The Plan to Destroy Russia. Conceived and Started in 1948. Concluded in 1993? Or Not…

After the hot war phase on Russia(USSR) between 22nd of April 1941 and the 9th of May 1945, executed through Germans, but lavishly funded by US (for example grandfather of the Bush presidential clan), USA did not view 1945 as a year of defeat. Along with preparation for a carpet nuking of the key cities in USSR, USA also devised a plan to politically change and destroy USSR/Russia from within. In the document below, Russia and USSR are referred interchangeably.

The document, presented in full below my analysis, is copied from this resource, which also provides the raw scanned pages of the text.

It demonstrates well the strategy of “divide and conquer” that that US were going to employ, as well as their understanding that the only way to destroy Russia, is from within – something that the “liberal” 5th column is doing in Russia of today. Remember that USSR, is never the stated final objective in the document below – Russia is. On the other hand, they do not understand many aspects of the Russian World, illustrated well by this fallacious statement “Before the revolution of 1918, Russian nationalism was solely Russian.”, as Russian Empire of pre 1917 was also a multi-national and multi-confessional state.

Let me extract the key-points of the doctrine first, and then I’ll let you read through the whole text, leaving to you to decide if there is even a gram of good in the outlined intents…

Our basic objectives with respect to Russia are really only two:

a. To reduce The power and influence of Moscow to limits in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international society; and

b. To bring about a basic change in the theory’ and practice of international relations observed by the government in power in Russia. If these two objectives could be achieved, the problem which this country faces in its relations with Russia would be reduced to what might be considered normal dimensions.

Our difficulty with the present Soviet Government lies basically in the fact that its leaders are animated by concepts of the theory and practice of international relations which are not only radically opposed to our own but are clearly inconsistent with any peaceful and mutually profitable development of relations between that government and other members of the international community, individually and collectively.

Prominent among these concepts are the following:

(a) That the peaceful coexistence and mutual collaboration of sovereign and independent governments, regarding and respecting each other as equals, is an illusion and an impossibility;

(h) That conflict is the basis of international life wherever, as is the case between the Soviet Union and capitalist countries, one country does not recognize the supremacy of the other;

(c) That regimes which do not acknowledge Moscow’s authority and ideological supremacy are wicked and harmful to human progress and that there is a duty on the part of right-thinking people everywhere to work for the overthrow or weakening of such regimes, by any and all methods which prove tactically desirable;

(d) That there can be, in the long run, no advancement of the interests of both the communist and non-communist world by mutual collaboration, these interests being basically conflicting and contradictory;

and

(e) That spontaneous association between individuals in the communist-dominated world and individuals outside that world is evil and cannot contribute to human progress.

Plainly, it is not enough that these concepts should cease to dominate Soviet, or Russian, theory and practice in international relations. It is also necessary that they should be replaced by something approximating their converses.

These would be:

(a) That it is possible for sovereign and equal countries to exist peaceably side by side and to collaborate with each other without any thought or attempt at domination of one by the other;

(b) That conflict is not necessarily the basis of international life and that it may be accepted that peoples can have common purposes without being in entire ideological agreement and without being subordinated to a single authority;

(c) That people in other countries do have a legitimate right to pursue national aims at variance with Communist ideology, and that it is the duty of right-thinking people to practice tolerance for the ideas of others, to observe scrupulous non-interference in the internal affairs of others on the basis of reciprocity, and to use only decent and honorable methods in international dealings;

(d) That international collaboration can, and should, advance the interests of both parties even though the ideological inspiration of thc two parties is not identical; and

(e) That the association of individuals across international borders is desirable and should be encouraged as a process contributing to general human progress.

Note: the above were not just concepts, they were practised by USSR, and are now professed and practised by the Russian Federation. So the Empire of Chaos, already in 1948 set about to exploit any rifts, widening them into chasms

It may he stated, accordingly, that our first aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to encourage and promote by means short of war the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present satellite area and the emergence of the respective eastern European countries as independent factors on the international scene,

We should encourage by every means at our disposal tile development in the Soviet Union of institutions of federalism which would permit a revival of the national life of the Baltic peoples.

We may say, therefore, that our second aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is, by informational activity and by every other means at our disposal, to explode the myth by which people remote from Russian military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the Soviet Union for what it is and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward it.

Then comes the undermining from within, in the chapter of “THE ALTERATION OF RUSSIAN CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS” – in other words making a not-Russia out of Russia

We must say, therefore, that our third aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to create situations which will compel the Soviet Governntent to recognise the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving, at least outwardly, as though it were the converse of those concepts that were true.

This is of course primarily a question of keeping the Soviet Union politically, militarily, psychologically weak in comparison with the international forces outside of its control and of maintaining a high degree of insistence among the non-communist countries on the observance by Russia of the ordinary international decencies.

That phase was started in 1980s with the coming of Gorbachev.

They had the plans for war, of course. And whereas Russian military doctrine is to defend its territory, the American one is written like this:

The first of our war aims must naturally be she destruction of Russian military influence and domination in areas contiguous to, but outside of, the borders of any Russian state.

However that may be, we must leave nothing to chance; and it should naturally be considered that one of our major war aims with respect to Russia would be to destroy thoroughly the structure of relationships by which the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens, or groups of citizens, in countries not under communist control.

In other words, being cowardly to go head on, attack the weaker parts, and then divide and conquer. It is interesting to observe that throughout the 90s, in the accursed Yeltsin era, USA were already implementing the war-time part of the 1948 plan towards Russia:

we may definitely conclude that we could not consider our military operations successful if they left a communist regime in control of enough of the present military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable them to wage war on comparable terms with any neighboring state or with any rival authority which might be set up on traditional Russian territory.

It is impossible to forecast what the nature of such terms [of surrender of Russia] should be. The smaller the territory left at the disposal of such a regime, the easier the task of imposing terms satisfactory to our interests. Taking the worst case, which would be that of the retention of Soviet power over all, or nearly all, of present Soviet territory, we would have to demand:

(a) Direct military terms (surrender of equipment, evacuation of key areas, etc.) designed to assure military helplessness for a long time in advance;

(b) Terms designed to produce a considerable economic dependence on the outside world;

(c) Terms designed to give necessary freedom, or federal status, to national minorities (we would at least have to insist on the complete liberation of the Baltic States and on the granting of some type of federal status to the Ukraine which would make it possible for a Ukrainian local authority to have a large measure of autonomy); and

(d) Terms designed to disrupt the iron curtain and to assure a liberal flow of outside ideas and a considerable establishment of personal contact between persons within the zone of Soviet power and persons outside it.

Funny how Project Ukraine is playing out now. USA got more than what they bargained for in 1948.

Furthermore, here is what Yeltsin implemented in Russia after the November 1993 coup d’etat, almost to the letter of the 1948 document:

First of all, it should be said that regardless of the ideological basis of any such non-communist authority and regardless of the extent to which it might be prepared to do lip service to the ideals of democracy and liberalism, we would do well to see that in one way or another the basic purposes were assured which flow from the demands listed above. In other words, we should set up automatic safeguards to assure that even a regime which is non-communist and nominally friendly to us:

(a) Does not have strong military power;

(b) Is economically dependent to a considerable extent on the outside world;

(c) Does not exercise too much authority over the major national minorities; and

(d) Imposes nothing resembling the iron curtain over contacts with the outside world.

In the case of such a regime, professing hostility to the communists and friendship toward us, we should doubtless wish to take care i.o impose these conditions in a manner which would not be offensive or humiiiating. But we would have to see to it that in one way or another they were imposed, if our interests and the interests of world peace were to be protected.

In the 90’s and the beginning of 00’s (on inertia) military destroyed (check); economical dependence on pertodollar (check); provocation of conflicts and civil wars on ethnic grounds (check); total inability to withstand outside informational influence (check). Funnily, once Russia started to come back to it’s ow in 2007 (Putin’s München Speech), the West slammed an iron curtain on Russia from their own side, blocking almost all of information coming from Russia to the west.

We are therefore safe in saying that it should be our aim in the event of war with the Soviet Union, to see to it that when the war was over no regime on Russian territory is permitted:

(a) To retain military force on a scale which could be threatening to any neighboring stale;

(b) To enjoy a measure of economic autarchy which would permit the erection of the economic basis of such armed power without the assistance of the western world;

(c) To deny autonomy and self-government to the main national minorities; or

(d) To retain anything resembling the present iron curtain. If these conditions are assured, we can adjust ourselves to any political situation which may ensue from the war. We will then be safe, whether a Soviet government retains the bulk of Russian territory or whether it retains only a small part of such territory or whether it disappears altogether. And we will be safe even though the original democratic enthusiasm of a new regime is short-lived and tends to be replaced gradually by the a-social concepts of international affairs to which the present Soviet generation has been educated.

The above should be adequate as an expression of our war aims in the event that political processes in Russia take their own course under the stresses of war and that we are not obliged to assume major responsibility for the political future of the country. But there are further questions to be answered for the event that Soviet authority should disintegrate so rapidly and so radically as to leave the country in chaos, making it encumbent upon us as the victors to make political choices and to take decisions which would be apt to shape the political future of the country. For this eventuality there are three main questions which must be faced.

That disintegration cost more Russian lives in the Wild 90’s than what was lost during the whole of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945!

Also, note how the Ukrainian project is spun. In 1917 Lenin built Ukraine, at the expense of Russia, in 1945 Stalin added to it at the expense of Poland, Romania, Hungary, in 1954 Khrishev expanded it at the expense of Russia again, yet the US “masterminds” are persuing the aim that the “nationalistic organizations” [Read Galicina SS, Bandera follower] are most vocal abroad about. It was in 1948 that the disaster of today with Ukro-Nazis 3-year long shelling of Donbass and the total destruction of the USSR-inherited Ukrainian economy that we are observing now.

First of all, would it be our desire, in such a case, that the present territories of the Soviet Union remain united under a single regime or that they be partitioned? And if they are to remain united, at least to a large extent, then what degree of federalism should be observed in a future Russian government? What about the major minority groups, in particular the Ukraine?

We have already taken note of the problem of the Baltic states. The Baltic states should not be compelled to remain under any communist authority in the aftermath of another war. Should the territory adjacent To the Baltic slates be controlled by a Russian authority other than a communist authority, we should be guided by the wishes of the Baltic peoples and by the degree of moderation which that Russian authority is inclined to exhibit with respect to them.

In the case of the Ukraine, we have a different problem. The Ukrainians are the most advanced of the peoples who have been under Russian rule in modern times. They have generally resented Russian domination; and their nationalistic organizations have been active and vocal abroad. It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that they should be freed, at last, from Russian rule and permitted to set themselves up as an independent slate.

And when the collapse was the accomplished fact, first Yeltsin got installed as a president (cemented during the 1993 coup d’etat), and then they tried to install Khodorkovskij…

In the event of a disintegration of Soviet power, we are certain to be faced with demands for .support on the part of the various competing political elements among the present Russian opposition groups. It will be almost impossible for us to avoid doing things which would have the effect of favoring one or another of these groups over its rivals. But a great deal will depend on ourselves, and on our concept of what we are trying to accomplish.

We have already seen that among the existing and potential opposition groups there is none which we will wish to sponsor entirely and for whose actions, if it were to obtain power in Russia, we would wish to take responsibility.

On the other hand, we must expect that vigorous efforts will be made by various groups to induce us to take measures in Russian internal affairs which will constitute a genuine commitment on our part and make it possible for political groups in Russia to continue to demand our support. In the light of these facts, it is plain then we must make a determined effort to avoid taking responsibility for deciding who would rule Russia in the wake of a disintegration of the Soviet regime.

In 1948 they even planned for “decommunisation” – a term that was popular in Ukraine anno 2014, when physical violence, banning and disappearances became the norm. They did indeed give “plenty of arms and help” to the “non-communist authority” of Ukro-Nazis and Banderites. In the Baltic countries that manifested as apartheid…

We would be wiser, therefore, in the case of territories freed from communist control, to restrict ourselves to seeing to it that individual ex-communists do not have the opportunity to reorganize as armed groups with pretenses to political power and that the local non-communist authority is given plenty of arms and help in any measures which they may desire to take with respect to them.

We may say, therefore, that we would not make it our aim to carry out with our own forces, on territory liberated from the communist authorities, aпy large-scale program of de-communication, and that In general we would leave this problem to whatever local authority might supplant Soviet rule.

And now the whole documents, one of a planned infestation and murder of a country…


Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds.,
Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy,
1945-1950


U.S. OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIA

TOPSECRET

August 18, 1948

[Source; Records of the National Security Council on deposit in the Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives, Washington. D.C.]

NSC 20/1 originated in response to a request from Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal for a "comprehensive statement of national policy’" with regard to the Soviet Union, on the grounds that until such a statement was prepared, "no logical decisions can be reached as to the proportion of our resources which should be devoted to military purposes. . . ..” (*1) Drafted by the Policy Planning Staff, this document represented the most complete exposition up to that time of the objectives the policy of containment was supposed to accomplish.

(*1). Forrestal to Sidney W. Souers, July 10, 1948, quoted in NSC 20, “Appraisal of the
Degree and Character of Mllilary Preparedness Required by the World Situiilion,” July 12,
1948, Foreign Relations of the United Stales: 1948, I (part 2) 589-592.

The document established two basic goals for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union: (1) reduction of the power and influence of the U.S.S.R. to the point that they would no longer threaten international stability; and (2) accomplishment of a fundamental change in the theory and practice of international relations as applied by the Soviet govemment. Unlike NSC 7 (Document 20), NSC 20/1 stressed the distinction between the Soviet Union and the international communist movement, and, in line with the reasoning in PPS 35 (Document 21), held out the possibility of driving a wedge between the two of them as a means of implementing U.S. policy objectives.

NSC 20/1 emphasized the desirability of achieving containment’s desired results by means short of war, although it recognized the possibility that war might come, whether by inadvertence or design. The final portion of the document dealt with the question of what U.S. policy should be in that eventuality. It is noteworthy for its stress on the neutralization, rather than the elimination, of Soviet power, and for its implied rejection of the World War II doctrine of unconditional surrender.

I. Introduction

It is plain that Russia, both as a force in its own right and as a center for the world communist movement, has become for the time being the outstanding problem of U.S. foreign policy, and that there is deep dissatisfaction and concern in this country over the aims and methods of the Soviet leaders. The policies of this Government are therefore determined in considerable measure by our desire to modify Soviet policies and to alter the international situation to which they have already led.

However, there has yet been no clear formulation of basic U.S. objectives with respect to Russia. And it is particularly important, in view of the preoccupation of this Government with Russian affairs, that .such objectives be formulated and accepted for working purposes by all branches of our Government dealing with the problems of Russia and communism. Otherwise, there is a possibility of serious dissipation of the national effort on a problem of outstanding international importance.

II. Background Considerations

There are two concepts of the relationship of national objectives to the factors of war and peace.

The first holds that national objectives be constant and should not be affected by changes in the country’s situation as between war and peace; that they should be pursued constantly by means short of war or by war-like means, as the case may be. This concept was best expressed by Clausewitz, who wrote that, "War is a continuation of policy, intermingled with other means."

The opposite concept is that which sees national objectives in peace and national objectives in war as essentially unrelated. According to this concept, the existence of a state of war creates its own specific political objectives, which generally supersede the normal peacetime objectives. This is the concept which has generally prevailed in this country. Basically, it was the concept which prevailed in the last war, where the winning of the war itself, as a military operation, was made the supreme objective of U.S. policy, other considerations being subordinated to it.

In the case of American objectives with respect to Russia, it is clear that neither of these concepts can prevall entirely.

In the first place, this Government has been forced, for purposes of the political war now in progress, to consider more definite and militant objectives toward Russia even now, in time of peace, than it ever was called upon to formulate with respect either to Germany or Japan in advance of the actual hostilities with those countries.

Secondly, the experience of the past war has taught us the desirability of gearing our war effort to a clear and realistic concept of the long-term political objectives which we wish to achieve. This would be particularly important in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. We could hardly expect to conclude such a war with the same military and political finality as was the case in the recent war against Germany and Japan, Unless, therefore, it were
clear to everyone that our objectives did not lie in military victory for its own sake, it might be hard for the U.S. public to recognize what would in reality be a favorable issue of the conflict. The public might expect much more in the way of military finality than would be necessary, or even desirable, from the standpoint of the actual achievement of our objectives. If people were to get the idea that our objectives were unconditional surrender, total occupation and military government, on the patterns of Germany and Japan, they would naturally feel that anything short of these achievements was no real victory at all, and might fail to appreciate a really genuine and constructive settlement,

Finally, we must recognize that Soviet objectives themselves are almost constant. They are very little affected by changes from war to peace. For example, Soviet territorial aims with respect to eastern Europe, as they became apparent during the war, bore a strong similarity to the program which the Soviet Government was endeavoring to realize by measures short of war in 1939 and 1940, and in fact to certain of the strategic-political concepts which underlay Czarist policy before World War I, To meet a policy of such constancy, so stubbornly pursued through both war and peace, it is necessary that we oppose it with purposes no less constant and enduring- Broadly speaking, this lies in the nature of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the outside world, which is one of permanent antagonism and conflict, taking place sometimes within a framework of formal peace and at other times within the legal framework of war. On the other hand, it is clear that a democracy cannot effect, as the totalitarian state sometimes does, a complete identification of its peacetime and wartime objectives. Its aversion to war as a method of foreign policy is so strong that it will inevitably be inclined to modify its objectives in peacetime, in the hope that they may be achieved without resort to arms. When this hope and this restraint are removed by the outbreak of war, as a result of the provocation of others, the irritation of democratic opinion generally demands either the formulation of further objectives, often of a punitive nature, which it would not have supported in time of peace, or the immediate realization of aims which it might otherwise have been prepared to pursue patiently, by gradual pressures, over the course of decades. It would therefore be unrealistic to suppose that the U.S. Government could hope to proceed in time of war on the basis of exactly the same set of objectives, or at least with the same time-table for realization of objectives, which it would have in time of peace.

At the same time, it must be recognized that the smaller the gap between
peacetime and wartime purposes, the greater the likelihood that a successful military effort will be politically successful as well. If objectives are really sound from the standpoint of national interest, they are worth consciously formulating and pursuing in war as in peace. Objectives which cumc into being as a consequence of wartime emotionalism are not apt to reflect a balanced concept of long-term national interest. For this reason, every effort should be made in government planning now, in advance of any outbreak of hostilities, to define our present peacetime objectives and our hypothetical wartime objectives with relation to Russia, and to reduce as far as possible the gap between them.

III. Basic Objectives

Our basic objectives with respect to Russia are really only two:

a. To reduce The power and influence of Moscow to limits in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international society; and

b. To bring about a basic change in the theory’ and practice of international relations observed by the government in power in Russia. If these two objectives could be achieved, the problem which this country faces in its relations with Russia would be reduced to what might be considered normal dimensions.

Before discussing the manner in which these objectives could be pursued in peace and in war, respectively, let us first examine them in somewhat greater detail.

1 . THE GEOGRAPHIC REDUCTION OF RUSSIAN POWER AND INFLUENCE

There are two spheres in which the power and the influence of Moscow have been projected beyond the borders of the Soviet Union in ways detrimental to the peace and stability of international society.

The first of these spheres is what may be defined as the satellite area:
namely, the area in which decisive political influence is exercised by the Kremlin. It should be noted that in this area, which is, as a whole, geographically contiguous to the Soviet Union, the presence, or proximity, of Soviet armed power has been a decisive factor in the establishment and maintenance of Soviet hegemony.

The second of these spheres embraces the relation between, on the one hand, the power center which controls the Soviet Union and, on the other,
groups or parties in countries abroad, beyond the limits of the satellite area, which look to Russia for their political inspiration and give to it, consciously or otherwise, their basic loyalty.

In both of these spheres the projection of Russian power beyond its legitimate limits must be broken up if the achievement of the first of the objectives listed above is to be effectively served. The countries in the satellite area must be given the opportunity to free themselves fundamentally from Russia domination and from undue Russian ideological inspiration. And the myth which causes millions of people in countries far from the Soviet borders to look to Moscow as the outstanding source of hope for human betterment must be thoroughly exploded and its workings destroyed.

It should be noted that in both cases the objective can conceivably be achieved for Ihe most part without raising issues in which the prestige of the Soviet state, as such, need necessarily be decisively engaged.

In the second of the two spheres, a complete retraction of undue Russian power should be possible without necessarily engaging the more vital interests of the Russian state; for in this sphere Moscow’s power is exerted through carefully concealed channels, the existence of which Moscow itself denies. Therefore, a withering away of the structure of power which was formerly known as the Third International, and which has survived the disuse of that name, need involve no formal humiliation of the government in Moscow and no formal concessions on the part of the Soviet State.

The same is largely true of the first of these two spheres, but not entirely, In the satellite area, to be sure, Moscow likewise denies the formal fact of Soviet domination and attempts to conceal its mechanics. As has now been demonstrated in the Tito incidents, a breakdown of Moscow control is not necessarily regarded as an event affecting the respective states as such. In this instance, it is treated as a party affair by both sides; and particular care is taken everywhere to emphasize that no question of state prestige is involved. The same could presumably happen everywhere else throughout the satellite area without involving the formal dignity of the Soviet State.

We are confronted, however, with a more difficult problem in the actual extensions of the borders of the Soviet Union which have taken place since 1939. These extensions cannot in all cases be said to have been seriously detrimental to international peace and stability; and in certain instances it can probably be considered, from the standpoint of our objectives, that they can be entirely accepted for the sake of the maintenance of peace, In other cases, notably that of the Baltic countries, the question is more difficult. We cannot really profess indifference to the further fate of the Baltic, peoples.

This has been reflected in our recognition policy to date with respect to those countries. And we could hardly consider that international peace and stability will really have ceased to be threatened as long as Europe is faced with the fact that it has been possible for Moscow to crush these three small countries which have been guilty of no real provocation and which have given evidence of their ability to handle their own affairs in a progressive manner, without detriment to the interests of their neighbors. It should therefore logically be considered a part of U.S. objectives to see these countries restored to something at least approaching a decent state of freedom and independence.

It is clear, however, that their complete independence would involve an actual cession of territory by the Soviet Government. It would therefore raise an issue directly involving the dignity and the vital interests of the Soviet State as such. It is idle to imagine that this could be brought about by means short of war. If, therefore, we are to consider that the basic objective outlined above is one which would be valid for peace as well as for war, then we must logically state that under conditions of peace our objective would be merely to induce Moscow to permit the return to the respective Baltic countries of all of their nationals who have been forcibly removed therefrom and the establishment in those countries of autonomous regimes generally consistent with the cultural needs and national aspirations of the peoples in question. In the event of war, we might, if necessary, wish to go further. But the answer to this question would depend on the nature of the Russian regime which would be dominant in that area in the wake of another war; and we need not attempt to decide it in advance.

In saying, consequently, that we should reduce the power and influence of The Kremlin to limits in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international society, we are entitled to consider that this is an objective which can be logically pursued not only in the event of a war but also in time of peace and by peaceful means, and that in the latter case it need not necessarily raise issues of prestige for the Soviet Government which would automatically make war inevitable.

2. THE CHANGE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNAT10NAI-RELATIONS AS OBSERVED IN MOSCOW

Our difficulty with the present Soviet Government lies basically in the fact that its leaders are animated by concepts of the theory and practice of international relations which are not only radically opposed to our own but are clearly inconsistent with any peaceful and mutually profitable development
of relations between that government and other members of the international community, individually and collectively.

Prominent among these concepts are the following:

(a) That the peaceful coexistence and mutual collaboration of sovereign and independent governments, regarding and respecting each other as equals, is an illusion and an impossibility;

(h) That conflict is the basis of international life wherever, as is the case between the Soviet Union and capitalist countries, one country does not recognize the supremacy of the other;

(c) That regimes which do not acknowledge Moscow’s authority and ideological supremacy are wicked and harmful to human progress and that there is a duty on the part of right-thinking people everywhere to work for the overthrow or weakening of such regimes, by any and all methods which prove tactically desirable;

(d) That there can be, in the long run, no advancement of the interests of both the communist and non-communist world by mutual collaboration, these interests being basically conflicting and contradictory;

and

(e) That spontaneous association between individuals in the communist-dominated world and individuals outside that world is evil and cannot contribute to human progress.

Plainly, it is not enough that these concepts should cease to dominate Soviet, or Russian, theory and practice in international relations. It is also necessary that they should be replaced by something approximating their converses.

These would be:

(a) That it is possible for sovereign and equal countries to exist peaceably side by side and to collaborate with each other without any thought or attempt at domination of one by the other;

(b) That conflict is not necessarily the basis of international life and that it may be accepted that peoples can have common purposes without being in entire ideological agreement and without being subordinated to a single authority;

(c) That people in other countries do have a legitimate right to pursue national aims at variance with Communist ideology, and that it is the duty of right-thinking people to practice tolerance for the ideas of others, to observe scrupulous non-interference in the internal affairs of others on the basis of reciprocity, and to use only decent and honorable methods in international dealings;

(d) That international collaboration can, and should, advance the interests of both parties even though the ideological inspiration of thc two parties is not identical; and

(e) That the association of individuals across international borders is desirable and should be encouraged as a process contributing to general human progress.

Now the question at once arises as to whether the acceptance of such concepts in Moscow is an objective which we can seriously pursue and hope to achieve without resort to war and to the overthrow of the Soviet Government. We must face the fact that the Soviet Government, as we know it today, is, and will continue to be a constant threat to the peace of this nation and of the world.

It is quite clear that the present leaders of the Soviet Union can themselves never be brought to view concepts such as those indicated above as intrinsically sound and desirable. It is equally clear that for such concepts to become dominant throughout the Russian communist movement wou!d mean, in present circumstances, an intellectual revolution within that movement which would amount to a metamorphosis of its political personality and a denial of its basic claim to existence as a separate and vital force among the ideological currents of the world at large. Concepts such as these could become dominant in the Russian communist movement only if, through a long process of change and erosion, that movement had outlived in name the impulses which had originally given it birth and vitality and had acquired a completely different significance in the world than that which it possesses today.

It might be concluded, then (and the Moscow theologians would be quick to put this interpretation on it), that to say that we were seeking the adoption of these concepts in Moscow would be equivalent to saying that it was our objective to overthrow Soviet power. Proceeding from that point, it could be argued that this is in turn an objective unrealizable by means short of war, and that we are therefore admitting that our objective with respect to the Soviet Union is eventual war and the violent overthrow of Soviet power. ,

It would be a dangerous error to accept this line of thought.

In the first place, there is no time limit for the achievement of our objectives under conditions of peace. We are faced here with no rigid periodicity of war and peace which would enable us to conclude that we must achieve our peacetime objectives by a given date "or else". The objectives of national policy in times of peace should never be regarded in static terms. In so far as they arc basic objectives, and worthy ones, they are not apt to be ones capable of complete and finite achievement, like specific military objectives in war. The peacetime objectives of national policy should be thought of rather as lines of direction than as physical goals.

In the second place, we are entireiy within our own rights, and need feel no sense of guilt, in working for the destruction of concepts inconsistent with world peace and stability and for their replacement by ones of tolerance and international collaboration. It is not our business to calculate the internal developments to which the adoption of such concepts might lead in another country, nor need we feel that we have any responsibility for those developments. If the Soviet leaders find the growing prevalence of a more enlightened concept of international relations to be inconsistent with the maintenance of their internal power in Russia, that is their responsibility, not ours. That is a matter for their own consciences, and for the conscience of the peoples of the Soviet Union. We are not only within our moral rights but within our moral duty in working for the adoption everywhere of decent and hopeful concepts of international life. In doing so, we are entitled to let the chips tali where they may in terms of internal development.

We do not know for certain that the successful pursuit by us of the objectives in question would lead to the disintegration of Soviet power; for we do not know the time factor here involved. It is entirely possible that under the stress of lime and circumstance certain of the original concepts of the communist movement might be gradually modified in Russia as were certain of the original concepts of the American revolution in our own country.

We are entitled, therefore, to consider, and to state publicly, that it is our objective to bring to The Russian people and government, by every means at our disposal, a more enlightened concept of international relations, and that in so doing we are not taking any position, as a government, with respect to internal conditions in Russia.

In the case of war, there could clearly be no question of this nature. Once a state of war had arisen between this country and the Soviet Union, this Government would be at liberty to pursue the achievement of its basic objectives by whatever means it might choose and by whatever terms it might wish to impose upon a Russian authority or Russian authorities in the event of a successful issue of military operations. Whether these terms would embrace the overthrow of Soviet power would he only a question of expediency, which will be discussed below.

This second of the two basic objectives is therefore also one likewise susceptible of pursuit in lime of peace as in time of war. This objective, like the first, may accordingly be accepted as an underlying one, from which the formulation of our policy, in peace as in war, may proceed.

IV. The Pursuit of Our Basic. Objectives in Time of Peace

In discussing the interpretation which would be given to these basic objectives in time of peace or in time of war respectively, we arc confronted with a problem of terminology. If we continue to speak of the particular orientation lines of our policy in peace or in war as ”objectives", we may find ourselves falling into a semantic confusion. Solely for the purposes of clarity, therefore, we will make an arbitrary distinction. We will speak of objectives only in the sense of the basic objectives outlined above, which are common both to war and peace. When we refer to our guiding purposes as applied specifically in our wartime or peactime policy, respectively, we will speak of "aims" rather than of "objectives".

What then would be the aims of U.S. national policy with respect to Russia in time of peace?

These should flow logically from the two main objectives discussed above,

1. THE RETRACTION OF RUSS1AN POWER AND INFLUENCE

Let us first consider the retraction of undue Russian power and influence. We have .seen that. this divided into the problem of the satellite area and the problem of communist activities and Soviet propaganda activities in countries farther afield.

With respect to the satellite area, the aim of U.S. policy in time of" peace is to place the greatest possible strain on the structure of relationships by which Soviet domination of this area is maintained and gradually, with the aid of the natural and legitimate forces of Europe, to maneuver the Russians out of their position of primacy and to enable the respective governments to regain their independence of action. There are many ways in which this aim can be, and is being, pursued. The most striking step in this direction was the original proposal for the ERP, as stated in Secretary Marshall’s Harvard speech on June 5, S947. By forcing the Russians either to permit the satellite countries to enter into a relationship of economic collaboration with the west of Europe which would inevitably have strengthened east-west bonds and weakened The exclusive orientation of these countries toward Russia or to force them to remain outside this structure of collaboration at heavy economic sacrifice to themselves, we placed a severe strain on the relations between Moscow and the satellite countries and undoubtedly made more awkward and difficult maintenance by Moscow of its exclusive authority in the satellite capitals. Everything, in fad, which operates to tear off the veil with
which Moscow likes to screen its power, and which forces the Russians to reveal the crude and ugly outlines of their hold over the governments of the satellite countries, serves to discredit the satellite governments with their own peoples and to heighten the discontent of those peoples and their desire for free association with other nations.

The disaffection of Tito, to which the strain caused by the ERP problem undoubtedly contributed in some measure, has clearly demonstrated that it is possible for stresses in the Soviet-satellite relations to lead to a real weakening and disruption of the Russian domination,

It should therefore be our aim to continue to do all in our power to increase these stresses and at the same time to make it possible for the satel-lile governments gradually to extricate themselves from Russian control and to find, if they so wish, acceptable forms of collaboration with the governments of the west. This can be done by skillful use of our economic power, by direct or indirect informational activity, by placing the greatest possible strain on the maintenance of the iron curtain, and by building up the hope and vigor of western Europe to a point where it comes to exercise the maximum attraction to the peoples of the east, and by other means too numerous to mention.

We cannot say, of course, that the Russians will sit by and permit the satellites to extricate themselves from Russian control in this way. We cannot be sure that at some point in this process the Russians will not choose to resort to violence of some sort; i.e., to forms of military re-occupation or possibly even to a major war, to prevent such a process from being carried to completion.

It is not our desire that they should do this; and we, for our part, should do everything possible to keep the situation flexible and to make possible a liberation of the satellite countries in ways which do not create any unanswerable challenge to Soviet prestige. But even with the greatest of circumspection we cannot be sure that they will not choose to resort to arms. We cannot hope to influence their policy automatically or to produce any guaranteed results.

The fact that we embark on a policy which can lead to these results does not mean that we are setting our course toward war; and we should be extremely careful to make this plain on all occasions and to refute accusations of this character. The fact of the matter is that, granted the relationship of antagonism which is still basic to the entire relationships between the Soviet Government and non-communist countries at this time, war is an ever-present possibility and no course which this Government might adopt would appre-
ciably diminish this danger. The converse of the policy set forth above, namely to accept Soviet domination of the satellite countries and to do nothing to oppose it, would not diminish in any way the danger of war. On the contrary, it can be argued with considerable logic that the long-term danger of war will inevitably be greater if Europe remains split along the present lines than it will be if Russian power i.s peacefully withdrawn in good time and a normal balance restored to the European community.

It may he stated, accordingly, that our first aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to encourage and promote by means short of war the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present satellite area and the emergence of the respective eastern European countries as independent factors on the international scene,

However, as we have seen above, our examination of this problem is not complete unless we have taken into consideration the question of areas now behind the Soviet border. Do we wish, or do we not, to make it our objective to achieve by means short of war any modification of the borders of the Soviet Union? We have already seen in Chapter III the answer to this question.

We should encourage by every means at our disposal tile development in the Soviet Union of institutions of federalism which would permit a revival of the national life of the Baltic peoples.

It may be asked: Why do we restrict this aim to the Baltic peoples? Why do we not include the other national minority groups of the Soviet Union? The answer is that the Baltic peoples happen to be the only peoples whose traditional territory and population are now entirely included in the Soviet Union and who have shown themselves capable of coping successfully with the responsibilities of statehood. Moreover, we still formally deny the legitimacy of their violent inclusion in the Soviet Union, and they therefore have a special status in our eyes.

Next we have the problem of the disruption of the myth by which the people in Moscow maintain their undue influence and actual disciplinary authority over millions of people in countries beyond the satellite area. First a word about the nature of this problem.

Before the revolution of 1918, Russian nationalism was solely Russian. Except for a few eccentric European intellectuals of the 19th Century, who even then professed to a mystical faith in Russia’s power to solve the ills of civilization (*2) Russian nationalism had no appeal to people outside Russia. On the contrary, the relatively mild despotism of the 19th Century Russian
rulers was perhaps better known and more universally deplored in the western countries than has since been the case with the far greater cruelties of the Soviet regime.

(*2) Karl Marx was not one of these people. He was not, as he himself put it, “one of those
who believed that the old Europe could be revived by Russian blood,” [Note in source text]

After the revolution, the Bolshevik leaders succeeded, through clever and systematic propaganda, in establishing throughout large sections of the world public certain concepts highly favorable to their Own purposes, including the following: that the October Revolution was a popular revolution;
that the Soviet regime was the first real worker’s government; that Soviet power was in some way connected with ideals of liberalism, freedom and economic security; and that it offered a promising alternative to the national regimes under which other peoples lived. A connection was thus established in the minds of many people between Russian communism and the general uneasiness arising in the outside world from the effects of urbanization and industrialization, or from colonial unrest.

In this way Moscow’s doctrine became to some extent a domestic problem for every nation in the world. In Soviet power, western statesmen arc now facing something more than just another problem of foreign affairs. They are facing also an internal enemy in their own countries—an enemy committed to the undermining and eventual destruction of their respective national societies.

