economic interests – this has already been eloquently stated both by the presenters and by comrade speakers. Cultural relations between Crimea and Ukraine in particular have increased and deepened. The transfer of the Crimean region into the Ukrainian SSR will undoubtedly further strengthen the traditional ties.

Comrades, this friendly act takes place in the days when the Soviet people solemnly celebrate the remarkable historical date of the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Russia and Ukraine. This is a great traditional celebration not only of the Ukrainian people, but also for all the peoples of the USSR. Friendship of peoples – one of the foundations of our great multinational Soviet state, the source of its invincible might, of its prosperity and power. We know and rejoice that the Russian, Ukrainian and other peoples of our vast country, will also in the future continue to develop and strengthen their brotherly friendship. Let our great Motherland – the fraternal Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – develop and grow stronger!

Yes, Scythians Are Us

RTR Planet has recently aired a very thorough documentary, titled “Yes, Scythians Are Us”.

The documentary looks back through time, investigating who where Scythians, why they abruptly disappeared and Sarmatians turned in their stead, followed by Slavs. They come to the conclusion that both Scythians, Sarmatians (Samaritans?) and Slavs are one and the same people, called by different names at different periods in history.

I will at a later point write a complete translation of this documentary, but for now, here are some of the highlights of the arguments for this theory:

  • Greek and Western European chronicles list people from the same period interchangeably referring to the people living between Dnieper and Urals as both Scythians and Rus.
  • There are linguistic connection between the surviving Scythian names (in geographic name) and Old Russian.
  • Scythian burial customs are exactly the same as Slavic/Russian pre-Christian burial customs.
  • Scythians lead a semi-settle way of life, which allowed then to develop crafts like gold forging and iron forging of high quality. Scythians used the same types of weapons and armour as Rus vitjas (warrior).
  • “Scythians” seems to refer to a collection of tribes living between Dnieper and Urals, where each tribe was specialised in a certain craft and added to the value of the whole nation. This collection of tribes in their organisation seems to resemble a modern federation.
  • Depictions of Scythians on their own items of art, as well as the Greek artefacts, shows people with distinct Slavic facial features and body complexion, and nothing of the Asian look.
  • And the most significant argument comes from genetics. Scythians share the same Y-chromosome marker as majority of people living now on the territory of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine – the marker, which classifies them in the Slavic Rus group.

And just as an off-topic reminder: Holland is still holding Scythian – Russian – gold from the Crimean museums hostage.

Just like 70 years ago, it’s again up to Russia to clean up the mess that the West created – now in Syria and Ukraine

After the 70th UNGA meeting, Russia finally says “enough is enough” and starts dealing with the terrorist infestation in Syria, to the outcry of the Western MSM, which were conspicuously silent during the preceding year of USA’s bombing of who knows what in the very same Syria, US bombings which only lead to proliferation of ISIS.

In this light, the following articles from Lada Ray are a must-read to get the proper perspective on the current affairs in the Russian corner of the world:

Putin’s Full Speech at 2015 UNGA: Do You Realize What Kind of Monster You’ve Created? With Xi Jinping and Lukashenko

Russia Strikes ISIL (ISIS) Positions in Syria. What does it mean?

Make sure to watch the speeches and interviews in the above-mentioned articles. A special accent can be put on the interview President Putin gave to Charlie Rose, with the full transcript found here:

Interview to American TV channel CBS and PBS

And two analysis of the said interview:

President Putin Exposes MSM Propaganda And Embarrasses Their Amateur Shills

Kunstler Rages “Perhaps America Has Gotten What It Deserves”

Bird’s Eye Perspective on the Russian Federation

I get a feeling that many people, with whom I talk about Russia, have a perception about it as a large monolithic blob of unknown somewhere in the East. And as we know, everything that is unknown, becomes feared and distrusted. This perception is formed by the Western MSM, which seldom mentions Russia, and when it does, only the negative angle is allowed to reach the audience. This is very well put in Lada Ray’s article Desperate for Up-To-Date Truth About Ukraine and Novorossia?.
In this regard, it is an interesting exercise just to fire up Google Earth and take a bird’s eye view of the Russian Federation:

Russian Federation

And the first thing one notices is that, yes, it is a Federation. Notice all the territories, the Federal Subjects, that comprise the Russian Federation. They all have a large degree of autonomy, with their own regional laws, that take into account the specifics of the nationalities that populate them, most of them have one or more national languages, besides Russian – like Crimean Republic, which has Ukrainian and Tatar as official languages. And they all have a common desire for peaceful existence and prosperity. And Russia, just like about any other country, only as strong as it stands united

On the map above the reader can see Western Europe. I cannot say just “Europe”, because Russia is also Europe – a fact that is largely forgotten. And moreover, Western Europe is just a small fraction of one large common continent – Eurasia that got politically divided so as to split and rule us, the people.

Please read Lada’s Guide to the 85 Subjects of the Russian Federation for a lot more information and details on what is Russian Federation.

In the middle, a quite large chunk of the map is occupied by Ukraine – a hot topic of the last 2 years, what with the West-fuelled and MSM-ignored civil war raging there. That civil war was made possible for many reasons, one of which is: just like Russia (or, rather, because Ukraine is a historical fragment of Russia) Ukraine is not homogeneous, and for it to survive, it should have adopted a federative structure. This was vehemently denied to it by US/EU instigators, contrary to all common sense. So first Crimea, then Donbass/Novorossia took matters into their own hands, as then other regions will do too. It saddens me to see this large 40+ million country being so totally dominated by the Western mob.

But there is hope. Ironically, it comes from the biggest bully – the USA. Unwittingly, USA has acknowledged Novorossia’s claim to independence with a law, dating back to 1959!

US Congress and President Obama “Officially” Recognize Donbass’: Public Law 86-90 (1959)

The article above is a must-read. Not only does it describe the law in question:

The Captive Nations Week Resolution passed by both the Senate and House of Representatives in 1959 and reissued as a Presidential Proclamation every year for the last 56 years (also known as Public Law 86-90) affirms the RECOGNITION of the “Don” (Donetsk and Lugansk Peoples Republics are core countries of a Cossackia) as well as a future Zaporozhyian Republic (currently Zaporozhye Oblast).

It also gives an important view on the disparate constitution of what the West tries to pass as a monolithic “Ukrainian” nation:

According to Wasyl Veryha former Ukrainian World Congress president– read how he describes the populations of émigrés from “Ukraine

“In fact, the diverse nomenclature for the Ukrainian ethnic group caused a great deal of confusion not only at the turn of the century but also at a later period (through the 1930′s). The people of the province of Galicia and Bukovina, generally called themselves “Rusyny” (Ruthenians), Galicians, Bukovinians and Austrians… the Greek Catholic Church, to which at that time the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian immigrants adhered, preferred the term “Ruthenian”…both within the Austrian and the Russian Empires where the term “Ruthenian” and “Little Russian” respectively had begun to give way to the new, but at the same time old term, “Ukrainian”(person on the borderlands), as a national designation…The paper (Ukrainian Voice) was really a pioneer in transforming the “Austrians”, Ruthenians”, “Galicians” and “Bukovinians” into Ukrainians.. It popularized the term “Ukrainian” as a replacement for “Ruthenian.”

Wasyl Veryhas Masters of History Thesis

“Life is such a simple, yet cruel thing”

This recollection of the war was written by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and published in Russian Pioneer on the 30th of April 2015. Soviet Union lost 27 million people in that War, and almost every single family has a recollection of losses and hardships connected with it. And the family of the President of RF is no exception. Read on my unofficial translation from Russian below…


Frankly, father did not like even to touch the subject. Rather, it was like this: when adults were talking to each other and remembering something, I was just around. All the information about the war, about what happened with my family, came to me from those conversations between the adults. But sometimes they addressed me directly.

Father served in Sevastopol, in the detachment of submarines – he was a sailor. He was drafted in 1939. And then, after returning from service, he just worked at a factory, and they lived with my mother in Peterhof. I think they even built some house there.