To destroy this myth of international communism is a dual task. It takes two parties to create an inter-action such as that which exists between the Kremlin, on the one hand, and the discontented intellectuals in other countries (for it is the intellectuals rather than the "workers" who make up the hard core of communism outside the USSR), on the other. It is not enough to tackle this problem by aiming to silence the propagator. It is even more important to arm the listener against this sort of attack. There is some reason why Moscow propaganda is listened to so avidly, and why this myth takes hold so readily, among many people far from the boundaries of Russia. If it were not Moscow these people listened to, it would be something else, equally extreme and equally erroneous, though possibly less dangerous. Thus the task of destroying the myth on which international communism rests is not just an undertaking relating to the leaders of the Soviet Union. It is also something relating to the non-Soviet world, and above all to the particular society of which each of us forms a part. To the extent to which we can dispel the confusion and misunderstandings on which these doctrines thrive—to the extent that we can remove the sources of bitterness which drive people to irrational and Utopian ideas of this sort—we will succeed in breaking down the ideological influence of Moscow in foreign countries. On the other hand- we must recognize that only a portion of international
communism outside Russia is the result of environmental influence and subject to correction accordingly. Another portion represents something in the nature of a natural mutation of species. It derives from a congenital fifth-columnism with which a certain small percentage of people in every community appear to be affected, and which distinguishes itself by a negative attitude toward the native society and a readiness to follow any outside force which opposes it. This element will always be present in any society for unscrupulous outsiders to work on; and the only protection against its dangerous misuse will be the absence of the will on the part of great-power regimes to exploit this unhappy margin of human nature.

Fortunately, the Kremlin has thus far done more than we ourselves could ever have done to dispel the very myth by which it operates. The Yugoslav incident is perhaps the most striking case in point; but the history of the Communist International is replete with other instances of the difficulty non-Russian individuals and groups have encountered in trying to be the followers of Moscow doctrines. The Kremlin leaders are so inconsiderate, so relentless, so over-bearing and so cynical in the discipline they impose on their followers that few can stand their authority for very long.

The Leninist-Stalinist system is founded, basically, on the power which a desperate, conspiratorial minority can always wield, at least temporarily, over a passive and unorganized majority of human beings- For this reason, the Kremlin leaders have had little concern, in the past, about the tendency of their movement to leave in its train a steady backwash of disillusioned former followers. Their aim was not to have communism become a mass movement but rather to work through a small group of faultlessly disciplined and entirely expendable followers. They were always content to let those peoples go who could not stomach Their particular brand of discipline.

For a long time, this worked reasonably well. New recruits were easy to obtain; and the Party lived by a steady process of natural selection-out, which left within its ranks only the most fanatically devoted, the most unimaginative, and the most obtusely unscrupulous natures.

The Yugoslav case has now raised a great question mark as to how well this system will work in the future, Heretofore, heresy could safely be handled by police repression within The limits of Soviet power or by a tested process of excommunication and character-assassination outside those limits. Tito has demonstrated that in the case of the satellite leaders, neither of these methods is necessarily effective. Excommunication of communist leaders who are beyond the effective range of Soviet power and who themselves have territory, police power, military power, and disciplined fol-
lowers, can split the whole communist movement, as nothing else was ever able to do, and cause the most grievous damage to the myth of Stalin’s omniscience and omnipotence.

Conditions are therefore favorable to a concentrated effort on our part designed to take advantage of Soviet mistakes and of the rifts that have appeared, and to promote the steady deterioration of the structure of moral influence by which the authority of the Kremlin has been carried to peoples far beyond the reach of Soviet police power.

We may say, therefore, that our second aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is, by informational activity and by every other means at our disposal, to explode the myth by which people remote from Russian military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the Soviet Union for what it is and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward it.

2. THE ALTERATION OF RUSSIAN CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

We come now to the interpretation, in terms of peacetime policy, of our second major objective: namely, to bring about an alteration of the concepts of international relations prevalent in Moscow governing circles.

As has been seen above, There is no reasonable prospect that we will ever be able to alter the basic political psychology of the men now in power in the Soviet Union. The malevolent character of their outlook on the outside world, their repudiation of the possibility of permanent peaceful collaboration, their belief in the inevitability of the eventual destruction of the one world by the other: these things must remain, if only tor the simple reason that the Soviet leaders are convinced that their own system will not stand comparison with the civilization of the west and that it will never be secure until the example of a prosperous and powerful western civilization has been physically obliterated and its memory discredited. This is not to mention the fact that these men are committed to the theory of inevitable conflict between the two worlds by the strongest of all commitments: namely, the fact that they have inflicted the punishment of death or of great suffering and hardship on millions of people in the name of this theory.

On the other hand, the Soviet leaders are prepared to recognize situations, if not arguments. If, therefore, situations can be created in which it is clearly noi. to the advantage of their power to emphasize the elements of conflict in their relations with the outside world, then their actions, and even the tenor of their propaganda to their own people, can be modified. This was made
evident in the recent war when the circumstances of their military association with the western powers had the effect just described. In this instance, the modification of their policies was of relatively short duration; for with the end of hostilities they thought they saw an opportunity for gaining important objectives of their own regardless of the feelings and views of the western powers. This meant that the situation which had caused them to modify their policies no longer appeared to them to exist.

If, however, analogous situations could again be created in the future and the Soviet leaders compelled to recognize their reality, and if these situations could be maintained for a longer time, i.e., for a period long enough to encompass a respectable portion of the organic process of growth and change in Soviet political life, then they might have a permanent modifying effect on the outlook and habits of Soviet power. Even the relatively brief and perfunctory lip service done during the recent war to the possibility of collaboration among the major allies left a deep mark on the consciousness of the Russian public, and one which has undoubtedly caused serious difficulties to the regime, since the end of the war, in its attempt to revert to the old policies of hostility and subversion toward the western world. Yet all this occurred in a period in which there was absolutely no turnover of any importance in the Soviet leadership and no normal evolution of internal political life in the Soviet Union- Had it been necessary for the Soviet Government to observe these policies of circumspection and moderation toward the west for so long a period that the present leaders would have had to yield to other ones and that there would have been some normal evolution of Soviet political life in the face of these necessities, then it is possible that some real modification in Soviet outlook and behavior might eventually have been achieved.

It flows from this discussion that whereas we will not be able to alter the basic political psychology of the present Soviet leaders, there is a possibility that if we can create situations which, if long enough maintained, may cause them to soft-pedal their dangerous and improper attitude toward the west and to observe a relative degree of moderation and caution in their dealings with western countries. In this case, we could really say that we had begun to make progress toward a gradual alteration of the dangerous concepts which now underlie Soviet behavior.

Again, as in the case of the retraction of Soviet power, and, in fact, as in the case of any sound program of resistance to Soviet attempts at the destruction of western civilization, we must recognize that the Soviet leaders may see the writing on the wall and may prefer to resort to violence rather
than to permit these things to occur. It must be reiterated: that is the risk which we run not just in this, but in any sound policy toward the Soviet Union. It is inherent in the present nature of the Soviet Government; and nothing we may do can alter or remove it, This is not a problem new to the foreign relations of the United Stales. In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton stated:

"Let us recollect that peace or war will not always be left to our option;
that however moderate or unambitious we may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the ambition, of others."

In setting out, therefore, to alter the concepts by which the Soviet Government now operates in world affairs, we must again concede that the question of whether this aim can be achieved by peaceful means cannot he answered entirely by ourselves. But this does not excuse us from making the attempt.

We must say, therefore, that our third aim with respect to Russia in time of peace is to create situations which will compel the Soviet Governntent to recognise the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving, at least outwardly, as though it were the converse of those concepts that were true.

This is of course primarily a question of keeping the Soviet Union politically, militarily, psychologically weak in comparison with the international forces outside of its control and of maintaining a high degree of insistence among the non-communist countries on the observance by Russia of the ordinary international decencies.

3. SPECIFIC AIMS

The aims listed above are all general in nature. To attempt to make them specific would lead us into an endless maze of attempts at verbal classification and would probably be more confusing than clarifying. For this reason, no attempt will be made here to spell out the possible forms of specific application of these aims. Many of these forms will easily suggest themselves to any who give thought to the interpretation of these, general aims in terms of practical policy and action. It will be seen for example, that a major factor in the achievement of all of these aims without exception, would be the degree to which we might succeed in penetrating or disrupting the iron curtain.

However, the question of specific interpretation may be considerably clarified by a brief indication of the negative side of the picture: in other words, by pointing out what our aims are not.

First of all, it is not our primary aim in time of peace to set the stage for a war regarded as inevitable. We do not regard war as inevitable. We do not repudiate the possibility that our overall objectives with respect to Russia may be successfully pursued without resort to war, We have to recognize the possibility of war, as something flowing logically and at all times from the present attitude of The Soviet leaders; and we have to prepare realistically for that eventuality.

But it would be wrong to consider that our policy rested on an assumption of an inevitability of war and was confined to preparations for an armed conflict. Thal is not the case. Our task at present, in the absence of a state of war automatically brought about by the actions of others, is to find means of pursuing our objectives successfully without resort to war ourselves. It includes preparations for a possible war, but we regard these as only subsidiary and precautionary rather than as the primary element of policy. We are still hoping and striving to achieve our objectives within the framework of peace. Should we at any time come to the conclusion (which is not excluded) that this is really impossible and that the relations between communist and non-communist worlds cannot proceed without eventual armed conflict, then The whole basis of this paper would be changed and our peacetime aims. as set forth herein, would have to be basically altered.

Secondly, it is not our peacetime aim to overthrow the Soviet Government. Admittedly, we are aiming at the creation of circumstances and situations which would be difficult for the present Soviet leaders to stomach, and which they would not like. It is possible that they might not be able, in the face of these circumstances and situations, to retain their power in Russia. But it must be reiterated: that is their business, not ours. This paper implies no judgment as to whether it is possible for the Soviet Government to behave with relative decency and moderation in external affairs and yet to retain its internal power in Russia. Should the situations to which our peacetime aims are directed actually come into being and should they prove intolerable to the maintenance, of internal Soviet power and cause the Soviet Government to leave the scene, we would view this development without regret; but we would not assume responsibility for having sought it or brought it about.

V. The Pursuit of our Basic Objectives in Time of War

This chapter treats of our aims with respect to Russia in the event that a state of war should arise between the United States and the USSR. It pro-
poses to set forth what we would seek as a favorable issue of our military operations.

1. THE IMPOSSIBILITIES

Before entering into a discussion of what we should aim to achieve in a war with Russia, let us first be clear in our own minds about those things which we could not hope to achieve.

In the first place we must assume that it will not be profitable or practically feasible for us To occupy and take under our military administration the entire territory of the Soviet Union. This course is inhibited by the size of that territory, by the number of its inhabitants, by the differences of language and custom which separate its inhabitants from ourselves, and by the improbability that we would find any adequate apparatus of local authority through which we could work.

Secondly, and in consequence of this first admission, we must recognize that it is not likely that the Soviet leaders would surrender unconditionally to us. It is possible that Soviet power might disintegrate during the stress of an unsuccessful war, as did that of the tsar’s regime during World War I. But even this is not likely. And if it did not so disintegrate, we could not be sure that we could eliminate it by any means short of an extravagant military effort designed to bring all of Russia under our control. We have before us in our experience with the Nazis an example of the stubbornness and tenacity with which a thoroughly ruthless and dictatorial regime can maintain its internal power even over a territory constantly shrinking as a consequence of military operations. The Soviet leaders would be capable of concluding a compromise peace, if pressed, and even one highly unfavorable to their own interests. But it is not likely that they would do anything, such as to surrender unconditionally, which would place themselves under The complete power of a hostile authority. Rather than do that, they would probably retire to the most remote village of Siberia and eventually perish, as Hitler did, under the guns of the enemy.

There is a strong possibility that if we were to take the utmost care, within limits of military feasibility, not to antagonize the Soviet people by military policies which would inflict inordinate hardship and cruelties upon them, there would be an extensive disintegration of Soviet power during the course of a war which progressed favorably from our standpoint, We would certainly he entirely Justified in promoting such a disintegration with every means at our disposal. This does not mean, however, that we could be sure of achieving the complete overthrow of the Soviet regime, in the sense of
the removal of its power overall the present territory of the Soviet Union.

Regardless of whether or not Soviet power endures on any of the present Soviet territory we cannot be sure of finding among the Russian people any other group of political leaders who would he entirely "democratic" as we understand that term.

While Russia has had her moments of liberalism, the concepts of democracy arc not familiar to the great mass of the Russian people, and particularly not to those who are temperamentally inclined to the profession of government. At the present rime, there are a number of interesting and powerful Russian political groupings, among the Russian exiles, all of which do lip service to principles of liberalism, to one degree or another, and any of which would probably he preferable to the Soviet Government, from our standpoint, as the rulers of Russia. But just how liberal these groupings would be, if they once had power, or what would be their ability to maintain their authority among the Russian people without resort to methods of police terror and repression, no one knows. The actions of people in power are often controlled far more by the circumstances in which they arc obliged to exercise that power than by the ideas and principles which animated them when they were in the opposition. In turning over the powers of government to any Russian group, it would never be possible for us to be certain that those powers would be exercised in a manner which our own people would approve. We would therefore always be taking a chance, in making such a choice, and incurring a responsibility which we could not be sure of meeting creditably.

Finally, we cannot hope really to impose our concepts of democracy within a short space of time upon any group of Russian leaders. In the long run, the political psychology of any regime which is even reasonably responsive to the will of the people must be that of the people themselves- But it has been vividly demonstrated through our experience in Germany and Japan that the psychology and outlook of a great people cannot be altered in a short space of time at the mere dictate or precept of a foreign power, even in the wake of total defeat and submission. Such alteration can flow only from the organic political experience of the people in question. The best that can be done by one country to bring about this sort of alteration in another is to change the environmental influences to which the people in question are subjected, leaving it to them to react to those influences in their own way.

All of the above indicates that we could not expect, in the aftermath of successful military operations in Russia, to create there an authority entirely submissive to our will or entirely expressive of our political ideals. We must
reckon with the strong probability that we would have to continue to deal, in one degree or another, with Russian authorities of whom we will not entirely approve, who will have purposes different from ours, and whose views and desiderata we wiil be obliged to take into consideration whether we like them or not. In other words, we could not hope to achieve any total assertion of our will on Russian territory, as we have endeavored to do in Germany and in Japan. We must recognize that whatever settlement we finally achieve must be a political settlement, politically negotiated.

So much for the impossibilities. Now what would be our possible and desirable aims in the event of a war with Russia? These, like the aims of peace, should flow logically from the basic objectives set forth in Chapter III.

2. THE RETRACTION OF SOCIET POWER

The first of our war aims must naturally be she destruction of Russian military influence and domination in areas contiguous to, but outside of, the borders of any Russian state.

Plainly, a successful prosecution of the war on our part would automatically achieve this effect throughout most, if not all, of the satellitc area. A succession of military defeats to the Soviet forces would probably so undermine the authority of the communist regimes in the eastern European countries that most of them would be overthrown. Pockets might remain, in the form of political Tito-ism, i.e., residual communist regimes of a purely national and local character. These we could probably afford to by-pass. Without the might and authority of Russia behind them, they would be sure either to disappear with lime or to evolve into normal national regimes with no more and no less of chauvinism and extremism than is customary to strong national governments in that area. We would of course insist on the cancellation of any formal traces of abnormal Russian power in that area, such as treaties of alliance, etc.

Beyond this. however, we have again the problem of the extent lo which we. would wish Soviet borders modified as a result of a successful military action in our part. We must face frankly the fact that we cannot answer this question at this time. The answer depends almost everywhere on the type of regime which would be left, in the wake of military operations, in the particular area in question. Should this regime be one which held out at least reasonably favorable prospects of observing the principles of liberalism in internal affairs and moderation in foreign policy, it might be possible to leave under its authority most, if not all, of the Territories gained by the So-
viet Union in the recent war. If, as is more probable, little dependence could be placed on the liberalism and moderation of a post-hostilities Russian authority, it might be necessary to alter these borders quite extensively. This must simply be chalked up as one of the questions which will have to be left open until the development of military and political events in Russia reveals to us the full nature of the post-war framework in which we will have to act.

We then have the question of the Soviet myth and of the ideological authority which the Soviet Government now exerts over people beyond The present satellite area. In the first instance, this will of course depend on the question of whether or not the present All-Union Communist Party continues to exert authority over any portion of the present Soviet territory, in the aftermath of another war. We have already seen that we cannot rule out this possibility. Should communist authority disappear, this question is automatically solved. It must be assumed, however, that in any event an unsuccessful issue of the war itself, from the Soviet standpoint, would probably deal a decisive blow to this form of the projection of Soviet power and influence.

However that may be, we must leave nothing to chance; and it should naturally be considered that one of our major war aims with respect to Russia would be to destroy thoroughly the structure of relationships by which the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens, or groups of citizens, in countries not under communist control.

3. THE ALTERATION OF THE RUSSIAN CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Our next problem is again that of the concepts by which Russian policy would be governed in the aftermath of a war. How would we assure ourselves that Russian policy would henceforth be conducted along lines as close as possible to those which we have recognized above as desirable? This is the heart of the problem of our war aims with respect to Russia; and it cannot be given too serious attention.

In the first instance this is a problem of the future of Soviet power; that is, of the power of the communist party in the Soviet Union. This is an extremely intricate question. There is no simple answer to it. We have seen that while we would welcome, and even strive for, the complete disintegration and disappearance of Soviet power, we could not be sure of achieving this entirely. We could therefore view this as a maximum, but not a minimum, aim.

Assuming, then, that there might be a portion of Soviet territory on which we would find it expedient to tolerate the continued existence of Soviet power, upon the conclusion of military operations, what should be our relationship to it? Would we consent to deal with it at all? If so, what sort of terms would we be willing to make?

First of all, we may accept it as a foregone conclusion that we would not be prepared to conclude a full-fledged peace settlement and/or resume regular diplomatic relations with any regime in Russia dominated by any of the present Soviet leaders or persons sharing their cast of Thought. We have had too bitter an experience, during the past fifteen years, with the effort to act as though normal relations were possible with such a regime; and if we should now be forced to resort to war to protect ourselves from the consequences of their policies and actions, our public would hardly be in a mood to forgive the Soviet leaders for having brought things to this pass, or to resume the attempt at normal collaboration.

On the other hand, if a communist regime were to remain on any portion of Soviet territory, upon the conclusion of military operations, we could not afford to ignore it entirely. It could not fail to be, within the limits of its own possibilities, a potential menace to the peace and stability of Russia itself and of the world. The least we could do would be to see to it that its possibilities for mischief were so limited that it could not do serious dam’ age, and that we ourselves, or forces friendly to us, would retain all the necessary controls.

For this, two things would probably be necessary. The first would be the actual physical limitation of the power of such a residual Soviet regime to make war or to threaten and intimidate other nations or other Russian regimes. Should military operations lead to any drastic curtailment of the territory over which the communists held sway, particularly such a curtailment as would deprive them of key factors in the present military-industrial structure of the Soviet Union, this physical limitation would automatically flow from that. Should the territory under their control not be substantially diminished, the same result could be obtained by extensive destruction of important industrial and economic targets from the air. Possibly, both of these means might be required. However that may be, we may definitely conclude that we could not consider our military operations successful if they left a communist regime in control of enough of the present military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable them to wage war on comparable terms with any neighboring state or with any rival authority which might be set up on traditional Russian territory.

The second thing required, if Soviet authority is to endure at all in the traditional Russian territories, will probably be some sort of terms defining at least its military relationship to ourselves and to the authorities surrounding it. In other words, it may be necessary for us to make some sort of deal with a regime of this sort. This may sound distasteful to us now, but it is quite possible that we would find our interests better protected by such a deal than by the all-out military effort which would be necessary to stamp out Soviet power entirely.

It is safe to say that such terms would have to be harsh ones and distinctly humiliating to the communist regime in question. They might well be something along the lines of the Bresl-Litovsk settlement of 1918(*3) which deserves careful study in this connection. The fact that the Germans made this settlement did not mean that they had really accepted the permanency of the Soviet regime. They regarded the settlement as one which rendered the Soviet regime momentarily harmless to them and in a poor position to face the problems of survival. The Russians realized that this was the German purpose. They agreed to the settlement only with the greatest of reluctance, and with every intention of violating it at every opportunity. But the German superiority of force was real; and the German calculations realistic. Had Germany not suffered defeat in the west soon after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk agreement, it is not likely that the Soviet Government would have been able to put up any serious opposition to the accomplishment of German purposes with respect to Russia. It is in this sense that it might be necessary for this Government to deal with the Soviet regime in the latter phases of an armed conflict.

(*3). Treaty of Brest-Lilovsk, signed March 3, 1918, ended hostilities between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers on the basis of provisions that included the independence of the Ukraine, Georgia. Finland, the transfer to the Central Powers of Poland, the Baltic States, and portions of Byelorussia, and the cession of Kars, Ardahan. and Batum to Turkey. As part of the armistice agreement between Germany and the Western Powers on November II. 1918, Germany was forced to repudiate this treaty. [Ed. note]

It is impossible to forecast what the nature of such terms should be. The smaller the territory left at the disposal of such a regime, the easier ihe task of imposing terms satisfactory to our interests. Taking the worst case, which would be that of the retention of Soviet power over all, or nearly all, of present Soviet territory, we would have to demand:

(a) Direct military terms (surrender of equipment, evacuation of key areas, etc.) designed to assure military helplessness for a long time in advance;

(b) Terms designed to produce a considerable economic dependence on the outside world;

(c) Terms designed to give necessary freedom, or federal status, to national minorities (we would at least have to insist on the complete liberation of the Baltic States and on the granting of some type of federal status to the Ukraine which would make it possible for a Ukrainian local authority to have a large measure of autonomy); and

(d) Terms designed to disrupt the iron curtain and to assure a liberal flow of outside ideas and a considerable establishment of personal contact between persons within the zone of Soviet power and persons outside it.

So much for our aims with respect to any residual Soviet authority. There remains the question of what our aims would be with respect to any non-communist authority which might be set up on a portion or all of Russian territory as a consequence of the events of war.

First of all, it should be said that regardless of the ideological basis of any such non-communist authority and regardless of the extent to which it might be prepared to do lip service to the ideals of democracy and liberalism, we would do well to see that in one way or another the basic purposes were assured which flow from the demands listed above. In other words, we should set up automatic safeguards to assure that even a regime which is non-communist and nominally friendly to us:

(a) Does not have strong military power;

(b) Is economically dependent to a considerable extent on the outside world;

(c) Does not exercise too much authority over the major national minorities; and

(d) Imposes nothing resembling the iron curtain over contacts with the outside world.

In the case of such a regime, professing hostility to the communists and friendship toward us, we should doubtless wish to take care i.o impose these conditions in a manner which would not be offensive or humiiiating. But we would have to see to it that in one way or another they were imposed, if our interests and the interests of world peace were to be protected.

We are therefore safe in saying that it should be our aim in the event of war with the Soviet Union, to see to it that when the war was over no regime on Russian territory is permitted:

(a) To retain military force on a scale which could be threatening to any neighboring stale;

(b) To enjoy a measure of economic autarchy which would permit the erection of the economic basis of such armed power without the assistance of the western world;

(c) To deny autonomy and self-government to the main national minorities; or

(d) To retain anything resembling the present iron curtain. If these conditions are assured, we can adjust ourselves to any political situation which may ensue from the war. We will then be safe, whether a Soviet government retains the bulk of Russian territory or whether it retains only a small part of such territory or whether it disappears altogether. And we will be safe even though the original democratic enthusiasm of a new regime is short-lived and tends to be replaced gradually by the a-social concepts of international affairs to which the present Soviet generation has been educated.

The above should be adequate as an expression of our war aims in the event that political processes in Russia take their own course under the stresses of war and that we are not obliged to assume major responsibility for the political future of the country. But there are further questions to be answered for the event that Soviet authority should disintegrate so rapidly and so radically as to leave the country in chaos, making it encumbent upon us as the victors to make political choices and to take decisions which would be apt to shape the political future of the country. For this eventuality there are three main questions which must be faced.

4. PARTITION VS. NATIONAL UNITY

First of all, would it be our desire, in such a case, that the present territories of the Soviet Union remain united under a single regime or that they be partitioned? And if they are to remain united, at least to a large extent, then what degree of federalism should be observed in a future Russian government? What about the major minority groups, in particular the Ukraine?

We have already taken note of the problem of the Baltic states. The Baltic states should not be compelled to remain under any communist authority in the aftermath of another war. Should the territory adjacent To the Baltic slates be controlled by a Russian authority other than a communist authority, we should be guided by the wishes of the Baltic peoples and by the degree of moderation which that Russian authority is inclined to exhibit with respect to them.

In the case of the Ukraine, we have a different problem. The Ukrainians are the most advanced of the peoples who have been under Russian rule in modern times. They have generally resented Russian domination; and their nationalistic organizations have been active and vocal abroad. It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that they should be freed, at last, from Russian rule and permitted to set themselves up as an independent slate.

We would do well to beware of this conclusion. Us very simplicity condemns it in terms of eastern European realities.

It is True that the Ukrainians have been unhappy under Russian rule and that something should be done to protect their position in future. But there are certain basic fads which must not be lost sight of. While the Ukrainians have been an important and specific element in the Russian empire, they have shown no signs of being a ‘"nation" capable of bearing successfully the responsibilities of independence in the face of great Russian opposition. The Ukraine is not a clearly defined ethnical or geographic concept. In general, the Ukrainian population made up of originally in large measure out of refugees from Russian or Polish despotism shades off imperceptibly into the Russian or Polish nationalities. There is no clear dividing line between Russia and the Ukraine, and it would be impossible to establish one. The cities in Ukrainian territory have been predominantly Russian and Jewish. The real basis of "Ukrainianism" is the feeling of "difference" produced by a specific peasant dialect and by minor differences of custom and folklore throughout the country districts. The political agitation on the surface is largely the work of a few romantic intellectuals, who have little concept of the responsibilities of government.

The economy of the Ukraine is inextricably intertwined with that of Russia as a whole. There has never been any economic separation since the territory was conquered from the nomadic Tatars and developed for purposes of a sedentary population. To attempt to carve it out of the Russian economy and to set it up as something separate would be as artificial and as destructive as an attempt to separate the Corn Belt, including the Great Lakes industrial area, from the economy of the United States.

Furthermore, the people who speak the Ukrainian dialect have been split, like those who speak the White Russian dialect, by a division which in eastern Europe has always been the real mark of nationality: namely, religion- If any real border can be drawn in the Ulcraine, it should logically be the border between the areas which traditionally give religious allegiance to the Eastern Church and those which give it to the Church of Rome.

Finally, we cannot he indifferent to the feelings of the Great Russians themselves. They were the strongest national element in the Russian Empire, as they now are in the Soviet Union. They will continue to be the strongest national element in that general area, under any status. Any long-term U.S. policy must be based on their acceptance and their cooperation. The Ukrainian territory is as much a part of their national heritage as the Middle West is of ours, and they are conscious of that fact. A solution which attempts to separate the Ukraine entirely from the rest of Russia is
bound TO incur their resentment and opposition, and can be maintained, in the last analysis, only by force- There is a reasonable chance that the Great Russians could be induced to tolerate the renewed independence of the Baltic states. They tolerated the freedom of those territories from Russian rule for long periods in the past; and they recognize, subconsciously if not other’ wise, that the respective peoples are capable of independence. With respect to the Ukrainians, things arc different. They are loo close to the Russians to be able to set themselves up successfully as something wholly different, For better or for worse, they will have to work out their destiny in some sort of special relationship to the Great Russian people.

It seems clear that this relationship can be at best a federal one, under which the Ukraine would enjoy a considerable measure of political and cultural autonomy but would not be economically or militarily independent. Such a relationship would be entirely just to the requirements of the Great Russians themselves, it would seem, therefore, to be along these lines that U.S. objectives with respect to the Ukraine should be framed.

It should be noted that this question has far more than just a distant future significance. Ukrainian and Great Russian elements among the Russian emigre-opposition groups are already competing vigorously for U.S. support. The manner in which we receive their competing claims may have an important influence on the development and success of the movement for political freedom among the Russians, It is essential, therefore, that we make our decision now and adhere to it consistently. And that decision should be neither a pro-Russian one nor a pro-Ukrainian one, but one which recognizes the historical geographic and economic realities involved and seeks for the Ukrainians a decent and acceptable place in the family of the traditional Russian Empire, of which they form an inextricable part.

It should be added that while, as stated above, we would not deliberately encourage Ukrainian separatism, nevertheless if an independent regime were to come into being on the territory of the Ukraine through no doing of ours, we should not oppose it outright. To do so would be to undertake an undesirable responsibility for internal Russian developments. Such a regime would be bound to be challenged eventually from the Russian side. If it were to maintain itself successfully, mat would be proof that the above analysis was wrong and that the Ukraine docs have the capacity for, and the moral right to, independent status. Our policy in the first instance should be to maintain an outward neutrality, as long as our own interests—military or otherwise—were not immediateiy affected. And only if it became clear that an undesirable deadlock was developing, we would encourage a composing
of the differences along the lines of a reasonable federalism. The same would apply to any other efforts at the achievement of an independent status on the part of other Russian minorities. It is not likely that any of the other minorities could successfully maintain real independence for any length of time. However, should they attempt it (and it is quite possible that the Caucasian minorities would do this), our attitude should be the same as in the case of the Ukraine. We should be careful not to place ourselves in a position of open opposition to such attempts, which would cause us to lose permanently the sympathy of the minority in question. On the other hand, we should not commit ourselves to their support to a line of action which in the long run could probably be maintained only with our military assistance.

5. THE CHOICE OF A NEW RULING GROUP

In the event of a disintegration of Soviet power, we are certain to be faced with demands for .support on the part of the various competing political elements among the present Russian opposition groups. It will be almost impossible for us to avoid doing things which would have the effect of favoring one or another of these groups over its rivals. But a great deal will depend on ourselves, and on our concept of what we are trying to accomplish.

We have already seen that among the existing and potential opposition groups there is none which we will wish to sponsor entirely and for whose actions, if it were to obtain power in Russia, we would wish to take responsibility.

On the other hand, we must expect that vigorous efforts will be made by various groups to induce us to take measures in Russian internal affairs which will constitute a genuine commitment on our part and make it possible for political groups in Russia to continue to demand our support. In the light of these facts, it is plain then we must make a. determined effort to avoid taking responsibility for deciding who would rule Russia in the wake of a disintegration of the Soviet regime. Our best course would be to permit all the exiled elements to return to Russia as rapidly as possible and to see to it, in so far as this depends on us, that they are all given roughly equal opportunity to establish their bids for power. Our basic position must be that in the final analysis the Russian people will have to make their own choices, and that we do not intend to influence those choices. We should therefore avoid having proteges, and should try to see to it that all of the competing groups receive facilities for putting their case to the Russian people through the media of public information. It is probable that there will be violence between these groups. Even in this instance, we should not interfere unless our military interests are affected or unless there should be an attempt on the part of one group to establish its authority by large-scale and savage repression along totalitarian lines, affecting not just the opposing political leaders but the mass of the population itself.

6. THE PROBLEM OF "DE-COMMUNIZATION"

In any territory which is freed of Soviet rule, we will be faced with the problem of the human remnants of the Soviet apparatus of power.

It is probable that in the event of an orderly withdrawal of Soviet forces from present Soviet territory, the local communist party apparatus would go underground, as it did in the areas taken by the Germans during the recent war. It would then probably reemerge in part in the form of partisan bands and guerrilla forces. To this extent, the problem of dealing with it would be a relatively simple one; for we would need only to give the necessary arms and military support to whatever non-communist Russian authority might control the area and permit that authority to deal with the communist bands through the traditionally thorough procedures of Russian civil war.

A more difficult problem would be presented by minor communist party members or officials who might be uncovered and apprehended, or who might throw themselves on the mercy of our forces or of whatever Russian authority existed in the territory.

Here, again, we should refrain from taking upon ourselves the responsibility of disposing of these people or of giving direct orders to the local authorities as to how to do so. We would have a right to insist that they be disarmed and that they not come into leading positions in government unless they had given clear evidence of a genuine change of heart. Bul basically this must remain a problem for whatever Russian authority may take the place of the communist regime. We may be sure that such an authority will be more capable than we ourselves would be to judge the danger which ex-communists would present to the security of the new regime, and to dispose of them in such ways as to prevent their being harmful in the future. Our main concern should be to see that no communist regime, as such, is re-established in areas which we have once liberated and which we have decided should remain liberated from communist control. Beyond that, we should be careful not to become entangled in the problem of "de-communization."

The basic reason for this is that the political processes of Russia are strange and inscrutable. They contain nothing that is simple, and nothing that can be taken for granted. Rarely, if ever, are the colors straight black or
white. The present communist apparatus of power probably embraces a large proportion of those persons who are fitted by training and inclination to take part in the processes of government, Any new regime will probably have to utilize the services of many of these people in order to be able to govern at all. Furthermore, we are incapable of assessing in each individual case the motives which have brought individuals in Russia into association with the communist movement. We are also incapable of assessing the degree to which such association will appear discreditable or criminal to other Russians, in retrospect. It would be dangerous for us to proceed on the basis of any fixed assumptions in such matters. We must always remember that to be the subject of persecution at the hands of a foreign government inevitably makes local martyrs out of persons who might otherwise only have been the objects of ridicule.

We would be wiser, therefore, in the case of territories freed from communist control, to restrict ourselves to seeing to it that individual ex-communists do not have the opportunity to reorganize as armed groups with pretenses to political power and that the local non-communist authority is given plenty of arms and help in any measures which they may desire to take with respect to them.

We may say, therefore, that we would not make it our aim to carry out with our own forces, on territory liberated from the communist authorities, aпy large-scale program of de-communication, and that In general we would leave this problem to whatever local authority might supplant Soviet rule.

The Upside-down World of the Western Main Stream Media (MSM)


MSM – only the truthful information

I’ve been meaning to post the above caricature for quite some time, but as it is usual with many of my posts, it’s been sitting in draft until I felt it “matured” enough. Now, I saw a convergence of two seemingly insignificant events, that made it feel like a good time to post this image.

It is not a secret that anything published in the Western main-stream media about Russia (as well as China, or Syria, or any other state that the Western elites feel is in need of some “democratic bombings”), is presented through a certain prism, where either partial truths or outright lies are given to the audience to form an image of an enemy.

This can be seen in the materials, published both…

… in Peace …

Seemingly such an innocent thing, a report by one of the many Russian TV channels on a vegetable shortage in Europe… But look how it got blown out of proportions both by the 5th column inside and the agents of influence outside of Russia.

Here I am going to demonstrate how the above caricature applies to the everyday reporting. Take a look at the following article in one of the main Norwegian newspapers, Aftenposten: Russlands største TV-kanal hevder det er rasjonering på grønnsaker i butikkene i Norge (Russia’s biggest TV channel claims that there is rationing on the vegetables in Norway). Remember this headline. Interestingly, it is perceived by the population as “Russia is claiming…” – that’s how some people I know recited the story to me.

The article above cites a Russian TV channel – TV1. It translates some snippets of the material, but not all of them, making it sound as if the Russian channel is postulating that it is explicitly in Norway that we ration broccoli and experience vegetable shortage. To Aftenposten’s credit, they provide the link to the channel’s news-item, but who is going to go there and verify it anyway, it being in Russian?

Aftenposten provides the following picture:

With the sub-text of that’s how Russian TV channel presents the state of affairs in Norway, Denmark and Britain. Looks dramatic, right? Russians must be out of their minds, right?

That’s what they want you to think. And they don’t even stop there. In the second half of the article, Aftenposten presents it as “Kremlin’s propaganda” for “Putin’s Russia”, etc, etc.

Let’s go to the source…

http://www.1tv.ru/news/2017/02/04/319211-evropeyskie_pokupateli_stolknulis_s_defitsitom_ovoschey_v_supermarketah

It’s a 35-second long filler news snippet, and I’ll give the full translation here:

“Three salads into one hands. European buyers have come to face a shortage of vegetable in the supermarkets. It is unusually empty in the shops of Britain, Norway, Denmark. What’s left in stores is being rationed, for example, selling a few salads and broccolis per person. And the prices are very high – squashes and aubergines saw a price hike of almost 4 times over the last month. The reason for this is a harvest failure due to very cold winter in Italy and Spain – the main suppliers of vegetables during this time of the year. First the agricultural areas where flooded by rain, and then came frost. Experts say, that if the weather does not become better, Europe can also experience shortage of the citrus fruits.”

That’s it. But wait…

This is a still frame from the report, and what does it say? “Photo from the site of www.dailymail.co.uk”. That attribution was “conveniently” omitted in the image, published in the Norwegian Aftenposten.

A quick search leads us to this article:

Supermarkets RATION salads and veg after storms in Spain devastate crops with shortages due to last until APRIL (and a box of 12 iceberg lettuces is even being offered on Gumtree for £50)

So! It wasn’t the “crazy Russians spinning a lie”, but rather a short translation of an article from the British Daily Mail. But that won’t sound as sensationalist, would it?

And going back to the outrage, demonstrated by Aftenposten, I did a quick search in the Norwegian news items, and here is what came up:

Grønnsaksmangel etter uvær i Sør-Europa: – Situasjonen er svært krevende (Vegetable shortage after bad weather in Southern Europe – The situation is very demanding). And in it they say that the supply of vegetables to Northern Europe is halved, compared to the same time last year. They even quote PR chief of one of the largest Norwegian supermarket chains COOP, Harald Kristiansen, as saying that it concerns mostly broccoli and iceberg salad, but also, to a lesser degree paprika, tomatoes, cauliflower… I personally noticed a shortage of eco-salads and eco-tomatos, which I usually buy, and which I have not seen in the shops for about a month, without giving it a second thought – there were enough of the local greenhouse non-eco alternatives on the shelves.

So, the news item on TV1 was also truthful, when they included Norway! I’ll leave it to the reader to research the Danish newsfront.

Towards the end of the article, Aftenposten actually refers to the British tabloids, but presents it as if Russian media “twists the British publication”. From my translation above, where does it twist anything?

And finally they say that they took contact with TV1 fro comment about the “source foundation for the material”, but got no answer. But the source was specified in the material all along!

Funnily, not only The Daily Mail published these news:
BBC: European vegetables: ‘Perfect storm’ raises prices
The Telegraph: What is causing the 2017 vegetable shortage and what does it mean for consumers?
The Sun: IT’S THE A-BROC-ALYPSE! ‘Perfect storm’ of bad weather wipes out vegetables in Europe – and it’s set to send the price of lettuce, broccoli and peppers soaring in UK supermarkets

What I find interesting in all of this, is how it got quickly tied to “Russia”, “Russia’s biggest TV channel”, and the subsequent demonstration and ridicule on the net, tie in to “Kremlin propaganda”, and the usual ad hominem attack – “Putin’s Russia”. In other words, Western MSM business as usual.

First of all, TV1 is a fully-private channel, with some of its owners spending more time in London, than in Moscow. As there is no censorship on the Russian mediascape, each channel, or media outlet publishes whatever they want – isn’t it what the West wanted all along?

Secondly, how this got twisted in the Russian “5th column environment”:
“Radio Svoboda” – the very same that has a stated goal of government change in Russia (and played the same role against USSR), published a stream of Tweet ridicules under the title “Hungry Europe”, without bothering to say where the news come from and blaming it all on Russia. A series of other “liberal resources” wailed about Russia spreading fakes, for example here, here and here (the last one is an example of how it gets spread on the social media by people who don’t care about doing a source research). And only one outlet, Meduza.io, tried to come to the bottom of it.

Mission accomplished.

As the Russian saying goes, they “made an elephant out of a fly”. And drew Russia’s name through mud in the process. All, over a 35-second long filler newsreel, which was a re-telling of a British news item. All the while leaving the original source, the complete picture, out of the view. Take a look at the caricature at the beginning of my post once again. Telling isn’t it?

… and in War

Presenting half-truths or big lies is typical of any war-mogering propaganda. I could exemplify with Ukraine and its populace at large, that have become ensnared in this kind of the nets of deception, but we can go even bit further back in history, to the Goebbels/Hitler propaganda in the Nazi Germany, and how the people of Germany were made to believe that they were liberating the Eastern lands…

Fast forward to 2008…

In the sitrep article at The Saker, Sandwiching NATO in Ukraine Scott Humor writes:

As we all know the plans to instigate war between Russia and Ukraine go way back. It’s kinetic stage, however, started in 2008. Immediately after the skirmishes in South Ossetia with Georgian and NATO troops in August 2008, in October the Washington Times publishes an article of Jeffrey Kuhner: “Will Russia-Ukraine be Europe’s next war?”

“Europe faces the risk of another major war. In 1939, Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland triggered the Second World War. Today the possible trip wire is not Poland, but Ukraine. And the aggressor will not be Adolf Hitler, but Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.”

That’s a statement; it’s not an analyses, or expert opinion, its a statement of intent. This statement was made not by anyone in the government of Russia. This statement was made by the “deep state” globalist government. It says that they are about to stage a major war in Europe. Like the previous big war in Europe, this new war will be fought under the fascists and Nazi flags. They also say that they will start this war on the territory of Ukraine, the war will be against Russia, and Russians will become the appointed aggressors and even “the invaders“ of their own homeland.

This is a typical for globalists switch, when the victims are named aggressors, and that the Western powers act in order to “stop an aggression” and even better “to prevent an aggression.”

Just let me reiterate: The West calls Russians, who for centuries (if not millennia) living in the Don river basin (Donbas), the descendants of those Russians, who in 1813 liberated Europe from Napoelonic forces, and restored the kingdom of the Netherlands, the Russians who fended off the German invasion of the Don river basin in 1941-43, they call these Russians for “invaders” on their own land! The same justification, that also Hitler used to start his war!

The West went even further to reinforce the parallel.

In 1941 German soldiers were photographing against the backdrop of the Russian fortress of Ivangorod in Narva:

And on February 10th 2017, the Americans decided to repeat the feat. Wonder if the consequences will be the same…

So, with the help of MSM, a Westerner is prepped with a picture of an enemy: a crazy Russian, who must be “liberated” from his own values, political structure, country, life. That’s how wars were usually started by the West, and it always historically fell on Russia’s peoples shoulders to end those wars and bring back balance and peace to our one common continent: Eurasia.

To wrap it up…

Always check the source, even in the face of a simple newsitem, and especially if it want to play on your emotions. Earlier I translated a fragment of a Russian documentary, The Nets of Deception – False Reality, and it would be a good moment to revisit it again.

Seek alternative sources of information. There are a few English-language sources, which will give you either a second opinion, or a direct and unadulterated version directly from the source, here to name a few:

Croudfunded media outlet Russia Insider
Lada Ray’s Futurist Trendcast
The Saker
RT
Global Research
Paul Craig Roberts
TASS
Sputnik News

When Rouble Was Golden – Russia that we lost in the ashes of WWI and the coup d’etats of 1914-1917

In the years before Russia got drawn into WWI, it was displaying fabulous growth, both socially and economically. WWI, also known as the “War of 4 cousins” – as all heads of the warring states were blood relatives – was a disaster for Russia, and weakened it sufficiently to facilitate the second – internal – disaster of 1917, which all but destroyed it.

One of the contemporary writers said that “Pity that we have Nikolai the Second, and not the second Nikolai”, referring to the strong in the will Nikolai I. Nikolai II, while being praised by the Western (British) powers, delivered Russia on a platter, and then was dumped by the Brits to be executed by the followers of their agent – Lenin. There was only one other Russian ruler, who was praised as highly by the West – Yeltsin, who caused destruction of Russia almost to the point of no return in the “Wild 90s”.

In November 1914 the Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold wrote: “Our main goal in this war lies in the long-term weakening of Russia.” Oh, how well they succeeded!

What did Russia lose? Marking the coming 100th anniversary of the two coup d’etats of 1917, Russian weekly “Argumenty and Fakty” publishes in 2016 a series of articles – “When Rouble was Golden” – showing some key points of Russian life before WWI. Here I want to present the translation of the series.

1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2Please note that translating a documentary film or an article takes a lot of time and emotional effort. I am doing it on a voluntary basis, but if someone feels like supporting my work, a Bitcoin donation to the following address is appreciated: 1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2




Publication of 03.02.2016, regarding the foundations of the Russian economics.


Harvest. Urals, 1907

What was the country, that lost forever? What was the foundation of its economy, when oil was not the main article of Russian exports nor the main source of state revenues? Argumenty i Fakty got at its disposal a unique booklet, first published in 1958 in New York City in 8 thousand copies. Edited by B. Brazol, it compiled statistics showing that over the last 15-20 years before the First World War, Russia made giant steps forward both in the economy, and in the development of the social and educational systems.

“AiF” starts a series of articles in which we will talk about how our country developed in the early twentieth century. In this edition we will focus on the golden rouble and gold reserves, revenues and expenditures of the state budget, taxes and savings.

A strong currency

During the reign of Emperor Nicholai II, by the law of 1896 Russia introduced the gold currency standard. That is, the issuance from each rouble was tied to the amount of gold reserves of the country. In case of emergency, the state Bank was granted the right to issue 300 million paper roubles not backed by gold, but it never used this right. The rouble was equal to 0,7 grammes of pure gold. As for the paper money (banknotes) and gold coins — they were equal in value. The content of the precious metal in the golden rouble surpassed the gold content of the coins of other countries. The rouble as the currency enjoyed a steady demand both inside the country and in the world.

In that period the financial system of all developed countries were also based on the gold standard — the amount of money had to match the size of the gold reserves of a country. Today the exchange rate is determined by its correlation with the dollar, while gold is a regular market commodity.

Positive budget

Russia of that time built its policy not only on a balanced budget, but also on the principle of substantial accumulation of gold reserves. Despite this and without any increase in the tax burden, the state income steadily grew from 1,410 billion in 1897, whereas the government spending remained more or less on the same level. Over the last ten years before the First World War, the excess of government revenue over expenditure amounted to 2.4 billion roubles. This amount is all the more impressive if one remembers that during the reign of Nicholai II, railway tariffs were lowered, redemption payments for land ceded to serfs from their former landlords in 1861 were abolished, as well as some taxes were cancelled.

Infographics: Budget of the Russian Empire by year

Legend: Blue sack – income; gold coins – expenditures; in the circle – income over expenditure surplus; in 1912: * in squares – converted to 2016-roubles.
млн – million; млрд – billion; трлн – trillion

Low taxes

Total sum of taxes per capita in Russia was more than twice lower than in Austria, France and Germany, while compared with England it was four times lower.

Infographics: Total sum of taxes per capita in roubles

Legend: in the circle – roubles; white square* – converted into 2016 roubles (20700p).

The welfare of the citizens

In 1914, the State Savings Bank had deposits for 2,236 billion roubles. From 1904 accumulation of the Russians on savings accounts was steadily increasing — with the exception of 1905, which coincided with the Russian-Japanese war and the revolution.

Infographics: Saving deposits by the population

Legend: млн – million; млрд – billion; трлн – trillion
White square* – converted into 2016 roubles
1 golden rouble was equal to 0.774235 gramme of pure gold, ad at today’s (2016) Central Bank rate would have cost about 2282 roubles.

Bread and Tariffs

The Treasury of the Russian Empire is the dream of any Finance Ministry: minimum os social spending, — said Sergei Bespalov, historian, senior researcher of the Ranepa.

— Russia in the XIX-XX centuries was more fortunate than in the beginning of the XXI century — it’s the Ministry of Finance was successively headed by several talented administrators. First N. Bunge, then I. Vyshnegradsky, and finally, S. Witte. They were engaged in the replenishment of gold reserves, while Vyshnegradsky began preparation of the currency reform, which was conducted by Witte. The reform not only made the rouble convertible, what’s more important, it was valued internally. In addition, Witte cleverly borrowed from foreign banks at low interest rates. Re-borrowing, he managed to reduce payments on previous debts.

Vyshnegradsky is credited with the phrase: “we’ll eat less, but will export”, which refers to the export of bread. he could have well said it, because the export of grain for the Russian Empire was the most important source of income for the Treasury — almost like oil today. And the volume of grain exports had to be maintained at a high level. Exporters of bread were mostly not the peasants, but the large landlords farm — the agricultural firms of today.

The flourishing economy of Russia in the early XX century was carefully prepared. A major achievement of the Ministry of Finance, besides the gold rouble, can and should be considered the Customs Tariff of 1891 which was developed by Dmitri Mendeleev. There is a legend that it was the Customs Tariff, and not the periodic system of chemical elements, that he considered to be his main achievement. Mendeleev was a close ally to Sergei Witte. Customs Tariff helped to protect the market from cheap imports and to develop domestic industry. At the same time, high tariffs led to a rise in import prices, resulting in the Tariff having many opponents.

A major source of revenue waere taxes. It is believed that they were lower than in other countries. However, the standard of living in Russia in the early XX century was also lower. With this in mind, it turns out that the tax burden was comparable to other countries — there no difference “in magnitudes”. In addition to taxes, the Treasury was receiving “redemption payments” — the peasants up to 1905 paid for the purchase of the land from the landlords during the abolition of serfdom.

Government spendings were by a degree smaller — there were almost no social expenditures, pensions were paid to a narrow group of the population. But when they were paid… The whole of his numerous family, including the future leader of the proletariat, lived for many years on the pension, received after death of the Director of public schools in Simbirsk province, Ilya Ulyanov (Lenin’s father).




Publication of 15.02.2016, regarding the development of the industry.


The view from Dorogomilovo to partnership calico factory of Albert Hubner in Moscow.

In this edition we will focus on the development of industry and entrepreneurship, the construction of railways and the already establishing social legislation.

Industrial growth

In the period between 1890 and 1913, the productivity of Russian industry by grew four times. Its revenues not only nearly equalled to the income from agriculture — the produce covered almost 4/5 of the domestic demand for manufactured products.


Upper left corner: value, produced by the Russian factories in billions of roubles
Upper right corner: Construction of agricultural machinery in million of roubles.
Table with comparison of production between 1895 and 1914, top to bottom, in [млн – million / тыс. – thousand] of tonnes: coal, oil, gold, copper, magnesium, cast iron, iron/steel, salt, sugar.

Protection of workers

Industrial development caused a rapid increase in the number of factory workers. It should be noted that the laws relating to the protection of labour, were first published in Russia in the XVIII century, during the reign of Empress Catherine II. In the reign of Nicholai II were issued the laws to ensure the safety of workers in the mining industry, on the railways and in factories, constituting particular danger to life and health, such as gunpowder factories.

Child labour under 12 years of age was prohibited, minors and women were not allowed to work in night shift. Fines were not to exceed one third of the salary. In 1912 there was adopted the law on insurance payments due to illness, for child birth and accidents. Workers unions were recognized by law, strikes were allowed.

Development of entrepreneurship

During the 4 years before the First World War, the number of newly founded joint stock companies increased more than 2-fold, and the capital invested in them — by almost 4 times.

The number of new stock companies and their capital in million of roubles:

The construction of railways

Railway length in thousand of kilometres, 1917 and 2016.

The Great Siberian Railway was the longest in the world.

58,2 thousand km of railways were built in 1880-1917 (1600km per year in average).

In 1916, that is in the midst of the war, Russia built more than 2 thousand km of railways, which connected the Arctic ocean (port Romanovsk, now Murmansk) with the centre of Russia.

On the eve of the war, more than 4/5th of the payments on external and domestic debt were secured by revenues that the state received from the operation of railways.

Russian railway for passengers was the cheapest and most comfortable in the world. Train rides through the Siberian railway.

The price of the growth

Russia in the early XX century made a sharp spurt in industrial development, but became – as is in our time – directly or indirectly owned by foreigners, says Vasily Simchera, former Director of the Institute of State Statistics Committee, the author of the work “Development of Economy of Russia over 100 years.”

Cast iron, steel, gold

— In the early twentieth century, Russia played a prominent role in the extractive industries, production of iron, steel, gold, furs, building materials, military equipment, machine building. According to the total volume of technical and economic development, the country was on the 5th place in the world (after the USA, Germany, UK and France). The volume of national property (60,3 billion gold rubles, while the United States had 397,4 billion in terms of gold roubles) also at the 5th place (in the domestic Russian market, the gold rouble was equal to paper rouble, while on the foreign market it cost 1.85 U.S. dollar to 1 rouble, though the paper rouble was not convertible. — Ed.). At the same time, judging by the production of iron, steel, metal, copper, gold, platinum, locomotives, wagons, grain, sugar and other 27 key indicators, Russia is among the top three countries in the world. Today (2016) it is not included even in the top ten.

Industrial production grew due to the measures of the tsarist government — the domestic manufacturers were provided with incentives, loans and allowances. Metallurgical factories were generously paid for railroad tracks by the Treasury. For the first 13 years of the XX century the volume of production in the country almost doubled, while foreign trade rose by 2,5 times. On the advice of Witte and Mendeleev, Nicholai II imposed significant restrictions on the export of crude oil in 1896 – to secure the development of domestic refining and engineering. Major industrial regions were formed: Central, Urals, St. Petersburg, Volga. Only during the years of Russia’s participation in World War I (1914-1917), the indicators of industrial production decreased, although individual industries (military equipment, food, import) on the contrary showed rapid development.

And whose is the money?

The flip side of acceleration was the increase of Russia’s dependence on foreign (mainly French, Belgian and British) capital. Witte and Stolypin strutted, but not all was good — the economy lacked money. The construction of railways — Caucasian, Chinese — underwent on foreign loans. Even the money of the Russian Industrialists were borrowed. Foreigners were especially eager to invest in the primary sector. Thus, the Donbass and Baku oilfields in fact belonged to the British. In general the foreigners owned at least 70% of its assets in commodities in the heavy and, to a lesser extent, in light industries. This dependency was the reason for the involvement of Russia into a world war it did not need, and the ensuing collapse of the Empire.




Publication of the 17.02.2016, second part regarding the economic foundations of Russia.

Recently, the United States acknowledged that this year (2016) Russia will be able to come out on top in the world in grain export. In the beginning of XX century our country has also fed the world with its bread.

Bread with butter

Agrarian reform of the early XX century wasleft unfinished, but its interim results gave birth to another 40 million Russians, believes Alexander Bessolitsyn, Professor at the Department of Economics, Ranepa:

– 1891-1892 was the last hungry years in the Russian Empire (later the famine only happened after 1917: in 1921-1922 in the Volga region, and in 1932-1933 as a result of collectivization). Harvests increased, also grew the export of grain from Russia. The government stimulated it through the banks – for example, the Russian-Asian, which invested the mostly borrowed from the Western bankers money into the export, built elevators, including offshore in the Azov and Black seas, tankers. There arose grain exchanges, bread was sold to the dealers both by the landlords and the peasants.

The Russian food exports of the beginning of the XX century is called by some experts “a hungry export”, while others say that the excess was exported. Both assessments are unfair. In 1913 the population of the Russian Empire had reached 166 million: in 15 years it grew by 40 million people – mostly rural residents. Per capita consumption of bread in this time was only a little below the norm of 500kg per year, and amounted to 459kg. But such a gap may not lead to starvation. Rapid population growth confirms that the life of the peasants was relatively stable.

Egypt, Turkey and other countries in the Middle East and the Northern Mediterranean were those countries that purchased Russian grain the most. Although it is believed that Russia fed Europe, our grain was mainly shipped to the colonies. It was the cheapest (a pound of rye in 1913 cost 91 kopecks) and was considered low quality – too diverse and clogged. Europeans looked upon it with disdain. Germany bought Russian rye for processing and then sold the flour back to us.

Eggs and butter were more valued – two of the main Russian export product of the period. We started to produce butter only in the 80-ies of the XIX century, but already in the beginning of XX century it was considered the best in the world. Belgium, France, Germany and the UK were eager to buy it.

Agriculture was considered by the Head of the Government, Sergei Witte, as a source of funds for industrialization. Later on the Bolsheviks treated it in the same way. Still, the Imperial government saw agriculture not only a cash cow. Witte announced a program of replacement of grain export by flour: Russia, being one of the leaders in the export of grain, controlled only 3% of the world flour market.

But landlords and peasants, together with the foreign bankers, did not support the idea – it was easier to ship out the grain, while the foreigners did not want to let Russia to a more lucrative market. This problem is not resolved till this day.

Agrarian reform, called after Stolypin (from translator: the fact that there were made 11 assassination attempts over 5 years on the Interior Minister Petr Stolypin speaks volumes! He was ultimately murdered on the 14th of September 1911 in Kiev.), was also developed in the period of the Witte government. It remained unfinished. But the interim results were impressive. The main rise of agricultural cooperation, resettlement of peasants to Siberia and its development.

The government stimulated the development of the village, but the Russian agricultural sector, even in this period of rapid development, all the time suffered from lack of money. Just as the rest of the Russian economy of the early XX century.

Crops

In 1913 the harvest of the main cereals in Russia was one-third higher than in Argentina, Canada and the USA combined. Our country was the main bread supplier for the Western Europe.

In the 20 years preceding the First World War, the harvest of bread almost doubled.


Infographics block by block:
Upper left: Average grain productivity of a “tenth” (1,09 hectare), in hundredweigt; Area of planting of sugar beets, in thousand of hectares.
Upper right: Yearly harvest of the cereals, in million tonnes. Note! In 2015 Russian Federation harvested 104.3 million tonnes grain – not much more than in 1913. In 2012 the harvest was even lower than in the pre-revolutionary Russia, when mainly horses were used in agriculture – 70.9 million tonnes.
Middle: Harvest of cotton, in thousand of tonnes. In 1913 cotton harvest fully covered the needs of the Russian textile industry.
Bottom: Harvest of flax, in thousand of tonnes. Comparing France, Autro-Hungary and Russia. Russia produces 80% of the world flax harvest before WWI.

Stolypin’s agrarian reform (started in 1906)

The peasant was allowed to leave the community and become individual and hereditary owner of the land. In 1913 already 2 million families have received plots. By the beginning of the First World War, 13% of communal land passed into individual ownership.


Infographics: Peasants owned in million of hectares.

The State Farming Bank was buying out landlord estates and giving them to the peasants on favourable lending (up to 90% of the land cost) low-interest terms (4.5%). As a result, in 1917 the peasants owned up to 90% of arable land in the European part of Russia and 100% in the Asian part.

Peasants were moved from European part of Russia, where there was not enough land, in Siberia. Migrants were exempt from taxes, given land (15 hectares for the head of the family, plus 45 hectares for the whole of the family), provided with an allowance (200 RUB) and transported with the whole economy at state expense. In Siberia the settlers were supplied with agricultural machinery.

One hundred years passed, and now in 2016, the Russians are again given free land in the Far East, but only 1(!) hectares per person. Feel the difference…


Infographics: Animal husbandry.
Cattle, in million heads. Note! In 2014 there was only 19,2 million heads of cattle in Russian Federation!
Horses, in million heads.
Export of eggs: 1908 2.59 billion for 54.8 million roubles, and in 1909 2.84 billion for 62.2 million roubles. Russia stood for 50% of world production of eggs.




Publication of 24.02.2016, regarding the state of education.


Nikolai Bgdanov-Belskij. “Schoolgirls”. 1901.

Russia has enough universities, but it “is in need of opening of higher schools, and even more so, in secondary technical and agricultural schools.” This phrase belongs to Emperor Nicholai II. 100 years passed, and our country again lacks engineers and farmers.

In early 1913, the total budget of national education in Russia reached colossal figures by those time – 0.5 billion roubles in gold (1,14 trillion 2016-roubles).

In 2016, the Russian Federation Federal budget spendings on education amounted to 578 billion roubles.


Infographics: Budget of the Ministry of Education above; and the number of literate conscripts below.

Elementary school

Zemskaya (rural) schools of the Ministry of National Education (MNE)

Free education.
Duration: 3-4 years
Subjects: basic – the Law of God, reading, writing, arithmetic. In schools with two classes – also history, geography, natural sciences, Church singing and drawing.


Infographics: 1914: 123.7 thousand schools, giving education to 30% of all children between 8 and 11.

Parochial schools

Duration: 3-4 years
Subjects: basic – the Law of God, Church singing, reading, writing, arithmetic. In schools with two classes – also history.

City schools

Duration: 4 years
Subjects: the Law of God, reading, writing, arithmetic, geometry, sketching, drawing, history, geography, natural history, physics, gymnastics.

High schools

Classical gymnasium
* Men’s
Duration: 8 years
Subjects: the Law of God, Russian and Church Slavonic languages, ancient and foreign languages, philosophy, mathematics, physics, history, geography, science, art, jurisprudence.

* Women’s
Duration: 7 years
Subjects: The same as above, but with a simplified program, plus crafts and pedagogy.

* Real school (with natural-mathematical bias)

Duration: 7 years
Subjects: the Law of God, Russian and foreign languages, geography, history, mathematics, physics, natural history, drawing, sketching, calligraphy, jurisprudence.

In 2014-2015 there were 950 high schools in the Russian Federation. Authorities are trying to reduce their number, closing inefficient ones.


Infographics: Number of High schools on 1913-1914. Total: 63.
The list from top to bottom:
Engineering-industrial: 15
Universities: 10
Military/Navy: 8
Church: 6
Agricultural: 6
Jurisprudence: 4
Pedagogical: 4
Veterinarian: 4
Eastern Studies: 3
Medical: 2
Art: 1

The lessons of the century

The reform of public education in Russia of the beginning of XX century remained unfinished, but the pre-revolutionary system made possible the scientific and technological breakthroughs of the Soviet era, says historian and teacher Yevgenij Spitsyn.

Hordes of illiterates

– The development of the education system in the Russian Empire was consistent and continued on the basis of the democratic principles of classlessness and universality, established in 1803. However, the law on universal primary education did not come into force – on June 6, 1912 it was ultimately dismissed by the Council of State.

It is generally believed (including in the Soviet historical science) that the main contribution to the increase in the number of educated people in Russia was made by “Zemstvo” (country schools), but it is not so. The parochial schools, which constantly created be the statesman in the reign of Alexander III, the chief Procurator of the Holy Synod K. Pobedonostsev, helped more in the education. It is customary to call parochial schools for the “hotbeds of obscurantism”. Pity. The children learned not only to read, but the main skill – the ability to learn, helping them further in the gymnasium or real school. Furthermore the population of Russia has grown very rapidly in this period, so a new “hordes” of illiterate people came to replace the educated ones, thus the number of schools had to increase rapidly and by much.

When mathematicians knew Latin

Russia lagged behind. By 1914, on 1000 people of the population, students accounted for: in Russia – 59, Austria – 143, UK – 152 in Germany – 175, USA – 213, France – 148, in Japan – 146. However, the primary school attendance of children of 8-11 years by 1914 constituted 30.1% in the whole Empire, including in the cities – 46.6%, and in rural areas – 28.3% (see: Russia in 1913. Statistical and documentary Handbook. SPb, 1995). And according to some sources, in the central provinces and in the big cities the education of children of school age was universal.

The Empire’s scholl helped to educate scientists, engineers and designers, who then, in Soviet times, made many discoveries and inventions. The gymnasium included study of Greek and Latin, gave a strong mathematical training. Mathematician could read in Latin, and a philology scholar possessed the knowledge on the natural Sciences. The classical school provided the opportunity to give a really higher education people with a broad outlook, who posessed three ancient as wells as 2-3 modern languages, were familiar with the scientific picture of the world.

Higher education evolved as intensely as secondary and primary – by 1914, there were 63 state-owned, public, private and departmental educational institutions of the higher school, where there studied 123532 students (of those, 71379 in public universities). Self-financed and state-financed students were approximately equal in numbers.

The aim of the pre-revolutionary education was not the economics, but the development of the harmonious human personality. But, as happens in such cases, the rapid economic development of the country became a “by-product” of the creation of schools, colleges and universities.

The Future of the Russian World

I have on previous occasions translated articles by the excellent analyst Rostislav Ishchenko. This particular article, “The Future of the Russian World” appeared on Kont on the 28th of September. It gives a good definition of what the Russian World is.


Flag commemorating a years since the Crimean Spring

Two and a half years ago, when Crimea has just returned to Russia, I once had the opportunity to participate in a conference in Yalta, devoted to the prospects of the Russian world. Then, I was surprised by the limited approach to the issue by the majority of the participants in the discussion.

Some thought that the Russian world is Russia within its existing borders. Particularly insistent on this definition were the Crimeans, who came just barely into those boundaries fall. Some identified the Russian world as the territory of the former USSR. Those inclined towards the monarchy were replacing the Soviet Union with the Russian Empire. At the same time, most of them agreed with the fact that Alaska, is definitely a part of the Russian world, while Poland is not Russian, as for Finland, opinions diverged. Finally, yet another group believed that the Russian world extends to the Western borders of the states that once were members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

As you can see, no matter how far we are willing to push the boundaries of the Russian world, members of this or that group all agree on the fact that the Russian world is only part of the known world, and is relatively small in comparison with the non-Russian world. No one was able to answer my question, in what exactly way Yakuts or Kamchatkan are so different from French or Germans, that Kamchatkan are without reservations allowed in the Russian world, while the French and Germans are not allowed at all? Although a part of the Germans (in GDR) were in the boundaries of WTO and, probably, too could qualify for inclusion into the Russian world.

This restrictive approach has another vulnerability. All the supporters of the Russian world (in whatever borders they were squeezed) state, that in order for the Russian world to exist, it must give the global world some idea, show it the direction of development.

But how can we “give an idea” of the Russian world to those, whom we a priori refuse to include into it?

For comparison, when we defined the modern world as Pax Americana, we understand that we are talking about a global world, not about the world within the borders of the United States, not about the world of the Anglo-Saxons and not about the world of the North Atlantic. Border ideas coincide with the boundaries of the planet, and if mankind lived outside the Earth, the idea of a Pax Americana would have expanded with it out of the planetary limits.

And this is not about Anglo-Saxon expansionism and not about the Russian peacefulness. In Russia there is also a sufficient number of supporters of solving complex international problems with military force. The most interesting thing is that even the Russian expansionists, who see their ideal in the tri-colour over the White House and a dozens of aircraft carrier battle groups sailing the seas and oceans of the planet under the St. Andrew’s flag, still however, just like their peace-loving opponents, separated the “true” Russian world, from the rest of the world. They consider 3/4 of the Earth’s land as something alien, something that is necessary to be defeated by the military force, that can be remotely controlled, but that is not subject to integration.


The meeting of defence Ministers of States participating in the Warsaw Pact. 1968

Characteristically, both of these ideas are in direct contradiction with the Russian history and the practice of building of the Russian State, be it in the form of the Kingdom, or the Empire, or a Union. If the kings, emperors and General secretaries thought about the boundaries of the Russian/Soviet world, the state would not have gone beyond the borders of the time of Ivan III. And even within those borders there lived a lot of foreigners.

While the United States created a melting pot in which all (even the British) have disappeared without a trace, becoming a new nation of Americans, Russia has always built the hostel, in which all that joined, lived comfortably lived, and where national identity did not preclude a general Russian-ness.

And that was understood by our enemies. While rushing into our land us with arms, they are well versed in national diversity, and have always sought to use any differences, to play people off against each other. But while identifying us from the outside, they have always talked about the whole mass of the peoples, as Russians.

Actually, this is the idea of the Russian World, which is opposed to the idea of Pax Americana. American world – a world of the averages. In its ideal expression, all nations and races should melt, mix and give at the output a common race. The two sexes are merged into a common “third gender”. Super-tolerance should ideally go so far as to artificially limit the abilities of intellectuals, because it is unfair to idiots, and prevents the allocation of the arithmetic average in the field of intelligence.

For its part, the Russian World, offers unity, which does not encroach on the variety. As in a family where everyone is different (all with a different degree of consanguinity), but all are united by common goals and interests.

That is why the United States is opposed to Russia, which, since the formulation of the ideals of the Pax Americana in the mid-twentieth century, was an example of an alternative world order. And it is a successful and sustainable alternative.

Russian World arose with its main features by the beginning of the XVI century, when the United States did not even exist as a project. Not having lost any nation, without coming across with anything even remotely resembling genocide of Indians, the Russian World lived on for half a millennium, while constantly expanding.

Our opposition with the US is not ideological, not economic or financial (this is only the external form ,in which the opposition manifests). We have a confrontation of the systems – not so much in world views, as in world perceptions.


The participants of the festive events dedicated to the anniversary of the “Crimean spring”

We live on the same planet but in different worlds. These worlds can push each other, but cannot mix.

All the while, the Russian World can coexist with the American, but the American cannot coexist with the Russian. This inability is determined at the level of basic values. For the Russian World there is nothing extraordinary in the recognition of the right to existence of another, alternative world. From the point of view of the United States, American world is the only correct, the only possible ideal form of human existence. Everything else should be eliminated.

From here we reach some simple conclusions:

First, Russia cannot artificially limit the scope of the Russian world, because the decision on entry into the Russian World is reached by every nation of their own accord. Russia can neither allow, nor prohibit, nor order. This would be contrary to the basic principles of the Russian World.

Second, because Pax Americana claims to exclusivity and uniqueness, it will always carry the threat of Russian World. The American idea does not provide for its existence. And because an aggressive attempt to eliminate the danger of the America World is contrary to the basic values of the Russian World, involving coexistence and not aggression, then its expansion is only possible by protecting those who enter the Russian world, escaping from American values.

Actually it is exactly this policy that Russia is now conducting in Syria. And Russian attempts not to stifle the opposition, but to make the parties in the civil war to agree, rely exactly on the basic values of the Russian World, involving not the destruction of the different, but coexistence with them.

Thirdly, being the alternative to American global idea, the Russian world is in itself a global idea, the ideal form of organization of the planetary common house of the peoples. It is clear that with the centre of this world, which is Russia, will lie the responsibility for maintaining order in this world, like the responsibility for the maintenance of order in Pax Americana lies with the United States.

And here it is extremely important not to succumb to the temptation of simple and fast decisions, and not to go the way of the US, which rescinded the role of the global judge, who is subject to the same rules as in the whole community, in favour of the Sheriff from the Wild West, whose Colt is the absolute law.

If the Russian global justice becomes the same as modern American, then Russian world will turn into American, and the peoples of the world are not interested in shedding blood and sweat for a change of sign at the jail from one to another.

Short History of Creation of Ukraine and Donetsk-Krivorog Republics after the 1917 Coup d’Etat in Russia

On the 8th of December 2016, an analyst and blogger RoSsi BaRBeRa – one of the few that I read for their honest and direct approach to the world events – publish an article titled “Ukraine and the new bout for for-free [Euronews journalists are striking because of the refusal to count them as Russians]”.