He was working at a military enterprise when the war started, giving the so-called “reservation” that exempts one from conscription. But he wrote an application to join the party, and then another application – that he wants to go to the front. He was dispatched to the subversive detachment of the NKVD. It was a small detachment. He said that there were 28 people in it, and they were deployed into the near rear for carrying out acts of sabotage. The undermining of bridges, railway tracks… But they were almost immediately ambushed. Someone betrayed them. They came to a village, and then went out, and when after a while they returned, the Nazis were already waiting for them there. They were chased through the woods, and he survived, because he climbed into a swamp, and spent a few hours in that swamp, breathing through a reed. This I remember already from his own story. And he said that, while sitting in the swamp and breathing through the reed, he heard how the German soldiers were passing nearby, just a few steps away from him, how the dogs were yapping…

In addition, it was probably the beginning of autumn, in other words – already cold… I also remember well how he told me that the head of their group was a German. A Soviet citizen. But a German.

And here’s what’s curious: a couple of years ago, the archives of the Defence Ministry handed me the case of this group. There is a copy of the case in my home, in Novo-Ogaryovo. A list of the group, names, patronymics and brief descriptions. Yes, 28 people. And at the head – a German. Everything as it was told by my father.

Of the 28 people, only 4 crossed the front line back to ours. 24 were killed.

And then they were re-assigned into the active army, and sent on to the Nevsky Pyatachok. It was probably the hottest place during the whole of the Leningrad Blockade. Our troops held a small bridgehead. Four kilometres in width and some two kilometres in depth. It was supposed to be a springboard for the future breaking of the blockade. But it never got used for this purpose. They broke through the blockade elsewhere. Still the spot (Nevsky Pyatachok) was held, held for a long time, there was heavy fighting there. Very heavy. There are commanding heights above and all around it, it’s shot at throughout. The Germans were, of course, also aware that it’s there that a breakthrough may be attempted, and tried to simply erase the Nevsky Pyatachokto from the face of the earth. There is data about how much metal there is in each square meter of the land. There’s still metal all over the place there.

And the father told how he was wounded there. The wound was heavy. All his life he lived with shrapnel in his leg: not all fragments could be taken out. The leg ached. Foot didn’t bend since then. The medics preferred not to touch the small fragments so as not to shatter the bone. And, thank God, the leg was saved. They could, after all, amputate it. He got a good doctor. He had the second group disablement. As a disabled veteran, he was eventually given an apartment. It was our first separate apartment. A small two-room apartment. (Translators remark: Before that the Putins lived in a communal apartment, where several families share the facilities, corridor and kitchen, and sleep in separate rooms.) However, before that we lived in the centre and now we had to move. True, not quite to the outskirts, but to a new-built area. And it happened, of course, not immediately after the war, but when I already worked in the KGB. I was not given an apartment then, but my father finally got his. It was a great happiness. And here’s how he was wounded. He, together with a comrade, did a little sortie into the rear of the Germans, crawling, crawling… And then it becomes both funny and sad at the same time: they got to a German bunker, and, father said, out of it comes a man, a huge guy, and looks at them… and they could not get up because they were under the machine gun sight. “The man – he says – looked at us very carefully, then he took out a grenade, then another, and threw those grenades at us. Well… ” Life is such a simple, yet cruel thing.

What was the biggest problem when he woke up? The fact that it was already winter, Neva was icebound, and he had to somehow get to the other shore, to the skilled medical care. But he, of course, could not walk.

True, he still managed to get to ours on this side of the river. But there were few wanting to drag him to the other side, because Neva was in full view there and exposed to fire both from artillery and machine guns. Chances to reach the opposite bank were almost non-existent. But, by chance, his neighbour from Peterhof was nearby. And that neighbour pulled him over without hesitation. And managed to drag him to the hospital. Both crawled there alive. The neighbour waited for him at the hospital, made sure that he was operated, and said, “All right, now you’re going to live, and I am off to die.”