In short, that article was describing an absurd situation after closing of the Ukrainian office of Euronews. Euronews closed down its Ukrainian-language office in France. It was created in 2011, and as with all the Euronews participating countries, Ukraine was to pay a certain license contribution towards running of their department. (Russian VGTRK, btw, owns 7% of shares of Euronews). After the 2014 “revolution” Ukraine decided that Europe owes Ukraine for the defence of the European values, and stopped paying. The Ukrainian department was then financed by Euronews from the common funds, but was not disbanded as Russophobia was in high demand. At the same time Euronews tried to get the money from Ukraine (€10 mill) through Ukrainian court system. To the European amazement, Ukraine did the same number as they did on the Russian Gazprom – the debtor started dictated conditions. Euronews haven’t got a cent. Now, in December 2016 Euronews shut down the Ukrainian department. And here comes the essence of the story:

The journalists from that department attempted first to apply to the Russian-language department (currently the most profitable in the Euronews consortium, with good salaries), but were refused. The reason from the management was this: Ukrainians do not have enough command of the Russian language and culture to work in the Russian department (after all, that’s what the rabid Ukrainian propaganda was all about all this time!). Ukrainian Euronews journalists – who only the day before were “defending Europe against Russian aggression” – suddenly did a U-turn and indignantly stated that they were all born in USSR, are from the same country, and anyway, Russian department employed Armenians and Belorussians, so why are Ukrainians discriminated. When it became clear that Euronews would not budge on the decision, they did another U-turn and started blaming, who else – Putin for not allowing them to work in the Russian department of Euronews… Curtain.

That was a pre-history, now comes the story…

As a post-scriptum to the article, RoSsi BaRBeRa posted the following image:

Translation: Ukro-patriots. Learn this by heart. In 1922 Ukraine ascended into USSR without Harkov, without Herson, without Odessa and Donetsk, without Lugansk, and, of course, without Crimea. Ukraine even didn’t have Lvov back then. All these lands Ukraine got while being a part of the “damned” USSR. For free.

The year in that image, as well as the facts, were challenged in one of the comments, to which RoSsi BaRBeRa wrote an extensive reply, which I find enlightening and am translating below with a few minor edits:

Everything is clear with the period of the Russian empire. No national republics existed before 1917. Further, after the revolution, on January 30, 1918 in Kharkov hotel “Metropol” there took place the 4th Regional Congress of Soviets of Workers’ Deputies which initially proclaimed the creation DKR (Donetsk – Krivoy Rog Republic). But it was not enough to declare it creation, it is needed be reaffirmed, acknowledged, and not only orally, but de facto. After all, a war was going on, and there was chaos in the country. Nearby to the self-proclaimed DKR was just as equally self-proclaimed UPR (Ukrainian People’s Republic) – a unit in the central part of the outskirts (Okraina – Ukraina) of the former Russian Empire, acting against the Soviet authorities.

And there lay the problem, because a few days before the official proclamation of the DKR, the UNR Central Council (with the center in Kiev) signed in Brest an anti-Russian treaty with Germany and Austria-Hungary, which allowed the entry of the Austro-German forces on its breakaway territory. Clearly they had no legal rights to do so, but in general they did 100 years ago exactly what they do now – lying down with pleasure and selling themselves to the West. At the same time, the UPR did not just ask the Germans for protection, but also gave away to the invaders of the West Polesie with the Belarusian people and Donbass itself, which the Ukrainian Parliament considered to be theirs, while the Petrograd and DKR itself considered themselves to be Soviet.

So, on one hand a unitarian Ukraine did not exist back then, but rather there were two conflicting with one another breakaway territories, and the other, at the beginning of March 1918 the Germans outright occupied Donbass, and without Russia, which later fought off the land from the enemy, they (Ukraine) would simply not come to pass. Let’s continue.

Next, by the decision of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the wishing to be Soviet leadership of the not yet manifested Donetsk republic, was deposed and a commissioner was appointed – Hetman Skoropadsky. While the occupied -both UNR and DKR they called for Ukrainian State. Later, having renamed it to the Ukrainian People’s Republic, they put in charge one of their own, the present “independence hero” Petliura, who under the auspices of the Germans, cut down all right, left and centre – both the partisans of Makhno, and the Reds, and the Whites, and the locals. After the defeat of Germany and its allies and the return of Donbass by the Soviet military into Russia, Stalin said: “There is no need and should be no separate Don-Kriv-Bass”, and with that he annexed this territory to the formed at that time united Ukrainian SSR. But they (Donbass) initially did not want it! What does this mean? The fact that even the earliest Donbass, at the end of accession in 1922 was also presented the UkSSR (Ukraine) for free. Presented by Russia. Of which the image above speaks. Before the USSR, Ukraine did not have those territories. Just like Ukraine itself did not exist. A couple of months under the German occupation does not count.

Perhaps you are right in that it made sense to supplement the information in the picture that, Donbass was given to Ukraine by Russia in 1919, not in 1922, and I admit it, but this does not change the essence at hand.

Next, on March 10, 1919 3rd Congress of Soviets of the UkSSR took place in Kharkov, which declared the establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) as an independent state, the draft Constitution of the UkSSR was adopted. The congress approved the policy of the Ukrainian government on the comprehensive strengthening of relations with Soviet Russia. Thus, Ukraine acceded to the wishes of the other independent republics of the Soviets on the establishment of a union with them. And declared desire to become part of Russia. In their desires, they indicated that they consider their own administrative boundaries wherever Ukrainians lived – in Kiev, Kherson, Podolia, Volyn, Kharkov, Poltava, Chernigov, Ekaterinoslav and Tauride areas. But it’s all wishing on paper, signed against the backdrop of a civil war and while the Soviet Russian military advanced into Ukraine returning native Russian land. At that time, the civil war in Ukraine was rapidly taking turn to our advantage (in favour of the Reds), and October 11, 1919 Red Army began the decisive offensive against Denikin Red – or in fact, the third attempt to establish the Bolshevik rule on the territory of the former Russian Empire outskirts (okrainas). On December 12th, Soviet troops entered Kharkov, on December 16 – Kiev, on February 7, 1920 – Odessa. Eastern Ukraine is almost completely taken over by the Bolsheviks at the end of December 1919, the central and right-bank Ukraine – by the beginning of 1920.

And only then began the territorial disputes of the Ukrainian SSR and the South-East of Russia. When liberated by Soviet warriors Ukraine, habitually wanted more for themselves, their appetite increased and raised the question of creation of their own Don province, in order to include it in the part of the Donets Coal Basin, which was a part of the Don region of Russia, and at the same time – Taganrog. However, since this issue was discussed in closed circles and without the consent of the administration of the Don Region, on the 17th of January 1920, Donetsk Revolutionary Governorship (Gubrevkom) of the city of Lugansk ordered “until the economic territory of the Donetsk province and the proper distribution of the province areas is clarified, to TEMPORARILY approve … 11 administrative districts that make up the Donetsk province as described by UkSSR” including there also the territory of the Shakhty district – White-Kalitvensky, Bokovo-Hrustal’nyj, Alexander-Grushevsky areas and individual settlements of the Taganrog district.

I stress, temporarily. As long as the civil war continues.

But be that as it may, in April 1920, at the suggestion of the CPC of Ukraine and Presidium Council decided to establish the Donetsk province (governorship) of Ukraine from the parts of Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav provinces and regions of the Don Cossacks. From Ekaterinoslav province of Russia, Ukraine entirely got Bahmutskiy, Lugansk and Mariupol counties, and from the area of ​​the Don Cossacks, again – Russian – all the Taganrog district, the villages of the district of Donetsk (Gundorovskaya, Kamensky, Kalitvenskaya, Ust-Belaya Kalitva). Lugansk became the centre of Donetsk province.

And this is another “gift” to Ukraine from Russia. But I say it again, it was initially a temporary one.

But in general, there is a visual infographics of the “gifts” by Russia to its Ukrainian republic.

(Dates:
20th November 1917 (proclamation of UPR in Kiev) -> 12th December 1917 (proclamation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in Harkov) -> 1st November 1918 (proclamation of Western-Ukrainian People’s Republic in Lvov) -> 1919 (Creation of Ukrainian SSR, Western territories fall under Polish control) ->
1939 (Eastern Galicia becomes part of UkSSR) -> 1940 (Northern Bukovina and Southern Bessarabia become part of Ukraine) -> 1945 (Zakarpatie [Trans-Carpathia] becomes part of Ukraine) -> 1954 (Crimea is transferred into UkSSR)

Another map, is the sate of the South-Russian republics by 1917-1918:

ДКР (DKR) – Donetsk-Krivorozhje Republic
УНР (UPR) – Ukrainian People’s Republic
КРЫМ – Crimean Republic
ОДЕССА – Odessa Republic

Stealing Russian Treasure: Amsterdam Court Gives Crimean Scythian Gold to Kiev (a Lada Ray Reblog)

Reblogging Lada Ray article Stealing Russian Treasure: Amsterdam Court Gives Crimean Scythian Gold to Kiev. The Scythian gold is the property of the Crimean Museums, so what the Amsterdam court sanctioned is, indeed, a theft.

The Court in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, has made a decision that Scythian gold, which was on loan from the Crimean museums to the Dutch museums in 2013-14, belongs to Ukraine. The gold has been taken out of Dutch museums and shipped off to an unknown location in 2014, after Crimea voted to re-join Russia.

The story of the Scythian Gold (Zoloto Skifov), with pics, in my video, Crimea Scythian Gold/ MH17/ Russian Sanctions: Global Consequences (LadaRayLive 1):

Natalya Poklonskaya, ex-Attorney General of Crimea and Russian Duma Deputy, called the Amsterdam decision a thievery. She promised the decision would be appealed by the Crimean museums.

Natalya Poklonskaya: ‘Amsterdam court is hardly impartial. This illegal decision will be contested. It’s comparable to a highway robbery.

The famous Zoloto Skifov – Scythian Gold – was discovered in 19th century by the Russian archeologists in Russian Crimea.

It has nothing to do with the present day Kiev junta and today’s ukro-nazi ‘Ukraine,’ which denies any connection to Russia. In 19th century, when the gold was dicovered, Crimea was a part of Russia. Therefore, the decision clearly has no connection to fairness and law. It is a politicized act, designed to yet again punish Russia.

The only goal such actions by the Netherlands achieve is creating an Iron Curtain and putting a damper on any sort of cultural and museum exchanges. I can’t imagine Russians ever allowing their treasures out of the country again, under such circumstances.

But I’ll tell you more: the fact that the decision has suddenly passed now – after over 2 years of delays – has the fingerprints of Soros, Obama, Clinton, Merkel, Holande and the entire crumbling neo-liberal NWO clique all over. The Scythian Gold number is one of their last-ditch, desperate, efforts to create an irreconcilable rift between Russia and various Western countries.

The same is done in a hurry by Obama/Soros/Clinton in the US. The US elites are doing everything to create as many obstacles as possible for the future US president’s attempts to work with Russia. As I predicted in EARTH SHIFT REPORT 16: US ELECTIONS & WHAT WILL HAPPEN AFTER, the goal is to tie up Trump and to put him in a straight jacket of legal traps and time-bombs, as well as distrust and sour grapes, so he would not be able to improve US-Russia relations by much, despite his best efforts (look for my upcoming Trump/Electoral College prediction video for more!).

The same process is underway in the EU. But the only thing they will be able to achieve is prolonging the agony of the Western NWO project.

Lada Ray Report: Putin’s visit to Slovenia, Union of Southern Slavs and Russia (reblog)

This Lada Ray’s report, Putin’s visit to Slovenia, Union of Southern Slavs and Russia talks about the recent visit by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the tragic events of WWI, remembered through the Russian chapel.

I do urge my readers to go and read the full report, but in this re-blog, I’d like to concentrate on its second half – the history, language and ties of Slovenia…


Another striking point: Slovenia stands for dialogue and peaceful resolution of all outstanding issues and disputes.

It’s important to correctly understand certain things about Slovenia, Serbia and former Yugoslavia

First, let’s remember this: in the Balkans and elsewhere, one’s attitude towards Russia is connected closely with one’s attitude towards Serbia. If Serbia is perceived as an enemy and/or a rogue state, then Russia is likely perceived as at least not a friend – and vice versa.

Slovenia is the only early breakaway former part of Yugoslavia that never was involved in an armed conflict with Serbs, as opposed to Bosnia and Croatia, plus Kosovo. Conversely, Macedonia (FYRM) and Montenegro (Chernogoria) were split from Serbia later, in order to further weaken it. The collective West, at the time spearheaded by Bill Clinton, correctly perceived that the weakening of Serbia meant by default the handicapping of Russia.

Slovenia is a Slavic-populated country – as attested by its name; the language spoken is Slovenian (Slovene).

In truth, the differences between Yugoslav languages are minor and they really should be considered dialects of the same South-Slavic (aka, Yugoslav) tongue. The differences in many cases are akin to the degree of closeness of the Russian – Belorussian language relationship. In other words, it’s even closer than Russian – Ukrainian language relationship. And even Ukrainian, in my professional opinion as a linguist and native language carrier of both, should be considered a dialect. Read about that in Discovering The Real Belarus and in Earth Shift Reports: ESR2: Ukraine Truth, Lies & Future Hope and ERS6: Ukraine – New Khazarian Khaganate.

Southern Slavic languages are also very close to Russian. As an example, the name of the capital of Slovenia, Ljubljana, doesn’t really need a translation. Without knowing the language, I can tell you that it is very close to the Russian word lyubov’, which means love. Therefore, Ljubljana is likely translated as ‘the city of love,’ or perhaps, ‘the beloved place/city.’

Incidentally, those with a keen eye will recognize the same root ‘lyub’ in the English love. This again attests to something I often stress: we are ALL ONE, we all come from the same root, and all these barriers – political, military or linguistic – are artificial! Read more in Forbidden History: Are Scandinavians Slavs? and under Category: Forbidden Linguistics.

Historically, Slovenia is arguably the most ‘Westernized’ of all Yugoslavia and the closest to Austria and Hungary, having been a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As a result of religious conversion, the population is presently primarily Catholic.

As it so often happened in history, the difference in religion is what served as the foreign-induced pretext for the ’90s civil wars of Orthodox Serbs vs. Catholic Croats & Muslim Bosnians/ Kosovo Albanians. US/EU needed to breakup Yugoslavia pronto while Russia was at her weakest – and they succeeded admirably. Therefore, it is remarkable that Slovenia actually remained neutral through the ’90s war and it attests to the peaceful character and wisdom of the residents (of course it helps that geographically Slovenia is furthest removed from Serbia).

After the war ended and hot heads cooled down, those who retained reason and common sense began to question the war and resulting artificial separation. It’s much harder for Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia to come around in relation to each other, due to a deep-running resentment and mistrust. Kosovo situation is even worse: it is regarded in Serbia as an outright theft and humiliation. Of course, this division, resulting in lack of sovereignty and animosity was the end target of then US president Clinton and the globalist West.

The ‘divide and conquer’ worked in Yugoslavia’s case all too well. There is never such thing as one side exclusively being guilty of all sins. Since the ’90s, Serbia and Serbs were exclusively vilified, while the atrocities of Croats, Bosnians and Kosovo Albanians were ignored or whitewashed. Moreover, the barbaric NATO bombings of Serbia were presented as a great triumph of Western democracy against evil dictatorship.

The ultimate goal was to humiliate and suppress Serbia so it couldn’t continue being the heart of undesirable sovereignty in the middle of the EU. This goal was achieved. And here I have to tell you the truth, which will be hard for the Serbs to hear. The reason this goal was achieved so easily and so handily is because Serbs ALLOWED it to be achieved. By taking the foreign bait of inter-confessional conflict and civil war they opened an entry point for NATO to tear the country apart. If they were wiser and acted in such a way that would quell the conflict, the degree of the disaster we are observing today could have been diminished in big part.

As a stark contrast to that catastrophic mistake, let’s recall how Russia and Putin had handled the situation with the late ’90s – early 2000s Chechen war. Later in 2008, Russia wisely managed the situation with S.Ossetia/Georgia conflict. And the latest: how differently Russia and Putin are handling the situation in Ukraine! As you know, I predicted from the start of 2014 that Russia would never send troops to Ukraine and that Russia would, conversely, concentrate on peacefully remolding the situation, on turning it around carefully and slowly to de-escalate both regional conflict and WWIII potentiality. As we see, the situation has developed, and continues developing, exactly as predicted. (As always, read PREDICTIONS on top bar).

Therefore, the unwise actions of both sides in the ’90s Balkans conflict caused a rift from which it would take long to recover. However, those parts of Yugoslavia that don’t have much bad blood between themselves have started waking up.

We’ve seen the attempts to reach out to Russia and protest NATO and EU expansion in Macedonia and Montenegro – so far, squashed by the West.

I’ve noticed that for years Slovenia’s government and parliament quietly invited speakers and advisors who were anti-US/West establishment and steadily grew relations with Russia. As I said, Slovenia is the kind of country that will try to get along with everyone. They won’t fight and protest so much as they’ll try to quietly get where they want to be, while others are distracted by fighting. Kinda reminds me of how Zakarpatie (Transcarpathia) Rusins behave, who are presently under Kiev, but want to secede. Incidentally, both were for centuries under Austria-Hungary, so they learned to work quietly for fear of suppression.

Slovenia is the kind of country that is technically a part of EU and NATO, but at the same time it tries to develop and maintain a good relationship with Russia. This is a necessary job – we do desperately need the ‘bridge-countries’ that would help develop and keep connections between Russia and West, despite the destructive forces currently at work in the EU and West in general. Countries like Slovenia keep a small flame alive, protecting it from the raging hurricane and reminding those who would listen that there is another way. Slovenia tries to gently remind Europeans that if the continuing foreign-induced conflict between EU and Russia were to be replaced with cooperation, everyone would win. They aren’t the only ones. Austria tried to do the same, Czech president did as well, while being isolated by his own parliament and government, Hungarian PM Orban tried…

But as I wrote many times before, the crumbling US Empire simply cannot afford Russia and European countries working peacefully and cooperatively together. The artificially built new Iron Curtain is in the works, using the sell-out Poland, Romania and the Baltics, through NATO expansion and BMDS in Eastern Europe.

It’s the Grand Chess Game, however. Putin’s Slovenia visit is one of Russia’s counter-moves. Slovenia sees Russia getting stronger, while EU and US are busy with their own problems. Therefore, Slovenia can make a move of her own. It’s a small and meek move, but it’s an affirmation of a certain allegiance and a nod to the historic memory.

All in all, this is a very good start!

In addition, it’s important to remember that Russians routinely helped ‘brothers’ Slavs, including Slovenians, during several previous great wars. This includes liberating many of the Slavic and Orthodox ‘brothers’ in the Balkans and Eastern/Southern Europe from the Ottoman Empire yoke and helping them during WWI and WWII. The liberation list is very long and includes Czechia, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and all of Yugoslavia, including of course, Serbia and Slovenia. There indeed are many Russians who fell in the Balkans.

If there are readers from those parts, I invite them to share their experiences in the comments! TRUTH ONLY accepted!

On another note, Slovenia, as much of the former Yugoslavia, has magnificently beautiful nature, with pristine forests, mountains, some parts of ex-Yugoslavia also have a lovely sea shore. I hope it stays that way!

PREDICTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Union of Southern Slavs & Russia

It is my strong opinion that the Yugoslavs (the word means ‘Southern Slavs’) need to unite in one country, based on mutually respectful, cooperative principles. They need to use wisdom and reason – not their pride and overinflated egos, while doing so. Failing that, they’ll always be a yo-yo in someone’s unscrupulous hands, ready to be manipulated on moment’s notice.

Uniting is the only way for them to re-gain sovereignty and to be strong enough to withstand foreign pressure and invasions. Incidentally, this South-Slavic/Balkan Union should include Bulgaria. The inclusion of Greece, plus possibly Cyprus (as non-Slavic, but Orthodox countries), is a long shot; but if that were to happen, it would be greatly beneficial for both Greece and all Yugoslavs.

This is what Serbia tried to do: create a union of Southern Slavs. However, for this union to be lasting, Serbs and others have to tuck away their egos and pride and work together for the greater good of all.

The weakness of the Balkans is that it doesn’t have a border with Russia. If it did, history, as we know it, would have been very different… WWI and Yugoslavia ’90s bombings may have never happened. The Russian Empire attempted to establish a friendly corridor to the Balkans via creating from scratch in the 19th century what was thought of back then as ‘friendly’ Romania, having liberated that area from the Ottomans. However, it didn’t take long for Romania to get seduced by the UK, turning it into a problem rather than part of the solution. Therefore, the larger the Union, the more stable it will be. When these little countries are apart they are easy pickings for predators.

If such union of Southern Slavs is created, it would serve as powerful ADDITIONAL counterweight to NWO/globalists, US and EU. It would become a great help for Russia’s global rebalancing efforts. By default, it would mean the strengthening of Russia.

Meanwhile, Russia would also be in much better position to help the Southern Slavic Union to defend itself and to develop its economy. For instance, South Stream pipeline project would be automatically revived as then the YugoSlavic Union, not EU or US, would be deciding whether it should go through Bulgaria or not.

Eventually, Eurasian Union can and should be expanded to include the Southern Slavic Union.

But this is exactly what globalists are afraid of and this is exactly why they want to keep Balkans broken up into small parts.

People can make a difference by uniting, setting aside their old grudges and creating a new reality. I’ve more than once seen my ideas and recommendations materialize into reality, after I voiced them out on FT or in Earth Shift Report.

Uncovering Slavic/Russian language traces in the European History

Having read Lada Ray’s excellent article How to Reformat People’s Consciousness and Keep them as Obedient Slaves – which (while mentioning Etruscans and the fact that their writing has been long ago read using Slavic) was an introduction to my translation of the Latinisation article Galician Intellectuals Wishing to Deprive Ukrainian of the Cyrillic Alphabet – I thought that the topic of the traces of the Russian language in the re-written European history deserves more attention.

1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2Please note that translating a documentary film or an article takes a lot of time and emotional effort. I am doing it on a voluntary basis, but if someone feels like supporting my work, a Bitcoin donation to the following address is appreciated: 1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2

This is a translation of a series of articles from KM.RU, which go under the common topic of Russian Language is the Great Heritage of the Whole of Humanity. The articles are ordered in such a way, so as to first give a theoretical background, followed by some specific examples.

Contents:

  1. Why Do European Languages Have so Many Slavic Roots?
  2. The Anti-Slav Lawlessness in Epigraphy
  3. Who and How Erases Russian Names from the Maps
  4. Russian Truth about the Etruscans is Disadvantageous and Dangerous for the West
  5. Slavic Language in the Holiest Place of Vienna
  6. The Language Brotherhood of Russians and Bulgarians Was Deliberately Destroyed
  7. Moldavian Prince and Turkish Sultan also wrote in Russian!

Let me start with an article, which accentuates my own observations from using English, Norwegian, Spanish, German, and having an ear for Italian…


At least, until the XIV century, the overwhelming majority of the population of Europe spoke the same language – the Proto-Slavic.

No one today doubts the fact that Latin was created after the Greek letters. However, when comparing the so-called Archaic Latin, which is traditionally assigned to the VI century BC., and Classical Latin, which is traditionally assigned to the I century BC. (in other words, 500 years later), it is striking that the graphic design of the monumental Archaic Latin is much closer to the modern Latin, rather than to the Classical. The images of both varieties of the Latin alphabet can be found in any linguistic dictionary.


Black stone – one of the earliest artefacts inscribed in Latin (historic.ru)

According to the traditional chronology, it turns out that the Latin alphabet first degraded from archaic to classical, and later, during the Renaissance, again came closer to the original view. However, there is no such unjustified phenomenon within the concept of the supporters of the theory of the New Chronology, according to which the supposedly “ancient” Greek and Hebrew letter, not even speaking about the Latin alphabet, are derived from the Proto-Slavic (and thus Proto-European) alphabet.

When comparing Latin to modern languages, it is necessary to also pay attention to the fact that the structure of the medieval Latin language is almost identical to the structure of the Russian language. It is also inherited by the contemporary Italian.


Dante with a copy of “The Divine Comedy” at the entrance to Hell. The fresco in the Santa Maria del Fiore (kotaku.com)

It is believed that the literary Italian was created by Dante Alighieri, who lived allegedly, according to the traditional chronology, at the turn of XIII-XIV centuries. The Name – the nickname “Dante Alighieri” is translated as “Damned liguriets” (in other words: A citizen of the Republic of Genoa). And indeed, he was cursed by the Catholic Church and sentenced in absentia to be burned.

It is noteworthy that no original manuscripts of Dante, just like of Boccaccio and Petrarch, ever survived. Dante, according to the theory of the New Chronology, created the “Divine Comedy”, most likely at the end of the XVI century, After the Council of Trent, which published a list of banned books, and plunged us into total censorship. “For some reason, after Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio, for 200 more years all the other Italian authors write exclusively in Latin, – said Jaroslav Kessler in his book “Russian civilization. Yesterday and tomorrow” – and the Italian literary language as such is formed based on the Tuscan dialect (toscanovolgare) only by the beginning of the XVII century”. The blossoming up of the Latin literature falls on XVI-XVII centuries. The poetry of Dante, Petrarch and Shakespeare is born from the same epoch, and it is not the “antiquity”, but the XVI-XVII centuries. However the original manuscript of another Italian genius, Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), are preserved, and in the number of almost 7000 pages. This clearly indicates that in fact the real story of the Italian culture is just beginning in the XV century, while before that it was Byzantine, in other words, largely Slavic.


Leonardo da Vinci’s self-portrait (megabook.ru)

In in reality, the history of the origin of an artificial Latin language was repeated by L.Zamengof, when in 1887 he created the artificial language Esperanto, based on Latin, but with Germanic and Slavic elements. The only difference is that Latin was created on the basis of the Slavonic, and more specifically – on the Greco-Roman dialect of Proto-Slavic language, subjected to the influence of Judeo-Hellenic language. But it was not necessary to create artificial languages.

Scientists conducted an analysis of 20 major modern European languages, including Slavic, Baltic, Germanic, Roman and Greek, and identified more than 1,000 keywords, belonging to approximately 250 common to all the Balto-Slavic groups roots and covering all the concepts required for full communion. And this plainly demonstrates that, at least until the XIV century the vast majority of people in Europe spoke the same language – the Proto-Slavic.

In the light of the concept developed here, the sudden abundant appearance of the “Greek” literary artefacts at the end of XVI century becomes quite clear. Literary pogrom, inspired by the Inquisition and blessed by the Council of Trent, simply forced the Protestant intellectuals at the end of the XVI century to find other ways and different languages for the publication of their works, as the original literature in Latin was subjected to severe censorship, and freethinking authors were sent straight to the fires of the Inquisition. And thus appeared a pagan “Ancient Greek” mythology, relatively safe in terms of the Inquisition only due to its “ancient” character, the works “Roman” philosophers, “the ancient Greek satirist Aesop” (aka the French fable author of the XVII century Lafontaine), and so on.

And the emergence of modern European writing fully fits into the period of XI-XVI centuries (down to half a century margin of error): XI century. – Proto-Slavic alphabet (Cyrillic), XII century – Hebrew, Greek writing (zodiacal dating – 1152), Runic writing (zodiacal dating – 1198), Glagolitsa, XIII century – Latin, XIV century – the “artificial” languages: Church Slavonic, the liturgical Latin, the language of the Torah and the Koran, XV century – the beginning of printing, Bible gets printed in the XVI century. Note that the disappearance of the comparatively late Runic script and Glagolitsa is not a matter of chance: they were quickly driven out by forced introduction of Latin.

The activity of Saints Cyril and Methodius, who created the Church Slavic alphabet based on Proto-Slavonic was clearly already conducted against the backdrop of Latinisation of the Western and the Southern Slavs, so it must, according to the authors of the theory of the New Chronology, be dated 400 years later than according to the traditional dating – to the end of XIII – beginning of XIV centuries.


Gennady of Novgorod, lithography (megabook.ru)

It is noteworthy that in the late XV century the Archbishop of Novgorod Gennady advocated education to the Russian clergy, complaining: “We can not find those, whoever is talented in grammar… so at to elect him to be a priest… He can not do anything, just reads along the book, while knot knowing anything of our church writing.”

Meanwhile, it is clear from the quoted passage that Archbishop is talking about educated Russian people, who were presented to Gennady for examination of the suitability of a church service, but who at the same time did not know the Church Slavic language! In other words, far more people mastered the Russian civil script, than the Church Slavic.

The above was a fragment of an interview of Jaroslav Kessler.


The next article discusses how any attempts to unearth (literally) the Slavic roots of the European languages were met with hostility. Some of that was discussed in How to Reformat People’s Consciousness and Keep them as Obedient Slaves with regard to Etruscans.


Why do the attempt at the study of ancient Russian letters are stopped and severely punished.

(Epigraphy – an auxiliary historical discipline that studies the content and form of inscriptions on hard materials [stone, ceramics, metal, etc.] and classifies them according to their time and cultural context.)

Because from the perspective of a number of sciences, including toponymics and historiography, prior to the Germans Slavic settlements existed in a number of places in Germany, it is natural to assume that the most ancient written language in Europe came from Russia. This was the hypothesis of a number of researchers, however, the German scientists were against. The aim of the German scientists was to show that as the Russians in particular, and Slavs in general never had anything original to contribute. Therefore, the findings of figures of the Slavic gods in Prilvitse, where Slavs used Germanic runes, was a good luck for the German rather than for the Slavic point of view. In other words, the early Slavic writing was German.


Prilvitskie idols (valhalla.ulver.com)

Only Jacob Grimm noticed that in the German letter there are some subtle differences, so this variety can be called for the Slavic runes. However, a Croatian Vatroslav Yagitch devoted a lifetime to proving that there are no special differences in that form of the German writing used by the Slavs. But H. Fren discovered a Russian inscription in the Arabic manuscripts of El Nedim; and at once a Danish researcher Finn Magnus tried to show that it is inscribed with the German runes. However, his reading was rather clumsy and A. Shegren tried to improve this reading. So any special identity of the Russian letters was not even discussed.

Russian archaeologist Gorodtsov, while digging in Alekanovo village of Ryazan province, found an inscription on a pot, and after a year-long deliberation recognised in them “letters of the ancient Slavic writing”. But Gorodtsov was not an epigraphist, and his single message is no longer referenced by any researcher. While a Ukrainian archaeologist Vincent Chvojka, who discovered not only the Tripolis archaeological culture, but also the inscriptions on a vessel, which he described as Slavic, was later proclaimed by the colleagues from Moscow as a “dilettante.” The pre-revolutionary archaeologist from Kiev, Charles Bolsunovsky, who attempted to expand the monograms of the Russian princes into individual letters, is also deemed to be a dilettante by the modern archaeologists. In the XIX century, being called a dilettante – or an amateur – was quite a sufficient punishment.

In the twentieth century, everything became even more serious. Thus, Nikolai A. Konstantinov from Leningrad, who tried to decipher the “pre-Dnieper signs”, was forced to end his career under the pressure from the “conscience of the nation”, academician Dmitry Likhachev. In Kazakhstan, there turned up a researcher of ancient literature, this of the pre-Turkic one – a Kazakh writer Olzhas Suleimenov. For this he was threatened with expulsion from the Communist Party (at the time it was a “wolf ticket”, not allowing to engage in any form of creative activities in the future). He was only saved from such a severe punishment by the intervention of the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan comrade Kunaeva.


Olzhas Suleimenov (megabook.ru)

A Serbian researcher Radivoje Pesic was forced to emigrate to Italy from the socialist Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito. He was a professional epigraphist, researcher of Etruscans. However, he found a new type of writing in Slavic culture in Vinca, which relates to the Neolithic age. It is for this discovery of a new kind of Slavic script (although not deciphered by him), that he was forced to say goodbye to his homeland. And even in today’s Serbia, after his death, the memory of him is not the best.

But the most flagrant demonstration of this kind of persecution can be considered the suicide of a young epigraphist from Moscow N.V. Engovatov. At the height of Khrushchev’s thaw, he allowed himself to not only search for the ancient Slavic written language, but also to relate about its results in the socio-political press, the magazine “Ogonyok”, some newspapers and weeklies. And even though he was still on the distant approaches to the solution of the problem, he was fired at from the scientific arms of the large calibre: the journal “Soviet archaeology” №4, 1960, published an article by two academicians of the USSR Academy of Sciences, B.A. Rybakov and V.L. Yanin, “On the so-called ‘discoveries’ by N.V. Engovatova”. There were no specialists of higher rank in the Soviet Union at that time. Further career of the young scientist was closed, and he shot himself.

The same idea of ​​the inadmissibility of the search for the ancient Slavic letters (for example, for the “pre-Polish alphabet”) was repeated by B.A. Rybakov from the stands of the 5th International Congress of Slavists. So it was simply impossible to legally search for the ancient Slavic alphabets.

http://ic1.static.km.ru/sites/default/files/03_mikale_0.jpg
Michael Ventris (icls.sas.ac.uk)

However, experts of the subject will always remember that decipherment of Linear B by Michael Ventris made it possible to read the ancient Greek texts dating 500 years further back. However, the scientific community did not apply any punitive measures to Ventris, on the contrary, he was welcomed. Similarly, there were no problem with learning the ancient Hebrew letters: on the contrary, new discoveries in this direction only encouraged.

So why in one case – the glory and honour, and in the other – expulsion from the Party, exile to another country, or bringing about a suicide?

The answer is simple: because all the other epigraphists are deciphering minor writing systems. Consequently, the Slavic, Russian ancient letters is the most important thing, the most significant for the historiography of Europe and the world, which none of epigraphists can touch on pain of death.


River Russ became Neman and Porus turned into Prussia

Until recently in the West, it was fashionable to attribute the first mentioning of the Slavs in general to no earlier than the V century. Later, a “concession»was mad to the Slavs – III or even II century. Since it was becoming too indecent to ignore “Gethica” of the Gothic historian Jordan. And he directly informed about the wars of their national hero Germanarich against the Slavs in these times. So the world historiography graciously conceded to the Slavic existence the II century. But on one condition – not further to the west than the the mouth of the Danube, within the boundaries of the Black Sea steppes to the marshes of the Pripyat and Desna (maximum – the upper reaches of the Dnieper, and even that, grudgingly). It seems like that should be more than enough for those “savages”.


Vatican. St. Peter’s Square (megabook.ru)

At the same time, no one comes to the simple idea that the main sources on the history of Slavs and Russia are either simply destroyed or, more likely, taken from a wide use and are stored in special vaults of Vatican. So there was no “prolonged for many centuries lack of extensive contacts with the Rus people” and “incredible diversity in estimates” about this people, as postulated by some (incl. domestic) researchers. What was are the centuries of protracted censorship on the integral and consistent image of the Russian people’s history.

Professor, Chairman of the Commission of Russia Academy of Sciences on the ancient and medieval history of culture, Valery Chudinov remarks: “I very well remember the 50s of the twentieth century, when it was impossible in Russia anywhere to find either a caricature of Adolf Hitler or to form an idea of ​​the development of the Nazi Party in Germany: all sources of information were confiscated by the censor, and those interested in the problem of the position of various political forces in Germany could be suspected of disloyalty… We observe the very same thing in the history of the Middle ages: the Germans and the Italians, who came to the Slavic lands, won their place in the sun, first by fire and sword, destroying the owners of the land that hosted them, and then destroying the memory of said owners. A similar situation is being played out before our eyes, in Kosovo, where Serbs, who sheltered fleeing from neighbouring Albania citizens, these very same Albanian citizens, first began to squeeze out and then simply destroy. All Slavic shrines in this area were also subjected to destruction, so that no one would have any doubt that the Kosovo Albanians had “always” lived in this area, and not just from the middle of the twentieth century. Note that the rest of the European nations, especially the German and Italian, supported the line of the enemies of the Slavs, that is they just continued the line, which they held for centuries.”


Photo of two Albanians in national dress, 1904 (venividi.ru)

In such a situation, it would be strange to find any consistent data from at the Kosovo Albanians about the residing on this territory Serbs and their shrines. Even if by miracle such information would still remain, it would be contrary to a host of other information, so it will not be possible to recover a true picture of the Albanian expansion from that data. Subsequent generations will be convinced that SHKIPITAR (that is Albanians) had lived here for many thousands of years. While Serbians will fleetingly mentioned as “unknown” and “unmentioned” barbaric people, pagans; its origin will be associated primarily with the “monsters-people of the oecumene land”.

Naturally, the Serbs will be portrayed as fanatics, monsters, cannibals and criminals, and not as defenders of their own land from the barbarian aliens. Note that the Serbs had already once suffered the same fate, when on the same field of Kosovo, they have suffered a defeat from the Turks; also then the Turks did not have any information about the previous shrines of the Slavs, and even if some of the original documents came into their possession (after all, Constantinople had strong historical archives), they were destroyed.


“Catherine II – lawgiver in the Temple of Justice» Painting by D.G. Levitsky (megabook.ru)

As recalled by Professor Chudinov, “Catherine the Great wrote: “But as Sultan stoke their baths with archival papers, it is likely that also this scripture will be used to this end and will en up there” (IMP, with 168.). One can stoke the baths with archival documents, which have incalculable value, only in one case: when it is the documents of the enemies, of whom no memory must be preserved. The Europeans started treating the word Serbs (serby) as servi, i.e. servants; while the word sclavi, i.e. the Slavs, was turned into slaves. Note that such a derogatory naming of the ancestral Europeans from alien Germans and Italians is only possible in a condition of the alien victory over the hosts.”

But the opposite did not take place, and the Slavs called the Germans for “Nemcy” (translator: singular: “Nemec”, this is still the modern Slavic naming of the Germans), i.e. the people, who are “mute”, do not speak the common language of that time, that is – Russian. Our ancestors did not consider any people as servants or slaves, because they themselves did not know slavery. That’s why they let strangers into their land, considering them as people like themselves. It did not occur to them, that the new neighbours will eventually be engaged in the extermination and enslavement of the Slavs, and later – also in the elimination of the historical memory of the Slavs. The last act has a distinct name, introduced after World War II, although the phenomenon as such existed before – the Cold War. In contrast to the “hot”, this war is being waged in two dimensions – economic and information.

01_russriv_0
Element of the map of Prussia until 1905, with river Russ marked on it (emersonkent.com)

Here is one concrete example of one such “battle” in the ongoing information war, which Valery Chudinov shows, “Taking variation Rus/Ros as the root word, scientists have produced the correct decoding of, for example, the name of the area on the southern coast of the Baltic Sea – Prussia, which is ascending to the long-standing name of this land, Porusie, or “land at Russ river” as Neman was named in the annals, and how this river was depicted on maps as early as the beginning of the twentieth century (and still is on the contemporary Polish maps) (HUS, p. 106). I believe that here is an example of one of the brilliant victories of the Cold War episode, won by the Germans: River Russ became river Neman, i.e. Russian affinity of the terrain gave way to German one, even though the word “Neman” is Russian (the Germans call themselves Deutsche). The episode with Porus (Porusie, “lands along Russ”) was won even more interestingly: initially the newly-arrived Baltians were called for Prussians, and then the name was applied to the Germans, who took over the area and drove away the Baltic Prussians… In other words, the separation of Porus from Rus occurred in two stages. And then it turns out as if Germans were at war with the Prussians and seemingly this has no relevance to Rus at all. However, having dug to the original historical names in these two episodes, the researchers thus weakened the consequences of such cartographic expansion of the Germans. Weakened, but not eliminated, for Russian students in geography lessons still memorize the words Prussia and Neman, and not Porusia and Russ.”


The next article takes time to address some of the criticism aimed at Russian-based reading of Etruscan writing. As for me, the name “Etruscan” (Этрусский) is enough. As with many Russian words, it’s a composite: “Et” (“Эт”) means “this is/these are”, while “ruscan” (“русский”) means, well, “Russian”. You can’t get a clearer message than that! By the way, the reading of the name of the Italian capital, which stems from Etruscans becomes clear if you apply the mirror writing that Etruscans used and Russian/Old Russian: “Rome” (“Рим”) becomes “Мир” – (Mir) – “World”. Btw, I wonder why Leonardo da Vinci was so fond of mirror writing.


All of he centuries-old work of the Europeans to expel the Slavs from ancient history can go down the drain

The global historiography simply can not permit the very thought that the Slavs (and, in particular, Russian) were not simply the inhabitants of Pripyat marshes in the early Middle Ages, but the direct co-tribesmen of the ancient tribe of the Etruscans, who lived in Italy in the II millennium BC, whose culture, as is commonly believed, laid the foundation for the Ancient Rome. Unfortunately, many of the domestic researchers, who in other cases demonstrate their scientific integrity, also march within the European historiography paradigms.


The scene of a feast from the Etruscan tombs of the Leopards (about 470 BC) (artpax.info)

Here Professor Valery Chudinov cites an extensive fragment from the Book of Nadezhda Guseva (doctor of historical sciences, ethnographer and indologist – Ed.): “Parallel to the naturally interpreted explanation for the formation of the names of places or rivers, the scientific circles also developed a less common treatment of ethnonyms. And it was in this field that there arose a lot of contradictions in explaining, for example, the ethnonym “Etruscans”. After the scientists from many countries tried for two hundred years to explain the origin of this people, and reveal their connection with other populations both neighbouring and distant countries, a book by E.Klassen was published in Russia in the XIX century: “New materials for ancient history in general and for Slavic-Rus” (KLA), in which there were given decryptions and readings of the inscriptions on tombstones and some tablets of the Etruscans, and this decryption lead to believe that the language of these inscriptions was Russian. The reason for this interpretation was that the font of the writing was very close to the Greek alphabet, from which it is believed Cyrillic originated. Inspired by its deciphering, Russian readers, as well as some researchers, have not paid attention to the fact that such a modern Russian, which Klassen offers suggests, could not have been spoken in Etruria in the II-I millennium BC., as those inscription are dated.” (GUS, pp. 106-107).


Tadeusz Volansky (megabook.ru)

Chudinov responds to this remark: “Judging by the numerous inaccuracies (consisting truncations and a distorted title of E.Klassen’s book, not only in the text, but in the list of references, in the mention of the name of E.Klassen as the author of the deciphering, while in fact the author was Tadeusz Volansky, who inserted his own book into the book of E.Klassen, in the absence of any “Etruscan tables” in the book, etc., etc.), N.R. Guseva didn’t read E.Klassen’s book, while he opinion is formed, based on other people’s reviews.

For me as a researcher of the problem, it is of interest that the inscriptions are dated by her no only from the first, but also from the second millennium BC; it seems that it is a dating from the XIX century. Nowadays, the most ancient Etruscan inscriptions are dated already from the VIII century, in other words their history was brought closer to our days by 12 centuries. Although, in my opinion, the inscription are younger by another 12-15 centuries. As for the “modern Russian”, in which allegedly the T.Volanskij’s inscriptions are written, then, no one hand, no one before me studied the Russian language of the Etruscan times, so is very difficult to talk about how “modern” or “ancient” it is.

On the other hand, T.Volanskij’s decryption, though very progressive for its time, if only by the noble desire to considered the Etruscans language as a Slavic one (like a true Pole, T.Volansky never believed that the Etruscan language was Russian: he translated only Etruscan inscriptions into Slavic languages including Polish and Russian), were incorrect. So there is no reason to consider this attempt as a model one. So my objections to NR Guseva are: 1) written from hearsay, 2) there are errors in the knowledge of the source and, therefore, an error in its interpretation, 3) one of the unsuccessful attempts to read Etruscan texts is proclaimed as an example evidence of Etruscans belonging to the Slavs, and 4) condemn the unsuccessful attempt by T.Volanskogo to the other readers from the standpoint of an alleged knowledge of the Russian language of Etruscan times. Therefore, not only do I see any credibility in N.R. Guseva’s opinion, but it also contains all the features of unprofessional handling of the sources in question”.

Chudinov also touched upon another of Guseva’s observations: “Historian Y.D. Petukhov developed a scheme of the genealogical tree of Indo-European languages, by tracing them from “proto-Slavic/Boreale”, and among the other descendants of that ancestor he also included the Etruscans, calling them “raseno-Etruscans”; thus in his book “In Gods’ Path”, he traces the relationship of Etruria with Asia Minor – via the Balkans to northern Italy, completing the circle over the Dnepr and Black Sea, as well as linking the Etruscans and the ancestors of the Slavs.” (GUS, p 107.).

As Chudinov explained, “One would not like to discuss the works of Y.D. Petukhov in passing; I believe that over time, I will give a detailed review of these interesting constructions… The important thing is that he mentioned Etruscans as the Slavs.”

Guseva, however, continues to insist: “He was not a novice in his search: many researchers wrote already in the XIX century about a marked influence on the Etruscan art and culture by the many aspects of the culture of Asia Minor. The big total work on the history, culture and language of the Etruscans, was the capital research of the French historian-orientalist Z. Maiani”Etruscans start talking”. Having prefaced his work with detailed prior publications, the author points out that some of the words and signs found in Etruria, are indecipherable as belonging to the Indo-European family system, but the basic vocabulary is clearly correlated with the major part of the system.” (GUS, p. 108).

But Zachary Maiani took upon himself an almost impossible task: to understand as a language the mess, into which the Etruscan was by Massimo Pallottino (Italian Etruscologist, professor of the University of Rome – Ed.) in his “reading”, when he simply “split into words” a continuous sequence of letters and then “transliterated” it, that is – gave the Latin spelling of Etruscan texts. As pointed out by the Valery Chudinov, “not knowing the reversals, that is how Etruscan letters should be shuffled, nor the ligatures, or, on the contrary, the writing of the dismembered letter (translator: for example as in the following single Russian letter: ‘ы’, which an unwary person may be tempted to split into two letters ‘ь’ and ‘ı’), not knowing Etruscan words, it is practically impossible even to split the text into words.” So, from the point of view of Professor Chudinov, “Zachary Maiani actually read a Latin surrogate of Etruscan, and his book should be titled “Surrogate Etruscan starts turning into some babble”, because over more than a quarter of a century, he was able to understand only about 300 words of this surrogate language, whereas I was able to identify more than 2,000 Etruscan-Russian word over two years time.

A legitimate question arises: are the professional Etruscologists after more than two centuries of observations did not understand that they are dealing with a form of the Russian language? I think they understood. Similarly, Europeans are well aware that the Albanians do not have any legal rights to Kosovo. However, they believe that it is necessary to get rid of the Slavs at any cost… Returning to our problems: why would they say that the Etruscan language was Slavic? What if the unearthed inscriptions suddenly contain something, that runs counter to accepted European historiography, in which the Slavs were expelled from the ancient period? What if it turns out that there was Russia, and Moscow, and that the “hand of Moscow” ordered to create Rome? Then all the centuries-old works of Europeans on the expulsion of Slavs from the ancient history go down the drain, and so well-going for Europeans cold war turns into a counter-attack of the Slavs”.

This was aragment of an interview of Professor Valery Chudinov to KM TV about the secret origin of the Etruscans and their relationship with the Russian people


It was in this language that the service in the famous St. Stephen’s Cathedral were conducted.

Unfortunately, the records of abbot Mauro Orbini (?-1614) were read by a few in our country. To explain for the non-experts: he is – the author of the monumental work “Slavic Kingdom” (published, as is commonly believed, in Pesaro in 1601 in Italian), in which he was one of the first to attempt to give a generalized history of all the Slavic peoples. Incidentally, Orbini believed that the Swedes, the Finns, the Goths, Danes, Normans, Burgundians, Bretons and many other Europeans stemmed from the Slavs.


The title page of the “Slavic Kingdom”, 1601 edition (library.yale.edu)

Orbini was proud of the feats of the Slavs, their majesty and power. He tells us about the spread of the Slavs, the invention of the Slavic written language, the ancient history of the Czechs, Poles, Polabans, Russians and especially the Southern Slavs. As the sources, Orbini used Russian chronicles, Callimachus, Cromer, Varshevitskij, Gajk, Dubravitskij, as well as Byzantine, German and Venetian writings. By personal order of Tsar Peter I, the book has been translated (with cuts) into the Russian language under the title of “Historiography praising the name, fame, and the expansion of the Slavic people and their kings and lords under many names and in many kingdoms, principalities, and provinces. Gathered out of many historical books, by the hand of the Lord Mavrourbina Archimandrite Raguzhskogo” (1722).


The first page of the Russian edition of the book by Mavro Orbini from 1722 (11pr.net)

Among other things, the Orbini’s book states that said “Slavic people” possessed France, England, Spain, Italy, Greece, the Balkans (“Macedonia and Illirich Lands”), as well as the coast of the Baltic Sea. In addition, according to the author, many European nations descended from the Slavs, while the official contemporary science says have nothing in common with their progenitors. Orbini fully realised that the historians will have a negative attitude to his work, and wrote about it in his book (re-translated from old Russian): “And if one of the nations would rebuke in hatred this true description – I call in witnesses historiographers, the list of whom I attach, and who in their historiography books speak regarding this case.”


St. Stephen’s Cathedral in Vienna, photo from 1905 (general-art.ru)

We shall not recount in detail all Orbini’s work (a list of primary sources alone takes an impressive amount space there), and will focus only on one curious aspect. So, Mauro Orbini said: “From that time (that is from the time of Cyril and Methodius – Ed.) and till this time (that is to the end of the XVI century, according to the author – Ed.) priests of the Liburn Slavs, subjects of Archduke Noritskij, serve the Liturgy and other divine rites in their own native tongue, with no knowledge of the Latin language, and moreover Noritskij Counts themselves used the Slavic letters in the public writings, as seen in the Church of the Holy Stephen in Vienna” (here from the updated Russian translation of 1722).


Coat of arms of the Roman emperors Habsburgs (manwb.ru)

We repeat: he is talking about the famous Catholic cathedral of St. Stephen in Vienna, which is the national symbol of Austria and the symbol of Vienna itself. It turns out that in the XVI century Austria (and according to the official version, it was in this century that Vienna became the capital of a multinational state of the Austrian Habsburgs – the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire) still wrote in Slavic! While the church services were held in the Slavic language! And the Slavic inscriptions adorned not just anything, but in the cathedral – St. Stephen’s Cathedral. The cathedral still stands today and is well known, but now you will not find Slavic inscriptions there. The authors of the theory of “The New Chronology” Anatoly Fomenko and Gleb Nosovskii, believe in their book “Slavic conquest of the world”, that obviously the awkward letters were ‘carefully’ destroyed by the reformers in the XVII-XIX centuries so as to no longer remind the inhabitants of Vienna of their “wrong” Slavic past. (Translator note: In Russia herself, many ancient inscriptions on the graves and in the churches, as well as the faces of some of the dukes in the church painting in the churches were chiselled off when Romanovs came to power, so literal “erasing of history” is a common practice.)


Anatoly Fomenko (left) and Gleb Nosovskii visiting KM.RU

And it is only one of the brightest examples cited by Orbini. Note that it touches not even the distant past, but the contemporary to Orbini times. In this case the author acts not as a chronicler, but as a living witness of the events.


The following article is important for understanding how a wedge is put between people and how peoples are separated using language as a tool. This is an example from the recent history, but it’s not the last such event to have taken place. Ukrainian “language” and now the Belorussian are the current ongoing examples of linguistic segregation.

Bulgarians are a Russian people from the shores of Volga river. People living there are to this day called “Volgarí” (Волгари) – compare to “Bolgary” (Болгары), which is how Bulgarians call themselves. For more information on the subject, I recommend Lada Ray’s article Bulgaria Returning to Native Shores: ‘Thank you Russia – 1878 and 1945’.


According to Academician Fomenko, up to the XVIII century we spoke the same language in both Russia and Bulgaria, down to the smallest details.

Many interesting things become revealed today when viewing Bulgarian history from the perspective of the concept of “The New Chronology”. For example, the creator of “The New Chronology”, Academician Anatoly Fomenko with the research team, was surprised to find that the old Bulgarian texts (for example, “Naming of the Bulgarian Khans”) is in fact written in exactly the same language as the old Russian texts (not to be confused with Church Slavonic!). They are virtually indistinguishable – neither in the language form, nor in the form of the letters! If you are not told in advance what kind of text your see – old Bulgarian or old Russian, then you are unlikely to guess its identity. Knowing the Old Russian language, experts were able to read those texts with ease read, unlike the later Bulgarian texts (not even speaking about the contemporary Bulgarian), which an unprepared Russian person understands with difficulty.


Text in “Naming of the Bulgarian Khans» (turklib.com)

“And this is understandable. Bulgarian language, branching from the old Russian in approximately XIV-XV centuries, eventually diverged from it and began to develop more or less independently. It did not diverge far, but noticeable differences had already appeared.” – explains Academician Fomenko explains. He’s also convinced that in Bulgaria of XIV-XV centuries simply the old Russian language was apparently in circulation, “also called Old Bulgarian language or the old language of the ‘Volga river dwellers’. As the language of the Rus-Orda. Moreover, it turns out, it was common in Bulgaria virtually unchanged up until the nineteenth century.”

It was no accident that in the XVIII-XIX centuries a special reform of the language had to be carried out, notably both in Bulgaria and in Russia. The grammar was slightly changed, and as a result the new languages started to markedly differ from each other. Although these languages ​​are still very similar, their complete identity disappeared.

As Anatoly Fomenko insists in his book “Mathematical Chronology of Biblical Events”, “up to the XVIII century one and the same language was spoken in Russia and Bulgaria, right down to the smallest details. Then this identity of the Russian and Bulgarian languages was intentionally destroyed. Bulgarians were taught (forced?) to speak slightly differently. Why was this done? Apparently, so as to create a linguistic border between the Bulgarians and the Russians. After all, the very fact that up to the XVIII-XIX centuries almost the same language was in use in both Bulgaria and Russia, clearly contradicted the Scaligerian history (Joseph Juste Scaliger, the founder of modern scientific historical chronology), which asserts that the Bulgarians and the Russians lived as different peoples for many hundreds of years.”

To clarify: Scaliger – this is the very same mathematician of the XVII century, who “invented” the chronology, on which the whole of the official world paradigm of historiography is based. Peter I, in his quest to imitate the West, forced its introduction also in Russia. However, Fomenko believes that the implementation of Scaligerian history in Russia was started already by the ancestors of Peter – the Romanovs, to strengthen their dynastic claim to the Russian throne.

However, the question arises: how could have the two nations – Russians and Bulgarians – for centuries managed to keep almost an identical language? After all, living apart, Bulgarians and Russians would have had to rather quickly start speaking much differently.

Anatoly Fomenko answers this question directly and categorically: Without a doubt, the reform of the Bulgarian language in the era of XVIII-XIX centuries was carried out deliberately to hide as much as possible of this glaring contradiction in the Scaligerian-Romanov history of the Balkans.

In the reconstruction-hypothesis established by Anatoly Fomenko, the explanation for all this is very simple. Bulgarians came to the Balkans as part of the Ottoman Horde forces in the XV century, they were mostly Russian and naturally spoke in Old Russian. The communications between Balkans and Russia remain very close up to the XVII century, so the language long remained virtually the same. Incidentally, we see the same in the case of the very distant from each other parts of Russia.


Cyril and Methodius with the students. Fresco of the monastery “St. Naum”, now in the Republic of Macedonia (megabook.ru)

Academician Fomenko, in order to avoid confusion, clarifies that we are talking about the identity of the Old Bulgarian and Old Russian languages, and not of the Church Slavic, which has them an indirect relationship, and was obviously intended for the translation of the Greek church literature, first and foremost of the Holy Scriptures, to which end it (and the corresponding alphabet), were in fact developed by the great educators Cyril and Methodius.


Russian, also known as “Slovenian” language, was spoken on the vast territory, from the Adriatic Sea to the Urals and from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean

Any revolution is always a disaster for those, whose world it destroys. (In this context, the revolution must be understood in a broad sense – as a set of events that drastically alter the state of a society.) But it’s also an antistrophe, the ability to realize their ambitions for those who before could not even dream of it (“He, who was nothing, becomes everything). Revolutions are always associated with a change in the basic foundations of the mass consciousness of people (although, in theory, it is enough that 1/6th of the population accepts the innovations). And the foundations of consciousness (mentality) are directly connected with the language, because the language is a category of a higher order, than biology-physiology.


King of England Henry VIII (megabook.ru)

A few examples from history. It is believed that Henry VIII in the first half XVI century forcibly imposed a mandatory “correct” English in England, while those who did not master it, lost all rights, including property (very similar to the current situation in the Baltic States). And that despite the fact, that for a long time the official language of England was… French. While in France – Latin! There is evidence that the “home” language of the first Romanovs was Polish. During Peter I rule, Dutch became the language of the court (and not German, as that dialect is is commonly called!). Later in Russia French became the language of the “tops”, while the family of Nicholas II spoke English at home, anticipating the current dominance of the “American English”.


Moldavian Prince Roman I (megabook.ru)

According to the official version, the major European national languages ​​(English, French, German, Italian, Spanish) largely developed in the XVI-XVII centuries. The fate of the Russian language is completely different, though! Karamzin called Russian language of the XV century for “Slovenian” (from the name of the northern group of the Eastern Slavs – “Slovens”), which was spoken on the vast territory – from the Adriatic Sea to the Urals, and from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean. For quite understandable without any translation of the Russian language written Both the official letters of Moldavian Prince Roman of the XIV century and the letters of the Turkish Sultan Murad of the XV century, documents of office of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in XIV-XVI centuries – all were written in a quite understandable Russian language, which does not require any translation (Translator not: into modern Russian. See also a comment by Krzysztof Zanussi in Project ‘Ukraine’. Documentary by Andrei Medvedev regarding the language use in Lithuania). It is noteworthy that there (in Grand Duchy of Lithuania) this language bore an amazing name – «Попросту» (“Simply”, or “In a simple way”)! In other words, it was understandable to almost everyone, it was not for church, but for civil use. Until this day in Lithuania it is called “Russian” (meaning not the modern Russian language, but the one that was used in Europe in the Middle Ages), while by our linguists for “Old Belorussian”. It is believed, that in the XVI century and up until 1697 poetry was written in this language, not worse than in Italian, and, notably, using Cyrillic writing.


Ottoman Sultan Murad II (megabook.ru)

But… in Romanovs’ Muscovy these books were banned: during the whole of the XVII century a total of 6(!) books of the secular kind were published. The Old Believers were almost without exception literate, while Nikonian reforms led to the fact that in just 40 years the majority of the population turned into ignoramuses. Peter I, abolishing the Patriarchate and subjugating the Church, introduced a civil alphabet and began to revive literacy. (Translator note: At the same time Peter I conducted persecution of the Old Believers, many of whom had to go into exile into the periphery territories, for example to the present-day Lithuania. Also, Peter I conducted a calendar reform, which tied Russian calendar to the Western-European and chopped off over 5000 years of history). His cause was later continued by Lomonosov, Dashkova and others. However, the classic Russian language only formed in the first half of the XIX century with the efforts of Zhukovsky, Pushkin, Boratynsky, Gogol, Lermontov, and a whole galaxy of writers of the “golden” century. The main achievement of these educators is the creation of a unified Russian language understood by all classes (“class” – “soslovie”, in Russian).

Incidentally, the word “soslovie” is a purely Russian notion, it means a community of people who have their own language, slang, understanding each other “from the words” (Translator note: “soslovie” [сословие] consists of the preposition “so-” [со-], meaning “co-” and root “slovie” [-словие], meaning “of word” – in other words “class”, “soslovie” is a group of “coworded” people). This slang, despite the specificity of terms and meanings is within the scope of the commonly accessible language. And, for example, in Greece and Norway there still exist two languages – “book” and “vulgar”. (Translator note: In Norwegian there is a “Bokmål” – “book language”, derived from the Danish and “Nynorsk” – “New Norwegian”, artificially created as an amalgam of the large variety of the Norwegian local dialects.) The revolution in Russia in the early XX century was objectively inevitable, but it led to very serious catastrophic consequences, including for the Russian language. As a “revolutionary” slang there appeared a lexicon of truncated combined word-freaks like “Kombed” (“Commettee of the Poor”), “Combrig” (“Brigade Commander”), “Narcom” (“People’s Commissar”), “Comintern” (“Communist International”).


Poster by the Gestapo during the Second World War (capitolhillblue.com)

In the first case “com-” is from the word “committee”, in the second – from the “commander”, in the third – from the “commissar”, in the fourth – from the “communist”. Echoes of this phenomenon is found in the words of the current “Prodmag” (“Food store”), “Universam” (“Universal self-service store”, “supermarket”), “Spetsnaz” (“special forces”), etc. A similar phenomenon was also in Germany, for example, “Gestapo” is an abbreviation of the German Geheime Staatspolizei (“Secret State Police”)…

October Revolution also needed a spelling reform. Having been carried out in 1918, it “cut off” from itself a considerable part of the Russian intelligentsia, which did not accept either the revolution or the revolutionary newspeak.

But the language, as a system of a high degree of organization and self-protection, is very tenacious. This fully applies to the Russian language. Evidence? You are welcome. The “telegraphic” Russian language can reduce up to 50% of the initial letters of words without losing the meaning. This is a direct evidence of at least two-fold redundancy, reliability, embedded into the language. Language absorbs what is viable, digests and throws out the surplus “carrion.”

Nature abhors a vacuum. And dialectal simple word “loh” (“goof”), which means emaciated after spawning salmon, which you can take with your bare hands, and Pskov-Tver, “lohan” (“a fool”) fully manifested in their meanings in the 1990s, during another revolution..

So do not be afraid of borrowed sayings such as “as’ka” (“ICQ”) or “fleshka” (“flash drive”): Russian language digested more than that before. An indicator of such digestibility are Russian suffixes, endings, declination.

While the Russian language is alive – Russia is alive too. And not only that: many different ethnic groups can communicate with each other exclusively in Russian. Therefore, the question of the Russian language is political, both in Russia and outside it. Several years ago, there was a campaign for the reform of the Russian language, which, thank God, was stopped. Russia needs not reforms of the Russian language, but a reform of the teaching methods of the Russian language – from top to bottom.

Putin’s biggest failure (Re-blog with commentary)

I’ve written before that For Russia the 90’s Were Worse Than WWII, both when it came to loss of sovereignty, loss of human life and loss of industrial potential.

The Saker, an astute analyst, published not long ago an article Putin’s biggest failure, in which he describes the dynamics and the forces that were active in the 90s and, which are still partially present in the Russian political life. The Saker describes the continued presence of this 5th column as one of the Putin’s failures.

I do not entirely agree with the formulation. Rather, I view this as an event yet to happen. Observing Putins moves, one can come to a conclusion that he, like a doctor, is guided by the principal of “don’t do harm”. If an intervention into the political system brings more harm than good, then he’ll wait for a more favourable time. In this case, the threat is unsettling a delicate political balance in Russia, which it just re-acquired after the Wild 90s.

The beginning of the article below, highlighting is mine.


Whatever happens in the future, Putin has already secured his place in history as one of the greatest Russian leaders ever. Not only did he succeed in literally resurrecting Russia as a country, but in a little over a decade he brought her back as a world power capable of successfully challenging the AngloZionist Empire. The Russian people have clearly recognized this feat and, according to numerous polls, they are giving him an amazing 90% support rate. And yet, there is one crucial problem which Putin has failed to tackle: the real reason behind the apparent inability of the Kremlin to meaningfully reform the Russian economy.

As I have described it in the past many times, when Putin came to power in 1999-2000 he inherited a system completely designed and controlled by the USA. During the Eltsin years, Russian ministers had much less power than western ‘advisers’ who turned Russia into a US colony. In fact, during the 1990s, Russia was at least as controlled by the USA as Europe and the Ukraine are today. And the results were truly catastrophic: Russia was plundered from her natural wealth, billions of dollars were stolen and hidden in western offshore accounts, the Russian industry was destroyed, a unprecedented wave of violence, corruption and poverty drowned the entire country in misery and the Russian Federation almost broke up into many small statelets. It was, by any measure, an absolute nightmare, a horror comparable to a major war. Russia was about to explode and something had to be done.

Two remaining centers of power, the oligarchs and the ex-KGB, were forced to seek a solution to this crisis and they came up with the idea of sharing power: the former would be represented by Dmitrii Medvedev and the latter by Vladimir Putin. Both sides believed that they would keep the other side in check and that this combination of big money and big muscle would yield a sufficient degree of stability.

I call the group behind Medvedev the “Atlantic Integrationists” and the people behind Putin the “Eurasian Sovereignists”. The former wants Russia to be accepted by the West as an equal partner and fully integration Russia into the AngloZionist Empire, while the latter want to fully “sovereignize” Russia and then create a multi-polar international system with the help of China and the other BRICS countries.

What the Atlantic Integrationists did not expect is that Putin would slowly but surely begin to squeeze them out of power: first he cracked down on the most notorious oligarchs such as Berezovskii and Khodorkovskii, then he began cracking down on the local oligarchs, gubernatorial mafias, ethnic mobsters, corrupt industry officials, etc. Putin restored the “vertical [axis]of power” and crushed the Wahabi insurgents in Chechnia. Putin even carefully set up the circumstances needed to get rid of some of the worst ministers such as Serdiukov and Kudrin. But what Putin has so far failed to do is to

  • Reform the Russian political system
  • Replace the 5th columnists in and around the Kremlin
  • Reform the Russian economy

The current Russian Constitution and system of government is a pure product of the US ‘advisors’ which, after the bloody crackdown against the opposition in 1993, allowed Boris Eltsin to run the country until 1999. It is paradoxical that the West now speaks of a despotic presidency about Putin when all he did is inherit a western-designed political system. The problem for Putin today is that it makes no sense to replace some of the worst people in power as long as the system remains unchanged. But the main obstacle to a reform of the political system is the resistance of the pro-Western 5th columnists in and around the Kremlin. They also the ones who are still forcing a set of “Washington consensus” kind of policies upon Russia even though it is obvious that the consequences for Russia are extremely bad, even disastrous. There is no doubt that Putin understands that, but he has been unable, at least so far, to break out of this dynamic.

So who are these 5th columnists?

I have selected nine of the names most often mentioned by Russian analysts. These are (in no particular order):

Former First Deputy Prime Minister Anatolii Chubais, First Deputy Governor of the Russian Central Bank Ksenia Iudaeva, Deputy Prime Minister Arkadii Dvorkovich, First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, Governor of the Russian Central Bank Elvira Nabiullina, former Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin, Minister of Economic Development, Alexei Uliukaev, Minister of Finance Anton Siluanov and Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev.


Please read the complete article and comments to it at The Saker.

As a post-scriptum, a remark to the fragment from the above article that “Russian Federation almost broke up into many small statelets”. Nikolai Starikov in his videoblog #68 at 44:23 demonstrates a collection of “Ural Francs” – money that were printed in 1991 in anticipation of the break-up of the Russian Federation into such statelets:

Project ‘Ukraine’. Documentary by Andrei Medvedev (with English subtitles)

This is a dispassionate chronological look at the history of Galicia and Malorossia, and how those Russian lands were being gradually turned into Ukraine. The film presents a trove of documents, citations, documentary footage and lives it to the viewer to draw conclusions. The documentary also takes an introspective look at where Russia went wrong with its handling of the budding extreme nationalism in those lands at the turn of the 19th-20th century, and introspection is a good sign – a nation, which does not view itself as exceptional, which has the capacity to understand its mistakes, has a hope for the future…

1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2Please note that translating a documentary film or an article takes a lot of time and emotional effort. I am doing it on a voluntary basis, but if someone feels like supporting my work, a Bitcoin donation to the following address is appreciated: 1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2

The original untranslated video is published here: Проект ‘Украина’. Фильм Андрея Медведева.

After watching the documentary, I can recommend reading the following articles:

I could not include formatting for the subtitles, published on YouTube. The formatted subtitle file in ASS format can be downloaded separately. Full text of the script is below the video frame.