And he went back. I later asked my father: “Well, did he die?” And he returned several times to this story. It tormented him too very much. They lost contact, and father believed that his neighbour was killed. And somewhere in the 60s, I don’t remember the exact year, I was still very young then, but somewhere in the early 60’s, he suddenly came home, sat down and wept. He met his saviour. In a shop. In Leningrad. Accidentally. He went to the store for food and saw him. It is some coincidence that the two went at the same moment to the same store. One chance in a million… They later came to our home, met each other… And my mother told me how she visited father at the hospital where he lay after he was wounded. They had a small child, he was three years old. At this time there was blockade, hunger… My father gave her his hospital ration. Secretly from doctors and nurses. And she hid it, took it home and fed the child. And then he began to faint from hunger in the hospital, so doctors and nurses understood what was happening, and didn’t allow her to visit any more.

And then the child was taken away from her. It was done, as she later repeated, in a compulsory fashion in order to save small children from starvation. They were collected to the orphanages for further evacuation. Parents were not even asked.

He fell ill there – my mother said that it was with diphtheria – and didn’t survive. And they were not even told where he was buried. They have never learnt where. And then, last year, completely unfamiliar to me people worked on their own initiative through the archives and found documents about my brother. And that’s really my brother. Because I knew that they lived then, after fleeing from Peterhof from the advancing German troops, at their friends’ place – and I even knew the address. They lived, as we call it, on the Water Channel (Vodnyj Kanal). It would be better to call it a “Bypass channel” (Obvodnyj Kanal), but in Leningrad it’s called “Water Channel”. I know for sure that they had lived there. And not only the address, where he was taken from, coincided. Name, surname, patronymic, date of birth coincided as well. It was, of course, my brother. And there was stated the place of burial: Piskaryovskoye Cemetery. And even the specific area was given.

Parents were told nothing of this. Well, apparently, other things had higher priority back then.

So, everything that my parents told about the war, was true. Not a single word was invented. Not a single day was moved. And about my brother. And about the neighbour. And about the German, the commander of the group. Everything matches. And all this got later confirmed in an incredible way. And after the child was taken away, and mother was left alone, and my father was allowed to walk, he stood up on crutches and went home. And when he came to the house, he saw that the medics were carrying corpses out of the entrance. And he saw my mother. He came up, and it seemed to him that she was breathing. He told the medics: “She’s still alive!” – “She’ll pass away along the way – said the nurses. – She’ll not survive now.” He told that he pounced on them with crutches and forced them to lift her back into the apartment. They told him: “Well, we’ll do as you say, but know that we will not come here for another two or three or four weeks. You’ll have to sort it out yourself then.” And he nursed her back to life. She survived. And lived until 1999. While he died in late 1998.

After the lifting of the blockade, they moved to the homeland of their parents, in the Tver province, and lived there until the end of the war. Father’s family was quite large. He had, after all, six brothers, and five of them were killed in the war. This is a disaster for the family. And my mother’s relatives also died. And I was a late child. She gave birth to me when she was 41 years old.

And there was, after all, not a family where someone didn’t die. And, of course, grief, misfortune, a tragedy. But they had no hatred for the enemy, that’s what’s amazing. To be honest, I still can not fully understand this. My mother was a very gentle, kind person… And she said, “Well, what kind of hatred can one have toward these soldiers? They are simple people and also died in the war.” It’s amazing. We were brought up on Soviet books, movies… and hated. But she somehow did not have it in her. And I remember very well her words: “Well, what can you have against them? They are also hard workers, just like us. They were simply force-driven to the front.”

These are the words that I remember from the childhood.


Translator’s afterword

What I personally find sad in this story, is that Putin’s parents didn’t live long enough to know that their son became the President of the Russian Federation, and a worthy president at that. Just like his father nursed his mother back to life, so did Putin nurse Russia back to life after the Wild 90s, at a time, when most world leaders treated it like a still breathing corpse, ready to be carried out of the world arena. More about it can be gleaned from the newly-released documentary, “The President”. Lada Ray wrote a good summary and is posting links to the ongoing English translation of the documentary in her blog.

Repentance of Berlin.
After 70 years, the Germans have an unambiguous attitude towards the Soviet victory

Below is my translation of an article by Georgij Zotov, published in “Argumenty i Fakty” on the 6th of March 2015.


– Excuse me, but where is the monument to Soviet soldiers?

– Stay on the road. Walk a little further and you’ll immediately see the gates.

The memorial in Berlin’s Treptow Park is the largest outside the former Soviet Union, and one is immediately struck by its size. Police strolls by, watching order, cleaners gather fallen branches. People come here all the time – and, surprisingly, not only the residents of the former East Germany (GDR), but also quite the Westen Germans. I met a businessman from Hamburg, a 34-year-old Herbert Müller, who made a special trip to the monument – to lay flowers and pay tribute to the Soviet soldiers. A situation that is quite difficult to imagine in today’s Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic.


Traffic controller Katya Spivak at the crossroads of Berlin. May 1945. Photo: RIA Novosti / Jacob Ryumkin

“The monstrous meat grinder”

– On the 9th of May I always think about the suffering of the German and Soviet soldiers, who were involved in a terrible slaughter, the bloodiest in human history – Herbert tells me. – Do you know what angers me the most right now? Politicians in Western Europe forgot about the Second World War and are aggressively pushing us for a showdown with Russia. They learned nothing from 50 million victims. How would supplies of modern weapons to Ukraine help to maintain truce in this country? We can not change anything in the last war, but we can prevent the next: that’s what we have to think about!

Herbert Mueller never saw his grandfather – he was killed near Moscow in December 1941. The same story, with a few exceptions, will be told by almost every German – grandfathers in the service in the army, the SS, the Gestapo, fighting in the Volkssturm. Some died at the front, some were captured, and some even hanged as war criminals: I got to talk to a woman, whose grandfather served in the Majdanek concentration camp. However, I heard nothing negative with regard to the Victory Day, in contrast to our former friends from Eastern Europe. Of course, for the Germans, the 8-9 May is not a national holiday, but rather an occasion for mourning for the dead relatives. Something that no one has forgotten, is the bombing of Berlin and other cities by the Anglo-American aviation. “40,000 civilians were killed in Hamburg in 1943, two years later in Dresden – 25,000. We can’t even put a memorial to them – the “allies” of Germany will misunderstand – says businessman Volker Heinecke, who in 1942, as a two-year child, was kidnapped by the Nazis from the USSR and placed in an SS child centre “Lebensborn”. – I was five years old, but I remember very well how residential neighbourhoods of Hamburg burned: the bombs fell nearby”.

“How many Russians died?”

At the same time, after having communicated with pupils and students in Berlin, I realized with sadness – the victims from the Soviet Union in World War II have become half-forgotten over the past 25 years. “How many Soviet citizens died? – A group of students at the Brandenburg Gate repeats the question. – Uh-uh … a million? No? Five million? I’m sorry, we have to look it up on the Internet”. Nowadays German schools teach the exact number of Jews and Gypsies put to death by the Nazis, but it is not known to the Germans about the three million Soviet POWs who died in captivity (falling under the definition of the Holocaust in a broad sense) – as well as about a million victims of the siege of Leningrad, and about thousands of burnt villages in USSR.

On the other hand, the guides in Berlin tell school groups about how many people were shot dead by GDR border guards while trying to scale the Berlin Wall, and, pointing at the Soviet flag (next to the checkpoint “Charlie” – the former checkpoint at the entrance to the American sector), explains: “Here began the territory of the Kremlin and ended with the territory of freedom.” Who said that the Cold War is over?

– I want to emphasize – the vast majority of Berliners do not question that the Soviet Union played a significant role in the collapse of National Socialism, – said in an interview to “AIF” Florian Schmidt, press officer of the Mayor of Berlin. – Although occasionally neo-Nazis try to desecrate the monument to the Soviet soldiers in Treptow Park, we are determined to prevent such actions. For us, this monument is the evidence of the end of a terrible war, a sign of liberation from Nazi dictatorship, and the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazism is an important anniversary for the people of the united Germany. On the 8-9 May they plan in Berlin, at the state level, to hold a series of celebrations, organize exhibitions and public readings of novels about the war.