I initially uploaded the video to YouTube, but it was immediately censored, claiming copyright violation by some BigMovieNetwork, even though the video is produced by Rossia24. Allegedly, the violation happened in the “Audio-visual content 39:50 – 1:25:40”, a span which incidentally starts in the middle of a voice only interview. I filed a dispute, which was rejected within minutes: Your dispute wasn’t approved. The claimant has reviewed their claim and has confirmed it was valid. You may be able to appeal this decision, but if the claimant disagrees with your appeal, you could end up with a strike on your account. The video is therefore being moved to another hosting channel…

Meanwhile, here is the original untranslated video without subtitles, which YouTube accepted under the standard license:

Until I find a venue to publish the subtitled version, here are 5 easy steps that will allow you to watch it with subtitles on your desktop machine:

  1. Download the video above, using KeepVid
  2. Download the subtitles
  3. Download and install VLC for your operating system
  4. Make sure that the video and the subtitle files have the same name
  5. Play the video in VLC – subtitles will load automatically

In July 1991, during his visit to Moscow, the President of the USA George Bush
was telling Gorbachev that a dismemberment of USSR is not in the American interests,
and that he will go to Kiev, the capital of the Soviet Ukraine, so as to convince the Ukrainians to not leave USSR.
Ukraine was still a republic in the Soviet Union, was still accountable to Moscow, and Gorbachev could have forbidden
the American president to go to Kiev, but he didn’t so that.
On the First of August Bush spoke before the Supreme Rada.
“Many centuries ago your ancestors called this country for Ukraine, or Borderland,
because your steppes lie between Europe and Asia.
But Ukrainians have now become border-guards of another kind.
Today you explore the borders and outlines of freedom.
We shall support those, who intend to abide by the democracy and the economic freedoms.”
That was, of course, a challenge to Moscow, which it failed to respond to.
Three months later, right after a sovereignty referendum, USA recognised the independence of Ukraine.
[Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzeziński. National Security Advisor for US President (1977–81)]
The West was interested in closer ties with Ukraine,
so the West made it clear for Ukraine, that if it wants to become a part of NATO at one point, then it is welcome in.
“Ukraine without Moscow!”
PROJECT “UKRAINE”
“Death to the enemies”
“Glory to Ukraine. Heroes be glorified.”
“Revolution”
Ukraine. Kiev. Winter of 2014.
A prolonged staying at Maidan.
Tents. Tea of the self-defence legion. Cookies from Victoria Nuland.
Collisions with the police.
Unidentified snipers shoot at the demonstrators.
This is how the world remembers Kievan winter of 2014.
Coincidence or not, but Kievan Maidan happened exactly 100 years after
the very first in Russian history mass march of the Ukrainian nationalists.
On the 26th of February 1914, a mob of several thousand people was moving down Kreschatik in Kiev.
Slogans of “Away with Russia” and “Hail to the independent Ukraine” were shouted.
Mikhail Menshikov, eyewitness to those events and a renowned publicist wrote:
“And so, this disgrace came to pass.
Kiev unfurls a banner of separation of Malorossia from Russia.”
Crashing shops and vendor stalls, the mob was moving towards the Austrian consulate.
Cossack divisions were brought into the town.
The police reported that they arrested several dozen of the rioters.
The liberal public in St. Petersburg and Moscow was indignant:
“What folly is this? What nationalists can there be on Kreschatik? State papers are lying!
In reality it was the progressive youth celebrating the birthday of poet Taras Shevchnko!”
But the Police Department knew: the demonstration was organised by Mazepanists.
Thus, after Hetman Mazepa, who betrayed Peter I, the police called the Ukrainian nationalists,
who were financed by the foreign intelligence services and embassies.
From the report of the Police Department to the Cabinet of Minister of the Russian Empire
about the situation in Malorossia – in Kiev, Volyn, Poltava and Chernigovo counties:
“A forceful propaganda of the ideas of Ukrainian separatism is being conducted on the territory of the whole of the Southern Russia.
Numerous propagandists – both foreign and local – by all means and with great persistence
are arguing that Malorossians are a completely different people, which must have a separate existence,
both culturally-nationally and politically.
Mazepanists plans consist of tearing away from Russia the whole of Malorossia, up to Volga and Caucasus.”
We will never be brothers.
Neither by birthplace nor by mother.
You don’t have willpower to be free.
We won’t even be stepbrothers.
You are calling yourselves elder brothers.
We can be younger brothers, but no yours.
It’s a pity there are so many of you, faceless.
You are huge, we are great.”
(Translator note: Such a manifestation of an inferiority complex, yet written in Russian!)
(We want into EU)
These verses were written in February 2014.
Young Kivan, Anastasija Dmitruh, could not, of course, have known that in her verses,
she almost verbatim recites the Polish publicists from the end of the 18th century.
It is they, 200 years ago, formulated the theory about two “unbrotherly” peoples – Russian and Ukrainian.
I was then that the geopolitical project “Ukraine” was launched.
[Szczepan Siekierka. President of the Polish Society for the Remembrance of the Victims of Crimes Committed by Ukrainian Nationalists, UOZUN]
Where did such terms as “Ukrainian lands” really come from?
No one knows.
Today this notion is so abused,
the world’s attention is so strongly directed towards the idea of the “Ukrainian people”,
of the “great Ukrainian state”, which in reality never existed.
What existed, was the Russian state.
And it started from Kievan Rus.
It was there that the Russian people were Christened, and Kiev became a centre, that united
the Russian principalities – from the Carpathian mountains to the Vladimir-Suzdal forests.
[Andrei Marchukov. Head Researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Science]
There lived the one and the same Russian nation, and that’s a historic fact.
It does not matter where they lived – in Galicia, Vladimir-on-Kljazma, Novgorod,
in Perejaslavl or Smolensk, in Minsk or Vitebsk – they were still the Russian people.
They had the same material and spiritual culture, faith, common self-consciousness.
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
We have “The Tale of the Times” – the most ancient Russian chronicles.
This is the authentic history of Rus, which starts from the calling of Rurik
and continues until about the 13th century.
The two eldest editions of this chronicles are called Laurentius Chronicles and Ipatiev Chronicles.
The most striking thing is that these two versions are from two different corners of the Russian world.
One is from Suzdal lands, and the other is from the Western Rus,
what we now call for Western Ukraine.
And they both carry one and the same text.
Kiev is that spiritual centre around which was created not just the Russian state, but the whole of the Russian civilisation.
[Andrei Medvedev. Program author]
By the end of the 12th century Kiev loses its importance and influence.
It is no longer a political centre of Rus.
Galician-Volyn and Vladimir-Suzdal principalities become the two new centres of Rus.
One in the West, the other – in the North-East.
The ultimate division comes after the Mongol invasion.
North-Easten Rus falls under the Horde’s domination,
while the Western Rus becomes part of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
[Andrei Marchukov. Head Researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Science]
They retained the understanding that they are Russians,
and that the Moscowy State is also inhabited by Russians, though by slightly different ones.
In Moscow they also regarded those lands as our lands, the lands of the line of Rurik –
conquered illegally by Lithuania and Poles – but inhabited by the same Russians.
The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was not only a Russian state, but also an Orthodox Christian one.
Russian was the official legal language of the Duchy.
Russian kjazes – counts (commonly mis-translated to English as “princes”) comprised the majority of the elite.
[Krzysztof Zanussi. Polish film and theatre director]
Everything that the Duchy’s offices in Vilnius wrote, was written in Cyrillic and in a Slavic language.
Lithuanian was very seldom used at that time.
However, by the middle of the 15th century the life of the Western branch of the Russian world changes.
Lithuanian count dynasty actively seeks to become closer to Poland,
and in 1569 a federative state, known to us as Rzecz Pospolita, is founded.
Several counties (voevodstvo or “war regions”) populated by the Russians became part of Poland, or Rzecz Pospolita:

Kievan, Bratslavsk, Belzsk, Podolsk, Volyn, and one more, called plainly Russian (Russkoe voevodstvo).
The capital of the latter became the Orthodox city of Lvov.
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
The Great Count of Lithuania became also the King of Poland, while only a Catholic could become a Polish king.
So Catholicism became the dominant religion not only in Poland, but also in Lithuania.
The Orthodox Christians start being repressed in Rzecz Pospolita.
At that time, the self-consciousness of any people was based on religion.
Back then, “Orthodox” was synonymous to “Russian”.
[Andrei Marchukov. Head Researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Science]
That was really a very harsh and at times cruel repression.
Russian people were not considered as equal in the two-part Polish-Lithuanian state.
Under pain of death, Russians were forbidden to travel abroad
and to have any contact with the Orthodox Patriarch in Constantinople.
They were forbidden to hold any official posts.
While Orthodox Christians were altogether forbidden to live in some of the cities.
At that time, it was extremely important for for the Polish government to weaken the Orthodox Church’s influence in the Western-Russian lands.
And so, in 1596, a number of bishops of the Kievan Metropolia,
headed by the Metropolitan Mikhail Rogoza himself, declared
about accepting the Catholic teachings and subjugation to the Roman Pope.
On the 9th of October 1596, at the Brest Gathering, a decree (union) was ratified,
proclaiming creation of a Greek-Catholic Church, or – as it is more commonly called – Uniate Church.
Meanwhile, in the newly-created church the services were conducted according to the Byzantine tradition,
and using the Church-Slavic language.
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
The Unia was strengthened on the future Ukrainian lands using quite brutal methods.
Not only did the churches were handed over by force from one confession to the other.
[Translator note: Exactly the same is done to the Orthodox Christians living in Ukraine after the coup of 2014.]
Orthodox Christian priests were killed,
while the Orthodox flock was given a choice: either death or conversion into Uniatism.
Those who risked remaining as Orthodox Christians, formed brotherhoods.
The largest of those was the Lvov Brotherhood.
In 1609 its members report to their brothers-in-faith in Kiev:
“We, the Russian people, live under the yoke of the Polish people.
What is customary for a man to live by, that is not allowed for a Rusin on his very own Russian land,
and that is in the very same Russian city of Lvov.”
But it was already impossible to stop the process. More and more Russians were converting to Uniatism.
Russian gentry were converting directly to Catholicism –
in Rzecz Pospolita it was the only way to become an equal member of the state elite and to make a carrier.
In 1609 died the last Orthodox Christian Russian baron – knjaz Konstantin Konstantinovich Ostrovskij.
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
How is Eurointegration conducted? Not through some deep-going economic processes,
but through the unification of the elites.
The national elites are incorporated into the pan-European ones, usually at the expense of the main part of the population, which
becomes pushed away from the values, or let’s say, valuables of the European home, European civilisation.
That happened 500 years ago, and it’s happening now.
“Ukraine is Europe”
“Ukraine is Europe”
To be honest I want to go to America.
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
To blossom, Europe needs periphery.
Today this project is of special interest, when you can include into this periphery a former Russia,
cheap labour force and space for economic expansion, a goods market.
You need, after all, a place to sell all that.
That’s also a price to be paid for Euro-integration.
One must remember that Ukraine during the 16th-17th centuries was the main breadbasket of Europe.
London, Paris, were fed with the South-Russian bread.
So as to keep the bread’s price down, you need to have a production cost, which is close to zero.
And that was ensured by the system of strict exploitation of the local population.
[Andrei Marchukov. Head Researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Science]
So people started thinking: “Who are we. We seem to be living in Poland, want to be in Poland, but we don’t get accepted. Why?
Because we are Russians, we are Orthodox Christian. And where do other Orthodox Christian Russians live? Oh!
Over there, across the Eastern border, in the Moscovy kingdom, and they live in freedom,
they have their own Czar, set by God.”
[Bogdan Bezpalko. Member of the Council on International Relations under the President of the Russian Federation]
They had two choices.
Either to flee to the state with the same faith, to the Russian Empire, the Russian Orthodox Christian Moskovy State,
or to muster a revolt, which Bogdan Khmelnitsky managed to turn into an all-out war against the Polish state,
which as the result lost a part of the territories – the left bank.
[Krzysztof Zanussi. Polish film and theatre director]
Simply speaking, we lost our historic chance already back then.
And it’s good to look at your own history with a critical eye, because you then understand that
not only our neighbours are to blame. Neighbours being the common scapegoats.
The question is how did we handle it.
And that’s what we must think about if we feel ourselves free.
Then we must simply see our own mistakes.
The revolt, headed by Bogdan Khmelnitsky started in 1648.
After 6 years of war, in 1654, Periaslav Rada was signed.
It’s a document about reunification of a part of Western Rus – including Kiev and the territories of Zaporozhje county – with the Moskovy State.
It was signed by Czar Aleksei Mikhailovich Romanov.
By the way, the phrase “reunification of Ukraine with Russia” appeared first in the Soviet history texts in the 1920s.
The historians knew perfectly well that in 1654 there was simply no such country as “Ukraine”.
Those territories were called Malorossia.
While the word Ukraina was used in Poland and Russia about borderlands.
For Poles it is the lands of the middle Dnepr – the central regions of the modern Ukraine.
[Anna Raźny. Polish historian, Professor of the Department for Russian and East-European studies at Jagiellonian University in Krakow]
In Polish it is called “pogranicze”.
It’s the border in the cultural, national, political, even historical meaning.
For Rzecz Pospolita, “Ukraina” meant a far away border,
a territory, where different ethnic groups could live.
In this context, Ukraina no longer exists in the present time.
For Moscow, on the other hand, Ukraina once meant Tula, Kashira, Serpuhov –
that was the “Oka-river Ukraina” – the border with the territories, from where nomads came.
The word “Ukrainian” in the Russian language of that time, is a profession – a border guard.
While a resident of Kiev or Poltava was called a Malorossian.
By the end of the 18th century, the weakened and torn apart by internal strife Poland
stopped playing any important role in the European politics.
In 1772, her neighbours – Prussia, Austrian-Hungary and the Russian Empire –
partially divided between themselves the lands of a once poweful state.
[Krzysztof Zanussi. Polish film and theatre director]
It is a separate question if our civilisation could have enough power
to raise such a large part of Europe.
Maybe it was our pride saying that we could do that.
It was a huge expanse.
Ultimately Poland ceased to exist in 1795,
when the large states performed the third division of the Polish lands.
Galicia, Zakarpatie (Transcarpathia) and Bukovina, populated by Russians, or as it was said then – Rusins (Ruthenians),
came under Austria-Hungary, while almost all of the Kievan Rus territories were taken by the Russian Empire.
So, here is a map of the Russian Empire.
Here is the territories of the Kievan Rus, which were a part of Poland.
Here is the part, which, after partitioning of Poland, went to Auatria.
And here are those lands, which Russia returned itself.
That is how a large portion of the Polish population ended up in the Russian Empire.
[Andrei Marchukov. Head Researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Science]
The Poles are, of course, dreaming about resurrection of their beloved Poland – Rzecz Pospolita,
and in the wider borders, as they were before the partitioning.
All their ire and hatred is directed at Russia.
The idea is like this: sow separatism on those lands, tear them away from Russia,
announce that the people there are not Russians, but close to Poles.
In 1795 the Polish writer and historian Jan Potocki published
“Historically-geographical fragments about Scythia, Sarmatia and Slavs”.
In that work, for the first time, Russians of Malorossia were called “Ukrainians”,
a separate people, descendants of the Scythian tribe of Sarmatians.
Potocki’s idea was very simple in its design:
If Malorossian “Ukrainians” have nothing in common with Russians;
if Malorossian “Ukrainians” is a separate people with its separate culture and history,
then it follows that also Russia has no historical rights on the lands West for Dnepr, including Kiev.
Then it follows that there is not gathering of Russian lands.
It follows then that Russia annexed and occupied Malorossia/Ukraine.
Potocki’s propaganda was first and foremost directed at the Western reader,
who traditionally had a very vague idea what is Malorossia, Russia, Kiev, and where all this is found.
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
We see very clearly how neighbours were calling these “Ukrainians”.
Up until 20th century they were called Rus.
Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Romanians, all who surrounded this territory,
they were never in doubt that what starts from across Carpathian mountains is Rus.
But it was the Polish publicists, who by the beginnig of the 19th century turn a topographic term “Ukraina” into a name of a country.
In 1801 the Polish bibliophile and publicist Tadeusz Czadzki published his work, titled
“About the name of Ukraine and the birth of Cossacs”.
It was a new phase in forming of Ukrainianism as an ideology.
Tadeusz Czadzki further distinguished that Ukrainian Malorossians are not Russians, but rather a separate people.
Czadzki started the history of Ukrainians from the horde of the “Ancient Ukros”,
who according to him moved in the 7th century from somewhere in Urals, across Volga, to the Drepr river.
The fact that neither the Polish nor the Russian chronicles ever mentioned any “Ukros”, didn’t in the least bother Czadzki.
These theories could have probably remained as mind games of the intellectuals, if not for one “but”.
Czar Alexander I, a liberal pro-Westerner, favoured the Polish nobility.
He considered it to be more educated and well-mannered, than Russian.
During Alexander’s reign, Poles played an important role at the court, at the Academy of Science.
The Imperial Foreign Ministry was headed by an ardent russophobe Adam Czartoryski,
and with his support the Poles got full control of the education system in Malorossia.
Czartoryski’s close ally, a priest and historian Valerian Kalinka, thus wrote about Malorossia:
“This land is lost for Poland, but we must do it so, that it becomes lost for Russia too.”
[Andrei Marchukov. Head Researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Science]
If we take look at the Right Bank that was added at the very end of the 18th century,
the leading educational institutions there – Kremenetski Lyceum, Umansk Basilian School –
were controlled by the Poles.
In these educational institutions Polish teachers were planting in the heads of the Russian pupils the idea
that Rus Minor (translation of Malorossia) is a part of the Western worlds, that Malorossians is a separate ethnos,
while Russian Moskovians are savages and Asians, occupants.
[Bogdan Bezpalko. Member of the Council on International Relations under the President of the Russian Federation]
If a school pupil is told that Ukraine and Russia had 5-6 wars, at a period when there in fact was no Ukraine at all,
when he is told that hunger was organised by the damned Moskovians so as to kill Ukrainians
for their pursuit of independence, what can grow up out of such pupil?
In the best case he will be a person, who will approve of the punisher battalion actions in Donbass;
in the worst case, he will be doing the killing as he will view those people as enemies of his nation.
“Who’s not jumping, he’s Moskal.” (‘Moskal’ is a Polish(!) derogative for ‘Russian’)
“Glory to Ukraine.”
“Moskals to the gallows.”
“Glory to heroes.”
“Communist to the gallows.”
“Glory to Ukraine.”
“Who’s not jumping, he’s Moskal.”
(A table for school kids of how the same names are written “correctly” and “incorrectly”. E.g if you are called Anja, then if you don’t respond to Gannusja, then you are an enemy.)
In 1831, during the Polish uprising, all pupils of the Kremenetski Lyceum –
Russians, Malorossians, Poles – went to war, to fight for the dependence of Poland.
A few other of its graduates fought in the Crimean War on the side of Britain, storming Russian Sevastopol.
One of them, a publicist and historian Frantishek Duhinski, wrote:
“Moskals are neither Slavs nor Christians.
They still remain nomads and will always remain nomads.”
However it was Nikolai Kostomarov, one of the biggest Russian historians of the 19th century,
who became the most famous pupil of the Polish professoriate.
He was a graduate of the Kharkov University.
Who is he?
He’s a someone, who dedicated all his life to destruction of the Russian Empire.
In 1845 Kostomarov founds in Kiev the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius,
a society for the young intellectuals, students and teachers.
They are the first in the Russian history to declare, that Ukraine is neither Malorossia nor Russia,
that it is a separate country, populated by a separate people – Ukrainians.
The Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius was the first such society of intellectuals,
but it was the one to create the construct of the future “Ukrainian” identity.
One of the active members of the society was Panteleimon Kulish, also a pupil of the Polish teachers.
He was an ideological Ukrainian nationalist, who was the first to create an alphabet for the Malorossian dialect,
which he hastily proclaimed to be a full-fledged language of a new nation – a Ukrainian language.
[Alois Woldan. Professor of Slavic Literature at the Wien University, Austria]
For example, since the Romanticism era there was a striving towards the folk language.
That was, of course, a local language, a folk language of approximately the Dniestr river area,
which differed from the one, spoken in Poltava.
[Andrei Marchukov. Head Researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Science]
You take a local dialect, codify it, formalise it, introduce a couple of letters,
and here you have a new language. And then, on this foundation, a new nation is grown.
This kind of operation could have been conducted on any territory –
not just in Malorossia, but in Arkhangelsk. Great, isn’t it?!
You publish a dictionary and seemingly do ethnography, but in reality – politics.
And many understood what this was leading to.
Even when the Malorossian intellectuals started publishing press using Ukrainian,
the so-called Kulishovka, no one read it.
Ukrainiaphilic journal “Osnova” (“Foundation”) closed in the beginning of 1860s as it lacked subscribers.
Books in Malorossian dialect were published also before Kulish, but they were printed using the regular Russian alphabet.
Intelligentsia and nobility from Kiev, Kharkov and Poltava spoke, wrote and read using the Russian language.
They could not understand why a new language needed to be invented.
In the middle of the 19th century every educated person in Russia knew
that the literary Russian language was created, among others, by Kievan learned men.
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
The literary Russian language, which is spoken in Russia, was created by southern Rusins,
who at the time of Peter I and even before him – from the end of the 17th century –
played a significant role at the court of the Russian Czardom, and then the Russian Empire.
Before Peter I, Russian literary language, the official state language,
was very heavy, limited and very far away from the spoken language.
The young Czar invited the best experts from Malorossia to reform the language.
[Igor Barinov. Candidate of Science (History) at Moscow State University]
These were Simeon Polockij, and in the contemporary Ukraine – Berynda, Innokentij Gizel.
Simeon Polockij was one of the founders of the famous Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy in Moscow.
In 1755, using Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy as a foundation, the Moscow University was opened.
In other words, it was the Kievan-Russian scientists and teachers, who laid the foundations for the future common Russian academic science.
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
So if someone is talking about “Moskal speech” – it’s nothing else, but a high-bread Kievan language of the 18th century,
which very organically blended into the greater Russian civilisation.
However, contrary to the common sense, the liberal societies of the intellectuals of Malorossia
continued with the propaganda of the ideas of Ukrainaism and spreading of the “Ukrainian language”.
Many went into the folk masses, carrying there the Ukrainian literature.
Those books were, however, printed not in Russia, but abroad – mostly in Lvov.
In Austrian Galicia, in Western Rus, the Ukrainian language was turning into
a formidable and dangerous political weapon, which was used to cut out a new map of Europe.
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
The territories that stayed in Austria is Galicia, and first and foremost, Lvov
they turned into those areas, where a rather harsh confrontation begins.
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
Before the beginning of the 20th century, and then up to the middle of the 20th century, Galicia was a part of various states.
For a long time it was a Polish territory, and that is why the domination of the Polish landlords formed there.
Then it became a part of Austro-Hungary.
Galicia, Bukovina and Trans-carpathia – the Western-most reaches of the Russian world –
ended up under the Austrian crown after the division of Poland.
Russians here were called in a Western style – Rusins or Ruthenians.
Over the years under Polish governance, Galician Russians forfeited Orthodox Christianity and became Uniats.
Polish landlords mercilessly exploited the Russian peasants.
[Igor Barinov. Candidate of Science (History) at Moscow State University]
As the result of the Polish domination, at one point the Russian intelligentsia in Galicia simply disappeared.
It wasn’t for nothing, that the Poles said that only peasants (“hlopy”) and priests (“popy”) are left of Rusins.
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
The Austrian emperor was perceived by Rusins as an ally in their fight against their Polish landlords.
At some point the Austrians put a bet on supporting this Rusin movement.
The Viennese court conducted some strong reforms – cut down the size of the corvee taxes.
At the Uniat Church of St. Barbara in Vienna they opened the first college for education
of the Greek-Catholic priests and teachers from among the Galicia-Russians.
[Alois Woldan. Professor of Slavic Literature at the Wien University, Austria]
The upper class, the Ruthenian ruling class, was exceedingly loyal to Austria,
as there they could get certain freedoms, which were previously unavailable in Poland.
Loyalty to Austria was percieved as a counterweight to the Polish domination.
Ruthenians, Ruthenian leaders, put their hope on Austria so as
to achieve greater autonomy and independence from the Polish supervision.
Rusins became possibly the most loyal subjects of the Viennese court.
During the Polish revolt of 1809 and the Hungarian revolt of 1848,
armed Rusins fought on the side of the Austrian Emperor.
The Russian battalion showed an exemplary courage and perseverance in battles.
So the governor of Galicia, Count Schtadiun, on behalf of the Emperor, presented the Russians their new battle banner.
The banner was accompanied by a ribbon, on which the Empress herself embroidered the words “Loyalty Leads to Victory”.
The banner was a two-coloured, yellow and blue canvas.
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
After the Polish uprising was suppressed, the Austrian court stumbled upon a contradiction in its own internal policy.
On one hand, it was good to use the Rusins against the Poles,
on the other hand, they were fully aware that this was a borderland province,
and that it is inhabited by people, who have a language, culture and mindset
akin to those living on the other aide of the border, in the Russian Empire.
Naturally the Austrians were afraid that under certain conditions
this province might feel a pull to transfer under the jurisdiction of the Russian Emperor.
In 1848, so as to control the Russians, central powers allowed to create the Supreme Russian Rada in Lvov,
which unified and coordinated the political demands of Galician Rus.
However, the governor of Galicia, Count Franz Stadion von Warthausen und Thannhausen, immediately gave Russians a condition:
“You can count on the government support only in that case if you’d want to be a separate people,
and would renounce the national unity with the people outside of the state, specifically – in Russia.
In other words, if you’d want to be Ruthenians, and not Russians.
It would not hurt if you take a new name, so as to differ from the Russians, who live outside of Austria.”
In 1849 happened the first in 500 years meeting of Galician Russians with the Russians of the Russian Empire.
The troops on General Paskevich, whom Nikolai I sent to suppress the Hungarian Revolution, were returning home through Galicia.
Rusins were communicating with the Russian soldiers using virtually one and the same language,
went to the church services, conducted by the Russian field clerics.
And with each day they were becoming more and more convinced – they are one and the same people,
wherever they live – in Lvov, Kiev or Moscow.
A Russian newspaper starts being published in Lvov – “Galician Dawn”.
Any one of us can easily read it now.
The texts have some dialect-specific words, but it is without any doubt Russian language.
Here is an edition from the 9th of March 1853.
A poem marking the death of a Trans-Carpathian and Uzhgorod priest and enlightener, Andrei Boludjanski.
A sad voice has come to us
From the dusky valleys of Carpathians
Father Andrei has passed away
Our kin, Rusin, brother.
One light has become extinguished,
A light that so majesticly and pleasantly
Was enlightening our sky.
By the beginning of the 1850s, Galician intelligentsia started to openly talk about reunification with Russia.
A schism was forming in the Russian Rada.
One part of the intelligencia – who was referred to as Moskvaphiles – thought that the folk education must be done using Russian literary language.
The other part was convinced that they must invent a separate, Galician-Russian, writing.
This part of the Russian Rada was referred to as Populists.
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
The Austrian court made quite a logical under such circumstances choice.
They started supporting that group which promoted propaganda using a local dialect.
They accentuated that this group represents a completely different nationality.
That not Russians, but “Ukrainians” live on these territories.
That they have their own language, own culture.
That they have nothing in common with the Russian population of the Russian Empire. And so on…
In 1859, a work by a Czech philologist Josef Jireček was published in Vienna in German language.
It was called “On proposition to Rusians to write using Latin letters”.
(Note: Between 1919 and 1930 Bolsheviks almost pushed through the same Latinasation reform for Russian language!)
It was printed at the government printing house using government funds on the order from the Imperial Ministry of Education.
From Josef Jireček’s brochure:
“While Rusins are printing and writing in Cyrilllic, they will display a predisposition towards Churchslavinism and Russianism and thus the very existance of the Ukrainian literature will be jeopardised.
The Churchslavic and Russian influence are so great that they threaten to push out the local language and local literature.”
They didn’t manage to force Rusins to switch to Latin writing.
Then the Austrian government decided to form a new language and the new grammar,
based on the already existing alphabet of Panteleimon Kulish.
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
So the local dialect, the Galician, which was spoken by the Galician peasants, started to be called “Ukrainian language”.
A Galician Rus politician Osip Monchalovski thus described the process of creation of a new language in the 1870s:
“Each of the professors of the Lvov University has his own private language.
It’s not even a language, but an artificial mish-mash of Russian, Polish and,
ever so often, arbitrarily invented ‘Ukrainian’ words and phrases.”
Panteleimon Kulish, who by the end of his life distanced himself from the idea of Malorossian nationalism and ukrainianism,
was terrified by what was happening in Galicia, how his alphabet became used.
But he had already laid the foundations for the forming of the identity, and he was powerless to correct anything.
From a letter sent by Kulish to a Galician scientist, teacher of the Ukrainian language, Emelian Portitski:
“I swear that if Ljahs will be printing using my alphabet, so as to underline a strife with the Great Rus,
if our phonetic writing will be positioned not as a help for the masses on the their way to enlightenment,
but as a banner for our Russian split, then I, who wrote in my way, in Ukrainian,
will from now on be printing in the old-school etymological orthography.”
An interesting detail: the Austrian subject, Emelian Portitskij, was developing and propagandising Ukrainian language and literature,
but he was still considering himself to be a Rusin – a Russian.
In Lvov he founded an organisation for the Ukrainian language teachers,
which he surprisingly called “Rusko Pedagogichno Tovarishestvo” – “Russian Pedagogic Union”.
However hard you try, there is no other way to translate this phrase from the Carpathian-Russian dialect.
Galician-Russian writer Vasilij Vavrik remembered:
“A peasant had difficulty in immediately switching from being a Rusin to being a Ukrainian.
It was difficult for him to trample over something that was sacred and dear to him.
Even more difficult is was for him to understand why the Ukrainian professors so foggily, cunningly
and misleadingly are substituting Rus with Ukraine and mix one name with the other.
With its very essence the people realised that a lie, falsehood, treachery is abound.”
The Austrian authorities, however, held the harsh course on the forming of a new identity among the Russians.
Those writers and journalists, who refused to use the new language were proclaimed to be “Moskal spies”;
school books were published in Ukrainian; the dissatisfied teachers were sacked.
Right before WWI, the Austrian War Ministry’s printing house published a phrase book,
with the intent that the soldiers conscripted from the various parts of the Empire could somehow understand each other.
The phrase book was printed in 6 languages: Hungarian, German, Polish, Czech, Croatian and Russian.
There was no place for the Ukrainian language in the phrase book.
[Anna Raźny. Polish historian, Professor of the Department for Russian and East-European studies at Jagiellonian University in Krakow]
They say it’s an artificial language.
As a culturologist I can say that you can use this language to speak and to write literature works.
But the following question arises: Why do Ukrainians – both from Western and Eastern Ukraine – speak Russian?
There are very many of them in Poland as of late, and they speak Russian.
I ask them, “Are you Russians?” “No, we are Ukrainians.” “Why do you speak Russian?” “We don’t know.”
In 1898, Osip Monchalovskij – a Lvov publicist and a Russian public figure –
wrote in his book “Ukrainophilism in Literature and Politics”:
“To be Ukrainian means to denounce your past; to be ashamed of belonging to the Russian people,
and event to the names Rus, Russian;
to denounce your tales and history;
to thoroughly erase from yourself all common Russian features;
and to try to blend into the provincial Ukrainian lifestyle.”
[Andrei Marchukov. Head Researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Science]
One must say that for a long time, up to the 1920s, the term “Ukrainian”
was used, also by the adepts of the Ukrainian nationalism,
not as an ethnic term to characterise all these Malorossian and Rusin masses,
but as a term for those, who belonged to the Ukrainian party.
Odessa. The 2nd of May 2014.
Kulikovo pole.
Last minutes before the tragedy.
“We shall save all the icons over there, our belongings, go into the building and will be holding fort.”
– “As I see it we shall stand till the end.”
– “Yes”
At the same time at the Cathedral Square, the newly-arrived to Odessa Right Sector,
starts to warm up the football fans and the youth, who joined the nationalists.
“Glory to Ukraine. Heroes be Glorified.” (The Nazi-Bandera chant)
“Death to the enemies.”
The angered mass attacks the anti-Maidan camp.
Sign text: “We are FOR federalisation referendum.”
[Andrei Marchukov. Head Researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Science]
Nowadays, a third of the Right Sector are ethnic Russians.
Now they’ve all naturally become Ukrainians.
And this is, by the way, a demonstration that Russian and Ukrainian identities
are like connected vessels – one flows out, the other in.
[Bogdan Bezpalko. Member of the Council on International Relations under the President of the Russian Federation]
There was the question: “Where are your mythical Bandera followers?”
Here you have the, here the turn up. You can admire them in their full splendour.
“The punishers attacking Odessa reaidents…”
“Firefighters working inside…”
“Barrages are being literally thrown into the windows…”
In the deranged crowd, most cries are heard in Russian.
The murderers scream in Russian, and the victims plea for their lives in Russian.
“Guys, guys, we must drag…”
“To the knees!” – “Help!”
“Please, don’t!”
“They murdered four people!”
“He’s sitting here. He’ll not go anywhere.”
“He shot at the people.”
“What are you doing, devils?! What are you doing?!”
A Ukrainian artillery shooter in Donbass is commenting his actions using Russian language.
He is shelling a peaceful city.
“Fire!”
“At this rate, in the near future, we’ll already completely exterminate them.”
“Glory to Ukraine. Heroes be glorified.”
Chanting this motto, Russians are again killing Russians.
Just like 100 years ago, in the Austrian concentration camp Thalerhof,
where Western Rus was exterminated and Ukraine was born.
“To the victims of Thalerhof. 1914-1918. Galician Rus.”
“Moskals to the gallows. Moskals to the gallows.”
Where there is a telephone pole
A katsap (Polish derogative for Russian) hangs instead of a bell
His lips turned blue,
Black eyes turned white
Teeth got crusted with blood
Rope cut through his neck.
100 years in Galicia, in Lvov, “katsaps” – that is, Russians, were murdered to the chanting of such rhymes.
They were murdered by former friends, by neighbours, by acquaintances, even by relatives.
Russians were killing Russians.
And only because some of them considered themselves Ukrainians.
In 1914, during the first days of the World War,
over 2000 Russians – politicians, peasants, teachers, doctors – ended up in prisons in Galicia.
300 Uniat priests were killed only on the bases of suspicion that they were secret sympathisers of Orthodoxy and Russia.
[Alois Woldan. Professor of Slavic Literature at the Wien University, Austria]
Under the pretext “they are the Russian spies”, innocent people got arrested and executed.
This is a big black spot on the Austrian history, which is already far from being white.
The biggest mistake, committed by Austria during its 150 years of ruling in Galicia.
Thousands of Russians ended up being lockes up in the first in the European history concentration camps – Thalerhof and Teresin.
The camps were dotted with poles.
Inmates were hung by a foot and were left hanging for several hours.
Hundreds of people died from this torture.
From the Thalerhof Almanach – a compendium of documents and memoirs about the genocide of the Russians:
Memorial book of the Austrian cruelties, torture and violations of the Carpathian-Russian people during the world war 1914-1917.
First Edition.
Terror in Galicia during the first period of the war 1914-1915.
Lvov, 1924
“Austrian soldiers carry in their backpacks ready-made nooses, and everywhere –
on the trees, in the houses, in the barns – hang all peasants because they consider themselves Russians.
Galician Rus has turned into a huge, terrible Golgotha.”
They grabbed anyone indiscriminately – anyone who thought of himself as Russian or carried a Russian name,
anyone who was found possessing a Russian newspaper or book, icons or postcards from Russia.
Ukrainian activists participated in the punisher operations.
Not only did they write denunciations, but were also performing hangings and shootings of their neighbours and relatives.
From The Thalerhof Almanach:
“One part of the Carpathian-Russian people, in great suffering, carried to the altar of their common motherland Rus their lives,
while the other carried out the shameful and deceitful deed of the conscious brother-murderer Kain.
The role of these people’s traitors – of these so-called ‘Ukrainians’ – during this war is well known.”
[Bogdan Bezpalko. Member of the Council on International Relations under the President of the Russian Federation]
This is the history of the genocide of those Galicians, who thought of themselves as Russians
by the hand of the Austrians and by the hand of those Galicians, who thought of themselves as Ukrainians.
60.000 people were collected at one place and exterminated,
in the same way as people were herded into the Trade Union house in Odessa and burnt alive.
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
To this one must add about 300.000 refugees,
who went to the territory of Russia together with the Russian troops.
In that way the pro-Russian element in Galicia was completely wiped out.
[Andrei Marchukov. Head Researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Science]
When we say “Ukrainian nationalism”, we think of Russophobia in the broadest sense of this word –
as in an ideology, as in a world-view. Not just as in “who’s not jumping is Moskal”,
but as in the practice on which the foundation of the Ukrainian nation, of the Ukrainian statehood is laid.
“God and Ukraine above all!”
(Note: resonating withe the Nazi German “Deutschland über alles” slogan)
The phenomenon of the Ukrainian nationalism is specific in that it appeared before the Ukrainian nation did.
In November 1914 the Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold stated:
“Our main goal in this war lies in the long-term weakening of Russia.
And therefore, in case of our victory, we will start with creating an independent from Russia Ukrainian state.”
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
A Bysantian thinker Simeon Salunski, has once pondered over a question of what is a nation.
And he gave a very precise answer: A nation is a people, who have common history.
That that in essence is the answer to how to create Ukrainians out of Russians.
One must write for them a history of Ukraine.
Mikhail Grushevskij was tasked by the Austrian authorities with inventing the history of Ukraine and Ukrainians.
Mikhail Grushevskij, assistant professor of the Kiev University, emigrated to Galicia in 1890.
In the Russian scientific circles he was already known for his quite eccentric views on the history of Kievan Rus,
and for his exceptionally questionable theory of history.
But this very theory turned out to be very timely and very suitable for the Austrian authorities.
Grushevskij wrote his 10-volume work “History of Ukraine and Rus” in Lvov, explaining that,
yes, there was Kievan Rus, but then there also appeared Moscow Rus and Lithuanian Rus.
And so as not to mix them up, the ancient Kievan Rus, where Russians-Ukrainians lived, must be called Ukraine.
In effect it was a substitution of terms.
However, students were taught by Grushevskij’s books.
He read lectures, and the excited youth started thinking of themselves as an exceptional people –
not just any old Russian, but Western, European, progressive.
Mikhail Grushevskij headed a department at the Lvov University when he was 28 years old.
In Lvov Grushevskij lived in a big mansion – there is his museum now.
When he returned to Kiev, he immediately bought a house for renting out.
It was know by almost all townsfolk, and was often called as “Grushevskij’s House”.
In effect that was the payment that Grushevskij got for his participation in the Austrian political project.
[Alexandr Kolpakidi. Historian, writer]
I don’t now a single historian who would have earned such a fortune on his historic writing, so as to buy a whole house in the centre of a capital.
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
How much were the Austrians paying, and how much was coming in from still unknown sources – everything was done anonymously.
Huge amounts. In the order of hundreds of thousands guldens.
[Alexandr Kolpakidi. Historian, writer]
In 1991, the Ukrainian Ministry of Education officially issued an order that
Grushevskij’s concept is the metric for the Ukrainian history.
In Ukraine it is forbidden by law to challenge Grushevskij’s concepts. No other country has this.
The basic ideas of the Ukrainian nationalism were created by two Russian men,
both born in Malorossia – Nikolaj Mihnovskij and Dmitrij Dontsov.
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
While being ethnic Russians, they were the founders of the fascist
part of the ideology of the Ukrainian nationalism.
The lawyer from Kharkov, Mihnivskij, became the author of the slogan “Ukraine for Ukrainians”.
He also formulated the 10 commandments of the Ukrainian People’s Party, which he himself founded:
“Don’t take a wife from among foreigners because your children will then become your enemies.
Don’t be friends with enemies of our people because you then give them power and courage.
Don’t make alliances with our oppressors, as you’ll become a traitor of Ukraine.
All people are your brothers. But Moskals (Russians), Ljahs (Poles), Hungerians, Romanians and Jews
are the enemies of our people.”
Dmitrij Dontsov was doing politics in the Russian Empire.
In 1908, after two arrests, he moved to Galicia.
Using the money from the Austrian Interior Ministry, he founded and headed “The Union for Liberation of Ukraine”,
which had a goal of uniting the Ukrainian nationalists of Malorossia to create an independent Ukraine under the Austrian protectorate.
Dontsov was paid his salary in the Austrian Interior Ministry.
The son of the Miletopol landlord remained an fierce Russophobe until the end of his life.
[Michał Siekierka. Polish historian. Wroclaw University]
Dontsov’s very ideology was… para-fascist.
For a people to be mighty, it must be racially pure.
For a people to be eternal, it must have a support at a specific territory.
From Dmitrij Dontsov’s book “Nationalism”, published in Lvov in 1926:
“Until we start carrying within us a passionate desire to create for ourselves a world from the outward chaos,
until the theorems become axioms and dogmas,
until shamefacedness turns into rudeness,
and the spineless love of peoples into an aggressive nationalism,
until that time will Ukraine not turn into a nation.”
[Bogdan Bezpalko. Member of the Council on International Relations under the President of the Russian Federation]
Ukrainian nationalists, who now strive to create that nation, which was founded in Dontsov’s works,
they by and large strive to conduct an ethnic cleansing.
For them, the people of Donbass are sub-humans, sub-Ukrainians. So they have no use for them.
This ideology is very simple for most people – they have everything, including “nation” in their heads.
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
Ukrainism found an exceptionally warm response in the face of the Russian intelligentsia.
And it felt along the way some interest in supporting everything that went against the Empire, including these seeds of Ukainaism.
[Andrei Marchukov. Head Researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Science]
Who supported them? Cadets, other liberal parties, Left parties.
Everything connected to being Russian was beginning to get associated with something that is monarchistic, something oppressingly-tyrannic.
Ukraine started to be viewed as a focal point of freedom.
From the middle of the 19th century and until today, the very idea of Ukrainaism has remained virtually unchanged:
“Ukraine is not Russia.” “Malorossians are not Russians.” “Moscow is Asia.” “Ukraine is Europe.” “We’ll never be brothers.”
The authorities of the Russian Empire looked upon the nationalism in Malorossia benignly.
Thinking, no problem, they’ll get over it.
And the government was not frightened by the support from the intelligentsia.
[Bogdan Bezpalko. Member of the Council on International Relations under the President of the Russian Federation]
The main fault of the officials of the Russian Empire lies in them not paying any attention to this phenomenon.
Mihail Sergeevich Grushevskij printed his “History of Ukrainorus” not just anywhere, but in St. Petersburg.
There was a mistaken belief that the economic might of Russia is able to solve absolutely all problems,
including cultural and political.
[Andrei Marchukov. Head Researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Science]
Benignly and through the bushy whiskers they were booming,
that Russia is mighty, look, we have regiments stationed at Hindu Kush and on the Pacific shore.
Those intelligentsia with running noses are nothing to worry about.
We all know what it led to.
The situation of Russians in Galicia was becoming worse and worse by the year.
Russian activists got arrested. Court cases were constructed against them,
at which the Russians were accused of spying for the Russian Empire and of separatism.
Quite often the activists of the Ukrainian political parties acted as witnesses for the prosecution during these courts.
However, the absurdity of the situation was in the fact that by that time, those parties were at the same time Russian.
For example, in 1890 the “Russian-Ukrainian Radical Party” was founded in Galicia,
and it remained like that – Russian-Ukrainian – up until 1926.
Starting already from the end of the 19th century, the Austrian authorities started actively financing Ukrainian organisations.
Loans were given only to those peasants and businessmen, who called themselves for Ukrainians.
The association “Prosvit” – “Education” – covered the whole of Galicia with a network of libraries, reading rooms,
courses for the illiterate, theatrical clubs, in which the educational activities were conducted strictly on the Ukrainian language.
In 1912, the president of the Russian Club in the Galician parliament,
Kost Levitskij – basically a Russian man, who called himself a Ukrainian –
proclaimed the following to the Austrian Minister of War:
“Is it known to your highness that in Galicia that are a lot of Russophilic societies
of the young students, the participants of which get the right for a 1-year conscription service and get the Officer rank?
What are the prospects of a war, if there are so many enemies-Russophiles in the Army?”
[Bogdan Bezpalko. Member of the Council on International Relations under the President of the Russian Federation]
Racial theories were easily injected into various geo-political projects,
into different ideologies, and neither the Ukrainian nationalism could avoid this influence.
From the memoirs of the Russian activist if the Trans-Carpathia, Osip Monchalovskij:
“During one gathering in Lvov, some Ivan Rudnitskij, a notarial assistant, publicly stated:
‘From now on there will be no need for Secret Policemen, as we ourselves will be tracking them and exterminating them.
This role was put into practice by some volunteers so thoroughly,
that denouncements were written on even single and childless people, accusing them of bringing up their children in Moskalphilic spirit’.”
In 1908, the member of the State Duma, Vladinir Bobrinskij
returned from a Slavic symposium in Prague, where there also were delegates from Galicia.
Later, speaking before the State Duma, Bobrinskij said:
“I didn’t know that abroad there exists an authentic Rus,
which lives under an indescribable oppression, right here, near its sister – the Greater Russia.
We all must learn from the Galicians how to love Rus and how to fight for her.”
Count Vladimir Bobrinskij founded at his own initiative a Galicina-Russian charity.
At his own expense he financed the publication of Russian newspapers in Galicia, for example “Russian Pravda”,
financed the work of Russian political organisations and schools.
The Russian state continued to not notice the Galician Russians, refusing them both in financing and in political support.
[Igor Barinov. Candidate of Science (History) at Moscow State University]
Russian diplomats pointed out that financing of the Russophilic parties in Galicia
would lead to very serious international complications.
From the report of the the Russian Interior Minister Petr Durnovo:
“It is obviously not in our interest to add to our Fatherland a region, which lost with it any live connection.
After all, for a small handful of Galicians, who are Russian in spirit, how many Poles, Jews and Ukrainised Uniats would we get?”
From an article in the German newspaper Die Welt from February 2014:
“Europeans followed with admiration the unfolding of the Ukrainian drama,
and they are flattered to know that there are people, who for a dream about Europe
are prepared to sacrifice their health and even to risk their lives.
The European idea has not shone so brightly, as it did in the eyes of the demonstrators in Kiev and other places.
However, now is Europe is presented with the bill.
And a question arises: is it really worth to pay so much money for it?
Does Europe need yet another problematic country?
If €25 billion is the the price for spoiling a new imperial project of Russia, then paying such price is justifiable.”
What for does Europe and the West need Ukraine at all?
At the very peak of WWI, one of the founders of the German geopolitics, Paul Rohrbach, wrote about it.
In his work “Our military goal in the East and the Russian Revolution”,
the chief expert on the Russian question from the German Foreign Ministry reported:
“Only while having Ukraine, Russia attained the might, which allows it to strive for taking control
over the straits of the Black Sea and over the Balcans,
and if Ukraine remains a part of Russia, then the strategic goals of Germany will never be reached.”
Germany had the following goals in WWI:
to split off from Russia its eastern and southern lands;
to push it away from the Black Sea; entice wars with Caucasus;
to create a buffer Russophobic state West for Dnepr.
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
This is, in fact, “Divide et Impera” – the policy of divide and conquer.
Let’s say the Austro-Hungarian part of project Ukraine was an internal product,
and when WWI started, its geopolitical potential was set into motion.
From the call from the “Union for Liberation of Ukraine”, created by Dmitri Dontsov:
“Ukraine has always been an open enemy of Russia, and in its aspirations for liberation, it always sought help from the West.
Europe will never have peace, it will never be free of the threat of the invasion of tsarism,
it will never have security for its culture,
until on the vast territories of Ukraine there is created a solid foundation against Russia.”
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
Whole divisions fought as part of the Austro-Hungarian army and were angled as Ukrainian.
One of the Austro-Hungarian princes was even staking a claim on the future Ukrainian throne.
From the memoirs of the priest Iosif Egorskij:
“The army got its instructions and maps, where certain villages were underlined with red pencil.
And the red line on those maps left blooded victims in those villages.”
[Bogdan Bezpalko. Member of the Council on International Relations under the President of the Russian Federation]
“How is the slogan of th Ukrainian nationalists worded? “Glory to the nation, death to the enemies”.
Now those people got a chance to turn that slogan into reality.
They think that they are glorifying the nation by killing their own fellow citizens.
When in September 1914 the Russian army entered Lvov, it was met by communal prayers, cross processions, flowers and tears as a liberating army.
Even the Galician diaspora in USA –
which, seeking refuge from the prosecution in their homeland, ended up on the other continent – was exulted.
From “Svit” (“Light”) the newspaper of the American Galicians:
“Our Lvov is Russian, our Galicia is Russian! God be praised!
Our common prayer is sent to you from the millions of the Russian hearts.
Great God, the Almighty Savior, unite us as You are united in trinity.
So will our fragmented Rus will be as one forever.”
But the genocide of the Galician Russians of 1914 had forever changed the ethnic picture of Trans-Carpathia,
and those who thought of themselves as Ukrainians became more numerous than Russians.
[Anna Raźny. Polish historian, Professor of the Department for Russian and East-European studies at Jagiellonian University in Krakow]
There is no single Ukrainian people. There is not single Ukraine.
And there is no single Ukrainian ethnic national identity.
On the territory of Ukraine there live various ethnic minorities,
and the largest one is the Russian minority.
During the whole of WWI, Austrian and German concentration camps conducted an active propaganda work
with the imprisoned Russian soldiers from Malorossia.
It was attempted to convince them that they are Ukrainians, and that they have nothing in common with Russians.
From the book of Paul Miljukov – the Foreign Minister of the Temporary Government – “The History of the Russian Revolution” (Note: the February colour revolution), 1917:
“When it comes to the propaganda among the Ukrainian prisoners of war, it started already in the spring of 1915,
when all imprisoned Malorossians, who agreed to recognise themselves as Ukrainians, were concentrated in the camp Rastatt.
Systematic lectures were conducted in this camp.
One of the lecturers was the Austrian professor Bezpalko,
(Note: Cossacks were in reality the trusted backbone of Russian land).
who painted before the prisoners a picture of free Cossack movement, and calling to overturn the hated yoke of Moskovia.”
Hoverer, despite the colossal effort and money, which the authorities invested into the propaganda among the imprisoned Malorossians,
even in the camps they were in no hurry to recognise themselves as some new separate people.
On the 30th of January 1917 Vladimir Lenin, in his letter to a party friend Alicia Armant,
was telling a story of one such captive soldier, whom it was attempted to convince, that he is not a Maloross, but a Ukrainian:
“He spent a year in German captivity, in a camp with 27000 imprisoned Ukrainians.
Germans create camps, based on national affinity, and chip them off from Russia by all means possible.
Crafty lecturers from Galicia were sent to the Ukrainians.
The result: only 2000 agreed to “independence”.
The rest became enraged at the very thought of being separated from Russia and switching sides to the Germans or the Austrians.
It’s a remarkable fact. We can’t not believe it. 27000 is a large number.
A year is a long timespan. The conditions for the Galician propaganda were exceptionally favourable.
Yet still, closeness to the Velikorossia (Greater Russia) overruled everything.”
(Note: This quote must be read in the context that Lenin was a Russophobe and conteptious of all that is Russian.)
[Bogdan Bezpalko. Member of the Council on International Relations under the President of the Russian Federation]
Ukrainian nationalism got a certain push into the history only due to two historic events:
WWI and the October Revolution, as well as the preceding February Revolution.
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
The main idea of the political class of Ukraine was to simply separate themselves
by a border from the Bolsheviks, who won in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
There appeared a national excuse: “We live in Ukraine, we have a Ukrainian nation. You had a revolution, while everything is fine here.”
Those processes were nurtured from outside, as Germany and Austro-Hungary were interested
in creating a buffer between themselves and the Bolsheviks.
And it was precisely the Revolution, which gave Austria and Germany such an opportunity.
Moreover, the warring empires needed the sizeable resources of Malorossia.
In an interview to the British “Daily Mail” of 1918, the German Chief of Staff of the Eastern Front, General Hoffmann stated:
“Ukraine is, in reality, my handiwork.
I created Ukraine so as to have an opportunity to sign a peace treaty with at least a part of Russia.”
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
If we take a look at the maps that were drawn at that time,
Ukraine occupied the lands of Malorossia proper and part if the Galician lands.
While for the future they already drew maps, which covered Cuban, Northern Caucasus, Crimea, the whole of Donetsk oblast (region) –
in other words a much bigger span than the Ukraine of today.
Brjansk oblast, Orlovsk oblast, and even Southern Belorussia.
In February 1917 Mihail Grushevskij returned to Kiev from his exile. That very same “professor”.
In 1914 he came from Galicia to the Russian Empire,
and in the beginning of WWI he was arrested on suspicion of his connection with the Austrian intelligence services, and was sent into exile.
Right after the February revolution of 1917 in Petrograd, the Ukrainian separatists in Kiev gathered central Rada,
and declared about the creation of the creation of the Ukrainian state.
Grushevskij became the first Speaker of the Rada – the Austrian agent and the one who invented the story of “Ukraine is not Russia”.
Austrian and German troops supported the Central Rada, but Malorossians could not understand why they had to fight for some Ukraine
against the same Russian people, even though Grushevskij tried with all of his might to explain what Ukraine is.
[Andrei Marchukov. Head Researcher at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Science]
In the spring he writes one such little brochure: “Who are Ukrainians and what do they want”.
The name actually strikes the matter at its core.
By November 1918 both the German and the Austrian empires fell apart, while the Ukrainian statehood went on.
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
Because when in Moscow Bolsheviks run things and declare that everything will become nationalised and will belong to the people,
it’s clear that if I have here property and assets, then I’m definitely staying in a different state.
The local elite supported the pseudo-statehood, while little by little warring among themselves and plundering Malorossia.
(Note: Like Poroshenko and the other oligarchs in today’s Ukraine!)
The Ukrainian state finally dissolved in 1920, when
from one side the victorious Red Army moved over the territory of Ukraine,
and from the other side Petljura signed a treaty in Warsaw,
which ultimately transferred the Western Ukraine under the Polish rule.
Western Rus, Malorossia, was again divided.
Poland got Volyn and Galicia, and Bolsheviks got the rest.
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
Bolsheviks were the first to create a Ukrainian State,
with such attributes as Ukrainian language, with Ukrainian science, with Ukrainian economy.
That was an ingenious move. By doing that, they disarmed everyone.
Only the genius of Lenin could think of it.
In 1921, while speaking at the 10th summit of the Party in Moscow, Iosif Stalin – the People’s Commisar on the Affairs of Nationalities, proclaimed:
“Even if in some cities of Ukraine Russian elements are still dominating,
with the course of time those cities will inevitably become Ukrainised.”
[Victor Shchedrin. Historian at the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
It was Lenin’s thesis: self-determination of nations up to and including separation.
And if Ukrainian people decided to become a part of the Soviet Union, then the Ukrainian nation has a right to exist.
[Alois Woldan. Professor of Slavic Literature at the Wien University, Austria]
Initially the strengthening of Ukrainian identity started not in Galicia, but in Kharkov, in the Soviet Ukraine.
The policy of indigenisation and suchlike.
Assistance in light of Lenin’s national policy. Support of the Ukrainian language.
In April 1923, during the 7th Conference of the Ukrainian Communist Party,
it was announced about the start of the Ukrainisation policy.
Everything got Ukrainised: state offices, legal procesures, schools, higher education, newspapers, theatres.
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
The Ukrainian language was studied in schools.
Ukrainisation was conducted even somewhat cockily, also including on the Russian territories, which were added to Ukraine by Lenin.
By the way, why did he do it? Precisely so as to close the subject of Ukrainian separatism once and for all.
If the Ukrainian nationalists of today studied history,
they would have gathered not under the portraits of Stepan Bandera, but ubder that of the Stalin’s People’s Commisar – Lasar Moiseevich Kaganovich.
It was he, who with an iron fist mercilessly formed the Ukrainian nation from the Malorossian peasants.
Beat a Ukrainian identity into the youth.
It was thanks to Lasar Moiseevich, that by 1929 over 80% of schools,
55% of factory-professional schools, and 30% of universities conducted their education in Ukrainian language.
While by 1931, 90% of newspapers and 85% of journals of the Ukrainian SSR were published in Ukrainian language.
And that on the lands, where just 15 years before, most didn’t even understand what is this “Ukraine” and who are these “Ukrainians”.
From the book of the second President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma “Ukraine is not Russia”:
“Regardless of the attitude one has to what was happening in 1920s,
one must admit that if not for the the Ukrainisation of school conducted at that time,
our today’s independence would probably not exist.
As time shows, the mass Ukrainian school, that graduated tens of millions of people,
turned out to be the most important and the most indestructible element of the Ukrainian foundation in Ukraine.”
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
Those Ukrainians, who remained in Poland, looked at the Soviet Ukraine with envy.
Many moved over. Many openly expressed their sympaties.
Mikhail Grushevskij, who returned to Soviet Ukraine from his emigration, excitedly wrote to one of his comrades:
“Despite all the limitations, I feel myself here as in the Ukrainian Republic, that we began building in 1917.”
The former activists of the nationalistic movements also start returning from the emigration.
Galician Ukrainians are coming.
The forced Ukrainisation caused open hostility among the Malorossians.
Vladimir Zatonskij, the People’s Commisar for education of UkSSR wrote:
“The broad Ukrainian masses treated Ukraine with derision.
Not just workers, but also the peasants.
Back then, Ukrainian peasants hated Ukrainians.
In Kiev we received protocols of the peasants’ meetings.
In those protocols the peasants wrote to us:
‘We all feel ourselves Russian and hate Germans and Ukrainians,
and ask RSFSR (Note: Soviet abbreviation for Russia) to take us in.'”
In the beginning of 1930s the authorities of USSR stopped Ukainisation, fearing the possible growth of the Ukrainian nationalism.
The events in the Western Ukraine, which ended up in Poland, played a certain role in the decision.
In 1918, in Lvov the local Ukrainians attempted to create their own state – The People’s Republic of Ukraine.
However, Poland – which became independent earlier, after the dissolvement of the Russian Empire –
pretty quickly took Galicia under its control, after a short and brutal war.
While the Polish authorities started to suppress the Ukrainian national movement.
That’s is quite ironic. Poles, who played a special role in the forming of Ukrainian identity,
started to actively prohibit Ukrainian language and close down Ukrainian schools.
As the result of this, in 1929, the first summit of OUN – Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists – took place.
OUN set the goal of building a state, based on the principal of “one party and one nation” – Ukrainian.
OUN started an outright terror campaign against the Polish authorities –
murders of Polish colonists, Polish officials, arsens and bombings.
From the brochure of an OUN activist, Mikhail Kolodzinskij, “Ukrainian Military Doctrine”, 1938:
“Not only do we want to posses the Ukrainian cities, but also to trample over the enemy lands,
conquer the capitals of the enemies, and on their ruins salute to the Ukrainian Empire.
We want to win a war. A great, cruel war, which will turn us into the master of the Eastern Europe.”
From the end of 1930s the Ukrainian nationalists started to actively cooperate with Abwehr – the German secret service.
They were given training in the spy schools, studying diversion tactics.
These contacts especially intensified after the Soviet Army entered Western Ukraine in 1939.
The members if OUN viewed Germany as a temporary ally, which would help building an independent Ukraine.
The Germans, however, had no such plans.
For them the Ukrainian nationalists were a tool of their foreign policy, and nothing else.
[Bogdan Bezpalko. Member of the Council on International Relations under the President of the Russian Federation]
The creation of the Council of Ukraine as part of Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich was quite logical.
Yes, he quite openly wrote that he will have colonies in the East.
[Igor Barinov. Candidate of Science (History) at Moscow State University]
The Ukrainian nationalists were seriously expecting that after the occupation of Ukraine, once it’s over,
the Germans would give them the possibility to create their own independent state.
From the first days of the War, OUN started to openly collaborate with the German occupational administration.
Nationalists organised in Lvov terrible Jewish massacres, murders of Poles, Russians, Armenians.
OUN members participated in the polizei punisher battalions, into the Ukrainian division of SS.
From the speech of Stepan Bandera at OUN summit:
“During the time of chaos and trouble, one can allow oneself to eliminate the unwanted Polish, Moscovian and Jewish activists,
especially the supporters of the Bolshevik-Moskovian Imperialism.”
[Michał Siekierka. Polish historian. Wroclaw University]
It is very difficult to say what motives had those people, who enrolled into the ranks of SS as volunteers.
However, a part of those people undoubtedly enrolled on ideological grounds.
[Bogdan Bezpalko. Member of the Council on International Relations under the President of the Russian Federation]
The Ukrainian nationalism in itself is a pseudo-religion, which by and large pushes out Christianity from the minds and consciousness of the people.
And a good example to this are the brutalities, that the Ukrainian nationalists did back then and are doing now,
because a Christian simply can’t do something like this.
(Note: Not really. Remember the brutality of the Witch hunts and the Crusades of the Western Christianity?)
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
Here we must also understand that there happened a degradation of the traditional religious structures.
Christianity started losing its ground.
Andrei Sheptitskij, the head of the Greek-Uniat Church, which at one time headed all those movements for creation of Ukraine,
he later in horror tried to stop this terrible process.
When “Glory to Jesus Christ. Glory for all time.” got turned into “Glory to Ukraine. Glory to the heroes.”
[Bogdan Bezpalko. Member of the Council on International Relations under the President of the Russian Federation]
What is happening now in Donbass and in Ukraine – abductions, tortures, murders,
outright nazism, appeal to the Nazi aesthetics and symbolism.
For example the symbol of the Azov battalion is simply the symbol the SS division “Das Reich”.
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
Ukrainian democrats marched down Kreschatik with the portrait of Hitler,
but nobody really wants to accentuate that at the core of the Ukrainian nationalism is the Nazi ideology.
In the Soviet Union it was customary not to speak about the crimes committed by the Ukrainian nationalists during WWII.
For example, about the fact that the Belorussian village Hatyn was destroyed specifically by the Ukrainian polizeis.
Or about the Volyn massacre – a punisher operation during which the OUN members murdered 70000 Poles in Volyn,
including infants and old people.
Speaking about it did not go hand in hand with the Soviet concept of “friendship of the peoples”.
And besides, hundreds of thousands of Soviet Ukrainians honestly fought against Hitler, dying and becoming heroes.
And they fought also because it was the Soviet rule, which fully acknowledged the Ukrainian identity.
[Bogdan Bezpalko. Member of the Council on International Relations under the President of the Russian Federation]
We are all Russians – both those born Ukraine, and those born in Belorussia, and those born in Velikorossia.
The achievements that we had in science, in culture, in politics, in military art, they were always a common property.
For example the Ostankino TV Tower was engineered by Kondratjuk.
Basically a lot of figures, who are the classics of our culture, of our literature, hail from Ukraine: N.V. Gogol, Bulgakov, Korolenko.
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
The most modern industries of the time were concentrated in Ukraine.
And in fact Ukraine possessed about 60% of the most efficient and high-tech industrial potential of the USSR.
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
USSR was governed by Ukrainians for quite a lengthy period of time: Brezhnev, Chernenko, our various ministers.
Can one imagine the Russian Army without Ukrainians? What about Soviet Militia (police)? It’s totally impossible.
[Rostislav Ishchenko. Ukrainian politologist, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Prognosis]
There was definitely no restriction of the rights of the Ukrainians,
because if the language didn’t get the artificial support, if the books were not published in million copies in Ukrainian language,
if the Ukrainian writers and poets were not translated into Jakutian, or Uzbeck languages, or into the the languages of the world,
then, first of all, no one would have known about them, and without the support of the USSR Ukrainian culture would simply not have existed.
[Anna Raźny. Polish historian, Professor of the Department for Russian and East-European studies at Jagiellonian University in Krakow]
Why was everything different at the times of USSR?
The ideology of Communism was that power that was giving calmness to Ukraine. Stability.
The period of stability ended, Soviet Union fell apart, and from the 1991, an uncharted for Ukraine future begins.
In 1991, shortly after the so-called August Putch (coup d’etat), a referendum on independence was conducted in Ukraine.
Poland and USA immediately recognised its results. (Note: but not 2014 Crimean referendum!)
[Bogdan Bezpalko. Member of the Council on International Relations under the President of the Russian Federation]
A really independent Ukraine appeared only in 1991 and precisely within those borders, presented to it by the Soviet leaders.
[Anna Raźny. Polish historian, Professor of the Department for Russian and East-European studies at Jagiellonian University in Krakow]
The appearance of Ukraine, a huge Ukraine, after the dissolvement of USSR is, in my opinion, a mistake.
It is a political experiment, founded on the Western globalisation.
Here USA and EU play the most important role.
Leonid Daniilovich Kuchma, when he decided to define what is this state, the only thing that he could invent was that “Ukraine is not Russia”.
And this logical basis of the Ukrainian national policy is well-understood in the Western capitals.
The only ideology that was formulated over all these years, is the ideology of the Ukrainian nationalism.
Over all the years of the Cold War, the West was cultivating the Ukrainian nationalism,
financed the nationalistic organisations in Europe, USA and Canada.
From the televised address of the American President Obama to the people, September 2014
Full text at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/barackobamaunitednations69.htm
America heads the efforts to unite the whole world against the Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
America and our allies will support the people of Ukraine as they develop their democracy and economy.
Already in 1979, Zbigniew Brzeziński – the (Polish-born) advisor to the American President Jimmy Carter on the issues of national security –
devised the Constitution of Ukraine, independent of USSR. Zbigniew Brzeziński wrote:
“Ukraine. The new important territory on the Euroasian chessboard
is a geopolotical centre because its very existence as an independent state helps to transform Russia.
Without Ukraine, Russia stops being a Euroasian empire.”
[Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzeziński. (Polish-born) National Security Advisor for US President (1977–81)]
The West is open for Ukraine. And what is equally imortant, Ukraine became tighter connected to the West.
The majority of Ukrainians are not the opponents of the Russians.
On the other hand the majority of Ukrainians like independence more and more. They prefer independence.
According to my personal observations, it is important that their independence is more justified for them and brings them closer to the West.
(Note the 25th frame effect in his use of the word “independence”!)
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
Ukraine is still needed as a potential part of Rzecz Pospolita. After all, the Rzecz Pospolita project hasn’t been abandoned,
and it has great potential in the framework of the contemporary Europe.
In principal, USA is ready to hand over to the Poles the influence on these territories.
The Poles therefore don’t yet pull this ace out.
[Anna Raźny. Polish historian, Professor of the Department for Russian and East-European studies at Jagiellonian University in Krakow]
A Ukrainian has no influence over these processes, which are of a geopolitical kind.
It’s not just a domestic history of the contemporary Ukraine, it’s the Western intervention.
And that’s what EuroMaidan showed.
We all know how it was organised, who participated.
Regrettably, Poland took part in this EuroMaidan.
And the consequences of this EuroMaidan intervention unfold tragically before our eyes.
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
Ukrainian separatism has grown into a civil war, which is currently ablaze.
Ukrainian identity is often based on a so-called resentment complex.
Someone is constantly guilty before this people. Someone stagnated their development.
First it was the Poles, then it was the Russians.
Everyone does wrong by Ukraine. This is a complex without a future.
[Anna Raźny. Polish historian, Professor of the Department for Russian and East-European studies at Jagiellonian University in Krakow]
There is only one way out for Ukraine: to return to the roots,
to the high values, on which both a Ukrainian, Polish-Ukrainian and Russian-Ukrainian future can be built.
[Pavel Kuzenkov. PhD, Associate Professor of Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University]
Meanwhile a fratricidal war is going on, and we also carry our share of guilt.
We are at fault, and this is primarily an ideological fault.
We completely ignored this question. We let everything drift.
We that that we could control the whole situation with just a pipeline. This was a grievous mistake.
[Krzysztof Zanussi. Polish film and theatre director]
Russia seldom speaks of its faults, I almost never hear that.
However if we want development, we must acknowledge our mistakes of the past so as not to repeat them.
In reality, despite all of these 150-year long spites, despite a consistent implementation of the Project “Ukraine” by the West,
we – Russians and Ukrainians – remain in fact one people.
And none, but Russia will understand Ukraine the best.
And no one, but a Russian will understand a Ukrainian the best.
Our friendship, our relationship is founded on the principals of cultural, religious, bloodline kinship.
We have a common civilisational foundation. We have common values, common victories and defeats.
A common history.
And one wants to believe that our future is also common.

Rostislav Ishchenko: ”Next to Last Victim of the International Tribunal”

Rostislav Ishchenko is an astute Ukrainian political analyst, who had to go into exile after the Nazi coup d’etat in 2014 Ukraine. Below, I present hist article on a topic, which I intend to expand upon in the future, and which I touched in the past: the destruction of Yugoslavia bay US/NATO.

Other publications in my blog, related to Yugoslavia, are:

1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2Please note that translating a documentary film or an article takes a lot of time and emotional effort. I am doing it on a voluntary basis, but if someone feels like supporting my work, a Bitcoin donation to the following address is appreciated: 1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2

Kosovo is Serbia!

Yes, Kosovo is Serbia in the same way as Provence is France, Schleswig-Holstein is Germany, Malorossia is Russia and Oxfordshire is England.
And before I go on with the translation, let us remember hundreds of thousands of Serbs, who were killed or driven away from their heartland of Kosovo, and are now condemned to witness their beloved land being desecrated and turned into a hub of cocaine dealing, human organ trafficking and Islamic terrorism by the US/NATO.

Rostislav Ishchenko’s original article in Russian is published on the 24th of March 2016 at Cont.WS.


Lack of autonomy and prejudice of the ICTY, which on Thursday sentenced Radovan Karadzic, buried the idea of ​​international justice over war criminals.

On Thursday, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), located in The Hague, has sentenced Radovan Karadzic – the former leader of the Bosnian Serbs, the most high-ranking accused the ICTY after the death of former Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic. The court found him guilty and sentenced him to 40 years in prison.

The verdict is obvious

However, the chances that Karadzic would get an indictment were close to absolute.

And not only because without sentencing Karadzic, the validity of the previous convictions of the military leaders of the Bosnian Serbs would be cast under serious doubt. After all, Karadzic was their immediate supervisor, the mastermind and ideologue.

In the end, no one believes the impartiality of the ICTY for quite a long time, and Serbs (not only Bosnian, but also Croatian and Serbian citizens) and Montenegrins are openly called “victims of the tribunal”.

The “guilty” verdict for Karadzic was first and foremost inevitable for the following reason: When he was first arrested and brought to the Hague, he published the details of a secret deal that a UN negotiator for the Bosnian settlement, Richard Holbrooke, concluded on behalf of the USA.

Disclosure of the details of the deal, which the United States failed to comply with, has caused Washington a dual damage.

All potential victims of the American aggression learned that reaching agreements with the United States is meaningless – they will still cheat. This seriously weakened the USA’s ability to solve their problems with the help of secret diplomacy.

No one can say exactly how much Karadzic’s exposure influenced the decision of Gaddafi and Assad to resist until the end, but is definitely contributed to the awareness of the international community of the fact that Washington understands only the language of weapons.

In addition, the Karadzic’s exposure showed that the US diplomats at the UN office use their international status to promote US government interests. And that reduced the possibility for the Department of State to promote its own staff to the posts of United Nations representatives in the important for the US crisis regions.

Of course, the United States continues to work actively at such places, advancing for key positions the diplomats of the friendly countries. But any puppet is not controlled 100%. A puppet has their own government, their own state, and even personal interests. A puppet maybe not be against the Pax Americana, but wishes to take within it a higher position. In general, there are difficulties, which could be avoided in case of direct appointment of the American diplomats to such positions.

Given the not so young age of Karadzic, as well as the fact that some prisoners of ICTY prison (especially those who had the temerity to upset the United States) tend to suddenly leave this world, the 40-year sentence that he received, becomes in fact a sentence for life.

So once this episode’s informational potential connected to the sentencing is used, it is unlikely the MSM will ever again pay attention to this extraordinary politician, whose ups and downs are, however, in the past, in the turbulent 90s of the twentieth century.

The Court Withdraws

But not only Radovan Karadzic leaves the stage of the world political theatre. ICTY also concludes its activities. Karadzic was one of the last four of the accused whose cases remain unfinished.

In 2017, General Ratislav (Ratko) Mladic, who commanded Bosnian Serb army, expects the verdict. Former Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, Vojislav Seselj and the former President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (destroyed by the Croatian army in August 1995), Goran Hadzic were conditionally released on health grounds: both diagnosed with cancer (translator note: because of the extensive depleted Uranium use by the US in their bombing of Yugoslavia?).

Once all the cases are completed and the review of the appeals is finished, ICTY should cease to exist. However, the Tribunal is already too long with us. Originally it was planned that it would complete the work in 2010.

Summing up the ICTY activity, one cannot ignore its obvious bias.

More than half of the accused are Serbs and Montenegrins (92 cases). Meanwhile the tribunal considered a total of 60 cases against Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Macedonians and Kosovo Albanians together.