In the GDR at the monument to Soviet soldiers there were crowds of people. Today – much less. But still they come and bring fresh flowers. Photo: RIA Novosti (left), AIF / Georgy Zotov (right)

“We’re not stupid”

Only once (in 1992) the Senate of Berlin raised the question whether to remove the quotes of Stalin from the monument in Treptow Park. But it was immediately hushed: in Germany they behave differently than our neighbours in Eastern Europe, and understand that such things CAN NOT be touched. In Berlin I talked both with Western and Eastern Germans: so different in character, they often agree on one opinion – the Soviet Union had the right after the defeat of the Third Reich to remain on German soil. “And what were the options then? – A journalist of one of the leading newspapers in Germany asks me in surprise. – The Americans put their bases in the German west, Russians – in the east. Now in Eastern Europe they are trying to remove monuments to Soviet soldiers, but we do not imitate fools. We must keep in mind that for the Russians, the theme of the war is painful still – the Germans killed in the USSR more people than in any other country. Unfortunately, people start to forget about it…”

According to polls, 72% of young people from Eastern Germany were able to name the date of the end of World War II, on the other hand 68% of young from the Western part of the country failed to do so. Only 18% of the population of Germany know how huge were the human losses suffered by Soviet Union. “It is bad that modern Germans are not aware of the terrible fate of 15 million Soviet civilians killed by the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and the SS – sighs the businessman from Hamburg Volker Heinecke. – In my opinion, these people deserve a separate memorial complex in the heart of the German capital, in memory of their suffering. But neither the former Soviet government nor the current German thought of it…” However, at least one thing in Berlin remains unchanged. “We believe that Russians did not conquer, but liberate us – said to AiF the guitarist of the popular band “Rammstein”, Paul Landers. – And there is no other opinion about this among my friends.”

Prague Winter.
What is the Czechs’ attitude towards the coming 70th anniversary of the Victory?

Below is my translation of an article by Georgij Zotov, published in “Argumenty i Fakty” on the 27th of February 2015. The title is a play on concepts. “Prague Spring” was a period of political and cultural liberalisation of Czechoslovakia in 1968.


Over the last 25 years they repeatedly tried to rewrite history in the Czech Republic so as to show – Prague was liberated by whoever, but not by the Soviet troops. However, this period is now referred to by some citizens of the country as “madness”.

– When was Prague liberated? We celebrate the Victory Day on 8th of May. I do not know what happened there. It seems that the Americans wanted to help the Czechs, who revolted against the SS. But they were prevented by the Russians. Anyway, that’s what we were taught.

“They kissed hands of the Russians”

18-year-old student Vaclav does not know Russian, and standing on the Old Town Square in Prague, the guy is talking to me in English. He’d be happy to answer the question, but he’s not sure about the correct answer. Over 25 years too much has changed in the views of the end of World War II in the Czech Republic – and not for the better for our side. Although Soviet troops entered Prague on the morning of May 9, 1945, Liberation Day is celebrated here on May 8 – with the motivation: “If the whole of Western Europe celebrates on the eighth, so will we.” And the very fact of the liberation is questioned by the Czech press and politicians.

– Since 1990 we learned a lot of “new” from the articles of Czech newspapers and statements of historians, – says ex-employee of the TV Czechoslovakia Tatiana Ditrihova. – Especially about the uprising in Prague that erupted on May 5, 1945. For example, it was reported that the Russians did not allow the US Army to rescue the residents of Prague. Although it was the Americans themselves, who ignored calls for help, not wanting to get involved in heavy fighting. Other “experts” claimed – Vlasov’s fighters helped rebels more than the Soviet soldiers. Yes, hoping for amnesty, Russian units of the Wehrmacht joined the revolt, but already two days later they left Prague residents to fend for themselves by fleeing to the Americans. There were printed even such views as saying that on May 9 Russians entered the empty city, that armed Czechs liberated the capital on their own. This is nonsense. Prague Radio begged Marshal Konev: “An SS division moved out against Prague, we are being bombarded from the air, they press us out with tanks, we run out of ammo.” On the 8th of May, Nazi commandant of Prague, General Rudolf Toussaint, accepted the surrender of the guerrillas – the Germans crushed the uprising. When the Red Army entered Prague on the next morning, many Czechs were crying from happiness on the streets and kissed the hands of Soviet soldiers.