ICTY acquitted almost all of the Croatian generals accused of war crimes against Serbs and Muslims. It did not give an answer to the question of whose fault it is that in the Serbian Krajina hundreds of Serbs where killed, and hundreds of thousands of Serbs were exiled.

The tribunal is also not interested in the testimony of its own prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, who, in retirement, has released a book in which she argues that the ICTY had information Kosovo Albanians repeatedly extracted and sold organs from live Serbian prisoners. No one was charged on these accounts by the prosecution. ICTY ignored this information.

Today this terminating its activities tribunal has little respect, and people sentenced by them (especially the Serbs) are treated more as victims rather than as criminals.

World public opinion is inclined to regard the ICTY as nothing more, but a US mechanism for reprisal of the politicians, who prevent the advancement of the American interests in the Balkans.

Bad example is contagious

One could simply ignore the fate of the ICTY. Its work is almost over, there are no new accused, while the sentences have been passed on almost all of the old cases. But the fact is: the lack of independence, the injustice, the prejudice of ICTY practically buried the idea of ​​international justice, which, based on a UN mandate, would pursue people who have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity outside of the national jurisdictions.

The jurisdiction of the ICTY extended to the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia, except for Slovenia. However, the Rome Statute was adopted already in 1998, while the International Criminal Court in The Hague began its work in 2002.

The international community made an attempt to move from the practice of establishing tribunals ad hoc, whose work is limited in space and time, to a permanent international court, which does not work under any territorial or time limitations.

By the time of the adoption of the Rome Statute in May 1993, the ICTY had operated for five years. By the time the work of the International Criminal Court started – for nine. Taking ICTY as an example, the international community could just about imagine how and in whose interests would work the International Criminal Court, which was created precisely for the investigation of cases, similar to those considered the ICTY.

The enthusiasm faded pretty quickly. Especially after the United States, which signed the Rome Statute in 2000, not only didn’t ratify it, but withdrew their signature in 2002: President George W. Bush decided that there is no other way for Washington to protect their soldiers from prosecution.

After that, it became clear that the US is ready to use the International Criminal Court, in the same way as they used the ICTY – as a bludgeon against unwanted regimes and politicians. The only difference was that the ICTY could only consider cases involving crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and only in times of war, caused by the collapse of a single state.

The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court should, on the other hand, have extended to the whole world and to all the crimes committed after the Rome Statute of the approval. Meanwhile the United States themselves wished to remain outside of the international jurisdiction.

Naturally, after that the process of ratification of the Rome Statute was also stopped in Russia. Our country is still involved in the work of the International Criminal Court, but only as an observer. Its jurisdiction does not extend to the territory of Russia. China, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan and other countries did not even sign the Rome Statute.

As a result, today the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court extends to the EU, Canada, Latin America, Australia, Japan and half of Africa. The world’s leading countries (USA, Russia, China, India), and with them half of the humanity, are not included in this system. It is clear that in such circumstances the activities of the International Criminal Court (even if it was a model of honesty and impartiality) would have been far from perfect – after all, half of the world is unreachable to its jurisdiction.

In fact, the mechanism of a permanent international prosecution throughout the whole territory of the planet of the persons responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes, which do not have a statute of time limitation, has not been enacted.

Much of the blame for this lies with the judges and prosecutors of the ICTY, which turned international judicial body in the mechanism of political and legal violence in the interest of the US.

It is clear that in such circumstances, normal countries are extremely wary of international justice, which is able to find a crime where there is none, and do not notice it where it is to be found. Mankind is not yet mature enough for a permanent international court. This means that, as at Nuremberg, war criminals will be judged by the winners of a war.

In other words, as sad as it is, the war becomes a necessary element, preceding creation of any tribunal leading to the triumph of justice. And as before, the winners are not judged.


As an afterword, I want to present translations of some of the reader comments, which fully reflect the general view of the Russian people on this matter:

Nikolai Kireev:
It’s sad about the Serbs. Sad, that we couldn’t help them in their hour of need, as we ourselves were weakened by treachery and desolation. Bu we retain our memory, and that’s important. Our time will come.

Vladimir Maximenko in reply to Nikolai Kireev:
The Serbs, who following Clinton’s and Albright’s initiative were declared by the West as “genociding people”, will yet raise their heads. Karadzic and General Mladic, convicted by the Western pseudo-justice, are honoured by the Serbs. This people are always looking to the support of the Russians, and Russians do not give up.

What Nikolai is referring to in his comment is the fact that Russia was de-facto under foreign – American – rule from the coup d-etat of 1993 and until 2000. For more, read the second part of my post The ”Wild 90s” in Russia, as reflected in people’s memory.

Vladimir Leonov:
What is sad, is that practically all international organisations are drowning in the political machinations, playing only one side of the field. This lead to the increase of chaos in the worlds and further destabilisation.

Mikhai. V.:
Interesting, are there Russian judges in this tribunal?

Andrei Karataev:
Russia is only an observer.

Mikhai. V.:
Then who the hell called it for an “international”?

Vladimir Maximenko:
The whole of the so-called international justice, starting with the ICTY, is nothing more than a system of unjust courts, set to crack down on political opponents of the West. And this machine is running very smoothly.

And a very good conclusion:

Vladimir Maximenko:
Before he headed the resistance of the Serbian people and became the President of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic was renowned as a poet. The patriotic Serbs know well his poem “Inferno”:

Have you understood already?
Hell broke through
To our side.
Cerberus roam the streets,
Intercepting our delicate glances.
And there is little point
To be afraid of death
And the eternal darkness:
All that awaits us there,
Has already happened to us here.
Hell broke free,
It is visible to anyone who wants to see.
Cerberus growl at our thoughts.
Do not be afraid, my dear, of the old age,
Nor of the death.
The tomb will become a safe haven for us:
There the saving light will be born.
And our souls will break out of there,
To tame a raging inferno,
That broke through
To our side


And as a post scriptum, since one of the real war criminals – Hillary Clinton – was mentioned in the comments. Her role in enticing the discord leading to the destruction of Yugoslavia and the genocide of Serbs is comparable to that of Victoria Nudelman (aka Nuland) and her hallucinogenic-laced cookies in enticing discord in 2014 Kiev, leading to the destruction of Ukraine and the genocide of Russians in Novorossia and Malorossia. Here is Hillary Clinton, in her element – lying about “dodging sniper fire”:

”Donbass Seasons” – an Italian documentary with English subtitles

About a month ago a French documentary, “The Masks of Revolution” was aired in France, detailing the bloody consequences of the February 2014 coup d’etat in Ukraine. A little before that the Italian journalists published the film “Donbass Seasons”, presented here. And now the word is out that the Hungarian journalists are done filming their own documentary as well.

What we see is as the Russian saying goes: “All that is hidden, becomes apparent”, or an English saying of “Truth will out.”


Published on Jan 12, 2016
“Donbass-Seasons” is a documentary that traces the history of the war in Donbass, from the coup in Kiev to the Odessa massacre through to the start of the conflict.
The documentary contains interviews with Nicolai Lilin, Eliseo Bertolasi and Vauro Senesi, the narrating voices of the videos filmed by Eliseo Bertolasi and Sergeij Rulev.
Directed by Sara Reginella, “Donbass Seasons” shows the changing of seasons and the flow of life in a land in which life goes on, despite the suffering.

I have saved the film, and if YouTube censors it, like they did with the French film, let me know in the comments, and I will upload it to RuTube.

Crimea Celebrates the 2nd Anniversary of Reunification

On the 18th of March 2016 Crimea and Sevastopol celebrated the second anniversary of the joyous event of their reunification with Russia, after a 60-year long separation.

Lada Ray published a very much needed recap of the events that lead to the reunification in:

#Sevastopol #Krim #Rossia: 2nd Anniversary of Crimea’s Reunification with Russia

Following the February Ukraine coup, on March 16th, 2014, Crimeans voted overwhelmingly to secede from Ukraine and reunite with Russia. 95% to 97% voted for reunification, depending on the area. Simultaneously, a referendum whether to accept Crimea and Sevastopol as two new subjects of the Russian Federation took place in Russia. 95% of Russians said ‘yes.’

On March 18-19, Crimea and Sevastopol joined the Russian Federation as two newest subjects. The transition went smoothly and peacefully, not a single shot was fired and only two casualties were registered on both sides, shot by a provocateur Ukrainian sniper sent there to attempt inciting violence (by the old CIA playbook).

At the time, 16,000 Russian troops were stationed in Crimea, based on the Black Sea Fleet Sevastopol base lease agreement with Ukraine. Simultaneously, 20,000 Ukrainian troops were stationed on the peninsula as well. Out of these 20,000, about 18,000 Ukraine troops pledged allegiance to Russia, while only 2,000 chose to leave back to Ukraine. They were allowed to leave peacefully and with dignity.

The article also contains video from the celebrations in Crimea and from the Beautiful (Red) Square. Here I want to present one very significant song, the anthem of Sevastopol.

The Legendary Sevastopol

Music: Vano Muradeli
Text: Petr Gragov
Written: 1954
Ratified as the official anthem of Sevastopol on 29.07.1994

Russian text of the song and some history can be read in this Wikipedia article.

Fly winged wind.
Over seas, over land,
Tell the whole world,
About my beloved city.

Tell to the whole world,
How on the Crimean shores,
Our grandfathers fought,
And glorified in battle.

[Chorus:]
Legendary Sevastopol,
Impregnable to enemies.
Sevastopol, Sevastopol –
The pride of Russian sailors!

Here we went to the rightful and holy battles,
For our Motherland,
And your previous glory,
Have we multiplied.

Having shrugged of black sailor overcoats,
The Black Sea sailors, during the days of War,
Went against tanks with only handgrenades,
Your sons went to their deaths,

[Chorus]

If across the sea
enemies should come to us with swords,
We’ll meet the unwelcome guests
with annihilating fire

The whole of our dear country knows,
That the battleships do not sleep
And are guarding surely
The shores of the homeland

[Chorus]

Some trivia: During the most vicious period of Ukranisation of Crimea in 2006, Ukrainians tried to re-write the text, replacing “Russian sailors” with “Ukrainian sailors”, “Sevastopol” with “white-stone fortress”, and “Cossacks” were added. The reaction of the citizens was strongly negative, to say the least.

You can hear a rendition of it, where a girl spontaneously performed it at an election locale on the 16th of March 2014:

Galician Intellectuals Wishing to Deprive Ukrainian of the Cyrillic Alphabet

The essay below was published by a Ukrainian journalist and blogger Miroslava Berdnik in LiveJournal on the 7th of November 2014. It covers the history of attempts to replace the Cyrillic alphabet both in the lands, presently known as Ukraine, and also – after the revolution of 1917 – in Russia.

1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2Please note that translating a documentary film or an article takes a lot of time and emotional effort. I am doing it on a voluntary basis, but if someone feels like supporting my work, a Bitcoin donation to the following address is appreciated: 1Nemo1KPB8UjQjrURqn6V7Mscungx44XS2

Before going on to the translation, I want to highlight a few points that the reader should keep in mind (some coming from the comments after the article).

Throughout centuries, the main argument for replacement of the Cyrillic alphabet in the Slavic lands was that it would bring those lands closer to the Western European culture. How? Will writing Russian using Latin alphabet make an Englishman understand Russian or vice versa? No. Will it make easier for the Russians to learn English? Partially, but not significantly. Will it tear away the new generation of Russians from their historic roots by not allowing them to read their own literature. Yes. Here you have it.

For an example, look at Croatian and Serbian. These are one and the same language. Croatian is written in Latin, Serbian in Cyrillic. What did it achieve? A split of the one people into two and easier implementation of divide and conquer strategy.

Secondly, Cyrillic alphabet maps exactly the soundscape of the Slavic languages – one letter, one sound. Slavic languages, which got Latinised at various points in time – like Polish, Czech or Slovak – had to resort to dual, triple, and quadruple letters to depict a single sound. Example: letters “Ш” can be Latinised, transliterated, in various ways: “SH” or, as in Polish “SZ”. In some cases, additional “latin-like” letters need to be introduced. See for example Polish “ś”, “ł”, “ę”, “ą”; or the Czech “Ú”, “Ů”, “Č”. So Polish, with its essentially close-to-Russian pronunciation, ended up having more letters, than Cyrillic Russian. Interestingly, the same sound comprising the word “Czech”, would have been written in Cyrillic using only 3 letters: “Чех”.

Read also Lada Ray’s extended commentary to the article here: How to Reformat People’s Consciousness and Keep them as Obedient Slaves.

There will be a few more comments after the translation, but now, the historical article itself. Enjoy.


The idea of ​​replacing the Cyrillic alphabet in the Ukrainian language with the Latin one for the sake of “Eurointegration” is very close to heart of the Galician thinkers. Round table on the topic will be held on November the 9th (2014) in Lvov.

On the 9th of November, in the famous cult cafe “Dziga” in Lvov, there will be a discussion on whether it is possible to transfer the Ukrainian language from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet. News program “Facts” of the Ukrainian TV channel ICTV reports about it.

The main argument coming from local intellectuals in favour of switching to the Latin alphabet is a question of civilizations. Ukrainian people, or, more precisely, the western Ukrainians – are from “time immemorial the people of Europe. In this they differ from the Russians and the Malorossians (Trans-dnepr Ukrainians – Ed.), who in essence are the Russian people“. And Latin alphabet will be best suited to emphasize the affiliation of Western Ukrainians to the family of Central European nations.

Sooner or later, such a transition from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet will happen, postulates Lvov intelligentsia. The idea of ​​”Latinization of Ukrainian language” appeared already in the 90s among the Galician intellectuals who actively advocated the independence of Galicia. By 2000, the norms for Latin spelling of the Ukrainian language had already been developed. Among the developers was the most famous artist and publicist Vlodko (Vladimir – Ed.) Kostirko. In the early 2000s, he was already publishing his articles on the Ukrainian language, written in Latin, in the editions of the Lvov cultural almanac “Ї”.

Kostirko have long switched to the Latin alphabet in his Ukrainian-language texts. In this way he hopes to emphasize the intransigence and even hostility between the two cultures – the “European” Western Ukrainian and “Russian” Central Ukrainian.

He even once created a painting “Uniate killing a Cossack”. In this painting a Polish “bewinged” hussar is spearing the head of a Zaporozhje Cossack (Translator note: names “Cossack”, “Khazar” and “Hussar” are of the same origin. See Lada Ray’s ESR6: NEW KHAZARIAN KHAGANATE? for more info). This is a reminder that there was a war in the 17th century between the Greek Catholic Galicians and the Orthodox Trans-Dneprians, the descendants of the Cossacks.

Greek Catholics, recalls the artist, fought on the side of Catholic Poles. Ukrainisation of the Galicians was started over time, and especially after the 19th century, but it became somewhat forgotten now. Today Vlodko Kostirko openly pits against each other the residents of the East and the West of Ukraine, arguing that cultural and civilizational reconciliation between them cannot happen.

Let me remind that in March, a temporary special commission for preparation of a draft law “On the development and use of languages ​​in Ukraine” considered a gradual phasing out of the use of the Cyrillic alphabet on the territory of Ukraine.

Already in 2007 I wrote about the attempts during President Yushchenko’s rule to push through the replacement of the Cyrillic alphabet with “abetsadlo” (translator note: From the Polish word for “alphabet”). Back then those attempts were doomed.

Issues pertaining to the functioning of the language already had the political and civilizational colouring in the XX and XXI centuries. And recently, in various Internet resources, there appeared some sensational information – that the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ,for many months already, had a functioning commission on transfer of the Ukrainian language from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet, and that it’s headed by the retired Supreme Rada Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk.

According to the Internet publications, the commission includes officials from the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Culture and Tourism. In addition to the state of philologists and linguists, in the development of the project are also involved some of the deputies of the Supreme Rada from the faction “Our Ukraine”, in particular, Vyacheslav Koval and Nikolai (Mykola) Onischuk.

The idea of ​​creation of the commission allegedly occurred in early 2005 and was supported by President Yushchenko. But then it leaked to the media on the level of rumours, and after a series of critical articles in the press, the project became “forgotten”. However, scientists continued to work on the project. The idea of ​​a commission emerged anew after the parliamentary elections, which “Our Ukraine” failed. And in August 2006 the commission was created after all. The Moldavian nationalistic site Moldovatoday.net reported that the commission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts regular consultations with the Moldavian colleagues, who were engaged in the transition of the Moldavian language to the Latin alphabet. It is also reported that the issue of transfer of the Ukrainian language to the Latin alphabet was discussed in backstage conversations of the Ukrainian and Moldavian delegation at the third meeting of the GUAM Parliamentary Assembly in October 2006.

I think that the constant experimentations with the Ukrainian language are conducted not only from a desire of som individual “свідомих” (translator note: Ukrainian for “conscious elements”, a term used by the nationalistically inclined Ukrainians) officials to grovel and earn the favours of the Western patrons. This is done in order to collapse the common cultural and civilizational space of the two peoples, who are close to each other. Slavic peoples adapted script, depending on the rite of Christianity, which they adopted – the Byzantine or Latin (Catholic). If it was the Latin, it determined the choice of writing – Latins used for their services the liturgical Vulgate – a version of the Bible, which was almost never translated into national languages, because that was the policy of the Western Church. Hence there was no need to adapt the script of the Cathilicised Slavs to the needs of their languages.

A different approach was taken by the Byzantium, so the missionaries Constantine Philosopher (Cyril) and his brother Methodius, who translated the Gospel to the Slavic (more precisely, its Old Bulgarian dialect), created a special script. This Slavic translation was accepted by all those Slavs who professed Orthodoxy. So our current writing system is determined by a choice we once made.

However, attacks on the Cyrillic alphabet were made repeatedly – in the XIX century in the Austro-Hungarian Galicia and in the XX century, this time by… the Bolsheviks.

Alphabet and abetsadlo

Already in 1823, the Viennese palace librarian and philologist, Bartholomew Kopitar – a Slovenian by nationality, wrote in a letter to the Czech linguist Josef Dobrovský: “My ideal for all Slavs – Latin letters, and a few letters of the Slavic Cyrillic as a supplement”. He proposed to introduce phonetic transcription in language practice, which would have lead to the individual writing system for almost every village in Galicia. In addition, he was going to replace the Cyrillic alphabet with Latin.

A compendium by the ethnographer and writer Vaclav Zaleski “Piesni polskie i ruskie ludu galicyjskiego” (“Polish and Russian Songs of the Galician People”) was published in Lemberg in 1833. For the alphabet he used not Russian, but Polish, a choice which he explained by the following reason: “I put before me a goal to, as far as possible, write as people speak, even if this would lead to any grammatical errors. As for the fact that to achieve this I used Polish letters, and not Cyrillic or Glagolic – well, everyone is obviously going to praise me for this later. I’m sure the time will come when all the Slavic people will leave behind those old letters that are the most hindering introduction of the Slavic literature to the collection of the European literature.”

He was supported by a colleague August Belevsky – historian, publisher and translator of “The Tale Igor’s Campaign”. In a review of the compendium, he wrote: “One of the most important moments, touched by the publisher of the book, is using which letters and how to spell the songs of the Russian folk, who yet have no grammar nor vocabulary for their language…” (translator note: What?!)

However, neither Zaleski nor Belevsky (translator note: see a note on Latinisation of names after the article) had any political goals in their attempts to introduce the Latin alphabet for the Galician Ruthenian (Rusins). They just wanted to “bestow” the common people. Somewhat later started events, which subsequently were dubbed as the “alphabetic war”.

The Latinisation idea was picked up by a young Galician priest Joseph Lozinsky, who in a Lvov newspaper “Rozmaitosci” (1834, №29) published an article “O wprowadzeniu abecadla polskiego do pismiennictwa ruskiego” («On the introduction of the Polish alphabet in Russian writing”), and the following year published his ethnographic work “Russian wedding” using Latin alphabet.

A process of national revival has just taken place in Galicia of the 1830s. The heart of it were the “Galician adherents” – the youth of the Lvov University, headed by Markiyan Shashkevich, Ivan Vahylevich and Yakov Golovatsky, nicknamed at the University as “Ruska trinity”. It was they who gave the most harsh rebuke to attempt of the introduction of the Polish “abetsadlo”, considering it an attempt to tear off Galicia from the ancient historical and cultural roots. “That is an existential question: to be or not to be for the Rusins (Ruthenians) in Galicia” – Golovatsky wrote much later, – “If the Galicians were to accept the the Polish abetsadlo in the 1830s, the Russian nationalal individuality would have vanished, the Russian spirit would have been gone, and Galician Rus would turned into a second Kholmshchyna.” (Golovatsky Yakov, Notes and additions to the articles of Mr. Pypin, printed in the “Journal of Europe” during 1885 and 1886., Vilna, 1888). As a response, Markiyan Shashkevych published a pamphlet “Azbuka and abetsadlo” in 1836. (translator note: see a comment on Azbuka after the translation.) In it, he clearly and reasonably demonstrated that Lozinski’s offer was unfounded, unacceptable and directly harmful. He also argued that the departure from the Cyrillic alphabet would not have brought Galicians closer to the European culture, but only alienated them from the other Slavs. For some time the idea of ​​introducing the Latin alphabet was abandoned.

Next attempt by the Viennese authorities to transfer the Galician-Rusin language to Latin was made in 1859. In Vienna, an Austrian politician and senior official of the Ministry of Education Joseph Irechek published a brochure “Ueber den Vorschlag, das Ruthenische mit lateinischen Schriftzeishen zu schreiben” (“On the Proposal for Rusins to write in Latin letters”). The author very clearly outlined the purpose of spelling reform: “The healthy development of Ukrainian literature will find a very strong support in use of the Latin letters. While Rusins write and print in Cyrillic, they will demonstrate a tendency to lean to the Church-Slavinism and thus to Russianism, and thus the very existence of the Ukrainian literature would be called into question. Church Slavic and Russian influence is so great that it threatens to completely displace the local language and local literature.” And further: “Apart from the rejection of the Russianism, the transition to the Latin alphabet would help Galician Ukrainians later on in their study of the Polish and German languages, without which they will not be able to survive.”

Such influential in the Galician-Russian community people, like Bishop Litvinovich and philologist Joseph Lozinski – who by then switched over to a Russophile position – voted against this reform in the Seim. They argued that this reform “is detrimental to the Rus nation, because with the Latin alphabet, the spirit and faith of the Ukrainian people will vanish.”

Already in the summer, Irechek was going to come to Lemberg and lead the Alphabetical Commission, while from October 1859 all the children in Galicia were to begin studying by the new ABC books. But the scale of popular demonstrations against the reform frightened the central powers. The population of Galicia conducted spontaneous meetings, there were articles in the press, they were writing petitions and sending delegations. And the Austrian authorities, well remembering the Hungarian revolution of 1848, retreated.

“…books written in the Russian alphabet, will be the subject of history”

In 1919, in a March publication of “Izvestia” there was published an article “On the Latin alphabet” signed with frivolous pseudonym “old schoolboy”. It was a letter to the editor, playful in its form, but with a serious question in its essence. It claimed: “Our alphabet is too complicated and is so different from that in Western Europe, that foreigners become horrified by it. We should switch to the Latin script, simple and elegant, just as we have moved from the Russian calendar to the pan-European (translator note: see comments after the article for the calendar discussion), and to the metric system from the ‘pounds’ and ‘arshin'”. And it explains how one can transfer specific Russian sounds to the Latin alphabet. There were also references to Slavic peoples, for example the Poles, who have long used the Latin alphabet.

Who hid behind that pseudonym – contemporaries deducted that easily. It was either Lunacharsky, or Bukharin – the main Red intellectuals, who later became active promoters of the “new alphabet”. But what kind of a whim it is – to transfer Russian to Latin?

Everything is, however, very simple: the ardent revolutionaries considered a common alphabet as one of the tools to create a new trans-ethnic community. Why Latin? Firstly, the new leaders were, of course, the people of Western civilization in their spirit. And secondly, because the world revolution was to follow the Russian one! We renounce the old world and start everything with a clean slate.

And in 1922 they started with such clean slate in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani CEC chairman Samad Agamali-oglu, having previously spoken with Lenin, created in Baku “the Committee of NTA (New Turkic Alphabet).” Lenin, according to Lunacharsky, strongly approved the idea of Latinasation, though he thought that it was necessary to do this “later, once we become stronger”. Soon the Latin alphabet became the state alphabet of Azerbaijan. The previous script was declared as “feudal-reactionary”. Especially since Kemal Ataturk, who was then regarded as a strategic ally, was in full swing Latinising Turkey.

It was conceived to gradually turn the Latin alphabet into the basis for all non-Slavic peoples of USSR. VTsKNA (ВЦКНА) – The All-Union Central Committee of the New Alphabet – was created under the jurisdiction of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Council of Nationalities in 1927. By the beginning of the 30s the languages of ​​17 Muslim peoples were transferred to Latin, and by 1936 – of already 68 different nationalities. All this occurred against the backdrop of indigenization (in our country, Ukrainisation was carried out under the supervision of Kaganovich).

In 1930, on Lunacharsky’s initiative, the question of latinasation of the Russian alphabet (as well as Ukraine and Russia) was put forth. In the article “Latinisation of the Russian Writing”, published in the journal “Culture and literature of the East”, he wrote: “From now on our Russian alphabet has alienated us not only from the West, but also from the East which to a large extent was awakened by our own efforts… Gradually the books, written in the Russian alphabet, will be the subject of history. Of course it will always be useful to study Russian letters in order to have access to them. It will be a perceptible benefit for those, who deal with the history of literature, but in any case, it will be less and less necessary for a new generation… The benefits, presented by the introduction of the Latin alphabet, are enormous. It gives us the most of internationalisation, thus linking us not only with the West, but also with the renewed East.” (translator note: What a beautiful example of circular logic. First Latinise the East, then use it as an argument that Russia also needs to be Latinised. Also note the accent on the “new generation”, which is to be torn away from its roots.)

Established then in Glavnauka Narcompros (Head Department of Science in the jurisdiction of the People’s Committee of Education) a subcommittee on the Latinisation of Russian writing, announced that the Russian alphabet is “a form of graphics, ideologically alien to the socialist construct”, “a relic of class graphic of the Russian feudal landowners and the bourgeoisie of the XVIII – XIX centuries”, “graphics of the autocratic oppression, missionary propaganda, Greater-Russian nationalistic chauvinism and forced Russification”. (Translator note: In other words: let’s kill all that is Russian or somehow connected to Russia. It goes well with the obfuscation of Russia itself in the USSR, where it always went by an acronym RSFSR, and never by its full name. In USSR it was frowned upon mention anything to do with “Russian”.)

In the mid-1930s, the more ardent Latinisers were starting to get reined in. Stalin was able to defeat his Trotskyist opponents, so the idea of ​​the world revolution lost its relevance. A big war was looming over the the country, and it was necessary that the peoples felt themselves in a common cultural space.

In 1936, a top-secret report N ОБ-322 was submitted to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b), in which, among other things, it was stated: “The enemies of the Soviet government and the CPSU(b) tried to use Latinisation for the purpose of segregation of the working people of those republics and regions from the total family of the peoples of the Soviet Union. While using the talk of an “international character” of the Latin base as a cover, they defended the course on bourgeois culture of the Western Europe, in contrast to the developing culture, national in form and socialist in content… As a result of the active elimination of the Russian alphabet, VTsKNA and local committees created 10 Latinised alphabets for the people with Russian script… The situation with the terminological construction of the languages ​​of many peoples of the USSR is unfortunate. Especially unfortunate it is in this regard among the border peoples and nations, where the “Latinisation” is simply an instrument of the large and small imperialists. For example, Romanisation of the terminology has been openly carried out over a number of years in Soviet Moldavia, while in the Soviet Karelia (under the old leadership) – was the case of the most active Finnisation. And all this is happening in spite of the resistance of the broad masses of the population.”

Today, only a phrase from the book “The Golden Calf” reminds of those times: “‘Herculeans’, in response to someone’s intrigues, promised to answer with a mass Latinisation of the official documents.” The meaning of the joke becomes clear only if we remember about that unfinished Latinisation campaign. But the case of the enthusiasts for “coming closer to the West” was not lost…

Why mobile operators need transliteration?

When you read the program article for Latinisation of the Ukrainian language “Ukrolatinitsa: simple and tasteful” in the “Mirror of the week” (№28 (453), 26.07-1.08 ’03), you get the impression that you ended up in the distant 30s. The same argument – “coming closer the civilized West.” The same enemy – the “Greater-Russian chauvinism” and Orthodox Christianity. As well as the main target group – the younger generation: “…not in this generation, but in the coming ones. Because already from the cradle, not yet realizing what these squiggles mean, the baby will get used to the Latin alphabet. It will pay off when the time comes to learn a foreign language: the little Ukrainians will not be breaking over the font.” (translator note: see a comment after the translation)

As we know, children’s mouth speaketh oft the truth. My daughter recently asked me a surprising question: “Мамо, чому оператори мобільного зв’язку надсилають SMS-повідомлення не українською мовою, але латинськими літерами?” (“Mom, why mobile operators send SMS-messages not in Ukrainian, but in Latin?”) Why indeed? After all, every keyboard has not only Latin, but also Cyrillic script. But, as is known, the majority of the mobile operators’ customers are young people. And they gradually get used to the Latin alphabet.

As mentioned above, on-line editions reported about the consultations of our developers with the Moldavian colleagues, who in the early 90’s Latinised Moldavian language, using the work of Lunacharsky’s commission as a foundation.

I got in touch with the first secretary of the press service of Foreign Ministry of Ukraine, Natalia Zhitaryuk. She “in the working order” refuted this information, adding that “якщо газета «2000» претендує на те, щоб бути серйозною газетою, то вона не буде дезінформувати читачів і писати про те, що не відповідає дійсності” (“If newspaper “2000” pretends to be a serious newspaper, it will not be misleading its readers and writing something that is not true”).

Although the foreign ministry’s press service denies the existence of the Commission for Latin transliteration of the Ukrainian language, one is greatly worried by the fact that over the last few years, the on-line editions as well as reputable newspapers constantly “inject” this topic into the information space. On the “orange” youth forums this topic is discussed quite aggressively. Here one just ought to remember, that the prelude to the war, which split the former Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic into two irreconcilable parts, was precisely the Latinisation of the language.


This concludes the translation.

Several comments, that were too long to be included as the in-line translator notes.

  • Last thing first, the Moldavian language Latinisation. A comment left by a Moldavian in the original article, points to two other side-effects of the Latinisation of the Moldavian language, in addition to pushing away Pridnestrovie and Gagauzija. One is the fact that many young people, unable to get a good education in Russian in Moldavia, leave for Russia to study there, and never return. The other side-effect is Latinisation of the personal names. The commentor wrote, that in his family of 4, 3 people ended up having different spellings of their surname in the passports! See also the next comment.
  • The way surnames Zaleski and Belevsky are Latinised is an excellent example against Latinisation: both end with the same 4 letters, best represented by the phonetic transcription “-skij”: Залеский, Белевский.

    Remember the Boston Marathon Bombing? Russian services informed the American authorities about the possible perpetrator, but the Americans Latinised his name differently, so it didn’t light up in the database.

  • About the transition to the European – Christian-based – calendar. With that Calendar reform of Peter I in 1700 [7208 by the Slavic Calendar], a large chunk of the Russian history was erased and re-written. Just think – year 2016 is 7524 by the Slavic Calendar, which starts its counting from the “peace treaty with the Dragon [presumably, China]”. Read more here at Lada Ray’s site on the roots of Russian calendar.
  • About the quote “little Ukrainians will not be breaking over the font”. I have studied several foreign languages, and helped some people study Russian, and can say that the learning process of an alphabet is less than 1% of the total language learning experience, insignificant, compared to learning of the grammar, vocabulary and culture.
  • A special note on the name of the Russian alphabet – Azbuka – which, like its Latin counterpart, is formed from the name of the first 2 letters. Unlike Latin, the Russian letter names encoded a coherent message, which was carried through the millennia, from before the Cyrillic writing was introduced, from the time of Glagolitsa and Bukvitsa.

    Let me touch upon the first 6 letters. Latinised for the sake of transcription, they are read like this: “Az Buki Vedi Glagol’ Dobro Est'” – “Аз Буки Веди Глаголь Добро Есть”.

    “Az” is “I” or “The First”. In Scandinavian it remains as the name of Asgard, the dwelling of the gods. In English in the word “Ace”. In modern Russian, it’s in “Azy” – “the basics”.

    “Buki” is “writing”. En English it lives on as the word “book”, and “bok” in Scandinavian. In modern Russian it’s in “Bukva” – “letter, litera”. The meaning is also connected to the “future” – “budujushee” and “gods” – “bogi”. So this letter is very multi-faceted.

    “Vedi” is “to know”. In Scandinavian it survived as “Viten” – “Knowledge”. In English, somewhat transformed into “vision”, and in modern Russian it’s to be found in the root of the word “vedat'” – “to know”.

    “Glagol'” (soft ‘l’) is “to speak”. In modern Russian it’s in the “glas” or “golos” – “voice”, and “glagol” – “the verb”. In Spanish in “habla” – “to speak”, absent in English and Scandinavian, except in the derogative form of “bla, bla…”. EDIT: Reader JK left a comment, saying that this word lives on in the Swedish “glosa” – “word”, which also points to the English “glossary”.

    “Dobro” is “goodness, kindness”. Still has the same meaning in modern Russian as well as all Slavic languages. Absent from the Latin languages. However, both Norway and England have geographic names of special cultural significance: “The white hills of Dover” in England and “Dovre mountain” in Norway. As we know, all geographic names initially have a specific meaning, even if with time this meaning is lost…

    “Est'” (soft ‘t’) – verb “is, to be”. Retained this meaning in the modern Russian. In English may have transformed into the affirmative “yes”. (In Russian “Est'” is also used in the meaning of “yes” by the military.) The English verb “is” is also coming from “est'”, through German “ist”.

    So these first 6 letters already give us: “I writing know speak good is…”, or rewriting: “I know how to write and it is good to speak…”

    Latinising the Russian language would cut the whole nation from its root, like this one. And this is the true reason for such efforts.

Ukraine: Les masques de la révolution – Ukraine: Masks of the Revolution.

Without them, there would have been no Ukrainian revolution.

In February 2014, paramilitary groups fought against the police in the streets of Kiev and ousted President Yanukovych. They settled a new government.

According to western media, they were the revolution heroes. They fought on the right side.

But they are actually extreme-right militias. And they are now heavily armed.

The Right Sector, Azov or Svoboda created parallel irregular forces that easily go out of control. In Odessa, in May 2014, they were responsible for a mass killing without facing any charges. 45 people burnt to death. A massacre that didn’t get much attention.

How come western democracies haven’t raised their voice in protest?

Most likely because these Ukrainian nationalist militias actually played a significant role in a much larger scale war. The Ukrainian revolution was strongly supported by the US diplomacy.

In the new cold war that opposes Russia to the USA, Ukraine is a decisive pawn. A tactical pawn to contain Putin’s ambitions.

“Ukraine, masks of the revolution” by Paul Moreira sheds light on this blind corner.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_6zoNweKII

PS: Just like they did with the Russian-subtitled version earlier, YouTube also quickly killed this English-subtitled version.

This important documentary can, however, be watched on RuTube:

In French:
http://rutube.ru/video/11b2e424f8b8186d2168a66045ac49e4/

Full professional Russian translation (dub + subtitles):
http://rutube.ru/video/ebf657119ed2d3344366cff75c44b9a1/