The joy of the people of Prague. Photo: RIA Novosti

How to uproot memory

The first to burst into Prague was the tank of 25-year-old Lieutenant Ivan Goncharenko. A fight broke out. On Manesov bridge T-34 was hit and Goncharenko died, becoming the first of the Soviet soldiers who died for the liberation of the capital of Czechoslovakia. On July 29, 1945, on ​​Stefanik square there was unveiled a monument to Goncharenko: tank “IS-2” raised on a pedestal. He has long been a symbol of the liberation of Prague, but now the tank is no longer there – coming to Stefanik (now called Kinsky Square), on the site of the monument I see a crudely made fountain. On April 28, 1991 an avant-garde artist David Black mockingly repainted the tank in pink. And so it began … the combat vehicle was deprived of the status of “cultural monument”, dismantled and its pedestal destroyed – they even destroyed the flower bed in the form of a five-pointed star. When I ask the Prague residents about the tank, they feel uncomfortable. “We have nothing to do with it – sighs an elderly passerby on the Kinsky square. – We were not asked, and I am ashamed of hysteria in relation to Russian. Why the monuments in Berlin and Vienna do not trouble anybody? The new authorities explained their actions as follows: like this tank now only represents the Soviet intervention during the Prague Spring.

Of course, the decision by Brezhnev in 1968 to suppress the rally of the Czech people is a “black page” in the history of the USSR; back then 108 citizens of Czechoslovakia were killed. However, in the six years of the Nazi occupation, there were killed 325,000 Czechs, Slovaks, Jews, Roma (90% of them – civilians). Only in 1943, 350,000 people were driven to work in Germany. Only in one day of the American bombing of Prague on the 14th of February 1945, 700 residents were burned alive. I want to ask Czechs what is more important to them – the memory of an idiotic act of Brezhnev, or respect for the people who, by giving their lives, saved millions of others? However, since 2011 they already hold discussions in the Czech press: Should the tank be returned to its place for the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Prague? Alas, it doesn’t go further than mere talk.

Before
After
Stefanik Square in Prague before and after.
Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org / ŠJů; AIF / Georgy Zotov

End of insanity

– For me, the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Prague, is of course a celebration – said to “AiF” Maria Dolezhalova-Shupikova, one of the few surviving residents of the village of Lidice that in 1942 was obliterated from the face of the earth by SS punishers. – I was sent to be raised in a German family, forbidden to speak Czech, I had almost forgotten my mother tongue. If the Soviet army didn’t come, I would not have returned home and would not have found my mother. Of course there are problems between the Russians and the Czechs, there are differences of opinion. But this is not a reason to forget about the events that took place in Prague seventy years ago.

On May 11, 1945 a war correspondent Boris Polevoy conveyed report from Prague to “Moskovskaya Pravda”: “Near an overturned truck there lay a body of a girl with such a beautiful face, which it seemed that even death could not change. Next to her, with arms spread, a mighty Red Army tanker lay on the ground on his back, killed by a stray bullet that hit him in the forehead just at the moment when he probably wanted to rush to the aid of the girl. They lay here, head to head, surrounded by a silent crowd, as a symbol of the brotherhood of Czechoslovak and Soviet people. Brotherhood designated by a bloody seal.” There is, perhaps, no more brotherhood – it disappeared with the collapse of the USSR and Czechoslovakia. But the memory remains the same: after the “short madness,” as the situation was aptly described by one of Prague citizens, respect for Soviet soldiers is returning. The graves of our soldiers on Olshansky cemetery in Prague are restored at the expense of the authorities, flowers are brought to the gravestones.

On the 70th anniversary of the liberation of the capital of the Czech Republic they plan celebrations, during which they promised to reflect the role of the Red Army in the rescue of the city. Is Prague winter finally over? I hope so. Oh yeah, I forgot. Avant-garde artist David Black, who in 1991 defaced the Soviet tank, did not respond to my request for an interview to the “AiF”. Perhaps he simply had nothing to say…

Crimea.
The Path to the Homeland.

A definitive documentary on the reunification of Crimea with Russia is aired today. Here is a quick translation of the blurb as presented on Rossia TV site.

This full-length documentary was conceived to preserve the history of every major episode of events that took place in the Crimea in the spring of 2014. Filming lasted for 8 months and covered Foros, Sevastopol and Simferopol, and Kerch, Yalta and Bakhchisaray; Feodosia, Djankov, Alushta and a dozen settlements of the Crimea. A long conversation with Vladimir Putin was recorded while the events were fresh, and later, more than fifty interviews with participants and witnesses of the Crimean spring. How it all began? How Russia received an official request from the legitimate president of Ukraine to save his life?

It was an operation, the likes of which has not been seen in recent world history. Vladimir Putin himself reveals a year later all the details of how a few kilometers before the ambush with machine guns, Viktor Yanukovych had been secretly evacuated, and a detailed reconstruction is dedicated to it in this film.

“It was the night of 22 to 23 February, finished at about 7 am, and I let everyone go and went to sleep at 7 am. And, in parting, I will not deny, when parting, before everyone left, I told all my colleagues, there were four of them, I said that the situation in Ukraine turned out so that we have to start working on the return of the Crimea to Russia. Because we can not leave the area and the people who live there to fend for themselves, under the roller of the nationalists. And I put forth some tasks, said what and how we should do, but immediately said that we will do so only if we are absolutely convinced that this is what the people themselves who live in the Crimea want”, – said in an interview Vladimir Putin.

So the first order, which was given by the president, concerned not the security services and the Ministry of Defence, but his administration, which experts and sociologists conducted a closed survey in the Crimea. What questions answered Crimeans, when even the word “referendum” was not yet spoken?

“It turned out that of those wishing to join Russia, there 75% of the total population. You know, a closed survey was conducted, outside the context of a possible merger. For me, it became obvious that if we come to this, the level or the number of those who would like to this historic event to occur, would be much higher, “- said the Russian president.

Korsun pogrom. How many people were killed or missing after Ukrainian nationalists attacked the convoy of the Crimean people and burned their buses? How a militia of the Crimea was formed? Who was its leader?

How “polite people” first appeared in Crimea? Who were they, by whose orders were they sent to the peninsula? And how long did the special operation take the resulted of which on the night of February 27 was to take under control of all key government buildings?

“The ultimate goal was not to capture the Crimea and do some annexation. The ultimate goal was to give people the opportunity to express their opinion on how they want to live. I tell you quite frankly, honestly tell you. I thought for myself, if people want, then so be it. So if they will be there with greater autonomy, with some rights, but as a part of the Ukrainian state. So be it. But if they want a different way, we we can not leave them! We know the results of the referendum. And we did what was required to do!” – said the Russian leader.

How did they managed without bloodshed to disarm 193 military bases of Ukraine in the Crimea? What was the secret of the Black Sea Fleet, which invited Ukrainian colleagues to negotiate exclusively to Hersonissos? How did they manage to close in the bays Ukrainian Navy ships? But why did it not go without assault and shooting in Feodosia?

How Russia came into contact with NATO units in the Crimea, and at sea, with the naval forces of the Navy? About what did Vladimir Putin talk in those days with Barack Obama? And how did our coastal missile complexes “Bastion” come to the Crimea, suddenly changing the whole course of events? Two outspoken interviews with Vladimir Putin, and all the episodes of the Crimean spring, which determined the course of Russia’s recent history – see nin the film “Crimea. The Path to the Homeland.”


In the meantime, Yatsnejuk, in his typical evil clown amplua, threatens to create a film, titled “Crimea. Crime and Punishment.” Sure. He should know how to commit crime against humanity and to create punisher Nazi battalions that slaughter the population of Donbass (a fate, that was also slated to Crimeans by the West-Ukrainian coup-makers).

If ever a film under his proposed title is created, its full title will be “Crimea. Khrushov’s Crime and the Punishment of Ukro-Nazis”.